PHILIP *of* MACEDON

Nicholas Hammond

PHILIP OF MACEDON
N.G.L. Hammond

Philip of Macedon was one of the extraordinary figures of antiquity. Inheriting a kingdom near collapse, he left to his son Alexander the strongest state in Eastern Europe. He developed new military technology and made Macedonia the greatest power in the Western world. He created a united, multiracial kingdom based on liberal principles – and added to it the resources of a Balkan empire. Most important, he inspired the city-states of the Greek peninsula to form a unified community, ensuring peace among its members, the rule of law in internal politics, and collective security in the face of aggressors. No statesman in Europe had ever achieved so much.

In *Philip of Macedon* N.G.L. Hammond presents a narrative history of Hellenistic Macedonia from the state's rise out of obscurity under Philip to the accession of Alexander. Focusing on the character and career of Philip, Hammond discusses developments in military technology and strategy, the social composition and geography of northern Greece, and the region's political developments. He also examines the world of the city-states, the nature of their democracies, their propensity for interstate warfare, and their development of capitalism, scientific methods, and philosophical ideas.

With close analysis of the literary and material evidence – including interpretations of recent archaeological discoveries – Hammond offers a unique portrait of Philip as a Macedonian. Including illustrations of the frescoes and artifacts found in the Royal Tombs at

Philip of Macedon

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Philip of Macedon

N.G.L. Hammond

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To Manolis Andronikos,
his colleagues and
his associates

Preface

My study of Philip has been long and enjoyable. In 1934 and 1935 Professor Adcock gave me the privilege of lecturing on the period of Philip for Part II of the Classical Tripos in Cambridge. In 1957 a Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton provided ideal conditions for writing the chapters on Philip and Alexander in *A History of Greece to 322* BC. In 1965 the Clarendon Press asked me to follow my book on Epirus with a similar work on Macedonia. At the prompting of Professor (then Sir Frank) Adcock I obtained the cooperation of G. T. Griffith on the understanding that he would write the chapters on Philip (he had been lecturing on him for Part II). It was a most happy collaboration. We met almost weekly to discuss his draft as it progressed, and we agreed to differ at times. The result was a classic example of a most thorough study both of the ancient testimonia and of scholarly writings covering a century. Every student of the subject, and I not least, owe him a great debt.

Since 1976, when Griffith's work went to press, our understanding of Macedonia has been enriched by amazing archaeological discoveries, a plethora of articles, and books on Philip by J. R. Ellis and G. L. Cawkwell. The new material alone justifies another book on the subject; but more important is the need to base one's views on an assessment of the sources which were followed by Diodorus and Justin. This I am fortunately able to do, because I have published my researches on source-criticism, first in 1937 and again in recent years. There are also new views of the Macedonian state and of Philip's rise to power which I have published in books and articles, and it will be seen that I differ in many respects from my predecessors.

There has been a tendency in recent writing to give one's own view of other scholars' views rather than to tackle the ancient testimonia in detail. That is not my purpose. Because Griffith and Ellis have provided ample references to earlier writings, I shall often consider it sufficient to ask the reader to consult them. My concern is above all to interpret the ancient testimonia (literary, epigraphical, numismatic, archaeological, etc.), provide the reader with access to such testimonia, and base my own narrative and my understanding of Philip on those testimonia. I owe a special debt of gratitude to many Greek archaeologists –

especially the late Manolis Andronikos, Miltiades Hatzopoulos, Julia Vokotopoulou and Maria Siganidou – and to very many friends who have written on Macedonian topics and engaged in discussion with me.

Clare College, Cambridge N.G.L.H.
June 1993

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Figs 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 were drawn by the author. Acknowledgment is made to Oxford University Press for permission to reproduce Figs 3 and 6, and to Sidgwick and Jackson for Figs 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. Fig. 3 shows a cavalryman practising with his double-ended lance (from a fresco in the Kinch Tomb) and Alexander wielding a long lance (from the Alexander Mosaic in Naples).

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(ii) Tetradrachm of Philip, portraying the racehorse and jockey which won at the Olympic Games of 356 B.C.

(iii) Tetradrachm of the Chalcidian League. Head of Apollo, long-haired and wearing a laurel wreath.

(iv & v) Gold stater of Philip. Head of Apollo, wearing a laurel wreath / two-horse chariot victorious at the Olympic Games of 348 B.C. This coin is the famous Philippeios.

(vi & vii) Tetradrachm of Philip. Head of Zeus, wearing a laurel wreath / a bearded rider, wearing *kausia*, tunic and cloak, and in some issues a cloth diadem, and raising his right arm in a salute. The rider is Philip.

He was always portrayed from the left after losing his right eye in 354 B.C.

Acknowledgement is made to the late Professor M. Andronikos for 6(a), 7(a), 7(b), 8(b), 9(a), 12(a) and 16; to the Ashmolean Museum for 5 (ii, v and vii); to the British Academy for 4, 10(b) and 10(c); to the British Museum for 5 (iii); to Professor J.N. Coldstream for 6(b), 9(b), 10(a), 11(a), 11(b) and 12(a); to Dion Museum for 12(b); to the Fitzwilliam Museum for 5 (i and iv); and to Thessaloniki Museum for 13(a) and 13(b).

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References to ancient texts are as in LSJ and *OCD*. Chapter and section are usually cited as in the Loeb editions.

CHAPTER I

The setting

1. Macedonia's involvement with the Greek city-states

Philip was born a Greek of the most aristocratic, indeed of divine, descent. His famous ancestor Temenus was still honoured at the 'Temenion' as the founder of Argos in the Peloponnese, and Temenus himself was descended from Heracles, son of Zeus. As he grew up, Philip participated at Pella in the worship of Heracles Patroüs, the 'forefather' of the royal family in Macedonia, which was called 'the Temenidae' by Herodotus and Thucydides. He was related to other Heraclids, such as the two kings of Sparta and the Aleuad family of Larissa in Thessaly. His Heraclid descent was a matter of common knowledge; for the claim of his great-great-grandfather, Alexander I, had been upheld by the highest authority, the Judges of the Olympic Games.[1]

Philip was both a Greek and a Macedonian, even as Demosthenes was a Greek and an Athenian. Only members of his family had ruled over the Macedonians for some three centuries before his birth in 382, and it was by then inconceivable that the diadem would pass to any other family. The Macedonians over whom Philip was to rule were an outlying member of the family of Greek-speaking peoples. This had been affirmed by Hesiod for the period before the Temenidae came to Macedonia. In the family tree of eponymous ancestors which Hesiod constructed Deucalion had a son Hellen, who begot three sons, representing three distinct dialectal groups (Doric, Ionic and Aeolic), and a daughter Thyia, who 'conceiving bore to thunder-loving Zeus two sons, Magnes and Macedon fighting from a chariot, and they dwelt around Pieria and Olympus'. Thus Magnes and Macedon were eponyms of two distinct dialectal groups of Greek-speaking peoples. They were sons of the supreme Greek deity, Zeus, and first cousins of the sons of Hellen. Their habitat associated them directly with Zeus; for it was 'on the highest peak of many-ridged Olympus' that Zeus assembled the gods, and the earliest shrine of the Macedonians below the towering mountain was named after Zeus 'Dion'. The descendants of the two sons of Zeus and Thyia had separate destinies; for the Magnetes moved south into Thessaly, and the Macedones stayed on in the high country of Pieria and the Olympus massif, maintaining their own dialect of the Greek language. That dialect still persisted when Philip was born; but regular



Fig. 1. Macedonia

contact with other Greek speakers had already led to the adoption of standard Greek for the transaction of normal business and for official matters.[2]

The inclusion of the Macedonian kingdom in the comity of Greek states was made manifest in 371, when Sparta convened a conference which resulted in a general peace, Thebes alone opting out. At the conference Athens wanted confirmation that the Chersonese (the Gallipoli peninsula) and Amphipolis were Athenian possessions. 'All the Greeks' approved the former. As regards the latter, Aeschines spoke in 343 as follows. 'When a coalition came together of the Spartans and the other Greeks, one of them was Amyntas, father of Philip. He sent a delegate as he was master of his own vote. He voted to join with the other Greeks in capturing for Athens Amphipolis, the Athenian possession.' There is no ambiguity in these statements. 'Amyntas, father of Philip' stood for Macedonia (he was not present at the conference). When it suited the city-states, Macedonia was 'one of the Greek states'. So too a decade later, when the envoys of the shrine at Epidaurus were visiting Greek states, their hosts included the representatives of 'Macedonia' and 'Calindoea'. Both were part of the Greek world. So was Edessa when Argos wanted financial contributions.[3]

Greek speech alone did not qualify Macedonia for acceptance as a Greek state. Political distinctions were much more important. The hallmark of Greekness for many centuries had been the republican, self-governing city-state, in which the citizens were free to engage in political experiments. With the exception of Sparta, where dual kingship survived and conservatism reigned, these experiments led in the years of Philip's youth to extreme forms of democracy in most city-states and to extreme forms of minority government in others, whether called 'oligarchy' or 'tyranny'. In comparison the Macedonian kingdom was regarded as un-Greek; for it was unwieldy in size, its political form had been static for centuries, and its peoples were not self-governing but 'slaves' to royal authority. Moreover it lacked the substructure of the fourth-century city-state, a basis of actual slaves or serfs; for the Macedonians worked the land with their own hands. Such primitive features earned the jibe from their sophisticated neighbours that the Macedonians were 'barbarians'. 'Shall we be slaves to Archelaus, we Greeks to a barbarian?' That was the cry of an orator for the democratic party in Larissa, where the Macedonian king, Archelaus, had intervened c. 400. It was only too easy for Demosthenes to regard Philip as 'a barbarian' and to represent his rule to the Athenian democrats as an oppressive, authoritarian regime. At the same period Isocrates of Athens, addressing the world of Greek city-states, invited Philip 'to regard all Greece as his fatherland, as his ancestor had done', and to lead the Greeks in a war against Persia.[4]

2. Macedonia's involvement with the Balkan tribes

In fact the Macedonian state was much closer in its structure to the tribal states which lay to the north of the Greek city-states. In the northwest beyond Ambracia there were many small Greek-speaking tribal states which had similar institutions to those of Macedonia, and it was on that account that their people were called 'barbarians' by city-state Greeks. Some of them were apt to join forces with the enemies of Macedonia. To the north and to the east of the Bottiaean and Chalcidian city-states there were numerous non-Greek-speaking tribal states in which kingship was traditional – for instance, Dardanians, Paeonians, Agrianians, Triballi, Edonians and Odrysians, and also in earlier times Phrygians. These tribal states were constantly at war; for their aim was to acquire loot of all kinds and sometimes land. They constituted a much greater threat to the wellbeing and even to the existence of Macedonia than any Greek city-state or combination of city-states.

Amyntas, the father of Philip, was twice driven out of his kingdom by the strongest of the Illyrian tribal groups, the Dardanians, in 393/2 and in 383/2, and late in his reign he suffered defeat in battle and had to pay tribute to the Dardanians. The toll in lives and in property was high. The same Dardanians overran a Molossian group of tribes (to the west of Macedonia) and killed 15,000 men in battle. The Paeonians, the Triballi and the Thracian groups also engaged in extensive raids. They were able to converge on the Macedonian coastal plain from the north and from the east.[5]

The kings of Macedonia and the kings of the tribal states had similar customs. Their hospitality was so lavish and ostentatious that it was ridiculed by Athenian playwrights. They served meals on gold and silver plate and gave silver goblets to their guests. They all wore fine robes with gold facings, and they seem to have followed the prevailing 'court' fashion at any one time. They were given costly burials, and they were apparently worshipped after death (for instance, the Paeonian kings at Astibus). They were attended by courtiers who fought alongside them as cavalrymen, and by infantry guardsmen (for instance, the Agrianian kings by their personal 'hypaspists'). They led the state in war, religion and diplomacy, and they taxed their subjects in order to concentrate wealth in their own hands. Intermarriage between members of royal houses was as natural as it was in Europe in the Victorian period.[6]

There was a special affinity between the Macedonians and the Thracians. When the Macedonians were living 'around Pieria and Olympus', Thracian tribes were in occupation of the Pierian lowlands facing the Thermaic Gulf. They, and probably the Phrygians, worshipped Dionysus as the god of fertility and vegetation – notably the ivy and the vine –, and his worshippers, especially the women, engaged in an orgiastic cult which

was regarded in the Greek city-states as barbaric and gruesome. The terrifying power of the god was conveyed by Euripides who wrote and produced his *Bacchae* in Macedonia. No less important was the Thracian poet Orpheus, who was buried in the plain below Olympus. He and his Muses were the divinities of poetry and of music, and he was the founder of a religious cult, known as 'Orphism', which expounded the origins of man and the universe, and which believed in life after death for its initiates. Texts of Orphic hymns have been found in fourth-century tombs. Another cult which appealed alike to Macedonians and to Thracians was that of the Cabiri in Samothrace. It too was connected with fertility in all forms of life and so with the deities of the underworld. Rites were performed and offerings of figurines of humans and animals were made in circular pits, such as have been found in Samothrace and at Pella.[7]

Within the kingdom of Macedonia there were communities of Paeonian and Thracian blood. They managed their own local affairs, maintained their customs and religions, and in many respects stood in the same relation to the king as his Greek-speaking subjects. The exclusiveness which was typical of the Greek city-state was absent; the emphasis was rather on co-existence and on tolerance. The royal family set the example. Its members contracted marriages with members of Balkan royal families, and all subjects had the right of appeal to the king. Thus the Macedonian state was capable of rapid expansion by incorporating new subjects, whereas the Greek city-state denied itself that possibility by restricting its citizenship to males of citizen parentage.

3. The potentialities of the Macedonian state

We are concerned here with the Macedonian state which Philip was to lead after the death of his brother Perdiccas in 359. Its territory consisted of two main parts. Olympus and Pieria (the original heartland of Hdt. 7. 127. 1, 128. 1 and 131), the coastal plain known as Emathia and Bottiaea, and its hinterland called Eordaea and Almopia were all peopled solely by Macedonians. In the other part, namely Amphaxitis, Crestonia, Anthemus and Mygdonia north of the Lakes, there were both Macedonian settlers and earlier occupants of Paeonian, Phrygian, Thracian and other racial origins. The territory of the state was rich in timber of all sorts (including timber for naval construction), game in the high mountains, fruit-trees on the lower slopes, cereals in the plains, herds of stock enjoying transhumant pasturage, and an abundance of water from the perennial rivers and innumerable springs. It was potentially as wealthy in these respects as Thessaly. In addition it had valuable minerals: gold in Crestonia and Mygdonia, iron in Pieria and Amphaxitis, molybdenum in Eordaea and Amphaxitis, lead in Amphaxitis, and copper in Emathia, Amphaxitis and Crestonia. Iron was said to have 'provided the wealth of Midas', and tradition recorded that the Phrygians were skilled in metallurgy.[8] Iron was

important for the manufacture of weapons and armour. The men of all races within the kingdom were trained to serve as a local militia; for they had to defend their homes against sudden attacks by marauding neighbours and seaborne raiders.

The institutions of the state had certain strengths. The royal family, being of foreign extraction and of divine descent, was unique. It had no rival in the indigenous Macedonian families. In consequence the only pretenders to the throne were dissident members of the royal line. The Macedonians themselves had developed over the centuries 'an inborn reverence towards the kings' of the Temenid house. Once a member of that house was elected king, he chose his own Bodyguards and Companions, received an oath of allegiance from each soldier, selected recruits to the King's Forces, controlled all promotions and rewards, and exercised strict discipline. Provided that he ruled 'not by force' but 'by persuasion', he was able to exercise the almost unlimited powers of initiative and command which were needed in a kingdom so exposed to unheralded attacks by land and by sea. He took the lead in matters of foreign policy, arranged the marriages of members of the royal family, appointed his own delegates, and chose his own 'guest-friends' abroad. He was the wealthiest man in the Greek world; for he owned all the fine timber and valuable minerals of the kingdom. He was able to use that wealth as he wished.

While the king attended to matters of overall policy, his subjects conducted their own local affairs. The great majority lived in closely-knit communities, which were called 'cities' (*poleis*). The term was appropriate, because the members of each comunity were inter-related, possessed their own citizenship and managed their own affairs. The minority lived as small tribes, mainly in Eordaea which had a cantonal centre of administration. Thus every subject of the king, including members of the royal house (e.g. Ptolemy and Eurydice), had a local citizenship and local loyalty, for instance as a man of Pella or Lete, or as an Eordaean. One difference between a 'city' in the kingdom and a Greek 'city-state' was that the citizens of the former, having no say in foreign policy, were not split by difficult decisions, and that the citizens of the latter were often so divided in matters of foreign policy that they fell into civil strife (*stasis*). Another difference was that the men of the Macedonian city were all free men and worked on the land, whereas those of a city-state included a large slave element and the citizens were mainly rentiers, traders and craftsmen. The gap between the richest citizen and the poorest citizen in a Macedonian city was far narrower than in a city-state. Thus in many respects the Macedonian state had greater internal stability and more vigour than the average fourth-century city-state.[9]

The men of the King's Forces were distinct from the men of the local militia. They alone, both during service and after service, held a special form of citizenship, which conferred on them the title 'Macedones'. On the death of a king, they elected a successor and took the oath of loyalty to him.

In cases of alleged treason they were the judges, the king being prosecutor, and it was they who gave the verdict. For these routine purposes they met under arms in an Assembly. On other occasions they were convened by the king when he wished, for instance, to gain their approval before attacking the Illyrians in 358. Certain matters are known to have lain within the competence of the Assembly. By a majority vote the remains of Euripides were kept in Macedonia despite requests from Athens. Amyntas was deposed c. 392 by 'Macedones', i.e. by the Assembly. In a treaty between Amyntas and Chalcidice c. 391 there was provision for dues to be paid by the Chalcidians to 'Macedones', i.e. to the Assembly.

The king and the 'Macedones' were the only organs of state. There was no statutory Council. If the king wanted advice, he called on those Companions whom he judged most capable of giving it; but any decision was his, not theirs. He rewarded the leading Companions by appointing them to military commands and/or giving them the revenues of estates in land which he himself owned by right of conquest – what he called 'spear-won land'. But they had no constitutional position, and they did not command the services of any section of the community. They were totally different from the feudal lord or mediaeval baron who had his own large body of retainers. They were able individuals – sometimes foreigners – who depended entirely on the king's favour. This streamlined constitution was appropriate for a state which was continually on a war footing, as Aristotle noted in commenting on the comparable constitutions of Sparta and Malis.[10]

4. The weaknesses of the Macedonian state and events to 365

The potential merits of the Macedonian kingdom were not realised in the actions of the forty years from the violent death of Archelaus in 399 to the return of Philip in 365. What became apparent in those years was rather the weaknesses. Rivalry between the branches of the royal house, deaths under suspicious circumstances and the mutability of the Assembly led to the elections of five kings between 399 and 393. The fifth king – Amyntas, the first of his line to be king – was nearly crushed between two dangerous enemies: Bardylis, king of the Dardanians, who assembled a powerful group of Illyrian tribes, and the city-states of Chalcidice, which were creating a federal system under the leadership of Olynthus. Bardylis carried his conquests to the head of the Thermaic Gulf and placed a pretender, Argaeus, on the throne c. 392. Amyntas obtained the protection of the Chalcidians by lending some rich territory to them; a year or more later he was restored to his throne not by them but by the Aleuadae of Larissa. He then entered into a defensive alliance with the Chalcidians and regained the territory he had lent. Bardylis defeated Amyntas decisively in battle and occupied much of Macedonia in 383, whereupon

Amyntas again lent rich territory to the Chalcidians as the price of their aid. However, Amyntas soon regained his throne by his own efforts. The Chalcidians then refused to return the rich territory to him and overran the coastal plain as far as Pella, which they captured with their forces probably of 800 cavalry, 8,000 hoplites (heavily armed infantry), and more numerous light infantry. This time Amyntas was saved by Sparta, which answered his appeal and fought from a base in his kingdom from 382 until Olynthus capitulated in 379.

When Thebes and Athens went to war against Sparta, Amyntas sold timber for shipbuilding to Athens and entered into alliance with her against the Chalcidians, who were beginning to reassemble their federation. In 371, as we have seen (p. 3), Amyntas' representative at the meeting of 'all the Greeks' voted in favour of recognising the claim of Athens that Amphipolis was an Athenian possession. In 370 or 369 he died at an advanced age. The kingdom had been weakened by Illyrian raids and occupation, by the ravaging tactics of the Chalcidians, and by the destruction attending the war of Sparta against the Chalcidians. Amyntas owed his survival mainly to astute diplomacy and to accepting what amounted to vassal status first with the Chalcidians, then with the Spartans, and finally with the Athenians. It was clear that his military forces were dangerously weak.[11]

The ability of Amyntas in bringing his country through so many crises was appreciated not only by the Athenian pamphleteer, Isocrates, who praised his resilience, but also by the Macedonians, who (presumably in their Assembly) voted that he be accorded 'divine honours'. Evidence of this has been revealed at Vergina, the site of Aegeae, where the Temenid kings were buried. A new area was set aside for this branch of the royal house; there a large shrine was constructed, and alongside it Amyntas was buried in a cist-tomb, built below ground level. As a boy of twelve, Philip will have attended the funeral ceremonies, and he will have admired the beautiful frescoes on the plastered walls of the tomb. Two of the three frescoes are shown in Plate 6. Their subject, Pluto's rape of Persephone and Demeter mourning, was a part of Orphic belief, and in this setting it prophesied an afterlife for those buried in the tomb. We shall discuss the artistic merit of the frescoes later (p. 43), when we can compare them with others. Here we are concerned with the Macedonians' regard for Amyntas and the impression that regard must have made on Philip.[12]

Of his six sons by two wives Amyntas had already indicated his own preference by placing the name of Alexander after his own in the treaty of alliance with Athens. Alexander, Perdiccas and Philip were his sons by Eurydice, a princess of the famous Corinthian clan, the Bacchiadae, which had come c. 450 to rule over the Lyncestae in Upper Macedonia. The first acts of Alexander were to pay danegeld and to send Philip as a hostage to 'the Illyrians', presumably to the court of Bardylis; his life was the surety that the danegeld would be paid regularly.[13] Then Alexander extended the

Companionate system to include not only the cavalrymen, as in the past, but also the infantrymen of the King's Forces, 'in order that both groups should be most zealous in his service'; and he began to train the infantrymen in a phalanx formation, of which the depth was in files of ten men. During the reign of Amyntas the Macedonian infantrymen, fighting as light-armed skirmishers, had been outclassed by the Illyrians who had adopted Greek hoplite equipment and methods; by the Chalcidian hoplites; and even by the Thracian peltasts, who used a longer spear than the Macedonians. It was significant that the Spartan commander in 382 advised Amyntas 'to hire mercenaries [no doubt Thracians] and buy the alliance of nearby kings'. Through Alexander's reform the infantrymen of the King's Forces were to become hoplites and to bear the honourable title *pezhetairoi*, meaning 'infantrymen-companions'.[14]

Alexander intervened in Thessaly and placed a garrison in Larissa. In 368 it was expelled by the Theban general Pelopidas, who invaded Macedonia, settled a war between Alexander and a pretender called 'Ptolemy of Alorus' (his local citizenship), and removed to Thebes thirty sons of leading men and Philip, who had previously been released by the Illyrians. The hostages, who were evidently Royal Pages, were a surety that Alexander and Ptolemy would honour the settlement and that they would respect other obligations which Pelopidas had imposed. In 367 Alexander was assassinated during a war-dance, which was probably performed at the spring festival, the 'Xandica'. It seems that the Assembly of Macedones found Apollophanes of Pydna guilty and executed him among others, and that the Assembly elected Perdiccas, a minor, as king and Ptolemy as guardian of Perdiccas and Philip.[15]

However, a pretender appeared. Pausanias, probably a son of Archelaus, invaded Macedonia and captured Anthemus, Strepsa and Therme with a force of Greek soldiers, hired no doubt with the support of the Chalcidians. At the time, in 367, an Athenian general, Iphicrates, in command of a small fleet was operating against Amphipolis. He answered an appeal for help which came from Ptolemy and the Queen Mother, Eurydice. Pausanias was expelled. But Thebes had no wish to be displaced by Athens. Still in 367 Pelopidas entered Macedonia and dictated the terms which Ptolemy accepted: to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes, and as a guarantee of good faith to provide further hostages, namely Ptolemy's son Proxenus and fifty Companions.[16] It was perhaps on the orders of Thebes that Ptolemy sent help to reinforce Amphipolis against Athens, with whom Thebes was then at war. In 365 Perdiccas at the age of eighteen assumed his royal powers. Ptolemy died, it was rumoured at the hands of Perdiccas or through Perdiccas' machination; but the truth is not attainable. Perdiccas reaffirmed the alliance with Thebes. As Epaminondas was starting to build a fleet of 100 triremes at this time, it seems certain that large quantities of timber were being provided from Macedonia under the

terms of the treaty of alliance. Perdiccas received a reward, the release of Philip, now in his seventeenth year.

During his three years as a hostage Philip had been treated well; for he might be installed as a puppet king of Macedonia, if it suited the policy of Thebes. He came under the influence of Epaminondas, the greatest statesman and general of the time, and he was able to observe the politics of the Greek city-states during a critical period. The sudden collapse in 371 of Sparta as the superpower in Greece supported by Dionysius in the West and Persia in the East had left a leadership-gap, which both Thebes and Athens tried to fill: Thebes as the propagator of a democratic federalism which extended as far as Arcadia in the Peloponnese and most of Thessaly in the North, and Athens as the founder and leader of a great maritime Alliance. But Thebes and Athens were now bitter enemies. Treaties of alliance, which the participants swore by the deities to observe for fifty years or 'for ever', were cynically discarded in the manner of the Spartan Lysander who declared: 'we cheat boys with dice and men with oaths'. Athens, for instance, allied herself successively with Thebes, Sparta, Dionysius, and Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly. In 367 Sparta, Thebes, Athens, Argos, Elis and Arcadia sent envoys to Susa to engage in what has been well called 'a crawling competition' for the favour and the gold of the Persian King. The winner was Thebes. The edict of 'The Great King' was that Athens was to beach her fleet, Amphipolis was to be independent, and a general peace was to be observed by the city-states. In spring 366 Thebes summoned delegates from the city-states to hear the Persian envoy read out his King's edict. It was rejected by Athens, Sparta and other enemies of Thebes.[17]

Philip must have realised that the secret of Thebes' military supremacy lay in constant 'training, practice, experience and action', the development of an élite infantry unit (The Sacred Band), the use of shock tactics, and the co-ordination of infantry and cavalry in battle. He will have realised the truth of Epaminondas' dictum, that any state seeking domination in Greece had need not only of military power but also of naval mastery. And as a lesson in Greek politics he will have seen what happened at Oropus on the borderland between Thebes and Athens. There were always some pro-Theban Oropians and some pro-Athenian Oropians. The former had been in power before 374, and Oropus had been part of Boeotia. Then the latter took control and 'gave the territory to Athens', which accepted it despite being an ally of Thebes. In 366 some Oropian exiles, who had been expelled presumably by Athens, seized control of Oropus with the help of a tyrant of Eretria in Euboea and delivered the city back to Thebes, which no doubt exiled pro-Athenian leaders. Such bitter border-disputes were a regular feature of city-state politics. 'The lessons, political and military, were not lost on Philip.'[18]

CHAPTER II

The sources of information

1. Contemporary evidence

The most important sources are inscriptions, coins, and excavation reports of sites contemporary with the lifetime of Philip. Inscriptions of that period are very rare within Macedonia. Records may have been made on wooden tablets and not on stone, which is uncommon in much of the country, but the main reason was that a monarchy did not emulate a democracy in making its decisions public. However, some copies on stone outside Macedonia have survived. Coinage was the monopoly of the king. The emblems he chose were indicative of his own priorities, and the quantity and quality of the coins revealed the economic condition of his kingdom. Excavation of classical sites began very late but has yielded amazing results, especially at Pella, Edessa, Dion and Aegeae (Vergina) – to a great extent since the late 1970s when G.T. Griffith was writing on the reign of Philip.

The works of contemporary and near-contemporary historians – Ephorus, Theopompus, Callisthenes and Marsyas Macedon – have survived only in fragments. Their influence upon later historians whose works have come down to us will be considered in the next section. There is a wealth of material in the extant speeches of the Attic orators (Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lycurgus and others), which shed light on the situation in Athens and on Athenian views of Philip. Interpretation of the speeches is rendered difficult by the prejudices and sometimes by the falsehoods of individual orators. The academic writings of Isocrates as a political thinker and essayist are of special importance; for he was Panhellenic rather than Athenian in outlook, and he had a deep understanding of the world of city-states and of the need for leadership of a new kind. Xenophon, who died c. 354, provided the immediate background of political events in his *Hellenica*, specialist information on hunting and cavalry, and a programme for economic recovery at Athens. Aeneas Tacticus composed soon after 357 a treatise *On the Defence of Fortified Positions* which incidentally provided an insight into social and political conditions. Plato, who died c. 347, and Aristotle, almost an exact contemporary of Philip, held the belief that the city-state was the finest political form, and that there was urgent need for fundamental reforms of the city-states of their time. Each produced his own blue-print for an ideal city-state. Neither expressed any faith in the Macedonian monarchy or in the capacity of

Philip to lead the city-states. We shall consider the problems of the city-states in Chapter VII.

2. Later writers

We derive our reconstruction of the sequence of events mainly from two world histories which were written long afterwards, one by Diodorus Siculus c. 50-30 BC and the other by Pompeius Trogus a generation later. Diodorus intended to make Philip the centrepiece of one book, and Trogus stressed Philip's importance by entitling his history *Historiae Philippicae*. That book of Diodorus survives, but the account of Philip is extraordinarily uneven. The work of Trogus is known to us through an Epitome by Justin, who flourished c. AD 150.

The worth of what Diodorus and Trogus wrote depends upon the worth of the literary accounts which they chose to follow and abbreviate. How do scholars decide which author or authors Diodorus chose for his book XVI? The standard method was to find a detail which was common to the text of Diodorus and to a fragment of a historian, who had been a contemporary or near-contemporary of Philip. For example, A. Momigliano noted that Diodorus attributed the wound of Philip at Methone to a *toxeuma* (arrow), and that Theopompus and Duris did so too; and he deduced 'certamente' that Diodorus drew on Duris, who himself had drawn on Theopompus. By making such comparisons Momigliano arrived at the conclusion that Diodorus changed from one source to another source no less than twelve times within twenty-three chapters (his predecessor R. Laqueur made Diodorus change eighteen times within four chapters). The method seemed to me extremely faulty. The word *toxeuma*, being the common term for an arrow, was probably used by every author who wrote of that event; and there is no reason to suppose that Diodorus was quoting Duris *verbatim* and that Duris was quoting Theopompus *verbatim*. Moreover, the resulting deductions constituted a *reductio ad absurdum*; for such frequent changes of source would have made any writer dizzy, let alone the far from capable Diodorus.[1]

In 1937 I published a new method of analysis.[2] I divided the narrative of Diodorus XVI into Groups, of which each had a distinct character in respect of fullness, accuracy, military interest, political interest, and central theme. The first Group – being the fullest and having Philip as its central theme – consisted of chapters 1 (Proem), 3-4, 8, 14, and 74-6, which were concerned only with Diodorus' archon-years 360/59 – 357/6 and 341/0. There were two general reasons for supposing that Diodorus was here following Ephorus: he had used Ephorus for XI-XV, and Ephorus was certainly thorough and an admirer of Philip. But there is a special reason which arises from the following passages.

Diod. 16. 14. 3 under his year 357/6. 'Ephorus not having included the

Sacred War, his son Demophilus wrote of it, beginning from the seizure of the shrine at Delphi ... Callisthenes wrote his *Hellenica* in ten books to the capture of the shrine ... Diyllus of Athens began his history of all events concerning Greece and Sicily from the violation of the shrine in 26 books.'

Diod. 16. 76. 5 under his year 341/0. 'Ephorus closed his history here with the siege of Perinthus ... having included in 30 books the events of Greeks and barbarians since the return of the Heracleidae ... Diyllus of Athens started his second *Syntaxis* (volume) from the end of Ephorus' history and comprised the events of Greeks and barbarians to the death of Philip.'

These details are quite unusual. Diodorus normally paid lip-service to culture by recording occasionally the names of writers, philosophers etc. (e.g. 14. 43. 5, 46. 6, 53. 6; 15. 76. 4), and the span of a historian's work (e.g. 14. 46. 6, 84. 7, 117. 8; cf. 16. 14. 4). But in these two passages Diodorus mentioned details of the internal structure of the works of Ephorus and of Diyllus, the extent to which they knitted together, and the intrusion of Demophilus' monograph which overlapped part of Diyllus *Syntaxis* I. As far as I can see, the only possible explanation for Diodorus making those detailed reports is that Diodorus was changing his source in his year 357/6 from Ephorus to Demophilus for the Sacred War, and from Ephorus to Diyllus *Syntaxis* I for other events to the death of Philip; and under his year 341/0 from Ephorus 'ending with the siege of Perinthus' to Diyllus *Syntaxis* II.

The second Group covered the events of the Sacred War in 16. 23-33, 35-9, and 56-63, the central theme being the fates of the various Phocian commanders. It has the consistent tone of a monograph, Philip appearing only as a participant in the Sacred War. Diodorus, then, was certainly following Demophilus for this Group.

I characterised the next Group, consisting of 16. 7. 3, 21. 22. 2, 53-5, 64, 77. 2-3, 84-88. 2, and 91-4, as 'clearly pro-Athenian, nurtured on Attic orators, interested in anecdotes, court-scenes and gossip, a champion of the autonomous tradition, attentive to personalities, and writing in the Hellenistic period' (probably in the third century). Momigliano attributed most of these passages to Duris of Samos as the source; but that was unconvincing, because Duris was famous for 'seine antiathenische Haltung', as Jacoby pointed out (*FGrH* II c p. 116). Another Hellenistic writer who covered the period was Diyllus of Athens. He was presumably pro-Athenian; he composed memoirs of generals and kings, and his fragments show his interest in scandal, bribery and a Macedonian state-function. Thus he fits my characterisation well. In fact, as we have seen, Diodorus makes our choice clear by indicating at 16. 14. 5 and 16. 76. 5 that he followed Diyllus *Syntaxis* I for events other than those of the Sacred War down to the beginning of the siege of Perinthus, for which he used Ephorus; and that thereafter he used Diyllus *Syntaxis* II for Greek events down to

Philip's death in 336/5. However, 'the actions of the barbarians (from the end of the siege of Perinthus) down to the death of Philip' were not included in book 16. They appeared in book 17 at 5. 3 – 7. 10, where Diodorus explained at 5. 3 that he was back-tracking.[3] The fittings of the Groups to the statements about Diyllus are precise. It is thus certain that Diodorus was drawing on Diyllus for Group 3.

Finally there are a few short passages, scattered through book 16, which are not attributable to any of my three Groups. It is probable that Diodorus culled them from a short Hellenistic text-book, for which no author can be named.

In 1991 I published my analysis of Justin 7, 8 and 9, which was conducted on the same method. Here I had no predecessor. G. T. Griffith had suggested 'Theopompus', '? Theopompus' and 'the Greek source(s) of Trogus' for various passages, but he had not argued any case. The passages forming my first Group (7. 1. 1 – 7. 4. 2) were pietistic, laudatory of early Macedonian kings including Alexander I, appreciative of the Macedonians' diligence, toughness and valour, and prophetic of Macedonia becoming a world power. They started 'from the Macedonian origins and the kings from the founder of the race, Caranus', as we read in Trogus, *Prologue* VII. Only a Macedonian writer would have expressed such simplistic and favourable views. The obvious choice is Marsyas Macedon, a contemporary of Alexander the Great who served in 307 as admiral of Antigonus Monophthalmus' fleet. He wrote *Macedonica* 'from the first king of the Macedonians' (Souda s.v.).[4]

The passages forming my second Group (7. 4. 5-8, 7. 5. 4-8, 7. 5. 10-12 and 9. 7. 1-14) concentrated on the lust and villainy of Eurydice, the fatal marriage of Arybbas to Troas, the horrendous acts of Olympias, and the complicity of Alexander the Great in his mother's instigation of Pausanias to murder Philip. There are similarities between Justin 9. 7. 1-4 and Athenaeus 13. 557 d-e in the quarrel between Philip and Alexander at the wedding of Philip to Cleopatra and the disastrous consequences of Olympias' rage. Fortunately Athenaeus named his source as Satyrus, *Life of Philip* (557 b).[5] Thus the second Group was derived from Satyrus.

The passages forming the third Group (7. 6. 3-9, 8. 1.1 – 8. 6. 8, and 9. 1. 1 – 9. 5. 7) were rhetorical in tone, keenly political, marked by psychological insights, critical of the folly of the Greek city-states, attributing Philip's success to ruthless and treacherous ability, and underlining Philip's murder of relatives and debauchery of a nephew. At the same time there is much information, some even about Macedonia, which reveals a very well-informed author. This all fits a contemporary of Philip, Theopompus of Chios, of whom Polybius wrote an illuminating critique (Plb. 8. 9. 1-4). While Theopompus was 'remarkable for wide and critical research and for the harshness of his verdicts', he said that 'Europe had never produced such a man all in all as Philip, the son of Amyntas'.[6]

Justin 9. 5. 8 – 9. 6. 8 and 9. 7. 1-3 reported the divorce of Olympias for

suspected sexual depravity ('propter stupri suspitionem'), the subsequent marriage of Philip to Cleopatra, the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the background to Pausanias' action, and the 'belief' ('creditum est') that Pausanias had been instigated by Olympias, not without the knowledge of Alexander. There are considerable differences of detail between this account and those of Plutarch, *Alex.* 9. 5-11 and Athenaeus, 557 d-e, which both were derived from Satyrus, *Life of Philip*, and of Diodorus, 16. 93. 3 – 94. 3, which on my interpretation was derived from Diyllus, *Syntaxis* II. These differences but not the entire story, were due in my opinion to Trogus using the account of Cleitarchus.[7]

Finally, there are linking passages between these Groups and within a Group which I attributed in my analysis to Marsyas Macedon as the author followed by Trogus.[8]

What is the value of such analyses? A modern writer who accepts all the material in Diodorus and Justin at its face value has no criterion of judgement but simply chooses those details, incidents and comments which appeal to his concept of probability and his sense of what Philip intended and could have achieved. His version is inevitably subjective. On the other hand, when we know which author lay behind the various details, incidents and comments, we possess an important yardstick for our assessment. In regard to the career of Philip we are fortunate in that Diodorus and Justin (Trogus) made use of four historians who were alive at that time and who wrote for contemporaries. It follows that they had to be accurate in regard to factual matters, whatever their interpretation of motives might have been. For example, when Marsyas Macedon living in court circles wrote that Philip was guardian and not king after the death of Perdiccas, he cannot have been lying; or when Demophilus reported that Philip drowned 3,000 prisoners as violators of the temple, he was reporting on something which was widely known to contemporaries in Macedonia and in the city-states of Central Greece.

The testimony of Ephorus (c. 405-330) is particularly valuable. He had a high reputation as an accurate and capable historian who had a comprehensive view of the Greek and the non-Greek world. Like his teacher, Isocrates, he saw Philip as one who brought unity to Greece and imposed his rule on the Balkan tribes. Theopompus, born some thirty years later and outliving Alexander, 'combined the industry and devotion of the first-rate historian', wrote G. T. Griffith, 'with the flair of the second-rate journalist for misrepresentation by hyperbole'.[9] Living at the court of Philip in the late 340s, he knew Macedonia and Philip, whom he regarded as the central figure of his time. His facts were accurate, however harsh and prejudiced his judgments may have been. Marsyas Macedon of Pella (c. 356-305) presented Philip from the Macedonian point of view and provided a Macedonian background to his achievements. Demophilus, a son of Ephorus and thus a contemporary of the Sacred War, wrote the

history of that war from a pietistic viewpoint; it seems that he was as accurate and as thorough as Ephorus.

Other writers used by Diodorus and/or Justin (Trogus) were not contemporary writers. Cleitarchus, a young man when Alexander was campaigning in Asia, was rather 'a second-rate journalist' than a historian, and he had little liking for the Macedonians. Satyrus, writing as a biographer in the middle of the third century, took 'an uncritical delight in anecdotes and personalities', and he, like his readers, was less interested in facts than in scandal, of which plenty had been provided by the adherents of Olympias and Cassander. Diyllus of Athens, writing in probably the first quarter of the third century, composed a universal history of the period 357-297. He was regarded by Plutarch as a writer who 'merged himself with the characters of generals and kings as they were recorded', and he seems to have been accepted as 'a satisfactory authority by Plutarch'. If he was the son of Phanodemus, born in the first quarter of the fourth century, as seems probable, Diyllus grew up in the period immediately after the death of Alexander and could have met Macedonian and Greek witnesses of the assassination of Philip.[10]

3. Information about Eurydice

Let us take as an object-lesson the evidence concerning Eurydice. In inscriptions dated c. 350-340 which have been found in and since 1982 she was recorded as the daughter of Sirras.[11] The name was already known from a slightly later work, the *Politics* of Aristotle: 'Archelaus, being hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrhabaeus, gave a daughter in marriage to the king of Elimea' (1311 13-14). Thus the form of the name 'Sirras' was confirmed. Moreover, her name and his name were mentioned three and a half centuries later by Strabo, who said that she was the daughter of 'Irras', an error in transmission for Sirras. Strabo was commenting on the rule of the Bacchiadae over the Lyncestae (see p. 8 above), which began with Arrhabaeus I (fl. c. 445). He stated that Arrhabaeus' daughter, having married Sirras (c. 430), bore him Eurydice (c. 410). There are grounds for holding that Strabo's source was Theopompus, who visited the Macedonian court in the 340s. He would have given the genealogy correctly. As I have argued elsewhere, during the reign of Archelaus (c. 413-399) we can see from the phrase of Aristotle that Sirras was guardian of the under-age king Arrhabaeus II, grandson of Arrhabaeus I, and that Sirras was the adult next-of-kin in the Bacchiad house.[12] Eurydice was given in marriage to Amyntas, presumably when he was already king of the Macedonians c. 393, or 391. It is obvious from these and many other instances that marriages of royals were frequently made with foreign royals in order to gain alliances.[13]

Once married, Eurydice was a Macedonian. Two inscriptions found at Aegeae (Vergina) were on statue-bases and recorded Eurydice's dedica-

tions to 'Eukleia' ('Good Repute'). A female statue, found near one of them, was dated by Andronikos c. 340, thus supporting his dating of the inscriptions. Further excavation has revealed that these statue-bases and two shrines were associated with the Agora of Aegeae. In the same complex there was the foundation layer of a third such base.[14]

Eurydice was mentioned by later writers. Plutarch cited an epigram which recorded a dedication by her. I translate the likeliest version of the text.[15] 'Eurydice, daughter of Sirras, dedicated this (male statue) to her city's Muses, because she had a longing for knowledge in her soul. Happy as the mother of sons growing up, she laboured to learn letters, the recorders of the spoken word' (*Mor.* 14 b-c). In her words about her sons she was referring to the 370s, before her eldest son became king; and it is reasonable to assume that she made the dedication then. The statue may have been of Hermes as patron of letters, and the place of dedication was presumably Aegeae, which was then Eurydice's city.[16] How did Plutarch know of the epigram? The probable answer is that Theopompus saw it and reported it in his history as an indication of primitive ways.

Plutarch led up to this epigram with the statement that Eurydice was 'Illyrian and thrice-barbarous', which is clearly slanderous since she was a Bacchiad of the ruling house of the Greek-speaking Lyncestae. Similar slanders have survived in Justin 7. 4. 7 – 7. 5. 8 and the Scholia to Aeschines 2. 29. They are clearly fictitious.[17] As I have argued above (p. 14), we owe these passages ultimately to Satyrus, *Life of Philip*. The truth is that Eurydice held an honoured position as Queen Mother of three kings, and that a part of the Agora at Aegeae was consecrated to her dedications. That she had not learnt letters at the Lyncestid court is not surprising; that she did so at Aegeae was to her credit. When she died, she was buried probably in the magnificent tomb which Andronikos has tentatively suggested was 'The Tomb of Eurydice'.[18]

CHAPTER III

The military revolution and the addition of Upper Macedonia

1. The reign of Perdiccas III, 365-359

Eurydice and Perdiccas were delighted by the return of Philip. His release was a sign of excellent relations with Thebes, of which we have further evidence in an inscription recently found at Thebes. In it Athenaeus, 'a Macedonian', was honoured and granted the right to purchase land in Boeotia for past and current services, which were no doubt concerned with the delivery of timber from Macedonia. For in this year, probably 365, Epaminondas was engaged in building a fleet of 100 triremes.[1] Perdiccas, aged eighteen, was glad to share his responsibility as active king with his brother. It was probably in 364, when Philip came of age, that Philip 'began his career as a ruler'. We learn this from Speusippus, the head of the Academy at Athens, who wrote in a letter that his predecessor Plato had prompted Perdiccas 'to assign some territory to Philip, in which he maintained an armed force and had it ready for action on the death of Perdiccas'.[2] There was a precedent in the previous century, when three brothers shared the rule after the death of Alexander I. Then one of them held the most strategic area, Amphaxitis (Thuc. 2. 100. 3), extending from the Iron Gates of the Axius to the head of the Thermaic Gulf. It is probable that Philip now guarded this area together with the approaches from the east, while the king held the Macedonian homeland with its two palaces and faced the greatest threat, the power of Bardylis.

As his armed force Philip had detachments of the King's Forces, consisting of excellent cavalry and hoplite infantry, the latter first trained by Alexander II and called *pezhetairoi* (see p. 9 above). He had the opportunity now to experiment with the ideas which were to revolutionise warfare. As a hostage he had studied the best 'hoplites' of the period – the Illyrians of Bardylis and the Thebans of Epaminondas. The hoplite wore bronze armour – helmet, cuirass and greaves – and carried a shield, three feet in diameter, on his left forearm. He fought with an iron-tipped spear, averaging seven feet in length, and held at its centre. The standard formation was a phalanx, a solid rectangular block, in which each front-rank man needed three feet of space to face the enemy and the front rank was supported by seven ranks of men. What Philip invented was the pike

(*sarissa*), twelve to fifteen feet long. Its iron point was so counterweighted by an iron butt, that the shaft was held close to the butt (see Fig. 2). Both hands were needed to wield it. The pikeman wore bronze helmet and greaves and a cloth tunic, and he had a small shield (*pelta*), some two feet in diameter, slung from his left shoulder. Pikemen were to fight in a phalanx, of which the depth was to be ten men instead of the hoplites' eight men. Their advantage was that they could present three or four pikepoints ahead of the first rank, while the opposing hoplites' spears stayed out of range. Moreover, because they had a smaller shield, they could form a closer order, in which a bristling hedge of up to five pikepoints ahead of the front rank could be presented to the enemy, and a charge by such a phalanx was likely to destroy a standard hoplite phalanx with a minimum of loss to itself. He planned also to equip the cavalryman with a counterweighted lance (*xyston* or *sarissa*) some nine feet long, which would strike an enemy cavalryman before he came into range with his seven-foot spear. See Fig. 3.

What I have described were the end-products of a period of experimentation and constant practice.[3] The best wood for the shaft of a pike or lance (*kraneia*, 'cornel') and also iron and copper were available as the monopoly of the crown in Macedonia, so that Philip was able to make the new equipment. At the same time his infantrymen were being trained as hoplites; for the hoplite was more versatile than the pikeman, who was designed only for a set battle of opposing phalanxes. During his five years in Amphaxitis Philip was involved mainly with repelling raiders who came overland from Paeonia and Thrace or were landed from Athenian warships. For this cavalrymen were important. They were probably trained by Philip to use the lance.

The greatest threat to the kingdom of Perdiccas came from the northwest. There the Greek-speaking tribal states (see p. 4 above), while similar in institutions to the Macedonian tribal state (*ethnos*), were closer to the Molossians of Epirus in their West Greek dialect and in their transhumant pasturalism, and they had been associated politically with the Molossians until Xerxes placed them under the suzerainty of Alexander I. From south to north they were Elimeotae, Orestae, Lyncestae and Pelagones, and Thucydides marked their attachment to Macedonia by calling the Lyncestae, for instance, 'Lyncestae Macedones'.[4] In the 360s the attachment was a dead letter. The Orestae joined the Molossian state, then in alliance with Athens, and became 'Orestae Molossoi'. A 'king of Pelagones' was honoured as a benefactor by Athens in 365/4, and one 'Menelaus Pelagon' and his ancestors were similarly honoured in 362.[5] At that time Athens and Macedonia were at war. Demosthenes referred to the situation in *The First Philippic* 4-5: 'many of the tribal states (*ethnê*), now with Philip, then independent and free, wanted to be on good terms with us rather than with him.'

The war with Athens peaked in 364, when the Athenian fleet acquired


Block of Phalanx eight men deep
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 metres
Wedge of Phalanx sixteen men deep
Soldier (from above)
Soldier with pike level for attack
Soldier holds pike upright
⅔ of pike
⅓ of pike
Pike length 5 metres
Soldier with pike level for attack
Soldier holds pike upright

Fig. 2. The pikeman-phalanx in action

1

2

Fig. 3. A Macedonian cavalryman in action

as bases Pydna, Methone, Potidaea and Torone and had as allies the Orestae and the Pelagones. A body of Athenian citizens were planted at Potidaea and reinforced in 361. Raids and blockades forced Perdiccas to accept Athens' terms, which included the deployment of Macedonian troops against Olynthus, the capital of the Chalcidian League, and against Amphipolis, which was supported by the Chalcidians and by the Thracians. Perdiccas broke with Athens probably in 363, when Epaminondas' fleet sailed in the Aegean. But Athens returned to the attack. Perdiccas was beaten to his knees in 362 and accepted an armistice. He infringed its conditions later by sending troops to help Amphipolis against Athens.[6]

Macedonia was an impoverished kingdom in this decade. Alexander II coined only in bronze; Perdiccas at first in silver didrachms but later only in bronze; and the royal harbour-dues were only twenty talents a year in 361, until an Athenian exile, Callistratus, raised them to twice that amount. 'The great wealth' of Bardylis was seen in the silver tetradrachms of Damastium and Daparria, which had an ingot as an emblem; and in Thrace Cotys, the Odrysian king, issued a fine coinage in silver and bronze. The Chalcidian League and Amphipolis coined occasionally in gold and regularly in silver tetradrachms and lesser denominations; and Crenides, a colony of Thasos in Thrace, issued gold coinage c. 360. Macedonia ranked rather with the independent Greek cities on the coast of the Thermaic Gulf – Pydna, Methone, Aenea and Dicaea – which coined only in bronze.[7] The kingdom itself was smaller than it had been in the reign of Alexander I. A list of states hosting the officials of the shrine at Epidaurus (Thearodokoi) has survived for the late 360s. It showed as independent city-states the above Greek cities on the coast, Calindoea inland south of Lake Bolbe, Apollonia and Arethusa east of Calindoea, and cities between them and Amphipolis – Argilus, Berge and Traïlus. The safest port for the kingdom was Pella, reached by a waterway up the Ludias river. Small forts served as refuges; for apart from a few natural citadels the Macedonian cities were undefended.[8]

Macedonia was at its weakest in relation to Bardylis. In one war against him Perdiccas lost many men, taken alive. He scared the rest of his army into resistance by announcing that the Illyrians were killing their prisoners. In 359 came the ultimate disaster. In a pitched battle Perdiccas and 4,000 soldiers were killed, and the morale of the Macedonians was shattered. The victorious Illyrians occupied some 'Macedonian cities' (*poleis*) in Upper Macedona. The Paeonians seized the opportunity to ravage a part of Lower Macedonia. It was evident that the Illyrians themselves would invade Lower Macedonia in 358.[9] The collapse of the Macedonian kingdom seemed to be almost inevitable.

2. Recovery, diplomacy and defeat of Argaeus in 359

The Macedonians proceeded, as in 399 and 367, to elect a minor as king, namely Amyntas, the infant son of Perdiccas, and to appoint as his guardian Philip, the next-of-kin. They did so in the belief that the divine favour passed from father to son in the Temenid line. We learn this from a Macedonian tradition about a king of the sixth century, Aëropus, who as an infant was brought in his cradle to a battle against the Illyrians. Defeated previously because they had lacked the evidences of divine favour ('auspicia'), the Macedonians then gained a decisive victory.[10] The worse the situation, the greater was the need of that favour. In practical terms, of course, Philip as guardian exercised the royal powers and was in all but name king.

We must digress to justify this interpretation. Justin is the chief literary source. Having referred to Amyntas as 'parvulus', 'a little fellow', he continued thus:

> Philip acted for long ('diu') not as king but as guardian of his ward. When more dangerous wars were impending and help was being deferred in view of the king being an infant, he assumed the kingship under compulsion from the people. When he entered on his rule, everyone had high hopes of him on account both of his own character which gave promise of greatness, and of the age-old destiny of Macedonia, wherein it had been prophesied that in the reign of one of Amyntas' sons Macedonia would be in its most flourishing condition (7. 5. 9 – 6. 1-2).

To interpret 'diu' we turn to Satyrus, *Life of Philip*, which gave him a reign of twenty-two years, namely 357-336 on inclusive reckoning. The time of 'more dangerous wars impending' was indeed summer 357, when the Chalcidian League allied itself with some Illyrians and asked Athens for alliance; for such a combination would have been wellnigh fatal. On my analysis Justin's ultimate source here was Marsyas Macedon, who, as a supporter of Philip and his greatness, would have had no reason to invent a two-year period of guardianship. More important is an inscription (partly restored) from the oracular shrine at Lebadea in Boeotia, which recorded names of consultants and included 'Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, king of Macedones' (*IG* VII 3055). The only time when Amyntas could have been so described was 359 and a year or two following. In a period of desperate fear, as in the winter of 359-358, a Macedonian emissary was evidently sent to Lebadea with the infant king, perhaps five years of age, because his physical presence, like that of the infant Aëropus, established contact with the god. Finally, since the religious dimension was so important, it should be noted that the oracle about the 'sons of Amyntas' counted for much in the later decision to make Philip king.[11]

Those who discount the religious side and view the succession from a secular angle do not believe that the Macedonians could have been so

foolish as to prefer an infant to the experienced twenty-three-year-old Philip. They find some support in the fact that Diodorus made Philip reign for twenty-four years, i.e. 359-336 on inclusive reckoning (16. 1. 3 and 95. 1; cf. 16. 2. 1 'Philip took over the kingship').[12] However, Diodorus, who followed some chronographic writer for lists of kings, described Ptolemy Alorites as 'taking over the kingship' (16. 2. 4) and as 'king for three years' (15. 71. 1 and 77. 5), whereas he was certainly guardian and not king (see p. 9 above). The same thing may well have happened in the case of Philip. It would not be surprising that non-Macedonians regarded Philip as the man in control and did not concern themselves with internal Macedonian arrangements. I shall consider later (p. 40 below) whether Philip's coinage has any bearing on the succession.

The death of Perdiccas and the weakness of the kingdom raised the hopes of pretenders to the throne. Argaeus, who had been the puppet-king with Illyrian backing in 392-391, was now supported by Athens. His brother Pausanias, who had tried to seize the throne in 367, was in control of Calindoea in the late 360s and now had the backing of Cotys, the powerful Odrysian king. These two were sons of Archelaus.[13] Other pretenders were three brothers, named Archelaus, Arrhidaeus and Menelaus, who were sons of Amyntas III by Gygaea. It is probable that they had some support in the Chalcidian League. Because Argaeus was the most dangerous of the pretenders, Philip withdrew the Macedonian soldiers whom Perdiccas had placed in Amphipolis, his aim being to conciliate Athens, which was determined to capture Amphipolis. He then sent an embassy to the Paeonians and purchased their neutrality with grants of money and generous promises. The assassination of Cotys at this time gave some relief; for Philip was able to pay a sum to one of his successors – probably Berisades – in exchange for the liquidation of Pausanias.[14] These prompt actions enabled him to concentrate his forces against the threat of intervention by Athens. It was fortunate for him that the Chalcidian League, which was far stronger than the debilitated kingdom, was at daggers drawn with Athens.

The Athenian Assembly had decided to 'restore Argaeus' to the throne. To this end they planned to send Mantias in command of 3,000 citizen hoplites and 'a considerable naval force'. This was a major undertaking by Athenian standards; for in 432 Athens had sent 3,000 citizen hoplites and 70 triremes to attack Perdiccas II, and in the attempt to save Olynthus in 348 she was to commit only 2,000 citizen hoplites. Argaeus was to be accompanied by some Macedonian émigrés and by his own mercenaries. The aim of Athens was not only to control Macedonia through Argaeus but also to enlist Macedonian forces and capture Amphipolis. While the expedition was being mounted, news arrived that Philip had withdrawn his troops from Amphipolis. This was said to have delighted Athens; but it did not change her plans.[15]

The Athenian force sailed to the base at Potidaea and then made a

surprise landing, probably at dawn, at Methone, which was in alliance with Athens. The direct route of some 28 kilometres to Aegeae, the old capital, went over the ridge via Livadhi. The position of Philip with his army was not stated; but we may be sure that he was at Pella, both because it was a central point and because the Athenian fleet might come up the Ludias river and attack it. Pella was separated from Aegeae by some 40 kilometres of flat country. Mantias sent Argaeus, the émigrés, the mercenaries and a few Athenian observers to Aegeae, but he kept the Athenian hoplites at Methone. At Aegeae 'no one joined' Argaeus. He had no option but to return to Mantias. On the way he was intercepted by Philip, who had been alerted probably by a fire-signal after dawn. Unable to reach Aegeae first, Philip had occupied the strategic point between Aegeae and Methone, presumably the pass by Livadhi. A battle ensued in which many mercenaries were killed. The remainder, isolated on a hill and still 14 kilometres from Methone (on my interpretation), accepted Philip's terms: the Athenian observers to recover anything they had lost and to go free, the mercenaries to depart under a truce, and Argaeus and the émigrés to be surrendered.[16] As the last were certainly to be executed as traitors, Athens lost any reputation for good faith. Her expensive expedition had failed utterly. All that Mantias brought home was a letter from Philip, who offered 'to make alliance and renew the traditional friendship with Athens'. In response Athens made a treaty of peace in which Philip declared that he no longer laid claim to Amphipolis.[17]

3. The defeat of Bardylis and incorporation of Upper Macedonia

The most important task for Philip was to replace the 4,000 men killed by the Illyrians, restore the morale of the army and prepare it for a decisive battle. We learn from Ephorus, as abbreviated by Diodorus, how he set about the task.

> He made the Macedonians confident by convening them in assembly after assembly and exhorting them by his eloquence to be brave. He altered for the better the military units, equipped the men appropriately with weapons of war, and held continuous manoeuvres under arms and training exercises under combat conditions. Indeed he invented the close order and the equipment of the phalanx in imitation of the shield-to-shield order of the heroes at Troy, and he first put together the Macedonian phalanx (Diod. 16. 3. 1-2).

The new recruits, 4,000 or so in number, received the élite citizenship of being 'Macedones' and formed part of the Assemblies which Philip addressed with an oratorical power, which may be compared to that of Churchill in the darkest hour. The shield-to-shield order was that of the pikeman-phalanx in close order (*synaspismos*), and it follows that the weapons and the equipment which Philip provided were the pike and the

shield (*pelta*) for the pikeman. Constant drill was needed to master the new weapon and the close formation. Training under combat conditions included marching in full equipment and carrying rations for some 55 kilometres a day. One porter only was allowed for the gear of each file of ten men. Each cavalryman was allowed only one groom.[18] We can assume that Philip was training his cavalrymen in the use of the lance, although that is not stated in our sources of information. As we suggested above (p. 19), Philip had probably trained in the new weapons that part of the army which had been under his command since 364, and it is to be assumed that he had formed from it his own Infantry Guardsmen, called 'Pezhetairoi'.[19] He and they had not been with Perdiccas in the disaster of 359, if I am correct in placing Philip's command in Amphaxitis (above, p. 18).[20] Now he was able to win the loyalty of the entire army by his approachability, his rewards and his promises (Diod. 16. 3. 3).

The first major operation by the new army was an invasion of Paeonia early in 358, when Philip learnt of the death of the Paeonian king. 'In a set battle' the pikeman-phalanx won the day, and 'Philip made the Paeonian tribal state subject to the Macedonians' (Diod. 16. 4. 2). While the victory was fresh in their minds, 'Philip convened an assembly, exhorted the men with suitable words to go to war, and led his army of not less than 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry into the territory of the Illyrians' (16. 4. 3). By taking the offensive Philip surprised Bardylis, who had intended to raise great forces and invade Lower Macedonia (16. 2. 6). Now Bardylis offered peace on the *status quo*; Philip refused unless the Illyrians would depart from 'all the Macedonian cities' (16. 4. 4). 'Confident in his previous victories and the prowess of the Illyrians, Bardylis with 10,000 picked infantry and about 500 cavalry was on the way to meet him.' If Philip began his advance in Eordaea and went through the Kirli Dirven pass, the battle took place in the open plain of Lyncus, which was suitable for his pikeman-phalanx.[21]

Realising that he was outclassed in cavalry, Bardylis formed his hoplites into a hollow rectangular formation, so that his men could face any approach by the enemy cavalry and repel them by keeping their own line of spears intact. Because he expected the frontal attack by the enemy infantry which was normal, he placed his finest infantry in the line facing the approaching army. The defect of the rectangular formation was that it inhibited movement. The initiative lay therefore with Philip. He advanced with his pikemen in a phalanx, ten men deep, but at an inclined angle in relation to the Illyrian front line, his own right being advanced and his left retarded. He and his Infantry Guard led the way on the right not directly towards the enemy but at an incline to the right, so that they would be able to charge the enemy's extreme left and left flank. To the right of Philip the massed cavalry rode at the infantrymen's speed. On reaching the desired position, Philip and the Guard and the following brigades charged the left angle and flank of the Illyrian formation, smashed their way into

the hollow space and were followed by the cavalry which charged into the backs and the flanks of the disordered Illyrian rectangle. The enemy fled over the plain, hotly pursued by the Macedonian cavalry. Bardylis escaped, leaving 7,000 dead.[22] The record of forty years was reversed decisively. The Illyrians sued for peace. It was granted on their withdrawal from all the Macedonian cities (i.e. including those of all cantons of Upper Macedonia), and the pact was sealed by Philip taking as his first wife 'the Illyrian Audata', a daughter or granddaughter of Bardylis, who was in his nineties.[23]

'Philip made all the inhabitants as far as Lake Lychnitis (now Lake Ochrid) subject to himself' (Diod. 16. 8. 1). This laconic statement needs to be expanded. What Philip did was to take into the kingdom all the tribal states of Upper Macedonia, including Orestis which returned to its Macedonian alignment. As subjects of the king the Upper Macedonians were henceforth on the same footing as the original Macedonians, in that they could qualify for service in the King's Forces and thereby obtain the élite citizenship. At one bound the territory, the population and the wealth of the kingdom were doubled. Moreover, since the great majority of the new subjects were speakers of the West Greek dialect, the enlarged army was Greek-speaking throughout. Since the *quid pro quo* was that the monarchies of the tribal states (Elimeotae, Orestae, Lyncestae and Pelagones) were abolished, their aristocrats were taken into the court and served at once as cavalrymen and so as 'Macedones' and 'Companions of the King'. The training of infantrymen in these areas as pikemen began forthwith; for some twelve months later Philip was the master of 'a greater force thanks to his victory over the Illyrians' (Polyaen. 4. 2. 17).

To advance 'as far as Lake Lychnitis' was to go beyond the western limit of Lyncus, incorporate some Illyrian-speakers and make use of a double line of mountains as the western frontier of the kingdom. Through it there were only two routes, one following the Wolf's Pass at the toe of Lake Little Prespa, and the other running from Lychnidus on the east side of Lake Ochrid to Heraclea Lyncestis, founded probably by Philip to commemorate his victory. The latter was the route taken later by the Via Egnatia. This frontier was very rarely breached. Of this added territory the southern part was named Eordaea, and the northern part became part of Lyncus.[24] The tribal states administered their own affairs, and the brigades of pikemen were trained in them and each kept its territorial name. Thus Philip managed to conserve local loyalty as a stable factor within the kingdom, and his much increased army was able to ensure his subjects against the marauding Illyrians.

The centre of Bardylis' kingdom was Dardania (Metohija and Kosovo). He had established his sway over the high corridor which extends north and south of Lake Ochrid; and from the latter there was entry west into North Epirus and east into Orestis. By occupying the east side of Lake Ochrid Philip was able to enfilade the route through the corridor and put

a check on raids southwards. The richest and the most developed of the tribal states was the southernmost, Elimeotis. Philip took as his second wife Phila, a member of the former ruling house of the Elimeotae, and he brought that house's fine cavalry into his enlarged army.[25] To the north his frontier was guarded by Mt Golesnitsa, and to the northeast the Paeonians were subject to his rule. Thus in summer 358 he set the framework of the greater Macedonian kingdom; but it would take some years for the revolution to be accepted and for the benefits to accrue.

CHAPTER IV

Philip exploits factions in and wars between city-states, 358-354

1. Philip, Athens and her allies, 358-357

On my analysis of the sources[1] Theopompus, writing with hindsight, inspired the opening sentences of Justin 8, which may be translated as follows.

> While the city-states of Greece longed individually to exercise power over others, they ruined their own power one and all. Rushing headlong into mutual annihilation, they realised only when they were subjugated that the very thing individual states were losing was being lost by them all; for Philip indeed, king of Macedonia, perched as it were on a watch-tower, having laid his ambushes against the liberties of them all, while he fed the flames of inter-state rivalries by affording help to the weaker party, compelled conquerors and conquered alike to accept enslavement to a king.

In autumn 358 at the head of his army Philip entered Thessaly. When the numerous city-states there had been united forcibly by Jason, tyrant of Pherae, Macedonia had been in great danger (Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 4). Now dissension reigned. In each state oligarchic horse-owning aristocrats were at odds with democratic workers, and neighbouring states quarrelled over boundaries. Two groups of states were hostile to one another: those of the inland plain, led by Larissa, had formed a federal system, 'the Thessalian League', and those of the maritime sector were forcibly controlled by the tyrants of Pherae, who were able to tax imports and exports from the Gulf of Pagasae. Both groups sought allies. The Thessalian League had switched from Thebes, its founder, to Athens, the enemy both of Thebes and of Pherae c. 360. The tyrants had allied themselves at first with Athens, but Jason's successor, Alexander, raided Athenian shipping and was on good terms therefore with Thebes. In 358 Alexander was murdered.[2] The Thessalian League appealed to Philip for some help against Pherae, which he provided – thus replacing Athens and assisting the weaker side in Thessaly. During his visit he married Philinna, presumably a member of the aristocratic Aleuadae (see p. 1 above),[3] and he thereby reinforced his alliance with the Thessalian League, which had excellent cavalry and hoplite forces. He was asked again for help by the Aleuadae

in the winter probably of 357 to 356, inflicted a defeat on the tyrants and was assured of the loyal support of the League thereafter.[4]

Another area in which Athens had had influence was Molossia in Epirus. Philip's defeat of Bardylis won for Philip in 358-357 a treaty of alliance with Molossia and the hand of a Molossian princess, Olympias, whom he had first met in Samothrace during an initiation ceremony of the cult of the Cabiri.[5] With his southern and western frontiers secured against Athenian intrigue Philip laid siege to Amphipolis in spring 357, his claim being that the party in power there was hostile to him and had offered many grounds for war (Diod. 16. 8. 2). In Philip's mind that hostility spelt friendship towards Athens, and Philip had no intention of letting Athens occupy so strong and strategic an outpost against his kingdom. His attack, however, was very hazardous; for it might bring about a coalition of Athens, the Chalcidian League and the local Thracian dynast. It was at this time, when 'more dangerous wars were impending', that Philip 'assumed the kingship under compulsion from the people' (Just. 7. 5. 10; see p. 23 above).

Philip's fears were justified, in that, just before he moved, two envoys from Amphipolis reached Athens and asked her to 'sail and take over the city' (D. 1. 8). But once the city was invested by Philip, intervention by Athens was extremely difficult. For the Chalcidian League, outraged by the Athenian cleruchy at Potidaea, did not offer Athens a base or an alliance. Philip's army 'brought up battering-rams against the walls and delivered vigorous and continuous assaults', and meanwhile a Note was sent to Athens, in which Philip 'agreed that Amphipolis was Athenian and said that on taking it by siege he would hand it over' ([D.] 7. 27; cf. D. 23. 116). This diplomatic statement caused Athens to reject overtures from the Chalcidian League later in the siege (D. 2. 6). In late summer 357 Amphipolis fell. Philip exiled his political opponents and treated the Amphipolitans 'generously'.[6] The democratic Assembly continued to act as it had when Amphipolis was independent, and one of its first decisions was to banish two pro-Athenian leaders, together with their children, for ever.[7]

The Athenians were dismayed. They had considered Amphipolis practically impregnable. Iphicrates for three years (368-365) and Timotheus likewise (363, 360 and 359) had failed to overcome its natural strength and its massive walls, and the traditional method of investment and blockade had proved ineffective. Capture by violent and sustained assault was an innovation in warfare on the Greek mainland. Ephorus appreciated the importance of this revolution in siegecraft; for the descriptions of such assault at Amphipolis and at Perinthus by Diodorus were derived from him.[8]

The Athenians still hoped that Philip might hand over Amphipolis not only because of the Note but because of 'the secret organised by Philip which was once on everybody's lips', as Demosthenes was to say in 349 (D. 2. 6). This 'secret' was explained by Theopompus, a contemporary who

made much of Philip's cunning. It was probably in reply to the Note that two envoys were sent by Athens to Philip who was besieging Amphipolis but was at peace with Athens. They and he entered into a secret deal, whereby Philip would hand over Amphipolis and Athens would give him Pydna, an ally of Athens. The deal was kept secret at the time by Philip and by the Council at Athens, so that Pydna would not take fright and be on its guard, and also so that the perfidy of Athens would not be exposed. Later, when Philip had taken Amphipolis, he went on to attack Pydna. After a short siege he captured it. For him the deal was off, and Athens had been outmanoeuvred. The 'secret' may have been maintained by Philip, but it was leaked in Athens, where Philip was denounced as a perjurer.[9] Late in 357 Athens declared war on Philip (Aeschin. 2. 70 and 3. 54).

2. The Chalcidian League and Philip's advance eastwards

Chalcidice was in some respects an offshoot of southern Greece. Its southern part enjoyed the full Mediterranean climate, was rich in olives, figs and other fruits, and had numerous harbours. There was sufficient good arable land to support a very large population. The hinterland and the Athos peninsula carried extensive forests of valuable timber, suitable for ship-building. Gold and silver were mined in east Chalcidice, especially at Stratonice, and copper, iron and lead were available as well as magnesite and chrome.[10] In classical times Chalcidice was occupied by Greek-speaking groups who lived in numerous small city-states. It had not always been so; for the eastern prong (Acte, now Athos) was the refuge of 'Pelasgians, Bisaltae, Crestoni and Edones',[11] who had previously held the peninsula, and the central prong still had the name of a Thracian tribe, the Sithones. But these survivors became bilingual, adopting the language of their Greek-speaking conquerors – namely 'Chalcidians', 'Bottiaei' and 'Greeks in Thrace'.[12]

It was probably in the eleventh and tenth centuries, during the period of migrations, that Ionic-speaking Greeks settled on the central prong and its immediate hinterland. They called themselves 'Chalcidians'.[13] To them and to later settlers south Chalcidice had the special attraction that it offered ports of call for sailing ships *en route* from southern Greece to the Thracian Chersonese and Asia Minor. It was for that reason that Chalcidice was called the region 'towards Thrace'. 'Greeks in Thrace' were colonists planted by Eretria and Chalcis at Mende and Torone and by Achaea at Scione in the late eighth century, by Andros at Acanthus, Sane and Stagira in the mid-seventh century, and by Corinth at Potidaea c. 600; and other colonies were founded, particularly by Chalcis, but dates are lacking. In all these cases their dialects of Greek differed from that of the 'Chalcidians'. Immigrants by land occupied northern and central Chalcidice on both sides of the central range 'Mt Cholomon' late in the seventh

century. These were 'Bottiaei', who had been expelled by the Macedonians from the coastal plain.[14] Their southernmost city was Olynthus. Western Chalcidice was occupied from south to north by the Crousaei, who were Greek-speaking and lived in small city-states, and the people of Anthemus, about whom nothing is known.

The most enterprising of these varied peoples were the 'Chalcidians'. In 432 they were the leaders in a revolt from Athens. They made alliance with the Bottiaei, took over Olynthus from them, and concentrated a number of small city-state populations on its table-like hill. Thereafter Olynthus became the capital city of the 'Chalcidians', who combined to form a tightly-knit federal state. Early in the fourth century they attracted or forced other city-states into their system, but not Acanthus and Apollonia in east Chalcidice, which appealed to Sparta for help. Sparta, aided also by Amyntas of Macedonia and Derdas of Elimeotis, defeated the Chalcidians and disbanded the League in 379. But it was re-established in 377 as an ally of Athens (Tod, *GHI* 125, 101), and it included all the 'Chalcidian' states except Stolus by the late 360s, as we see from the list of Epidaurian Theorodoci. In addition it seems to have taken into its power-block almost all the other peoples of the peninsula; for it issued its own superb coinage, gold on the Attic standard and silver on the Thracian standard, which suggests that it controlled the mines of Stratonice. The only other states which coined then were Aenea and Dicaea in the northwest and Apollonia in the northeast – all three in bronze for local use. On the other hand, the coinage of the Chalcidian League had an international circulation in the Aegean area and in the Balkans. Thus its emblems – the head of Apollo laureate and a tripod on the reverse – were imitated by the mint at Damastium, far inland in the realm of Bardylis.[15]

The Macedonians had good reason to fear the power of the Chalcidian League. For in the 380s its armed forces had captured the eastern part of the coastal plain and had occupied Pella (p. 8 above), and with the revival and expansion of the League those forces were stronger still by 360. They were estimated at 1,000 cavalry, 10,000 hoplites, numerous light-armed skirmishers and some warships,[16] and they had unimpeded access to the coastal plain. It was a blessing for Macedonia that the Chalcidian League was primarily concerned with the power of Athens and her Allies; for Athens had established a cleruchy as a naval base at Potidaea near Olynthus and had captured Torone in 362, and if she could regain possession of Amphipolis she would become a very dangerous neighbour. In 359 Athenian forces attacked Amphipolis yet again but without any success. When Philip attacked Amphipolis in spring 357, as we have seen (p. 30 above), he managed to prevent a coalition of Athens and the Chalcidian League. Even so the Chalcidian League made a defensive alliance with the Grabaei, Philip's Illyrian neighbours, presumably with possible action against Philip in mind.[17] The danger after the fall of Amphipolis was that the coalition would be formed against him. But fortune came to his aid.

Leading members of the Athenian Alliance rebelled in late summer 357, and the fleet of Athens was deployed in the eastern Aegean at the time when Philip was laying siege to Pydna.

When Philip captured and kept Pydna, and when Athens declared war against him, Philip and Athens 'competed for the alliance of the Olynthians', which would be 'decisive in the balance of war, since their state was of great weight and its citizens were very numerous'. This was the considered judgement of Ephorus, whose history was abbreviated by Diodorus (16. 8. 4). Philip acted promptly. He proposed that he and the Chalcidians should enter into a treaty of friendship, and that, if the Chalcidians were agreeable, he would concede to them the use of Anthemus, capture Potidaea with his own army, and hand Potidaea over to them. It was a most generous offer to a state which was already prosperous. Both parties consulted Apollo of Delphi, who commended the treaty and its agreed terms. They then concluded the treaty, binding themselves with the most solemn religious oaths. A penalty clause invoked 'many evils' on anyone breaking the oaths. The only other clause known to us from later events was that neither party would negotiate separately with Athens. Copies of the treaty were set up at Olynthus, Dium and Delphi during the winter of 357-356. The consultation of Delphi and the publication at Delphi, unusual in city-state treaties, were probably required by Philip.[18]

It was fortunate for Philip that he had the alliance of the League and that Athens was engaged in the Aegean, because three inland states made common cause against him: Grabus the Illyrian, king of the Grabaei and probably adjacent tribes; Lyppeius, king of the Paeonians; and Cetriporis the Thracian, son of Berisades. Had they been able to deploy all their forces together and invade Macedonia, they might have done as much damage as Sitalces had done in 429. But Philip was too quick for them. He defeated some of Cetriporis' forces in early summer 356, as we shall describe later. In July 356, after a time-consuming exchange of envoys, Athens contracted an alliance with the three kings against Philip. But she was too late. In July/August Philip's general Parmenio defeated Grabus in 'a great battle', in which the pikeman-phalanx no doubt prevailed again. Lyppeius was defeated separately (the time is not known) and he was compelled 'to side with the Macedonians'.[19]

I turn back now to Philip's undertaking to deliver Potidaea to the Chalcidian League. The city was so well defended by its natural situation, wall-circuit, and Athenian garrison, that the Chalcidians had failed to capture it by assault or by blockade. Philip's attack, however, forced it to capitulate in June/July 356, when help from Athens was on the way. He handed over the city, its land and its properties to the Chalcidians; he sold the Potidaeans as slaves; and he sent the Athenian garrison back to Athens free of ransom.[20] There men remembered that it had cost Athens more than two years of blockade, heavy casualties and 2,000 talents to capture Potidaea in 430/429.

Fig. 4. Philip's kingdom and its gold and silver deposits

It was probably earlier in the year that Philip was invited by the citizens of Crenides to come to their help, as they were being besieged by Thracians. Crenides lay some 65 kilometres east of Amphipolis and some 16 kilometres inland from Neapolis, a Greek city-state. It was founded c. 360 by Thasos, the capital of the offshore island. Since Neapolis and Thasos were allies of Athens, Crenides would normally have appealed to Athens, but in the early months of 356 Athens had no fleet at sea. The chief importance of Crenides was that it had gold mines and issued gold coins and silver coins. Philip was quick to go to its aid. He defeated the local Thracians and those of the Odrysian king Cersobleptes, improved its fortifications, and added some settlers to strengthen the defence. He returned after the fall of Potidaea, renamed the city 'Philippi after himself', increased its population with a large number of settlers, and improved the output of its mines. Then or soon afterwards he defeated Cetriporis, reduced him to vassal status and advanced to the lowest part of the river Nestus. Here the river formed the eastern limit of the greater kingdom of Macedonia. It was a barrier in itself; the river-gorge inland was impassable; and there was a second line of defence at the pass of Acontisma.[21]

During the advance eastwards or soon after the development of Crenides Philip destroyed two Greek cities on the coast, Galepsus and Apollonia, and made a third, Oesyme a colony of Thasos, into 'a city of Macedones' (the expression will be explained in the next section).[22] These cities had flourished as the exporters of products from the rich hinterland round Mt Pangaeum, which had excellent land and, above all, mines of gold and silver. It is evident that Philip was taking control of this region. He began also to develop a navy, probably of pentecontors and triacontors, which were suitable for raiding. In summer 355 Athens was reduced to impotence. She conceded the independence of the rebels, including Byzantium, Perinthus and Selymbria, and her colonists fled from the Chersonese. During this period, according to Aeschines, 'Philip, setting out from Macedonia, was contending with us no longer for Amphipolis, but already for Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros' (islands occupied by Athenian colonists).[23] On the coast of the Thermaic Gulf it was probably at this time that Dicaea and Aenea ceased to coin in bronze and were absorbed into the kingdom. Methone alone was independent, and Philip laid siege to it at the end of 355.

The site of Methone, an eighth-century colony of Eretrians from Euboea, was discovered only recently. The city-state must have been populous and vigorous to control its own arable land, and its walls must have been massive, because there were only minor natural defences. The siege was conducted with siege-engines (battering-rams and mechanically drawn bows), penthouses covering sappers, scaling-ladders, slingers and archers providing covering fire. Philip was struck by an arrow from a catapult and lost the sight of his right eye. 'The defenders were compelled to hand over the city to the king on condition that the citizens should depart from

Methone with one garment each.' A passage in Justin for which I have argued that the source was Marsyas Macedon described the attitude of Philip. 'The wound did not make him slower in war or angrier with his enemies, so much so that a few days later he granted them peace at their request and was not only restrained but also mild to the vanquished' (7. 6. 15).[24]

3. The development and organisation of the expanding kingdom, 358-354

Alexander gave an excellent summary of his father's work in these opening years. He was addressing his Macedonian soldiers in a mutinous Assembly:

> Philip found you nomadic and lacking in resources, the majority of you wearing sheepskins and pasturing your few sheep on the mountains and fighting for these unsuccessfully against Illyrians and Triballians and the neighbouring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of sheepskins, brought you down from the mountains to the plains, made you worthy opponents of the adjacent barbarians, so that you relied on your own courage rather than on positions of natural strength, as you had done, for your survival; he made you into inhabitants of towns and into an orderly people by introducing good laws and good habits. He changed you from being the slaves and subjects into becoming the commanders (*hegemones*) of those very barbarians, who until then had been plundering your property and carrying you off. He added to Macedonia much of Thrace, captured the best situated places on the coast, developed trade for his territory, and enabled you to work the mines without fear (Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 2-3).

In his opening remarks Alexander was addressing the Macedones who had been enlisted from Upper Macedonia; for it was there that transhumant pastoralism was practised on a large scale, and that the Illyrians raided triumphantly. Philip had encouraged the Upper Macedonian shepherd-groups to settle in the plains in towns, where life was orderly under the rule of law and men were educated for service in the armed forces. The value of the towns was reflected in the names of the cavalrymen and infantrymen from Upper Macedonia: *asthippoi* meaning 'townsmen-cavalry', and *asthetairoi* meaning 'townsmen-infantry', the latter comprising half of the Macedonian pikeman-phalanx of Alexander in Asia.[25] Alexander was referring in his speech to the Illyrians incorporated in the area between Lyncus-Pelagonia and Lake Ochrid and to the Thracians in the area between Bisaltia and the Nestus, and we shall see in what sense the Macedonians became their commanders. The places on the coast were the Greek cities we have mentioned from Pydna to Oesyme, and the mines were those of the greater kingdom, since all precious ores belonged to the king by right.

As Philip advanced he laid down the lines of organisation. Existing

administrative bodies were left to manage their own affairs, as in the original kingdom: councils in the tribal states of Upper Macedonia, democratic institutions in Greek cities (e.g. Amphipolis), king and courtiers in Paeonia, tribal institutions among the Bisaltae and among other tribal groups, which thereby kept their identity into the Roman period.[26] There was no attempt to impose a universal language, religion or legal system. The king with his deputies and the Assembly of Macedones conducted the foreign policy and passed regulations for all persons in the kingdom, whose universal prerogative was a right of appeal to the king. Thus Alexander was justified in saying that the Macedones became 'the commanders'. Similarly Diodorus described various peoples 'being made obedient to', 'added to', or 'paying a tax to the Macedones'.[27]

A distinction was made between those who joined the kingdom willingly or through alliance and those who were subjugated. The members of the tribal states of Upper Macedonia were accepted by Philip and by the Macedonians of the original kingdom as equals in the King's Forces, in the Assembly of Macedones and in local administration. There was one survival of privilege: the Infantry Guard of *pezhetairoi* was recruited only from the *pezhetairoi* brigades of the old kingdom, and the Guardsmen seem to have maintained the use of the Macedonian dialect.[28] Crenides-Philippi, having been saved as an ally, continued to coin in its own name and to treat with the king by sending envoys as from an independent state. Those Illyrians and Thracians who were subjugated were compelled to pay a part of the produce, probably a tithe, and to obey the orders of the Macedonian state without being entitled to send envoys and negotiate. A subjugated Greek city-state might be treated 'generously' (e.g. Amphipolis) or harshly (e.g. Galepsus).

Philip made separate arrangements for land and for people. The cities of the old kingdom, the peoples of Upper Macedonia and those of an allied city such as Philippi owned their own land outright. As king, Philip owned extensive lands within the old kingdom (of which the fertile plain called Anthemus was a well-known example)[29] and within Upper Macedonia. Moreover, the land of all peoples defeated in war was his possession 'won by the spear'. Philip granted the use or the produce but not the ownership of parcels of royal land to individuals or to peoples at his own discretion. We have learnt how he dealt with land and persons at and near Philippi from a recent inscription, which recorded rulings by Alexander but cited some by Philip, made no doubt when Philip increased the population of the city in 356. Some land he had given to Philippi to possess (*echein*); other land he had permitted Philippi to cultivate (*nemesthai*); and other land had been granted to Thracians to cultivate and evidently to keep its produce (*karpizesthai*). Philippi had to pay a rent for the land it was to cultivate, and the Thracians no doubt paid a tithe of the produce.[30] While the Philippians lived in a free city, the Thracians generally were living in villages on land they had once owned but had lost to the king.

Another recent inscription informs us how 'a city of Macedones' was created. It was probably in winter 335-334 that Alexander 'gave to Macedones Calindoea and the lands round Calindoea, namely the lands of Thamiscus, Camacae and Tripoeae' (three *poleis*). He gave Calindoea (city and land) to the Macedones, as Philip had given Potidaea (city and land) to the Chalcidians in 356; and he gave them the lands only of the other three *poleis*. The presumption is that he moved the population of Calindoea elsewhere but that he left the populations of the three *poleis* living in their cities and cultivating the land for the benefit partly of the Macedones and partly to maintain themselves. Thus the subjugated Bottiaeans of the three *poleis* were being treated as Philip had treated the Thracians near Philippi, except that part of the produce went not to the king but to the Macedones of Calindoea. We understand now how 'a city of Macedones' was created at Oesyme, and we may conjecture that the Greeks of Oesyme lived on the land and cultivated it on the same conditions as the Bottiaeans of the three *poleis*. An important aspect which should be emphasised is that the Macedones who were owners of the city's land were not themselves peasant-cultivators but soldiers or ex-soldiers living on tithes or rents and capable of defending their city.

The cases of Calindoea and Oesyme help us to see what happened at Methone. For a siege and assaults Philip must have rewarded his troops. At Potidaea, where he handed city and property to the Chalcidians, he sold the Potidaeans as slaves, probably to use the money for rewards. At Pydna it is probable that the city was looted, since unpleasant things happened even to the Pydnaeans who admitted him into the city. At Methone the population left the city with one garment apiece, in order that the troops might loot everything else (*diarpasas*). Philip then 'razed the city and distributed the territory to the Macedonians'. These last words mean that Methone became 'a city of Macedones'. At Calindoea it seems that Philip left it to the Assembly of Macedones to decide who should be sent to the city. At Methone Philip himself allocated parcels of land perhaps primarily to soldiers who had distinguished themselves or been wounded. How is this compatible with the remark in Justin, drawing on Marsyas Macedon, that Philip was even 'mild to the vanquished'? The explanation must be that the Greeks of Methone were not deported or sold as slaves but were allowed to live on the land and pay part of the produce to the owners, the Macedones, these being soldiers or ex-soldiers under arms. The site of the new town was a little more than a kilometre to the north on a gentle slope, apparently unfortified.[31]

What happened to names seems not to have been significant. Amphipolis stayed, Oesyme became Emathia, Crenides became Philippi, Potidaea stayed, Pydna stayed, Methone disappeared. As we mentioned above (p. 6), everyone in the kingdom had his local citizenship or tribal affiliation. If he was a member of the King's Forces, he added 'Macedon' to his name, so that Marsyas Pellaios became 'Marsyas Pellaios Macedon' and Nearchos

Amphipolites 'Nearchos Amphipolites Macedon'. On the other hand, this addition did not imply that the city was a 'city of Macedones'. The same was true of Alexander Lyncestes Macedon or of Perdiccas of Orestis Macedon.[32]

Rewards (*doreai*) and promises were important for the Macedonian soldiers. Ancient authors mentioned large rewards for the Companions of Philip and Alexander mostly in the form of the produce of land; thus Theopompus wrote of 800 Companions enjoying the produce of land (*karpizesthai*) which would compare with the profits of 10,000 Greek owners of the largest estates of good land, and Plutarch had Alexander distribute as gifts 'land, a village, a revenue of a hamlet or of a harbour'. The recipient did not necessarily work the land which remained royal property and was probably cultivated as before by local Greeks, Thracians or Illyrians. What he took was the produce, even as another Companion took the harbour-dues which previously had gone to the crown. A later king might continue the gift to a Companion's descendants or terminate it. Such grants of land varied in size. In 181 land granted to one Companion was reallotted to nine or more men.[33]

The starting points for the development of trade were the founding of towns which became centres of exchange and of agricultural settlement, especially in Upper Macedonia; the incorporation in the kingdom of Greek harbour-cities which had previously exacted a toll on import and export; and the exploitation of mineral wealth. We shall describe the growth of towns and agriculture later (p. 112 below). By 354 Philip possessed all the harbours on the west and north coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, so that he could trade in timber, minerals and other products directly with the purchasers. Pydna, strongly fortified, was the chief harbour for the export of Pierian timber, and Pella for timber floated down the Axius from the hinterland. His navy of small warships was well fitted to deal with piracy. Amphipolis controlled exports from the Strymon basin, and Emathia those from the Pangaean region. The incorporation of Paeonia and western Thrace added enormously to production within the kingdom, and the draining of marshlands and the control of river-floods brought much new land into agricultural use.[34]

The working of the mines was revolutionised according to Diodorus, drawing on Ephorus, when Philip enlarged Crenides and called it Philippi, that is in 356 on my interpretation.

'Philip increased the yield of the gold mines in the territory of Philippi, until then utterly paltry and insignificant, by improving the equipment to such an extent that they could bring him a revenue of more than 1,000 talents a year. In consequence of this he quickly amassed a fortune and raised the Macedonian kingdom to a high pitch of greatness, because he had an abundance of money.'

In his last year or two Perdiccas coined only in bronze. Danegeld and gifts after his death were made probably in gold (available in Kilkis and

near Lete) in the form of ingots, and a stock of Perdiccas' bronze coins may have sufficed for the reign of Amyntas IV. The suggestion that some silver coins attributed to Amyntas III should be transferred to Amyntas IV[35] is unlikely to be correct, because there were no silver mines within the old kingdom. Recently a bronze coin bearing Philip's name has been published by C. Hersh: it had the same emblems and was struck at the same mint as Perdiccas' bronze coins but it was 'in a seemingly different denomination'. Hersh argued that this coin counted in favour of Philip being elected king in 359. However, it is also possible that Philip began to coin in bronze as king in 357 or 356, and that he then used the type and mint of Perdiccas. The evidence of coin hoards has indicated that Philip began to issue gold and silver coins in 356, as the passage in Diodorus implied. He changed the standard to Attic in gold and Thracian in silver, in order to become the intermediary in trade between the Athens-dominated Aegean area and Central Europe. His earliest coins had the Thasian emblems of the Crenides-Philippi coins with an occasional change (e.g. introducing a springing lion and a trident on the reverse). On some silver coins he had a racehorse with a naked jockey, celebrating his victory at the Olympic Games of 356, and this was so also on the larger bronze pieces.[36]

In 358 Philip took over an area east of Lake Ochrid which contained at least one of the silver mines of Damastium. The Damastini continued to issue their fine silver tetradrachms (p. 22 above) which were the strongest currency in the northwest Balkan area. But the sign of Philip's control appeared in the names of two Macedonians which were inscribed in brief or in full on the apparently autonomous coins of Damastium and Philippi.[37]

The territorial expansion came in two stages. The kingdom of 359 was almost doubled in 358; and that enlarged kingdom was increased by nearly a third through gains up to 355. The total number of the king's subjects probably trebled between 359 and 355; for Paeonia and the Strymon basin were thickly populated.[38] The King's Forces were doubled through the recruitment of infantry from the Greek-speaking areas of Upper Macedonia (in modern terminology West Macedonia). It was this 'greater force' which enabled Philip to capture Amphipolis and make his eastward expansion, On the other hand, he did not recruit cavalry or infantry for the King's Forces from the subjugated or free Greek cities. It was probably later in his reign that he recruited light cavalry from the Paeonians and the Thracians, but not to be members of the King's Forces. The future was to lie in the hands of the king and the Greek-speaking Macedones of the King's Forces.

4. Life, education and art at the Macedonian court

Many features of the Macedonian court seemed strange to city-state Greeks. Whereas they were monogamous, the king was polygamous. He married 'with war in mind', or as we should say with policy in mind, since

we are not almost continually at war.[39] For that reason he usually married members of a foreign dynasty. His wives were all queens, and his children by them were all princes and princesses. Philip had taken four wives – none from the old kingdom – by 357. Before he died, he took three or four more, of whom only one was of the old kingdom. Philip had 'many sons recognised in accordance with royal custom'. The leading lady at court was the Queen Mother. She played a prominent part in public life, as we have seen in the case of Philip's mother, Eurydice (p. 17 above). The mother of the king's chosen heir might give herself airs, as Olympias probably did, but her position was still unofficial; for the Assembly of Macedones, not the king, elected the successor. The queens did not attend state dinners. They lived in the domestic quarters and made their menfolk's clothes.[40] Some queens of Greek speech may have been illiterate, as Eurydice was at first, and Philip's wives of other languages – Illyrian, Getic and probably Scythian – will have reckoned it sufficient to learn to speak Greek.

The princes were trained for responsibility in the School of Pages. A prince at the age of fourteen and sons of leading courtiers at that age entered the School as a year-class, lived as boarders with the king, and graduated on reaching eighteen. In their final year (perhaps earlier) they waited on the king at sacrifice and at table, guarded him at night, joined on foot in the royal hunt, and fought in battle alongside the king. They wore the traditional Macedonian dress, which included the distinctive hat, the *kausia*.[41] Discipline was very strict. Misbehaviour was punished with a beating by the king but only by him. Philip was said once to have killed a boy who disobeyed a military order. To the Greeks of a city-state this form of upbringing was inconceivable. In their society only slaves waited at table and were flogged for misbehaviour. The sons of the well-to-do were educated at home, and their teachers were usually slaves. Life was by comparison free and easy in a democratic state. Macedonians saw the School as 'a training ground for commanders and administrators', and they probably viewed the risk of homosexual relations between the king or his advisers and the boys as quite acceptable. Greeks thought that to put young boys at the mercy of men was to invite homosexual abuse.[42]

'The boys were trained in all aspects of liberal education' (Curt. 8. 6. 2 'omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium'). Socrates and Plato were said to have been invited to the court, and Euphraeus, a pupil of Plato, gave instruction there in philosophy in the 360s. Later in Philip's reign Alexander and no doubt the boys of his year-class were instructed by Aristotle, by an Acarnanian called Lysimachus, and by a relative of Olympias, Leonidas, who checked that she had not put goodies in Alexander's luggage. They all won the affection of Alexander, who regarded Leonidas as a Mr Chips. The curriculum included the study of the finest Greek literature, especially the epics of Homer. This liberal education was not without effect. For Parmenio wrote a history of the Illyrian wars (probably after his defeat of Grabus), and Ptolemy and Marsyas Macedon who attended



Note Those who became king of Macedonia are in italics.

Fig. 5. Philip's wives and descendants

the School of Pages with Alexander wrote histories of considerable importance.

The Macedonian court attracted leading Greek writers and artists. The finest lyric poets (Pindar, Bacchylides and Melanippides), the ablest historians (Herodotus and Thucydides), and the founder of scientific medicine (Hippocrates) made visits. In the reign of Archelaus Euripides lived in Macedonia and was made a Companion of the king. He produced two plays in the theatre at Aegeae, 'Bacchae' and 'Archelaus', and he was succeeded by another leading playwright, Agathon. A contemporary writer of epic (Choerilus) and a leading musician (Timotheus) attended the court. Particularly famous was Zeuxis, who painted frescoes for the palace of

Archelaus. No doubt he was paid generously by Archelaus, who was said to have given Choerilus a superb salary by Greek standards.[43] Yet the Macedonian court was portrayed as a sink of barbaric iniquity by some Greek writers. Plato, writing c. 390, chose Archelaus as his example of a wicked despot: the son of a slave mother, the murderer of an uncle and that uncle's son, and the drowner of his own half-brother in a well. Theopompus gave a fantastic description of the 'Friends and Companions of Philip' as 'practitioners of every kind of wickedness and beastliness, addicted to drinking and dicing, and not so much soldiers as sodomites'.[44]

The Macedonians and their Balkan neighbours drank their own forms of beer and spirits and took their wine neat, whereas the southern Greeks drank only wine and that mixed with water. It was the king's practice to entertain his Companions to all-male dinners, at which there was heavy drinking; indeed a remarkable feature of the late fourth-century palace at Aegeae was a series of rooms for such parties surrounding the central court. Contemporary Athenians preferred the company of dancing-girls and slave prostitutes at their wine-parties. They regarded the Macedonian orgies as barbaric. They did not understand or did not accept the fact that the king and his commanders were bonded together in this way, rather as a colonel and his officers are in an Officers Mess in wartime.

Objective evidence of culture at the court was very limited until the discovery of the Royal Tombs at Vergina in 1977. One relied mainly on the superb coinage of the kings from Alexander I to Philip, which excelled in portraying the heads of deities, especially Heracles and Zeus, thoroughbred horses, and hunting episodes. There were also fine examples of gold jewellery and of the painting of flora on the interior walls of tombs. In 1977 and 1978 Professor M. Andronikos excavated under the Great Mound a tumulus which covered three tombs, evidently of a branch of the royal house. Since the site was new, the tombs could only be those of the dynasty which began with Amyntas III, and the earliest tomb was therefore that of Amyntas III, who died in 370-369.[45] It had been robbed, but frescoes survived on three of the interior walls of the large box-shaped tomb (a cist-tomb being the technical term). Their artistry shows beyond dispute that the finest school of painting at that date was in Macedonia.

The painter used only four colours of great purity. The grasp of perspective is amazing, especially when one remembers the speed with which the painter had to work before the plaster dried. The subjects are the rape of Persephone by Pluto, the god of the underworld, who is driving a four-horse chariot with Hermes leading the way; the mourning of Demeter for her daughter; and the three Fates standing by. They were inspired by the Orphic religion, which included a faith in an afterlife for its initiates. Emotions are vividly portrayed. Pluto is ferocious, Persephone desperate, her handmaid Cynane appalled, and Demeter heartbroken. This masterpiece of painting is in the tradition of Zeuxis, whose work is known only from descriptions by ancient authors. Lucian, for instance, praised the

subtle gradation of colour from the human to the animal body of a female Centaur, the sheen of the grapes which were said to have deceived birds, the wild look of the God of the North Wind, and the flowing tears of Menelaus abandoned by Helen.[46] It is beyond doubt that the school founded by Zeuxis flourished at the Macedonian court long after his death and led the world (see also p. 180 below).

CHAPTER V

Philip's involvement with the city-states, 354-348

1. The Sacred War and the defeat of Onomarchus

Alliance with the Thessalian League brought Philip into the orbit of Central Greece. There Delphi played a political as well as a religious role. The protection of the shrine (and of an earlier one at Anthela near Thermopylae) was vested in the so-called Amphictyones ('dwellers-around'), who had in the distant past been the members of twelve nearby tribes. By 360 the administrative organ was the Amphictyonic Council, on which each 'tribe' had two votes. About half of these votes were held by 'tribes' north of Thermopylae, ranging from the Oetaei to the Perrhaebi. This group tended to take its line from its strongest member, the Thessalians. The 'tribes' to the south had greater military power but were divided by animosities; for they included the Boeotians (with two votes), the Athenians who had one vote of the 'Ionians' (Euboea had the other), and the Spartans who occasionally exercised one vote conceded to them by the Dorians of 'the Metropolis', i.e. of Doris.[1] During most of the 360s the Boeotians, led by Thebes, had controlled a majority of votes on the Council, because they had close alliances with Phocis, Locris, Euboea and Thessaly. In 363/362 the predominance of Thebes on the Council was recognised by a grant of precedence in consulting the oracle at Delphi.

In 362 Thebes lost her greatest general and statesman, Epaminondas, in the inconclusive battle of Mantinea, when Thebes and her allies faced Athens and Sparta and their allies. Xenophon ended his history of Greek affairs at that point with these words: 'after the battle there was still greater indecision and confusion than before in Greece.' As a hostage Philip had observed the great achievements of Thebes and her control of the Delphic Amphictyony, and thereafter he watched the growing confusion from Macedonia. In 361 Athens made an alliance with the Thessalian League; in 357 she drove Theban forces out of Euboea; and she had a traditional friendship with Phocis, which had not sent troops to help Thebes in the battle of Mantinea. Thus the position of Thebes on the Amphictyonic Council was being eroded. But in summer 357 Athens was crippled by the outbreak of the Social War, which lasted till summer 355. In April 356 Thebes seized the opportunity to discipline the opposing

party-leaders of Phocis by getting the Amphictyonic Council to impose a swingeing fine on Phocis for some offence against the god of Delphi. The Phocian leader, Philomelus, with the approval of Sparta which had also been fined heavily, occupied Delphi in early summer and hired mercenary soldiers. He beat off some Boeotian attacks and obtained alliances with Sparta and Athens. In October 355, when Athens was impotent, Thebes persuaded the Amphictyonic Council to declare a 'Sacred War' against Phocis – 'Sacred' in the sense that the desecrators of the god's shrine would be executed without mercy. Thebes expected a quick victory. But the declaration was to cause 'much confusion and division throughout all of Greece'.[2]

The Thessalians (the League and Pherae combining) and the other northern tribes had voted with Thebes. In spring 354, when Philomelus, having appropriated the temple monies, hired 10,000 mercenaries and overcame the forces of Locris and Boeotia, he went on to defeat separately the 6,000 troops which had been sent south by the Thessalians and their group of 'tribes'. This disaster split the Thessalians into two camps. The tyrants of Pherae obtained the alliance of Athens and took the side of Phocis. The Thessalian League asked Philip for help against Pherae. Accordingly, after the fall of Methone in midsummer 354, Philip entered Thessaly, laid siege to Pagasae (the port of Pherae), and captured it in the autumn shortly before the arrival of a relief-force sent by Athens. Philip was now firmly on the Theban side in the Sacred War. The friendly relations with Thebes which had operated in 365, when Macedonia supplied timber for a Boeotian navy, had probably never lapsed, because Philip had been mainly at war with Athens, the enemy of Thebes, and he and other Macedonians had guest-friends of the 360s in Thebes.[3]

In autumn 354 the Boeotians and their southern allies raised 13,000 men and defeated the Phocians at Neon. Philomelus committed suicide. In the winter Philip 'joined the alliance of Thebes' (Paus. 10. 2. 5), and he offered free passage through Macedonia to a Boeotian army. For, thinking that the war was as good as over, Thebes sent Pammenes and 5,000 men to serve under Artabazus in Asia Minor against the Persian king and thereby to earn large subsidies; for the Sacred War had cost her a lot in citizen soldiers and in finance. On the way, in spring 353, Pammenes met Philip, who was at war with a Thracian king, Amadocus, in the country east of the Nestus river. Amadocus was an ally of Athens and an enemy of Cersobleptes, who held the easternmost part of Thrace. Philip and Cersobleptes came to an amicable arrangement for Pammenes to proceed on his way to the Chersonese, which Cersobleptes then held, and to cross to Asia. Philip escorted Pammenes as far as the territory of Abdera. On turning back Philip despoiled the territories of two Greek cities, Abdera and Maronea, which were allies of Athens. But he then found his fleet of small warships threatened by an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes, stationed at Neapolis. He manned four warships (probably triacontors)

with superlative oarsmen and sent them ahead to row off Neapolis. The twenty triremes came out to capture them. But by rowing their utmost the four warships drew the triremes far out to sea, and meanwhile the fleet of Philip, which probably included some merchant ships, hastened past Neapolis to the Macedonian port, Emathia. Even the four warships escaped.[4]

Thebes had misjudged the situation in the Sacred War. A new leader, Onomarchus, hired more mercenaries and issued 'subsidies' to his allies. In spring 353 he forced the Locrians out of the war, and pinned down the depleted forces of Boeotia. He bribed some Thessalian leaders to back out of the war; but the opposing leaders invited Philip to intervene. With his own army and the forces of the Thessalian League Philip attacked Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae, who then appealed to Onomarchus and was reinforced by Phayllus (a brother of Onomarchus) and 7,000 mercenaries. Philip won a major battle, and Phayllus was expelled from Thessaly. But in autumn 353 Onomarchus appeared with his full army and in conjunction with the Thessalians of Pherae defeated Philip twice.

The second defeat was due to the superior generalship of Onomarchus. He drew up his phalanx of hoplites on level ground in front of a crescent-shaped hill and on the tips of the crescent he concealed stone-throwing catapults. When Philip's phalanx of pikemen approached, Onomarchus' phalanx made a feigned withdrawal. Philip's phalanx charged impetuously and were suddenly struck by the concentrated fire of the stone-throwers; for in their close order the pikemen were a perfect target. As they struggled to turn around with their unwieldy pikes, Onomarchus ordered his phalangites to charge. The Macedonians escaped with considerable loss (saved from worse by the cavalry, one supposes). There was some sort of mutiny. Philip took his men out of Thessaly and managed to restore their morale. He said that he had withdrawn 'like a ram, to butt the harder'.[5]

Onomarchus now appeared to be invincible. He captured Orchomenus and Coronea. If his triumphant army and the citizen forces of Athens could combine in 352, they would overrun the rest of Boeotia and have a fair chance of destroying Thebes. But Philip moved first. He laid siege to Pherae in the spring. The tyrants appealed to Onomarchus and Athens for help; once they had driven Philip out, they would unite Thessaly and use the Thessalian forces to finish the Sacred War. Meanwhile Philip persuaded the Thessalian League to place all its forces under his command. While he was engaged in the siege, news reached him that Onomarchus was approaching. His plan was to intercept Onomarchus before Onomarchus could join forces with the cavalry and the mercenaries of Pherae. He succeeded in doing so, probably by marching at night with 3,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry to the coast south of Pherae. Onomarchus came north along the coast, keeping contact with the supporting Athenian fleet, and entered the 'Crocus Field', as the plain was called. There Philip barred the way, his men wearing laurel wreaths as warriors of Apollo. Before any

Athenian troops could be landed from the fleet, the 3,000 cavalry mopped up the 500 cavalry of Onomarchus and attacked the open wing and rear of Onomarchus' phalanx of 20,000 hoplites, while its front was pinned down by the charge of the Macedonian pikeman-phalanx. Victory was complete. Of the Phocians and their mercenaries 6,000 lay dead, and 3,000 were taken prisoner. In the past both sides in the Sacred War had sometimes killed their prisoners. Philip now did so. On his order the 3,000 were put to death by drowning, a traditional punishment for sacrilege.[6] Whether from conviction or for political ends, Philip and his Macedonians were playing their part as avengers of Apollo.

2. The organisation of Thessaly and the advance to Thermopylae

The victory over Onomarchus brought Philip 'an incredible amount of glory in the eyes of all nations', that is of all who were opposed to Phocis. They expected Philip to advance straightway into eastern Locris, join hands with Thebes and conquer the Phocians before they could recruit more mercenaries. Philip acted otherwise. He moved his army against Pherae. The Athenian fleet was unable to send troops into Pherae, because its port, Pagasae, had been captured by Philip earlier (p. 46 above). The tyrants were isolated. They surrendered to him Pherae and cities allied with them on condition of a safe passage for themselves and their 2,000 mercenaries. Although it was obvious that they would join the Phocians, Philip accepted the terms rather than undertake a costly siege. There were no reprisals against the citizens of Pherae; for the blame was pinned on the tyrants. As a sign of reconciliation Philip married Nicesipolis, a niece of Jason. For he intended, like Jason, to unify Thessaly.[7]

The basis of unification was to be the Thessalian League, of which most members had been loyal supporters of Apollo and Philip. However, some city-states had deserted the League after the victory of Onomarchus in 353, and had gone to war with their neighbours. Philip now helped those neighbours, for instance Pharsalus, to overcome resistance and to punish those who had been guilty of betrayal and of sacrilege. Leading citizens of Tricca and Pharcadon were banished for ever. Parts at least of the populations of Pelinna, Crannon, some cities in the Enipeus valley, and Gomphi were sold into slavery. Settlers loyal to the League and to Philip took their lands, and Gomphi was renamed 'Philippopolis'. It seems that the decisions in these reprisals were made formally not by Philip as king of Macedonia but by the Thessalian League. It was claimed that Philip kept a low profile, and that '*he* did not lay cities waste'. Theopompus, however, did not exonerate Philip: he accused him of bad faith towards city-states which had once been his allies (in Just. 8. 3. 1-5).

The net result of these reprisals was that the Thessalian League in its reconstituted form was solidly in favour of Philip, elected him to be its

president (*archon*) for life, and entrusted to him the revenues which accrued from its harbours and its markets. Further, Philip took control of Perrhaebia and Magnesia, so that his territory reached Pagasae, which he retained as his own possession.[8] As president of the League he had at his disposal the population and the resources of Thessaly which were at least equal to the population and the resources of the Macedonian kingdom of 359. A system of unparalleled power was being created in Northern Greece; for Macedonia and Thessaly together were able to muster at least 3,000 superb cavalry and 30,000 heavy infantry.

3. Further expansion and the defeat of the Chalcidian League

While Philip was busy in Thessaly, Phayllus was rebuilding the forces of Phocis. He recruited large numbers of mercenaries at double the previous rate of pay and survived vigorous attacks by the Boeotians. At the same time he was sending money to his supporters abroad, and he received 1,000 soldiers from Sparta, 2,000 from Achaea and 5,000 from Athens, as well as the 2,000 mercenaries from Pherae. That the intention of Sparta and Athens was to prevent Philip and the Thessalians from invading Phocis was obvious from the position which they adopted at the Pass of Thermopylae, and from their claim that they would follow the example of Leonidas and the Greeks in resisting the advance of the barbarians in 480. Philip did not offer them the opportunity of showing comparable heroism; for when he came south in summer 352 and found them ready to defend the Pass, he withdrew without engaging. Once he had gone, the allied forces left Phayllus to his own devices.[9]

Athens was not to muster 5,000 citizen soldiers to face Philip again until 339-338. The expedition to Thermopylae was by her standards a major one; for she manned 50 triremes to transport the troops, and the financial cost totalled some 200 talents. What she feared was that the armies of Macedonia, Thessaly and Boeotia would invade Attica and place Athens under siege. Achaea and Sparta were afraid of an invasion of the Peloponnese, where many states would side with the avengers of Apollo; for the action of the Phocians had split the Greek states into two factions. Philip could certainly have forced his way south, but only at the cost of heavy casualties, of strengthening Thebes, and of losing any chance of a peaceful settlement with Athens. His decision not to do so appears to have been wise. But it was at the expense of the Boeotians and the Locrians, who fought on against the Phocians and their mercenaries in a series of minor battles.[10]

Soon after his withdrawal Philip appeared with an army in Thrace. The situation there had changed since his return from Abdera in spring 353 (p. 46 above). During that summer Athens' general, Chares, had captured Sestus in the Chersonese, executed all adult males and sold the rest of the population as slaves; and he had established friendly relations with

Cersobleptes, the Odrysian king, who had fallen out with Philip and recognised Athens' claim to Amphipolis. More to the point, Cersobleptes had ceded to Athens the cities of the Chersonese, all except Cardia on the isthmus. Athenian settlers came out to occupy Sestus and some other cities early in 352. Thus Philip campaigned that autumn in Thrace to anticipate any move by Athens and Cersobleptes against his possessions in Thrace. Gaining alliance with Perinthus, Byzantium, and probably Cardia he laid siege to Heraeum Teichos (a strongpoint on the coast of the Sea of Marmara). Thereupon Athens voted to despatch a citizen army and forty triremes, but they never did so, because news came that Philip was ill and had abandoned operations.[11] But he had removed any threat to his eastern frontier, and he had paved the way to gain control of the Bosporus and threaten the corn-route by sea on which Athens depended for her food-supply.

The independent neighbour closest to the heart of Philip's kingdom was the Chalcidian League. The alliance with the League had been made in the winter of 357, when both parties had had reason to fear Athens. That fear dwindled after the collapse of Athenian seapower in 355. The alliance brought economic benefits to both parties. The Macedonian ports on the coast of the Thermaic Gulf were off the main shipping lanes, which ran from Euboea to the Chersonese, one via Scyros, Lemnos and Imbros, and the other via Sciathos, the prongs of Chalcidice and Thasos. Thus the Chalcidian ports provided the best markets of exchange for Macedonian exports and imports; at the same time the Chalcidians profited from this traffic, as we see from the earlier treaty (p. 7 above), and they enjoyed the revenues of Anthemus through the generosity of Philip. On the other hand the balance of power had shifted since 357. Athens was no longer a dangerous imperialist; Macedonia overshadowed the League; and Amphipolis in Macedonian hands might be a basis for an attack. In addition the Macedonian navy was gaining experience. Successful raids were made on Lemnos and Imbros, merchantmen were intercepted and looted off Euboea, and the Athenians' Sacred Trireme was captured at Marathon.[12] It must have seemed to some democratically-minded politicians in Chalcidice that an alliance with Athens would be safer than the current alliance with Philip.

Demosthenes told the Athenians in 349 that 'Philip immediately (after his illness) made a move against Olynthus, and I forbear to mention his expeditions against Illyrians, Paeonians, Arybbas (king of the Molossians) and anywhere else one may say' (D. 1. 13). Details are lacking. It is probable that Philip took an army into the territory of Olynthus, the capital of the Chalcidian League, reminded the authorities that the treaty of alliance banned any unilateral approach to Athens, and told them that the lady 'Insolence' was closely followed by her jealous husband 'War'. Campaigns may have been needed to keep in subjection the Illyrians west of Lake Ochrid and the Paeonians of king Lyppeius. A rumour of activity in Illyria

was reported by Demosthenes in *The First Philippic* in 351, namely that Philip was fortifying cities there. As such fortification was more likely to have followed after the campaign, I should date the warning to Olynthus and the two campaigns to the first half of 351. On the other hand the expedition against Arybbas, which was not mentioned in *The First Philippic*, though much nearer home, should be dated to 350. It seems that Arybbas was reduced to the position of a client king; for Alexander, the son of the Molossian king Neoptolemus, with whom Arybbas had shared the throne, was removed to Pella by Philip, the Molossian bronze coinage ceased c. 350, and it was resumed only in 342 when Alexander became king of Molossia. In the intervening years Philip's bronze coinage was in use. It was probably at this time that Philip annexed Tymphaea and Parauaea, the easternmost regions of the Molossian tribal state. He raised recruits for the King's Forces from Tymphaea, abolished its monarchy, and incorporated members of its royal family in his own entourage.[13]

'Next he attacked the Olynthians; for in a sense of pity, after the murder of one brother, they had admitted to their city the two other brothers whom Philip was eager to kill as sons of his step-mother and so as claimants to the throne' (Just. 8. 3. 10). These half-brothers of Philip were the sons of Amyntas and Gygaea (p. 24 above); the two survivors were called Arrhidaeus and Menelaus. The decision of Olynthus to give them asylum prompted the attack in the opinion of Theopompus (he was the ultimate source here of Justin). That Philip demanded their extradition is probable. The League certainly decided on war. Philip had other reasons for his action: negotiations conducted with Athens by anti-Macedonian leaders in the League and especially in its capital, Olynthus, had violated the special clause in the treaty of alliance, and there were pro-Macedonian leaders in Olynthus whom Philip wished to protect and use. The attack began in midsummer 349. A Chalcidian strongpoint was stormed and destroyed, and some outlying members of the League were frightened into submission. Philip was then distracted by a rising in Pherae, which had suffered the loss of Magnesia and Pagasae and may have hoped for help from Phocis and Athens; but in vain, for Philip re-imposed his control as *archon* of the Thessalian League.[14] During this distraction Athens answered the Chalcidians' appeal for help by granting them alliance and sending them a force of 30 triremes and 2,000 mercenary infantry which was already operating in the north Aegean, and by adding another 8 triremes which were equipped at Athens.[15] This force, commanded by Chares, probably based itself at Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus.

In February 348 a rising started in Euboea, which Athens had held since 357. Some rebels received help in the form of mercenaries hired by Phocis. Others appealed to Philip for assistance which he provided. Athens responded by sending a citizen force under Phocion, which won a victory; but his successor was defeated in March and all of Euboea except Carystus became independent. In July Athens had to pay 50 talents for the release

of Athenians taken prisoner. During the operations in Euboea some Athenian cavalrymen were transported to Olynthus. There they found not only the 38 triremes and 2,000 mercenary infantry under Chares but also another force of 18 triremes and 4,000 mercenary infantry, which their general Charidemus had brought from their normal station in the Chersonese.[16] The Chalcidian army was estimated at 1,000 cavalry, to which 150 Athenian cavalry were added, and 10,000 hoplites. Charidemus took the offensive by ravaging the territories of some cities which had evidently joined Philip in the Pallene promontory and in Bottike.

If Philip delayed in the hope that the League might come to terms, he was disappointed. But it is more likely that he timed his offensive to cover the period of the northerly Etesian winds, during which for at least forty days a fleet sailing from Athens would have been unable to reach Chalcidice. Operating probably from Pallene, Philip obtained the surrender of Torone and Mecyberna 'through treachery', and then his army won two battles and took over a number of cities. Meanwhile the Olynthians had sent urgently to Athens for further help; but the Etesian winds delayed any sailing from Attica. When Philip was some seven kilometres from the city, the Olynthians asked Philip for terms. 'For the rest of time it is not possible for you to live on in Olynthus and me in Macedonia' was Philip's response. This stark reply may have prompted the desertion of part of the Olynthian cavalry, complete with their weapons, before the city was beleaguered.

'Making continuous assaults and losing many men in the fighting at the walls' Philip finally captured the city through the treachery of two leading men, Euthycrates and Lasthenes, who were said to have accepted bribes. There is no mention in our sources of any action by the Athenian forces of mercenaries previously sent to Chalcidice.[17] We know only that the expeditionary force which left Athens, consisting of 17 triremes, 300 Athenian cavalry and 2,000 Athenian hoplites, arrived too late. Olynthus was sacked, its population was sold into slavery, and the victorious troops received awards of money and land for their gallantry. Olynthus ceased to exist. Other Chalcidians surrendered at discretion. The Chalcidian League was disbanded.[18]

CHAPTER VI

Consolidation by Philip and opposition led by Demosthenes

1. Organisation and fortification in Philip's territories to 350

> Agathocles, who was a slave and one of the *penestae* in Thessaly, had great influence with Philip because he flattered him, kept company with him at banquets, danced and played the buffoon. So Philip sent him to corrupt the Perrhaebi and take charge of affairs there (*FGrH* 115 F 81).

This passage exemplifies Theopompus' scorn for Philip's Companions and his portrayal of Philip's bad faith and maltreatment of the Thessalians.[1] What is of special interest is the certainty that Philip annexed Perrhaebia and appointed his own representative as in some sense the 'manager' or governor, *epimeletes* being a Macedonian term for such a person.[2] No doubt the Perrhaebians continued to administer their own internal affairs, just as the citizens of regions or of cities did in Upper Macedonia. The presence of the king's representative in Perrhaebia may be compared to that of his officials at Damastium and Philippi, as revealed by the coinage (p. 40 above). We may assume that Philip placed 'managers' in other newly acquired areas, such as the eastern side of Lake Lychnitis (Ochrid), the kingdom of Paeonia, and the easternmost part of the kingdom towards the river Nestus.

It is probable that Philip incorporated into Elimeotis the northernmost part of Perrhaebia, into which the important passes of Petra and Volustana debouched at Pythion and Doliche. For an inscription dated c. 275-250, which described a man as 'Makedon Eleimiotes ek Pytheiou', shows us that Pythion was then in Elimeotis. A fragment of Theagenes (*FGrH* 774 F 3) states that 'he transferred the people of Balla to the district now called Pythion'. In other words the king (he is not named in the fragment) created at Pythion 'a city of Macedones' (such as we have seen at Oesyme on p.38 above) by transplanting the entire population of Balla, a city in Pieria, to a place of great strategic importance, Pythion. The most likely time for this transplantation was in the reign of Philip c. 352 or soon afterwards; for Alexander and the Successors needed any available Macedonians for new foundations overseas.[3] In Magnesia, the area south of Perrhaebia, which Philip annexed (D. 1. 13), there were reports that Philip was building

fortifications and that the Thessalians tried to stop him (D. 1. 22 and 2. 11). He will not have been deterred, since the Magnetes were now his 'subjects' (Isoc. 5. 21).

Demosthenes, speaking in 351, gave a report by some Athenians that Philip 'was fortifying cities in Illyria' (4. 48). The report was most probably correct, if we understand 'Illyria' as land taken from the Illyrians after the defeat of Bardylis. There is some other evidence that Philip made settlements of Macedonians to hold his northwestern frontier. For Stephanus Byzantius s.v. Heraclea had 'Amyntas, son of Philip', found Heraclea Lyncestis. It has been generally assumed that this was a slip for 'Philip, son of Amyntas', and that the city was founded to celebrate Philip's victory over Bardylis. Identified with the site at Boukova, this Heraclea lay at the eastern end of the Diavat Pass leading from the plain of Lyncus to Lake Lychnitis. Further west 'in Illyria' Stephanus recorded two cities with names which are traceable in Lower Macedonia, Astraea and Dobera; and a third city is known from an inscription found in the upper Devoll valley, Kellion. The repetition of the names 'in Illyria' indicated that these were 'cities of Macedones', to which a part or even the whole of a population had been transferred from elsewhere in the kingdom. Kellion is a diminutive form of Kellis, a city in Eordaea. In 335, when Alexander was campaigning in the upper Devoll valley, he camped beside the river 'Eordaicus', which flowed out of Lake Little Prespa. It is thus evident that the region of Little Prespa had been called Eordaea by Philip. He chose the name presumably because this region resembled the Eordaea of Upper Macedonia in containing marshes and lakes. The area to the north which included Lake Prespa was described later as 'Lyncus'; thus this area was added to Lyncus, as the region of Pythion was added to Elimeotis. Here a 'city of Macedones' called Melitousa should be placed, since there was a 'mutatio Melitonus' on the Via Egnatia in the eastern part of Lyncus.[4]

'The citadel of Kalyva' has been excavated and described recently. It commanded the crossing of the river Nestus, which itself formed Philip's eastern frontier. The lay-out of the fortification was attributed by the excavator to Philip. The masonry consisted of 'trapezoidal' stones, the towers were of irregular rectangular shape, and one of them was semicircular; and there were burials nearby of the fourth to second centuries BC. A stone cistern 8 m in diameter and 12 m deep conserved rainwater for the garrison. It may be compared with the rock-cut cistern at a high point at Aeane in Elimeotis, which was 6.5 m in diameter and 8.5 m deep.[5] A corresponding fortification at the westernmost point of Philip's kingdom was excavated by W. Unverzagt, who proposed to date it within the archaic period. I have argued that the inner keep, of which the walls were 2 m wide and constructed in polygonal masonry, was built early in the reign of Philip. It had its own rock-cut cistern 6.5 m square. The fortification, situated on the hill of St Erasmus (some 880 m high), commands the



Fig. 6. The fortifications of St Erasmus by Lake Lychnitis

narrow passage which any army coming from the west or from the north has to follow along the shore of Lake Lychnitis.[6]

The fortifications which I have mentioned were at strategic points on the route which was followed in Roman times by the Via Egnatia. It had been in use earlier, as the finds at Trebenishte and the campaign of Brasidas indicate; for the road from Eordaea into Lyncus was suitable for ox-drawn waggons in 423, and a stadion-stone, inscribed '100 stades from Boceria', which was found there, has been dated to the fourth or third century BC. Archelaus was praised for 'cutting straight roads', and the Odrysian king, Sitalces, cut a road through the forest of Mt Cercine. It was the development of a road-system within the kingdom which made Philip's speed of movement possible. Outside the kingdom Albanian archaeologists have noted that there was a narrow track of flagstones, suitable for cavalry and pack-horses, which was the predecessor of the Via Egnatia in the hills west of Lake Ochrid.[7] It may well have been laid by Philip during and after his campaigns in the region.

Justin shed some unexpected light on Philip's building activities in 351-350. On my analysis he drew his account from Theopompus, who obtained his information in Macedonia but added his own interpretation of motives. The passage may be translated as follows:

> Next, in order to offset the reputation for unpopularity in which he was held beyond all others at that time, he sent throughout the kingdoms and the

richest city-states his emissaries who were to spread the idea that king Philip was offering contracts, involving large sums of money, for the making of walls, shrines and temples throughout his cities, and that he was ordering his cities to solicit contractors by proclamation. When contractors came to Macedonia, they were frustrated by various delays, grew afraid of His Majesty's violence, and departed in silence (8. 3. 7-9).

Like an Arab potentate who has struck oil, or like Pericles in the rosy days of the Athenian Empire, Philip had big money at hand to beautify and strengthen his kingdom. He owned enormous areas of fine timber and mineral resources which included gold and silver; and he had recently added the revenues of Thessaly to those of his own kingdom. The prolific mints of Damastium and Philippi were to some extent controlled by his officials. His own coinage in gold, silver and bronze, starting probably in 356, flourished alongside that of his ally, the Chalcidian League. He had funds to employ bands of mercenaries in Thessaly and in Thrace, and to build and man a navy of small warships.[8]

Justin's text implies that Philip undertook the building of some fortifications and temples, and that the cities were to be in charge of their own works, probably with subsidies from him. The 'walls' were presumably circuit-walls, which many cities had previously not had or some cities had outgrown. Excavation of the walls on the acropolis at Aegeae has revealed a wall 2 m wide – the same width as the wall of the keep at St Erasmus. It may have been built at this time. 'Pella, which hitherto had been small, was increased in length by Philip, who had been brought up in it' (Strabo 330 fr. 23). The extent of the enlarged city's circuit-wall has been revealed by recent excavations of burial-mounds in the vicinity of the city and by the dating of offerings in the burials. The wall was seven to eight kilometres long 'in the mid-fourth century'.[9] Thus Philip's Pella was larger than contemporary Athens, of which the circuit-wall was some six and a half kilometres long. He probably designed the lay-out of the palace with its swimming-pool on the low hill which has sometimes been called 'the Acropolis Hill'. In fact the acropolis in the sense of a citadel was on a fortified island, called the Phacos, in Lake Ludias, and it was in this citadel that Philip placed his treasury (ibid. fr. 20). The Lake was converted by Philip into a capacious harbour; for he connected it to the river Axius by an artificial channel, of which the flow must have been controlled by gates, and to the almost tideless sea through the river Ludias. This was the first harbour to be made on a riverine estuary in Europe. It could be entered from the Thermaic Gulf in all weathers, and the entry could presumably be closed by a boom. The basin itself was sheltered, and the harbour was guarded by the citadel.[10] The passage from the harbour to the navigable river Axius was available even in flood-time, when entry was not possible at the river-mouth. This harbour was the model for Alexander's harbours on the estuaries of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Indus.[11]

Of the shrines and temples which Justin mentioned we can only attrib-

ute with confidence to the time of Philip the shrine at Aegeae, in front of which stood the statue-base dedicated to Eucleia by Eurydice.[12] We have no reason to doubt that Philip arranged for the building of other shrines and of temples. His initiative was followed by Alexander who left plans at the time of his death for the construction of great temples at Dium, Cyrrhus and Amphipolis[13] (the implication being that Aegeae and Pella already had considerable temples).

One reason for Philip seeking contractors in the neighbouring kingdoms and in the Greek city-states may have been that his own resources in labour were overstrained by the demands of military service in the King's Forces and of military training in the cities of Macedonia. He was also anxious to cultivate better relations with his neighbours, especially with the city-states of the Chalcidian League. Theopompus may have been accurate in suggesting that better relations were not in fact established; but his implication that the work was not carried out is not to be entertained.

By 351 Macedonia was the strongest and richest state in the Balkan area. Artabazus, a high-ranking Persian in revolt against the Great King, had been helped by Chares of Athens and by Pammenes of Thebes. Yet when he was defeated c. 352, he fled not to Athens or Thebes but to the court of Philip. In 351 Demosthenes said that some Athenians reported the sending of envoys by Philip to Artaxerxes, the Persian king (4. 48). It is probable that Artabazus and Artaxerxes were reconciled at that time, and that some agreement was made between Artaxerxes and Philip, in 351 or 350, when Artaxerxes was preparing to invade Egypt and was sending envoys to Greece. On that occasion the Thebans provided 1,000 citizen troops, and they obtained from Artaxerxes 300 talents of silver, in order to continue their struggle in the Sacred War. Thus Artaxerxes, Philip and Thebes were on the same side in that war; and their common alignment probably led to an agreement under which Philip undertook not to interfere in Asia Minor, while Artaxerxes was attacking Egypt.[14] If that is correct, we see that Artaxerxes regarded Philip's kingdom as as least comparable with the leading city-states.

2. The reactions of the city-states and speeches by Demosthenes

The city-states of the Thessalian League found Philip a congenial and effective ally; for they received his help against Pherae, Phocis, and some members of the League which had absconded and joined Phocis. They appreciated his championship of Apollo of Delphi in the Sacred War, his support of democracy against tyranny, and his encouragement of a federal system of which he became *archon*. As far as we know, they did not object to the punishment of the absconding city-states in Thessaly. In particular the splendid Thessalian cavalry was so loyal that it served thenceforth

with Philip and Alexander in Europe and Asia. The city-states of the Boeotian League were grateful to Philip for diverting some Phocian forces from Boeotia to Thessaly, helping Pammenes in his passage to and from Asia Minor, and defeating Phayllus and finally Onomarchus. On the other hand, for several years after 352 Philip did not send troops or money to assist Thebes in the exhausting guerrilla warfare against the Phocians.

The most active ally of Phocis was Athens. In gratitude she was accorded the privilege of priority in consulting the oracle of Apollo (*promanteia*). In the course of 352 she sent a naval squadron to assist Onomarchus, tried to raise the siege of Pagasae but was too late, and despatched 400 cavalry and 5,000 citizen hoplites by sea to help Phayllus hold Thermopylae against Philip and the Thessalians. Achaea and Sparta came a long way after Athens at that time; for they sent only 2,000 men and 1,000 men respectively to Thermopylae. The prominence of Athens was reflected in the list of states which contributed to the rebuilding of the temple at Delphi in spring and autumn 353 and spring 352. Twice she came immediately after Delphi. The other states were in spring 353 Locris, Megara, Epidaurus, Sparta, Corinth and Phocis; in autumn 353 Megara, Sicyon and Locris; and in spring 352 Corinth and Phocis. In autumn 352 and spring 351 there were representatives only of the states from the Peloponnese to which the Phocians and the Boeotians had sent troops; for the furies of the Sacred War were raging there also. Thereafter there were no meetings at Delphi until autumn 346, because Delphi was isolated. Athens' zeal dwindled after 352.[15]

The policy of Athens was inspired mainly by Eubulus, an influential statesman, who had proposed the terms of peace which brought the disastrous Social War to an end in 355. He was elected Chief Commissioner of the Theoric Fund for the four-year spell 354-350, and he persuaded the Assembly to approve a law, whereby all surplus revenue was placed in that Fund. Its immediate purpose was to help poor citizens to attend state festivals and functions; but it also made it less easy for the people to go to war. For in the event of the state undertaking a major war the surplus would have to be diverted to the Military Fund. But that could only be done after the repeal of Eubulus' law – something which was not to happen until 339. Meanwhile Athenian finance and trade were recovering, Athenian settlers reoccupied the Chersonese late in 352, and the Athenian navy could now safeguard the convoys of cornships from the Black Sea, which were needed to feed the large population of Attica. Her rapid recovery was such that the Chalcidian League felt drawn towards her rather than Philip in 351.

It was in this year that Demosthenes delivered *The First Philippic*. He was already an experienced orator; for at the age of twenty in 364 he had successfully conducted his own case against a guardian who had embezzled his inheritance, and in 354 he had delivered a speech in the Assembly, supporting Eubulus' policy of non-intervention in Persian affairs. But

whether from conviction or from ambition he opposed Eubulus thereafter; for he advised the Assembly to intervene in the Peloponnese in 353 and in Rhodes in 351. Fortunately for Athens the policy of Eubulus prevailed, and her forces were reserved for her vital interests in Central Greece, the North Aegean and the Chersonese. In particular Demosthenes did not even mention Philip in these early speeches, whereas Eubulus appreciated the power of Philip and deployed forces against him. Yet these early speeches showed a statesmanlike grasp of such political principles as the balance of power in the Peloponnese and the importance of Athens as a democracy supporting the democratic party in other states. In *The First Philippic* he admitted that many others had spoken of the threat posed by Philip. It is evident that he could no longer disregard it in the summer of 351.[16] He made this withering attack on Athens' past actions and so indirectly on Eubulus and his supporters:

> Men of Athens, your power is the greatest of all in triremes, hoplites, cavalry and financial income; yet you have not used a single one of them up to today in an effective manner. Rather you conduct your war against Philip in the style of barbarian boxers. As one is hit, he hugs the place, and when he is hit on the other side there go his hands; but to be on guard or to look at his opponent is beyond his intelligence and his will. When you hear Philip is in the Chersonese, you vote to send help there; if at Thermopylae, there; and wherever else he may go you run up and down in his footsteps. He commands you. You yourselves have planned nothing in your interest in the war, you do not foresee anything before it happens (D. 1. 40-1).

His own plan was to have always in readiness at the Peiraeus and so available for any major action (as at Thermopylae in fact) a squadron of 50 triremes, transports for 500 cavalry, cargo-vessels, and a citizen force. In addition and at once a striking force was to be despatched, consisting of 10 'fast triremes' and transports for 200 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, of whom a quarter should be citizens and the rest mercenaries. This force's task was to keep Philip's fleet out of action, raid his coast and intercept his merchantmen (23 and 34), and to be ready even in the winter to strike wherever Philip might strike (31-2); for it could use as winter-quarters Lemnos, Thasos and Sciathos. Although Demosthenes did not mention it, his 2,000 infantry would have to be transported initially on some 20 triremes, which would later be available for action as warships. Thus he had in mind some 30 triremes.[17] He criticised Athens for having sent in the past not citizen forces but mercenaries and mercenary commanders, who did what they pleased and often injured Athens' allies.

Demosthenes' proposals were not implemented. One reason was certainly that the expense was out of proportion to what could be achieved. The only bases from which a striking force could be effective were those of the Chalcidian League, which Demosthenes did not mention in his speech. The distance from Lemnos, Thasos and Sciathos to the head of the

Thermaic Gulf was more than 100 miles, and an effective blockade could not have been maintained from such a distance, especially in the winter. To have a standing force in readiness at the Peiraeus was no guarantee that Athens could respond quickly enough to an attack by Philip on a friend or ally of Athens; for he operated on interior lines, and reports of his movements reached Athens long after his arrival at his target. The speech was more remarkable for its rousing rhetoric than for its practical planning.

In summer 349 Olynthus as leader of the Chalcidian League approached Athens with a request for an alliance. In *The First Olynthiac* Demosthenes attributed this approach to a happy chance. In fact the ground had probably been prepared by Eubulus and his supporters. Demosthenes proposed alliance and the despatch of two expeditionary forces, one of triremes and soldiers to ravage Philip's territory and the other of soldiers 'to save the cities' of the Chalcidian League 'for Olynthus' (D. 1. 17). He foresaw that Olynthus was fighting for survival, and he claimed that Athens had to fight Philip either in Chalcidice or in Attica, since Thebes would join Philip in invading Attica, and Phocis could not help Athens (25-6). *The Second Olynthiac*, delivered soon afterwards, sought to encourage the Assembly by depicting Philip as a dissolute despot, his Companions as scum (19), and his people as discontented. He claimed that Philip's power would collapse because it was based on deception and injustice (10). *The Third Olynthiac* attacked the leading politicians and the people for past and present slackness (3-4) and contrasted both with their predecessors of the glorious past (23-31). In this speech Demosthenes stated what he had hinted earlier, that the law of the Theoric Fund should be reviewed. That was actually proposed later by Apollodorus, who was fined a talent for his pains.[18]

As we have seen (p. 52 above), Athens sent considerable forces to help her ally. What the first two forces achieved, apart from some ravaging by mercenaries under the command of Charidemus, is not related, and it is evident that they absented themselves from the final phase, perhaps because they were afraid of being betrayed. The third force which at the request of Olynthus consisted of citizen troops arrived too late; but at least its escorting triremes enabled it to return unscathed.[19] Even if it had arrived earlier, it is very doubtful whether it could have averted the betrayal of Torone and Mecyberna and the desertion by the Olynthian cavalry. The problem for Athens in 349-348 was that her citizen troops, unlike mercenaries, could not be replaced. To use them near home in Euboea was sensible. To send them far away was hazardous. If Demosthenes had had his way and citizen forces had moved early into the Chalcidian cities 'to save them for Olynthus', the chances were high that they would have been destroyed or captured by Philip, or even have been betrayed by traitors in some of the cities. Nevertheless, the reputation of Demosthenes was enhanced by his speeches. He had a wonderfully forceful

style and a precise use of language which fascinated his audience, and he could claim afterwards that he had not advocated the course which had led to the double failure of Athens, in Euboea and in Chalcidice.

3. The settlement of Chalcidice by Philip

The sacking of Olynthus has already been described. It will be recalled that the treaty of alliance which Philip and the Chalcidian League made in 357-356 contained a penalty clause which invoked 'many evils' for either party, if it should break the most solemn religious oaths. A copy of the treaty had been placed in the temple of Artemis at Olynthus, so that she could see that it was being fulfilled. It is beyond doubt that Olynthus, acting as leader of the Chalcidian League, broke those oaths deliberately in 349. Philip was able to claim that he was acting in accordance with the will of the gods in destroying the city. Such destruction was not without precedent among the city-states. Thebes, for instance, had had less justification in killing all adult males and enslaving the rest of the population of Orchomenus in 364; and Athens even less in doing the same at Sestus in 353. Olynthians who escaped or were redeemed from slavery were given exemption from tax as resident aliens at Athens, and probably in some other cities; for the alliance had been made not only with Athens but also with Athens' allies.[20]

In a much discussed passage (9. 26) Demosthenes in 341 dwelt on the enormous iniquities of Philip and continued: 'I do not mention Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia and thirty-two cities of the Thracian district, all of which he has destroyed so brutally that it is difficult for a visitor to tell if they were ever inhabited.' The phrase 'the Thracian district' stood for the Chalcidic peninsula, and the elimination of so many cities in one campaign was completely unparalleled in the history of the Greek world. Was it true? Griffith remarked that Strabo 'seems to have accepted it', but without discussion of the passage, which may be translated thus. 'Eretria settled as colonies the cities around Pallene and Athos, and Chalcis settled those next to Olynthus, which Philip maltreated' (447, *has dielumeneto*). The last words refer not to the cities of the western and eastern peninsulas but to those at the head of the Toronaic Gulf; and 'maltreated' is very far from 'eliminated'. Diodorus, following Diyllus at 16. 53. 3, described the sacking of Olynthus, the valuable loot, and the intimidation of 'the other states opposing him'; but he said nothing of wholesale destructions of other cities. The omission is even more striking in Justin 8. 3. 11 in view of the context and the source. Justin had described the perfidy, treachery and violence of Philip, and after mentioning the sacking of Olynthus he recorded Philip's act of parricide in killing his half-brothers and his criminal act of robbery in Thrace ('fraude latronis ac scelere'). Justin's source here was Theopompus. Yet nothing was said of the destruction of thirty-two cities, although Theopompus took a delight in stressing the wickedness of Philip.[21] More-

over, in the other literary sources only one city apart from Olynthus was mentioned as having been razed, namely Stagira (Plu. *Alex.* 7. 3).

Excavation has confirmed the destruction of Olynthus and the desolation of the site thereafter. But it has also shown that its nearby port, Mecyberna, was occupied without any break until the founding of Cassandrea in 316; and a destruction-layer has not been noted at Torone. A most important inscription, said to have come from the central part of the Chalcidic peninsula, was published with a full commentary by Julia Vocotopoulou in 1990.[22] It recorded a ruling by the king (probably Demetrius Poliorcetes) in 292/291 or 290/289 which laid down the frontiers of seven or eight cities just to the north of the Singitic Gulf. The fact that the king made the ruling indicated that he was governing spear-won land and peoples; and we have considered a similar ruling by Alexander in spear-won land near Philippi. The inscription recalled an earlier transfer of plainland which had been made 'by letter' (*kat' epistolen*), that is by the ruling of a previous king. For the land near Philippi Philip was cited as having made the original ruling (see p. 37 above). It was presumably so also in this area of Chalcidice. We see here a large area in which seven or eight cities were adjacent to one another c. 290. It is most unlikely either that any of them had been destroyed in 348, or that there was an additional but destroyed and so lost city within this area.

When we take the literary evidence and the other evidence together, we conclude that Demosthenes' statement was a rhetorical flourish and was not based on fact. What happened, apart from the sacking of Olynthus, may have been that in the course of the war Philip razed a fortress (Diod. 16. 52. 9) and a city, Stagira. After the sacking of Olynthus he gave his ruling for the future of the spear-won land and peoples, rewarding those who had collaborated and penalising others. At that time or soon afterwards Philip brought back 'those of the citizens who escaped or were in slavery' and re-established the city of Stagira (Plu. *Alex.* 7. 3). His intention was that Chalcidice in the future should be properly cultivated and developed, in order that he could draw revenues from the letting of the land and from the harbour-dues and use Chalcidians, for instance, as oarsmen in his navy. He took as his personal possession the fine timber and the rich mineral resources, and he granted to leading Macedonians who had served him well some of the revenue from the confiscated lands of his opponents.[23]

After the settlement of Chalcidian affairs Philip celebrated the autumn festival in honour of Zeus of Olympus at Dium. The sacrifices in thanksgiving for Macedonia's victory were magnificent, and the competitions in the arts were brilliant. Philip invited the visiting artists to his banquets. He gave to many of them gold and silver goblets and other gifts, which made them eager to keep his friendship. According to Demosthenes the Athenian actor Satyrus was asked by Philip what favour he desired. When he replied that he wanted the liberation of two marriageable girls who were

daughters of Apollophanes of Pydna but had been captured at Olynthus and enslaved, Philip granted the request despite the fact that Apollophanes had been held guilty of killing Philip's brother, Alexander II, and had been executed.[24] He could well afford to be generous. For at very little cost in Macedonian lives he had rounded off and completed what was to be the Macedonian kingdom for the next 180 years.

CHAPTER VII

The strengths and weaknesses of the city-state

1. The achievements and the enshrinement of the city-state

The city-state showed an extraordinary capability for some three centuries. During the period 750 to 550 the city-states founded hundreds of colonies on the coasts of the Sea of Marmara, the Black Sea, the northern Mediterranean Sea, Sicily and Cyrenaica. Each colony was from its inception an independent city-state. The colonists at first perpetuated the institutions of their foundress, but they quickly formed new ones to meet the problems of their new environment. The ties between the colony and the mother-state were thereafter sentimental and religious rather than political. Indeed wars between them were not unknown. That the city-states of the homeland were able to organise and despatch so many groups of colonists was amazing. Miletus, for instance, was credited with the leadership of as many as ninety colonies.[1] That the colonies flourished was another proof of the dynamism of the city-state as a political form, wherever it was transplanted and took root. The great majority of the colonial city-states became racially exclusive, like the city-states of the homeland. They increased their labour force and their productivity by reducing the nearby natives to slavery or serfdom. They excelled in military and naval warfare, and they developed seaborne commerce. In literature, philosophy, medicine, and a primitive form of capitalism they rivalled the city-states of the homeland. Their chief competitors were the Phoenicians of the Lebanon, who also lived in city-states and founded colonial city-states such as Carthage. There were as yet no super-powers. By 550 the Greek city-states had created a network of seaborne trade which brought prosperity to most of them and affluence to the commercial leaders, such as Syracuse, Corinth, Athens, Miletus and Ephesus.

The Mediterranean world began to change with the emergence of great powers (Carthage and Etruria in the West and Lydia and Persia in the East) which put a stop to colonisation and threatened the independence of the city-states. In comparison the city-state was very small. Athens and Sparta were unusual in being able each to muster 10,000 first-line

infantrymen; for an average state such as Plataea did not dispose of more than 1,000 first-line infantrymen, and many were even smaller.

The city-states responded to the challenge of the great powers and to the unusual growth of some city-states by devising various forms of coalition between 550 and 460. The Greek terminology is superior to that used by most modern scholars, who describe coalitions as 'leagues' and 'confederacies'. Thus the Greek term 'The Lacedaemonians and their Allies' indicated that the Lacedaemonians, as the Spartan city-state called itself, held the 'hegemony', i. e. the leadership in war, and had a vote equal to the majority vote of the Allies in deliberating policy. This coalition was formed at first to resist aggression by Argos or any other large city-state, and later it played the leading part in resisting Persian aggression on the Greek mainland. On the other hand the term 'The Boeotians' indicated that the member city-states were co-operating, but that there was no one state holding the hegemony. This coalition was formed initially to resist any aggression by Athens and by Thessaly. In practice it was dominated by Thebes as its strongest member. 'The Ionians', as the speakers of the Ionic dialect on the offshore islands and on the coast of the central part of the western coast of Asia Minor called themselves, was the name of a coalition in which all member-states were equal and each cast one vote. There was no hegemonic state. It lay with the representatives of the member-states to elect a commander-in-chief or not, as they thought fit. This coalition was formed to escape from Persian domination. Similarly the name 'The Greeks' advertised the fact that the members were equal. Ultimately thirty-one city-states were members of the coalition which was formed in order to resist the invasion by the huge Persian forces under the command of Xerxes in 480. In practice the representatives of the member-states had to choose a state to take command: at first Sparta on land and at sea, and later Sparta on land and Athens at sea. 'The Athenians and their Allies' was created to conduct the offensive of 'The Greeks' at sea against Persia. Its name indicated that Athens was the hegemonic state with similar powers to those of Sparta in 'The Lacedaemonians and their Allies'.

In the West the leading city-states in Sicily and South Italy were controlled by dictators (the Greek term being 'tyrants'), when the Carthaginians mounted a large-scale invasion of Sicily in 480. They created a coalition based on personal alliances and sometimes on inter-marriage, and the dictator of the strongest city-state, Syracuse, took the lead. They won a decisive victory over the Carthaginians in 480, and the dictator of Syracuse defeated the Etruscans at sea in 474. There personal leadership triumphed. Individual dictators were praised by Greek poets (Pindar, Bacchylides and Simonides), and some were granted posthumous honours as 'founders' by their citizens. Later the coalition collapsed and the last dictatorship fell in 461.

The victories of 'The Greeks' were no less remarkable. The huge forces

major town
other settlement
ancient boundary
MIEZA regional name
PODOT tribal name
ancient river or coastline
ancient road
modern road
ancient and modern road coincide
modern river
modern seasonal river
modern country boundary
Scale 1 : 1,500,000
0 miles 10 20 30 40
0 km 10 20 30 40 50 60
EPIRUS
CHAONIA
THESPROTIS
CESTRINE
ELINA
TRIPOLIS
TALARES
ARCTANES
ONOPERNI
PARORI
HELLOPIA
MOLOSSIS
TYMPHAEA
EORDAEA
ORESTIS
ELIMEA
LYNCUS
MACEDONIA
ATHICIA
THESSALIOTIS
ACARNANIA
AETOLIA
EURYTANES
DOLOPES
AMPHILOCHIA
AMPHILOCIA
ATHAMANES
HESTIAEOTIS
PERRHAEBIA
TRIPOLIS
ORESTIS
PARAUAEA
MONTES CANDAVIAE
MONTES PINDI
ILLYRIA
PARTHINI
ATINTANI
PENESTAE
BRYGI
ARGESTAEI
PELAGONIA
DERRIOPI
DESSARETIS
OTTOLOBUS
TRIOCLARI
ALBERMIUM
VIA EGNATIA
ACROCERAUNIA
CHIMARRA
CASSOPAEA
THESPROTIS
MOLOSSIS
ATHAMANES
THESSALIOTIS
HESTIAEOTIS
DOLOPES
EURYTANES
AETOLIA
ACARNANIA
AMPHILOCIA
AMPHILOCHIA
MACEDONIA
Sinus Ionius
Mare Aegaeum
Phoenice
Onchesmus
Buchetium
Ambracia
Nicopolis
Actium
Anactorium
Argos
Ephyra
Elea
Cassope
Pandosia
Dodona
Photice
Antigonea
Omphalium
Hadrianopolis
Elaeus
Oricum
Apollonia
Dimallum
Byllis
Nymphaeum
Thronium
Amantia Marmaria
Oricus
Hecatompedum
Aoi Stena
Palaeste
Cerae
Idonia
Stephana
Aulon (Byllace)
Nymphaeum
Actium
Anactorium
Argos
Ephyra
Elea
Cassope
Pandosia
Dodona
Photice
Antigonea
Omphalium
Hadrianopolis
Elaeus
Oricum
Apollonia
Dimallum
Byllis
Nymphaeum
Thronium
Amantia Marmaria
Oricus
Hecatompedum
Aoi Stena
Palaeste
Cerae
Idonia
Stephana
Aulon (Byllace)
Nymphaeum
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Argos
Ephyra
Elea
Cassope
Pandosia
Dodona
Photice
Antigonea
Omphalium
Hadrianopolis
Elaeus
Oricum
Apollonia
Dimallum
Byllis
Nymphaeum
Thronium
Amantia Marmaria
Oricus
Hecatompedum
Aoi Stena
Palaeste
Cerae
Idonia
Stephana
Aulon (Byllace)
Nymphaeum

Fig. 7. Northern Greece and the Propontis

of Xerxes were defeated decisively on land at Plataea and at sea at Salamis. The names of the member states were inscribed on a column supporting a golden tripod at Delphi, and the base carried the following epigram:[2]

> This was dedicated by the saviours of spacious Hellas, who rescued the city-states from the threat of loathsome slavery.

The Lacedaemonians were named first on the column; for they had held the command by land and at sea. The Athenians came next. In addition to their famous victory at Marathon in 490 the Athenians had supplied the bulk of the Greek fleet at Salamis. The offensive against Persia, which was conducted by 'The Athenians and their Allies', liberated the city-states of the Aegean islands and of Asia Minor from Persian rule. A great victory was won at the river Eurymedon and the Greek dead were commemorated with this epitaph:[3]

> These are they who laid down the splendour of their manhood beside the Eurymedon. On land and on the swift-sailing ships alike they fought with their spears against the foremost of the bow-bearing Medes. They are no more, but they have left the fairest memorial of valour.

During this successful offensive 'The Lacedaemonians and their Allies' and 'The Athenians and their Allies', both operating within the general coalition of 'The Greeks', were acting in union (*homaichmia*, as Thucydides called it) until 461, when Sparta and Athens went their separate ways and war soon broke out between the two coalitions.[4]

This second period from 550 to 461 confirmed the belief of the Greeks that the city-state was the finest political form in the world. Small though it was in manpower, it excelled in warfare, in loyal defence of liberty, and in intelligent ability to combine in coalitions. The culture which it defended was more enlightened than that of any other state in art, architecture, poetry, drama, history, philosophy, medicine and scientific thought. By 460 the foundations of classical civilisation were laid, and the direction which European civilisation was to follow was determined without any ambiguity. In the eyes of the Greeks the city-state had proved itself to be the best form of political organisation in the history of mankind.

During the next hundred years, from 460 to 360, while the weaknesses of the city-state were becoming progressively more apparent, we must not underestimate its merits. In the years 446-431, when Athens was at peace both with Sparta and with Persia, she attained a political stability under which a brilliant leader and an intelligent electorate conducted a uniform policy. Material prosperity was based on her unrivalled seapower, her imperial revenues, and her central place in the network of maritime commerce. As the leading state in culture she attracted able artists and thinkers from other states, and Pericles was justified in claiming that Athens was the educator of the Greek world.[5] As a military state Sparta

had no rival at that time. Her system of education and her constitution were admirably designed to produce loyal and dependable citizen-soldiers and to exercise control over a huge population of serfs, called Helots. Every city-state had an individual personality, which was usually perpetuated from generation to generation through endogamy among the citizens.

In the later part of the period the versatility of the average citizen waned and specialisation became the order of the day. In Sicily the dictators had relied on mercenary soldiers, and now even Athens hired groups of mercenaries and employed mercenary generals. Citizen-soldiers of Sparta and of Thebes served abroad as mercenaries in order to obtain funds for themselves and their state. Versatile statesmen like Cimon and Pericles were replaced by lawyer-politicians whose expertise lay in presenting a persuasive case. Philosophers and educators, such as Plato and Isocrates, preferred to keep clear of public life. Financiers developed the capitalist system by setting up banks, insurance, loans, mortgages, bottomry, and so on. Merchants specialised in the production and sale for instance of shields or shoes. Advances were made in intensive agriculture, land drainage, ship-construction and artillery through inventions by specialists. Because these developments were widespread throughout the Greek world, the city-states generated greater and greater material power. Thucydides remarked that in 431 Athens and Sparta each had greater resources for war than the pair of them had had together in the period of union against Persia. Demosthenes saw in 341 that this was true of the Greek states generally. 'All the Greeks today', he said, 'far surpass the Greeks of those days in the number and the quality of their possessions: ships of war, numbers of men, revenues of money, abundance of general equipment, and everything else by which a city-state gauges its strength'.[6] It was the same in private life. The wealthy were more affluent than ever, a rich man in Athens having fifty household slaves. The last surviving play of Aristophanes, entitled 'Wealth', was concerned with wealth in private hands, not in the state. New forms of art and literature appeared in the city-states with more emphasis now on realism than idealism and on prose than on poetry. The dynamism and the inventiveness of the city-state were as great as ever, but they were directed to more materialistic and specialised purposes.

Philip was more aware than we are of the qualities of the city-state. He grew up in contact with colonial city-states on the coasts of the Thermaic Gulf and Chalcidice. He spent three impressionable years in Thebes when she was the leading military state. He had diplomatic contacts with many city-states and especially with Athens, he had influence at Delphi, and his horses won victories at the Olympic Games. As a descendant of Heracles he was proud of his distinguished Greek lineage. As we shall see, from 348 onwards he was concerned not to destroy but to utilise the great potential of the city-states of the Greek mainland.

2. The weaknesses of the city-state as a political form of organisation

The city-state was inbred. Citizenship with franchise was the prerogative of sons of citizen fathers, and at Athens it was limited to sons of citizen fathers and citizen mothers. Taxes were levied on resident aliens; they had no say in politics. In consequence the citizen body tended either to remain at the same size, even if the slave or serf population grew larger, or else to decline through wastage in war, as happened drastically in fourth-century Sparta. Thus the city-state was destined to remain small in relation to states which expanded by granting citizenship to entire communities, as Macedonia and Rome did. This smallness was a weakness when the independence of a city-state was at risk. In the winter of 405-404, when Athens faced complete defeat, she made a grant of citizenship to the loyal people of Samos. It was a unique grant, too late and never implemented.

Inbreeding fostered the nationalism which was an ingredient in the city-state's determination to be autonomous and independent. However, this nationalism was short-sighted. It resisted those restrictions on complete independence which were necessary to make a political combination or even a military coalition effective. For example at the battle of the Nemea river in 394 the city-states of the anti-Spartan coalition would not concede overall command to any one state but rotated it each day to a different state. The result was a humiliating defeat (they lost 3,000 men while Sparta lost eight men), because on the day of their command the Boeotians acted without any concern for their allies. The nationalistic interests of one city-state often conflicted with those of a neighbouring city-state. Sparta and Argos were always at odds and often at war. Corinth and Megara fought for control of the Peraea peninsula, and Athens and Thebes, as we have seen (p. 10 above), disputed the possession of Oropus interminably. These conflicts bred animosity and hatred. Thucydides, for instance, noted the origins of 'the intense hatred' which Corinth had for Athens.[7] Hatred led to atrocities. The Assembly at Athens proposed in 427 to execute all adult males and enslave the remaining population of Mitylene but thought better of it on the following day. Nevertheless, it inflicted those very reprisals on Scione, Mende, Torone and Melos during the fifth century, and on the native population of Sestus in 353. Corinth, Thebes and other states proposed to destroy Athens in that way in 404; but Sparta rejected the proposal. The Boeotians executed the males and enslaved the rest of the population of Orchomenus in 363. Such atrocities in Sicily started earlier and were more numerous still. They weakened the world of city-states in a manner which has been apparent in the Balkan states of modern times.

Another weakness of the city-state was the bitterness of its internal politics, which often led to revolution and reprisals. The name '*stasis*' was given by the Greeks to this form of violent party-strife. Thucydides wrote

a graphic descripion of it at Corcyra in 429. When the Corcyraean democrats had the support of an Athenian fleet, they killed their political opponents and their personal enemies in a most ruthless manner.

> Death thus raged in every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which violence did not go ... So bloody was the march of the revolution ... Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being everywhere made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians ... Society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow.[8]

Stasis continued to rage in the city-states after the death of Thucydides early in the fourth century. Athenians of both parties were unusual in declaring and honouring an amnesty in 401, which ended two years of civil strife. In the city-states of Sicily revolution and counter-revolution became endemic, to the despair of Plato who wrote c. 353 as follows:

> To this there is never any end. What seems to be an end always links on to a new beginning, so that this circle of strife is likely to destroy utterly both factions, those of dictatorship and those of democracy alike. The Greek tongue will almost die out in Sicily as it becomes a province of Carthage and Italy.[9]

Between 460 and 360 war after war was initiated by those states which tried to dominate the states of the mainland and of the Aegean islands: Athens versus Sparta, each with their Allies, in 460-446 and again in 431-404, then Sparta against Boeotia and Athens in 394-386 and again in 379-371, and then Boeotia against Athens and Sparta in 370-362. These so-called hegemonic city-states created each 'their Allies', initially by offering protection but often thereafter through intimidation and through intervening in internal politics. Sparta supported 'oligarchies', Athens 'democracies', and Boeotia federal systems similar to her own. In the 350s two major wars arose when some Allies rebelled against the methods of the hegemonic states. Byzantium, Chios, Cos and Rhodes rebelled against the 'democratic' governments imposed by Athens and terminated their alliance with Athens. During this the Social War of 357-355, other Allies broke away, and Athens failed to regain control. In 356 Boeotia tried to coerce Phocis, nominally one of her Allies, because a political party, led by Philomelus, was intriguing with Athens. She chose to operate through the Amphictyonic Council of Delphi, but Philomelus countered by seizing Delphi. When the Sacred War was declared in 355, Philomelus was supported by Sparta, Athens and Achaea, while Boeotia mustered her own Allies in the hope of imposing her will in Central Greece.

These almost interminable wars within Greece weakened the collective strength of the city-states in relation to other states. It was only Persian subsidies which enabled Sparta to defeat Athens finally in 404. Persian

ships and Persian money enabled Conon to defeat Sparta at sea in 394, and to rebuild the walls and reconstitute the navy of Athens thereafter. In 386 Persia presided over 'The King's Peace' in which she reimposed the hegemony of Sparta over the warring states and she took as her price the liberties of the Greek city-states of Asia Minor. In 371 Persia approved another peace which recognised the hegemony of Sparta on land and of Athens at sea. In 366 Persia supported the hegemony of Boeotia and showed hostility towards Sparta and Athens. In all these treaties the subjection of the Greek city-states in Asia to Persian rule was recognised by the contracting parties. Meanwhile the city-states of Sicily were being weakened even more than those of the Greek mainland, and Plato's fears that they would pass into the hands of Carthage or Italy appeared to be justified. Elsewhere some Aegean islands were acquired by Mausolus, the ruler of Caria; the Chersonese was seized by Cersobleptes; and Greek city-states of the north Aegean coast were being destroyed or forced to enter the Macedonian kingdom.

3. The dilemma of the city-states in the fourth century

Those Greek thinkers who concerned themselves not with the politics of one city-state but with the world of Greek city-states saw the signs of anarchy and disaster. Thucydides described the decline from civilised standards in the conduct of war between state and state, and 'the whole Hellenic world convulsed by the bloody march of revolution' (*stasis*) within each state. Isocrates, born in 436, wrote c. 380 as follows:[10]

> Pirates command the seas and mercenaries occupy our cities. Instead of waging war in defence of their territory the citizens fight within their own walls against one another. Inhabitants of the cities live in greater despair than those condemned to exile, so frequent are the revolutionary changes. Some of our cities are ruled by barbarian masters ... Sufficient is the time that is past, filled with every kind of disaster ... which we have brought upon ourselves by creating wars and revolutions, so that some are executed without respect for law, others with their wives and children are outcasts wandering in foreign lands, and many enlisting as mercenaries because they lack the means of life are killed in the service of their enemies against their friends.

When Philip came to power in Macedonia, the situation had worsened and more voices were raised in protest or in despair. Xenophon, who spent thirty years of his life in exile from Athens, completed his history of Greek affairs with the statement that after the Battle of Mantinea in 362 'there was still greater indecisiveness and confusion than before in Greece' – words which were written c. 356. At the same time Isocrates, living in Athens, despaired of her as a leader of other states and wrote a letter to Archidamus, king of Sparta, in which he urged Archidamus to lead the

Greek city-states in a war against Persia. He stressed again the terrible state of Greece 'filled and obsessed with war and revolutions and massacres and innumerable evils', and he saw that war against Persia could not be waged 'until someone may reconcile the Greeks with one another and make us put an end to our madness and contentiousness'.[11] Plato, having visited Syracuse, commented c. 353 on the vicious circle of revolution in the city-states and the danger of them becoming subject to foreign rule. When Theopompus came to write of this decade he observed that the Greek city-states in their individual lust for domination lost one and all the capacity to dominate.[12]

What could be done to halt the decline? Those who put their faith in the strengths of the city-state and regarded it as the highest form of organisation for political and social life were at pains to preserve it and therefore to overcome its weaknesses by reforms. Plato put his trust in compulsory education of the young and the promotion of the most intelligent graduates to be rulers of the city-state, actuated not by ambition but by a sense of duty. In the *Laws*, written c. 360-350, Plato gave an important place to religion in the curriculum of education and in the ceremonies of the state. The specification of the city-state which these educated citizens were to occupy was as follows. The citizen body should consist of 5,040 families, of which the richest should not be more than four times richer than the poorest. Each family should possess two inalienable estates, worked by serfs, so that its members should enjoy sufficient leisure to engage in higher education and in politics. The economy of the state was to be agricultural. It should not engage in maritime commerce, and it should not become urbanised. Aristotle too trusted in a system of education, which was designed to train the citizen's mind to understand what was right and the citizen's will to do what was right. His specification for the ideal city-state resembled that of Plato in its pattern of citizens and serfs, of minimal capitalism and of insulation from maritime commerce. Aristotle believed not only that the Greek city-state was the highest form of political organisation but also that the Greeks alone had the intelligence 'by nature' to conduct an enlightened life within such a state. Even they were to be led by men of outstanding intellectual and moral quality who were inevitably few in number and thus 'oligarchs' in political terms.

Isocrates believed that a new form of leadership was needed in the Greek world. The strongest city-states – Athens, Sparta and Thebes – were failing to achieve acceptance as leaders or to bring about stability. It was probably c. 368 that Isocrates wrote a letter to Dionysius, the military dictator of Syracuse, who had forced the city-states of Sicily into a form of unity and was attacking the last Carthaginian strongholds on the island with forces which numbered 300 warships, 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Isocrates appealed to him as 'the first and foremost of the Greek race and the possessor of the greatest power' to become the saviour of the Greek city-states by leading a crusade against the Persian Empire.[13] He turned

next, c. 356, to Archidamus as a descendant of Heracles, the leader as king of the Lacedaemonians, and the man with the highest reputation among the Greeks, and he hoped that he would first of all reconcile the Greek city-states and then lead them against Persia.[14] In making these appeals there is no indication that Isocrates had lost faith in the value of the city-state or advocated any form of authoritarian rule over the world of city-states. What he wanted was effective leadership by a man capable of reconciling the Greek states and powerful enough to be the spearhead of a united campaign of Greeks against Persians. One difference between him and Plato or Aristotle was that he was looking for an immediate and practical solution to the problems of the Greek world.

Philip was certainly aware of Plato's views, since the philosopher at the court of Perdiccas III was Euphraeus, a member of Plato's Academy. As a hostage at Thebes in 368-365 he knew of the ambitions of Epaminondas to establish the hegemony of Boeotia by land and by sea, and he was there when Pelopidas returned from Susa to proclaim a King's Peace supported by Boeotia as the hegemonic state. He no doubt knew Aristotle in the 350s, since Aristotle's father was the doctor at court. The essays and the letters of Isocrates were intended for a wide circulation, and they may well have been read by Philip.

4. Practical politics in the city-states and in Athens in particular

As Isocrates complained, the practical politicians of his time were dealing not with the problems of the Greek world but each with those of his own state. There was only one occasion on which the leaders of the mainland states except for Sparta agreed on a general plan for Greece, namely in the winter of 362 after the indecisive Battle of Mantinea, when the troops of Boeotia, Locris, Euboea, Malis, Aeniania, Thessaly, Tegea and Messenia had faced those of Sparta, Athens, Elis, Achaea and Mantinea. 'The Greeks, exhausted by the continual sequence of dangers, were reconciled with one another', and they took oaths to observe 'a pact of common peace and alliance' (Diod. 15. 89. 1 and 94. 1). This account is confirmed by an inscription, which also defined the purpose of the Greeks: 'in order that they should be freed from war amongst themselves, make each their own city-state as great and as prosperous as possible, and be continually useful and strong for their friends'.[15] The term 'alliance' was interpreted in the inscription as a common front against any aggressor. The description of themselves in the inscription as 'The Greeks' indicated that the member-states were equal in standing and that no one state held hegemony. There were judges whose duty presumably was to try states or individuals against whom any charges of violation of the terms of the treaty of Common Peace and Alliance were laid. Unfortunately nothing else is known about the organisation, except that 'The Greeks' rejected an invitation to join

those satraps who were in revolt against the Great King. The treaty was an important sign of the times but little more. For in 361 war broke out between factions in Arcadia, Thebes sent troops to help Megalopolis, and Athens and her Allies maintained an alliance with Arcadia, Achaea, Elis and Phlius in opposition to the threat from Thebes and her allies. The Common Peace was dead. The era of internecine wars was to continue.

Among the Greek-speaking peoples of the mainland there were two kinds of state: city-state and tribal state. The constitutions of the city-states ranged from dictatorship through oligarchy to democracy. Dictators relied on mercenary soldiers rather than citizen-soldiers and on well-rewarded friends in order to stay in power (e.g. at Pherae and Sicyon). The oligarchs were the well-to-do; they might be at the same time the military élite such as the Spartiate hoplites or the cavalrymen in a Thessalian city-state, and they too might have recourse to mercenary troops as a garrison force. The democrats, being the mass of citizens, were inevitably the less well-to-do; in a maritime state they formed the crews of the warships, and they tended to distrust those who occupied high executive posts. In the treaty of alliance which Athens and her Allies formed with Arcadia, Achaea, Elis and Phlius there was a clause under which the states undertook to respect each other's constitution and to take action to protect that constitution (both oligarchies and democracies were involved).[16] But for this clause the democrats in power in one state might endeavour to enlist the out-of-power democrats in another state, promote a violent revolution there, and thus instal another democracy; and the oligarchs likewise. Indeed the tendency to intrigue on such political lines was so strong that Aeneas Tacticus insisted that the troops on guard in a city-state must be 'both loyal and satisfied with the existing situation, since it is a great thing to have such a group acting like a fortress against the revolutionary designs of the other party'; and that their commander had to be a man for whom a change of government would be most disastrous.[17] The danger of an internal coup d'état was always present.

The tribal states were led by a king or by magistrates who inherited the strong executive powers of kingship. They existed in Northwest Greece from Aetolia and Acarnania to Chaonia and Parauaea; in Malis, Athamania, Dolopia and Aeniania; and from Magnesia and Perrhaebia to Pelagonia. Their constitution was relatively stable, and they seem not to have engaged in revolutionary strife (*stasis*). On the other hand they were primarily pastoral in their way of life, and thus they had less economic and military strength until the rise of Macedonia as a group of tribal states.

In the city-states of Philip's time the most common form of constitution was a democracy, usually of the extreme type, of which Athens was the model. There, as Aristotle put it, 'the people has made itself master of everything; all administration is conducted by decrees of the Assembly and

decisions of the Courts, in which the people is sovereign'.[18] Direct rule by majority vote in the Assembly was limited in theory by respect for legal precedent. But this was weakened when the charge of illegal proposal was blunted by overuse, and when before 355 a people's panel of 1,001 jurors was set up to try and if necessary alter all past and current laws. The Assembly met in public; its decisions were public; and they were put into effect by officials who had been elected by the Assembly or chosen by lot. Because procedure was strict in the meeting of the Assembly, and because oratorical skill was necessary in addressing several thousand citizens in the open air, the speakers tended to be specialists either as magistrates or as lawyers, such as Demosthenes. Successful speakers exercised considerable influence on the policy of the state; but if they held no office they were not likely to be prosecuted. Rather, if a policy proved disastrous, it was the executive magistrate who was held responsible and was punished by the People's Court with heavy fines, banishment or execution.

In peacetime the citizens of Athens paid no direct taxes. In wartime the financial burden fell mainly on the wealthy, to some extent on the middle class, and not at all on the lower class of citizens. Indeed the last group were paid as rowers in the navy, and if territories were won they might became colonists and move into a higher class. Aristophanes put it succinctly in 393. 'Let's launch the fleet (an orator cries); the poor vote "Aye", the wealthy and the farmers vote "No" '. The people too were proud of their past as a hegemonic and imperial state; and they were better pleased, said Isocrates, with orators prompting them to go to war than with those who advocated peace.[19] In 355 it was said that the reason for Athens abusing her Allies had been the poverty of the masses. In this there was certainly some truth. For in a society based on a large slave structure any citizen who lacked capital and worked for a living was in competition with slave labour. The Assembly helped the poor with the welfare payments; but they were not enough, as Aristotle observed, to lift the poor citizens above the level of a labourer.[20] The best hope of improving their lot lay in a successful war and in the acquisition of empire. In 354 the Theoric Fund was established as a check on too much readiness by the poor to go to war (see p. 58 above). In the next chapter we shall see some of the workings of the democratic system at Athens.

The attitude of the city-states towards worship of the Olympian gods changed radically after the end of the Second Peloponnesian War in 404. During the colonising period every state had consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphi and obeyed its instructions in so far as they could be understood. The colonial city-states recorded their gratitude to Apollo by honouring him as founder or by naming themselves after him. When A.J. Graham wrote of the Greeks of that period, he concluded that 'believing in their gods and hence in themselves they had the morale required to create permanent new communities far from home'.[21] Faith in the Olympian gods

was confirmed by the defeat of Persia. Gods and heroes were believed to have fought alongside the Greeks, and Apollo to have routed a Persian force at Delphi. The leading city-states consulted Apollo of Delphi when the great invasion was impending. They accepted his words as authoritative and final. The Athenians accordingly put their trust 'in the wooden wall', embarked on their warships and became a naval people. As Apollo advised, the Greeks prayed to the winds, and the storms destroyed much of the Persian armada. During the period 600-460 magnificent temples, comparable to our cathedrals, were a testimony to the faith of the states in the Olympian gods. Athens built her finest temples in 449 to 432, when she was at the height of her power.

The internecine wars which were particularly bitter from 431 to 350 brought increasing disillusion and cynicism. Conservative Sparta did ask the advice of Apollo at Delphi in 432 before going to war, but 'this was almost the last time when the Pythian Apollo was consulted on a major question of policy'.[22] For example in 368, when the Boeotians and their Allies and the Spartans met at Delphi to consider terms of peace, none of them consulted the god, as Xenophon remarked with disapproval.[23] The oaths by the Olympian gods which city-states took in making treaties of alliance became a mere formality. Lysander's dictum 'we cheat boys with dice and men with oaths' was characteristic of the Greek states in the fourth century.[24] In 366, for instance, when Athens and Corinth were allies, Athens decided to join the enemies of Corinth. She did not inform Corinth. Instead she tried to occupy Corinth with her soldiers and her navy. Thus she added treachery to perjury in breaking her oaths. In 364 some Arcadians seized the treasures of Zeus at Olympia. This act of impiety split the Arcadian League. In 356 the Boeotians used for political ends their influence in the Amphictyonic League and exploited the party-strife among the Delphians and among the Phocians. The resulting conflict split the world of city-states into two factions. The sacrilegious looting of the god's possessions was accepted without demur by the allies of Philomelus. State cyncism was a reflection of the cynicism of individual citizens, which Euripides portrayed so vividly in his plays. 'Zeus sent the ghost of Helen to Troy', said the Dioscuri, 'in order to cause strife and bloodshed among men.'[25]

On the other hand, in Macedonia orthodox religion was deeply rooted. In state policy it is important to note that in 356 Philip and the Chalcidians consulted Apollo of Delphi in advance, had Apollo's answer recorded both at Delphi and at Olynthus and Dium, and carried out the oracle's instructions to make suitable offerings to the god. The terms of the alliance between the two states were similarly recorded at Delphi, in the temple of Artemis at Olynthus and at the temple of Zeus of Olympus at Dium. The oaths by named gods included a clause that 'many ills should fall on those who commit perjury'.[26] Because Greek city-states had ceased to consult Apollo at Delphi on such matters of policy, we may conclude that the

arrangements with Delphi were due to Philip rather than to the Chalcidian city-states. In 348 Philip and his Macedonians felt that they were justified in the sight of Apollo and of Zeus, Earth, Sun and Poseidon in destroying Olynthus for its act of perjury.

CHAPTER VIII

Philip's gains and city-state reactions, 348-346

1. The political situation in Athens and offers by Philip

The great majority of Athenians had no personal knowledge either of Macedonia or of Chalcidice. What they did know and believed almost fanatically was that Amphipolis was theirs both by hereditary right because their ancestors had founded it, and by international agreement because the conference of Greek states in 371 had recognised it to be an Athenian possession. When the majority in the Assembly decided to support the Chalcidian League against Macedonia, they had three expectations: that they would defeat Philip, whose power was liable to collapse internally as Demosthenes assured them in *The Second Olynthiac*, and they would be acclaimed 'the greatest of the Greeks'; that they would enlist the Chalcidian League as a faithful ally for the future; and that with the League's aid they would at last capture Amphipolis.[1] Where so much was to be gained, they voted not only to spend very large sums on sending mercenary and naval forces to Chalcidice but also to place the monies of the Theoric Fund in the Military Fund on the proposal of Apollodorus (the move was blocked by a charge of illegality and the proposer was later fined a talent).[2] Finally, in summer 348, the Assembly took the unusual decision to despatch a citizen army – 300 cavalry and 2,000 hoplites – on a further 17 triremes. To us who enjoy hindsight the sending of citizen troops may seem a gallant gesture to a flagging ally. The Athenian expectation at the time was very different. They took the most unusual step of committing citizen troops so far afield because they felt confident of victory.

The collapse of the Chalcidians in early autumn 348 was a shattering blow to the Assembly. Their expectations were all belied. Macedonia was stronger than they had supposed, the Chalcidian League was disbanded, and Amphipolis was more securely in Philip's hands than ever. Their only ally close to the Macedonian kingdom was Thasos; but it had lost most of its possessions on the mainland, and its fleet was insignificant. Only Cersobleptes stood in the way of Philip advancing eastwards, allying himself with Byzantium and Perinthus, and blockading the Athenian corn-ships at the Bosporus; and he might even attack the Athenian bases

on the Chersonese, Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros (D. 59. 3). Alternatively Philip's army might move southwards. If the Macedonians, the Thessalians and the Boeotians joined forces, they would overpower Phocis and might attack Athens as the ally of Phocis. This last possibility was particularly alarming for the Athenians in the Assembly.

It is difficult for us to know what the position of Phocis was in autumn 348, because our chief source of information, Diodorus, placed his reports under two archon-years, 352/1 and 347/6. Yet he marked the reports as continuous in that he ended the first with the Boeotians gathering 'a mass of booty' in Phocis and he began the second with the Boeotians 'having sacked much of the territory of Phocis' (16. 39. 8 and 56. 1). It is evident that he was abbreviating the consecutive narrative of Demophilus, a contemporary writer,[3] and that he chose to put his material under these two years, in order to insert narratives of Persian affairs (16. 40. 3 – 52. 8) and Philip (16. 52. 9 – 55. 4). We have to spread the incidents of the first report over the years which intervened between 352/1 and 347/6. The bulk of the incidents took place in the Peloponnese, to which the Sacred War spread, as we mentioned above (p. 58). Sparta attacked Megalopolis, and each invoked its allies, probably in 351. The appeal of Sparta to Athens was discussed in the Athenian Assembly. Demosthenes proposed that Athens should send help not to Sparta, which (he claimed) wished to make the Peloponnesians into subject peoples (D. 16. 28), but to Megalopolis, which would then have to renounce its current alliance with Thebes. His aim was to strike a balance of power between Sparta and Athens and between Athens and Thebes by ousting Thebes from her position of influence in the Peloponnese (D. 23. 102). Had Demosthenes persuaded the Assembly, he would have involved Athenian forces in the internecine wars of the Peloponnese, which only perpetuated inter-state hatreds and weakened the collective strength of the city-states. The Assembly decided to take no action, probably on the advice of Eubulus.[4]

A full-scale war ensued in the Peloponnese, probably in 350-349. Sparta obtained 150 cavalry from the ex-tyrants of Pherae and 3,000 mercenaries from her ally Phocis. Megalopolis received the full forces of Argos, Messenia and Sicyon (*pandemei*) and 500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry from Thebes, which was eager to maintain its influence. A number of battles were fought, a couple of cities were destroyed by Sparta, and then the war ended inconclusively[5] with an armistice between Sparta and Megalopolis. The Theban forces, which had fought with some success, returned to Boeotia, probably late in 349. There Chaeronea had been captured by the new Phocian commander Phalaecus. With the return of the Theban troops the Boeotians overran and ravaged most of Phocis, probably in 348. Moreover, the source of Phocis' strength – the 'borrowed' wealth of the god at Delphi – was beginning to run dry. It was obvious in 348 that Athens was on the losing side in the Sacred War.[6]

Although Demosthenes failed to persuade the Assembly to intervene in

the Peloponnese, he hoped to revive Athens' days of greatness as a democracy defending other democracies against the tide of tyranny or oligarchy. Some democratic exiles from Rhodes, probably in 351, asked Athens to restore them by force to their homeland, where an oligarchy was ruling with the support of the Carian dynasty and the approval of Persia. Demosthenes argued, probably in 351,[7] that Athens should agree to the request, send out troops, and act worthily of her illustrious past (D. 15. 35). He maintained that Persian reverses in Egypt would prevent Persia from retaliating.[8] However, wiser counsels prevailed in the Assembly. Yet the advocates of those counsels were not necessarily popular; for many Athenians would have liked to hold the balance of power in the Peloponnese and to be the champions of democracy against the Carian and Persian despots.

Philip observed the policies and the activities of the city-states 'as if from a watch-tower' (Just. 8. 1. 3, deriving from Theopompus).[9] He had 'friends' in most states. Some were official representatives as *proxenoi*, chosen by himself or appointed by the Macedonian Assembly,[10] but the majority were individuals who, for whatever reason, were eager to cultivate his friendship and to enjoy his lavish hospitality. Nor did wars impose serious restrictions on the passing of information from a network of 'friends' who could use neutrals as go-betweens. Thus in 348, while Philip was still at war with the Chalcidian League and Athens, his friends in Euboea during a diplomatic mission to Athens told the Assembly that Philip wanted to come to terms and be at peace with Athens. Similarly, when negotiations were conducted about some ransom-money paid by one Phrynon to Macedonian 'pirates' during the Olympian truce, the official Athenian envoy returned with the message that Philip wanted to end the war with Athens. Thereupon the Assembly voted unanimously in favour of letting Philip send a herald (to ensure safe conduct during the war) and envoys to Athens with his offers; but the proposal was blocked as being unconstitutional. Subsequently, in September 348, Olynthus was captured and razed. During the rest of the year negotiations for the release of Athenian prisoners were conducted by Aristodemus, an Athenian actor, who was a friend of Philip, and in due course Aristodemus reported to the Council and to the Assembly that Philip was very well disposed towards Athens and wished to become Athens' ally.[11]

Philip's 'friends' – his opponents called them 'agents' or 'traitors' (Diod. 16. 54. 4) – were widely dispersed. He had plenty of them in Thebes and other Boeotian cities, since he and fifty sons of leading Macedonians had lived there for three years as hostages. His network certainly covered the Peloponnese, the islands, and some Greek cities in Thrace. Moreover, he was able through his friends to engage in unofficial diplomacy or to deliver misinformation. What did Philip really want from Athens? The Athenian Assembly had only one means of trying to find out, and that was to send an embassy to Pella. Yet to be openly suing for peace would be humiliating

for the Athenian People. The Assembly chose instead to stay at war, to rally the other city-states, and to form an active coalition against Philip. The proposer of the motion was Eubulus, and one of the envoys whom the Assembly appointed was Aeschines. During the winter of 348-347 the envoys carried out their mission.[12] Aeschines was proud of his speech to the Ten Thousand who formed the Assembly of the Arcadians at Megalopolis, and according to Demosthenes he denounced Philip as plotting against the liberties of the Greeks and called him 'a barbarian devil'.[13] Not a state, 'not a man' offered to join Athens, as Aeschines said later (2. 70). It may be that Eubulus had foreseen this result; for Athens' record of actions against Philip was dismal, her only allies were the temple-robbing Phocians and the imperialistic Spartans, and apart from Athens and Phocis no state on the mainland had felt the weight of war with Philip. If Eubulus had that foresight, he will have considered the exercise necessary in order to force the Assembly to send an embassy to Philip. However, the Assembly procrastinated.

2. The actions of Philip from autumn 348 to spring 346

Why did Philip send messages that he wanted peace and later alliance with Athens? Whereas we learn from Aeschines and Demosthenes some of the ideas which influenced the open debates in the Athenian Assembly, there are no reports of what ideas influenced Philip, who was the sole arbiter of Macedonian diplomacy. We can only speculate. If his aim in summer 348 had been to destroy Athens, as Demosthenes was later to assert, he would surely have gone on from the collapse of Olynthus to organise his Macedonian and Thessalian forces, make contact with the Boeotians, finish off the Phocians, and attack Athens with his base at Thebes. For he knew from his friends that, so far as the other Greek states were concerned, Athens was virtually isolated; for Phocis was on the defensive, Sparta was exhausted by her war in the Peloponnese, and the reputation of Athens was at a low ebb.[14] It seems rather that Philip did desire to make peace and to coexist with Athens for the immediate future. What prompted that desire? We must remember that Philip was a leading participant in the Sacred War, and in that capacity also he was at war with Athens, the ally of Phocis. To make peace with Athens was to make it acceptable that Philip and Athens would not fight one another in the Sacred War. In late 348 it was clear to Philip that the Phocians would not survive for long, and that the decision was likely to lie with himself, the Thessalians, Thebes and, if necessary, Thebes' allies in the Peloponnese.

While Athens procrastinated and the Phocians continued to hold out, Philip was certainly not inactive between late 348 and spring 346. The only report of his actions is in Justin 8. 3. 12, a passage based on Theopompus, who as a contemporary is likely to have reported events in the correct sequence.[15] First (after the sack of Olynthus) probably early in 347 'Philip

seized gold mines ('auraria' sc. 'metalla') in Thessaly and silver mines in Thrace'. Since Thessaly has no gold mines, Trogus or Justin has made a mistake in abbreviating Theopompus.[16] But it is most likely that Philip was in Thessaly in 347, confirming his position and that of the Thessalian League after the trouble at Pherae in the winter of 349-8 (p. 51 above) and preparing the Thessalians for action in the Sacred War. To this end he needed control of Achaea Phthiotis. He therefore supported Pharsalus as a leading city-state of the Thessalian League in a dispute with Halus, an important port of call on the Phthiotid coast, which made some kind of alliance with Athens. In spring 346 his general Parmenio was laying siege to Halus.[17] The capture of silver mines in Thrace was presumably associated with a campaign early in 347 into western Thrace. The mines were probably those of Akhladhokhori, just east of the middle Strymon in an area which had been controlled by the Odrysian king Sitalces in 429. No doubt these mines had provided Cetriporis with silver for his coinage,[18] because according to Aristotle the area 'beyond Amphipolis', which was marshy and so suitable for hawking, lay in the realm of Cetriporis.[19] Next, according to Justin, 'lest he should leave any law or right unviolated, he began also to practise piracy'. The term 'piracy' expressed the Athenian point of view, as in the case of Phrynon (p. 81 above); but since Athens was still at war and was neglecting Philip's offers of peace, the raiding tactics of the Macedonian fleet were legitimate acts of war and may well have been in response to Athenian raids on the Macedonian coast.[20]

'It was after these events ("his ita gestis")', Justin continued, 'that two brothers who were kings of Thrace ... chose Philip to arbitrate on their disputes. But Philip, true to his own character, ... intervened with his armed forces and robbed both of them of their kingdoms.'[21] Who were these two kings? In 359 the Odrysian kingdom of Cotys in southern Thrace split into three realms, over which his sons and grandsons became rulers: from west to east Berisades, followed by 'Cetriporis and his brothers'; Amadocus, the son of a like-named father; and Cersobleptes.[22] Since they fought one against the other, Cetriporis soon became a client king of Philip (p. 35 above). Amadocus was left holding an area west of the river Hebrus (D. 23. 183), and Cersobleptes an area east of the river. These are the two kings of Justin. Each for a time had been an ally of Philip.[23] Now, late in 347, they accepted him as an arbitrator, only for him to intervene with his army and reduce both to a position of dependency. Fighting probably ran into early 346. During these operations the Athenian general in the Chersonese placed some troops as garrisons in Hieron Oros and Serrion fort (both outside the Chersonese), presumably in collaboration with Cersobleptes.[24] Since Philip and Athens were still at war, the general was within his rights.

The quarrel between the two kings was mentioned also by the Scholiast (i.e. a commentator in antiquity) in a note on a statement by Aeschines, which referred to the time when he and the other envoys reached Pella late

in March 346. 'I and all the other envoys saw the son of Cersobleptes serving as a hostage with Philip' (2. 81). This was evidently a shock to the envoys who had not realised until that moment that Cersobleptes had suffered a major defeat. The Scholiast explained that Cersobleptes had gone to war against Amadocus, Byzantium and Perinthus 'about disputed territory', and that Philip intervened so forcibly that Cersobleptes had to relinquish the territory. 'Philip, taking his son from him as hostage, secured Cersobleptes as king in his own (Philip's) interest.' It is clear that Justin and the Scholiast went back to a common source, namely in my view Theopompus. Justin had the Macedonians' action in Thrace overlap with the despatch of the envoys from Athens (8. 4, 1, 'dum haec aguntur, legati Atheniensium petentes pacem ad eum venerunt'). It was on their arrival that they saw Cersobleptes' son.[25]

In order to understand the significance for Athens of Philip's treatment of Cersobleptes, we may provide some background information. Her policy was most clearly seen in an alliance in 357 with Berisades, Amadocus and Cersobleptes, in which she and they promised to cooperate in exacting tribute from 'the cities' and in attacking any city which might revolt. The cities were situated on the Thracian coast, a few being probably Thracian but most being Greek, as was specified in the case of 'Greek cities in the Chersonese' (Tod, *GHI* 151, 14, their tribute being 'a contribution'). Thus Athens depended on help from the Thracian kings. Later, when the kings fought one another, Athens made alliance with one or more of them (e.g. in 358 with Berisades and Amadocus, in 356 with Cetriporis, and in 353 with Cersobleptes),[26] no doubt with the same terms for exacting tribute and 'contributions'.[27] Demosthenes liked to speak of this policy as maintaining a balance of power,[28] just as (he claimed) the alliance with Phocis against Thebes and an alliance with Megalopolis against Sparta would create a balance of power. The difficulty was that Philip had a different and in fact a more successful policy, namely not to exact tribute but to make a free alliance with a Greek city and to reduce one king after another to subject status. By the end of 347 the only cities outside the Chersonese which sided with Athens were Aenus[29] and perhaps Neapolis, and the two Thracian kings, Amadocus and Cersobleptes, were being reduced to subject status by Philip during that winter.

3. A period of procrastination by Athens

The Athenian Assembly played a waiting game until the situation changed radically with the news of Philip's advance into eastern Thrace; for it meant that he might be in a position to attack the Athenian cleruchies in the Chersonese and with the help of his allies Byzantium and Perinthus threaten the life-line of Athens, the route of the corn-ships from the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the Hellespont. At the same time, as we shall see, a desperate situation had arisen in Phocis. Because Philip had

the power of quick decision and quick movement on internal lines, it was open to him to attack either Phocis or the Chersonese. Athens could not defend both.

The prospects of Phocis holding her own had been diminishing since late 348. Party-strife (*stasis*) broke out in Phocis in 347 (Aeschin. 2. 132). Phalaecus was deposed on the grounds that he and others in authority had misappropriated the treasures of Apollo, and three new men were appointed as generals. A trial was held. It resulted in the execution of those found guilty. According to Demophilus (whom Diodorus was following) Athens and Sparta were judged to have been paid far more than was due for the men they had sent to Phocis; so they too were found guilty of misappropriation (Diod. 16. 57. 1). Phalaecus, however, survived but without holding office. The Boeotians, too, were flagging. Having lost Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae, they sent envoys to Philip in 347; but they received from him only enough men to maintain his commitment to the cause of the god.[30] Then the three Phocian generals sent envoys to both Sparta and Athens offering to place control of Thermopylae in their hands. The plan was that Athens should take over three fortified posts (Alponus, Thronium and Nicaea), entrust them to Spartan troops on their arrival, and hold Thermopylae by land and sea themselves.[31] It seemed that the Assembly had been wise to procrastinate; for the combined forces of Phocis, Athens and Sparta could both hold Thermopylae against Philip and destroy the Boeotians. The Assembly therefore voted to send Proxenus to the fortified posts, man fifty triremes, and conscript citizen troops up to the age of forty. And a force of 1,000 hoplites, commanded by King Archidamus, set off from Sparta.

A rude shock awaited them. Proxenus was refused admission; for Phalaecus and his associates, regaining command of the mercenaries, had overthrown the three generals and arrested the envoys sent by the generals to Athens. The Spartan forces were rejected. When Athenian heralds announced the truce for the celebration of the Mysteries at Eleusis, the Phocians alone of all Greeks refused to respect the truce. The announcement of these happenings reached Athens on one and the same day in March 346.[32] There the Council met. The situation was desperate, both in eastern Thrace where Cersobleptes was ineffective and in Phocis which could not withstand the Macedonians and the Thessalians. If Philip should chose to prosecute the war which Athens had refused to terminate, there was little to stop him taking the Chersonese by storm or laying siege to Athens. The Council recommended the immediate despatch of envoys to make peace with Philip, and on the proposal of Philocrates the Assembly voted to send 'to Philip ten envoys who will discuss with Philip peace and the common interests of Athens and Philip' (Aeschin. 2. 18).

Why had Philip waited so long in the hope that Athens would accept his offer not only of peace but also of alliance? That was a question which some Athenians must have asked themselves. One answer was that peace for

Philip would be a temporary expedient; for with Athens withdrawing from the Sacred War Philip and his Greek allies would crush Phocis, and then they would be free to discard the peace and attack Athens. Those who took that view could point as a precedent to the experience of the Chalcidian League, which had made peace and alliance and had then been attacked and destroyed, all in Philip's good time. Another answer was that Philip's offer was genuine; for he had not taken the golden opportunity of attacking Athens or the Chersonese in autumn 348, when she had been defeated in Euboea and in Chalcidice and her attempt to raise a coalition had failed utterly. Those who held that opinion could not forecast what peace with Philip, and even more what alliance with Philip, might entail in the future. They might learn something from the negotiations of their envoys with Philip.

4. Diplomatic exchanges, peace and alliance concluded, and Isocrates' *Philippus*

Greek procedure in making a treaty was slow. The first stage was exploratory, envoys of both states visiting one another. If and when a draft was agreed, envoys of both states watched the authorities of each in turn take the oath to observe the terms of the treaty. A record of the treaty was then inscribed, often with mutual compliments. More statements about this particular treaty-making have come down to us than about any other example in ancient times. They are contained in the speeches delivered by Aeschines and Demosthenes in 343, when Aeschines was on trial before 1,501 judges. Both speakers lied freely. In deciding what happened we rely mainly on points where they agreed and on documents which they cited.[33]

The ten envoys were led by Philocrates. They included Demosthenes and Aeschines who were both supporters of Philocrates, and four friends of Philip. They knew that they would be answerable individually to the Assembly for what they said and did. They made haste, and on their way they saw that Halus was being besieged by a Macedonian army under Parmenio. They reached Pella late in March, and had two audiences with the king, whom they found courteous and charming. But they were alarmed to see Cersobleptes' son held as a hostage at Pella and to learn that Philip was setting out for Thrace. They therefore obtained a promise from Philip that he would not to enter the Chersonese with an armed force during the negotiations (Aeschin. 2. 82). They returned to Athens to report what had happened, and they were accompanied by three Macedonian envoys, led by Antipater, who were to confirm the statements by Philip and to administer the oaths if a treaty should be made.

Preliminary consideration was undertaken by the Council and separately by the Congress of the Athenian Allies. For it must be remembered that Philip was at war with 'Athens and her Allies', who together formed the Athenian Alliance (sometimes called the Second Athenian Confeder-

acy), and therefore that any peace or alliance would be made with both Athens and her Allies. The Council of Athens proposed that the ten envoys should be crowned with olive wreaths and that their report should be discussed; and the Congress of the Allies proposed that the Assembly should deliberate about peace (alliance not being mentioned) and authorise any Greek state to enter the peace within three months (Aeschin. 3.69). The latter proposal would, of course, allow Phocis and Halus, for instance, to save themselves by entering the peace. The debate in the Assembly lasted for two days in mid-April. On the first day it is probable that Demosthenes and Aeschines supported the proposal of the Congress of Allies, and that Philocrates proposed that a treaty of peace and alliance be made with Philip, and that Phocis and Halus be expressly excluded from such a treaty. Consultation followed afterwards with the envoys of Philip, who were there for that purpose. It seems that they stated that the proposal of the Congress was not acceptable, and that Philip required alliance as well as peace.

On the second day of the debate Philocrates repeated his proposal. He added that, if the Assembly chose to stay at war with Philip, they would face the hostility of Thebes, Megara, Chios and Rhodes (*FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 164). It is probable that Aeschines spoke in support of Philocrates' proposal, that many opposed it, and that Demosthenes sat silent. A stormy meeting culminated in a statement by Eubulus that the alternative was war, personal service, a capital levy, and conversion of the Theoric Fund into the Military Fund (D. 19. 291). The proposal of Philocrates was then carried.

In the drafting of the treaty each party was 'to possess what it already held' ([D.] 7. 18 and 26); they were to combine in securing the freedom of the seas and the suppression of the pirates (ibid. 14); and the parties to the treaty were Philip and his allies on the one hand, and Athens and her Allies on the other hand. At the time the last item was clear; for Demosthenes himself as President of the Assembly at a later meeting ruled that Cersobleptes' request to be included among Athens' Allies was invalid, since Cersobleptes was not a member of the Athenian Alliance. Moreover, the oaths to the treaty of peace and alliance were taken by the representatives of Athens and her Allies and by them alone, in the presence of the Macedonian envoys.

The treaty was still incomplete; for the oaths had to be taken by Philip and by the officials representing the allied states.[34] The same ten envoys went off to administer the oaths, obtain the release of Athenian prisoners, and 'negotiate anything advantageous that they can' (Aeschin. 2. 104). They took twenty-three days to reach Pella and waited twenty-seven days there. They found embassies 'from almost all of Greece' waiting to meet Philip. They included Philip's allies, notably the Thessalians and the Thebans, the latter seeking implementation of the alliance;[35] the Spartans, alarmed by Philip's friendly relations with the allies of Thebes in the

Peloponnese (Argos, Messenia and Arcadia);[36] the Phocians, hoping to negotiate a settlement; and smaller states, of which one, Chalcis in Euboea, expressed their general fear 'of the secret diplomacy of the great states' (Aeschin. 2. 120). Meanwhile Philip was capturing forts from Doriscus on the Hebrus river to the Sacred Mountain near the Chersonese, took Cersobleptes prisoner, and set him up as a client king. News of Philip's successes no doubt arrived together with Philip himself at the head of his victorious army at Pella. 'All the Greeks are watching to see what will happen' (Aeschin. 2. 104). Philip's hands were still free. His diplomacy had been so successful that he could espouse any cause.

Philip staged an open conference, during which each mission spoke before the assembled company. Demosthenes earned a laugh 'from the envoys of practically all Greece' by declaring that he did not praise Philip 'as a wonderful drinker, because that is suitable praise for a sponge'.[37] There must have been speeches galore. But Philip did not reveal his intentions to any of the missions. The Athenian envoys had to accompany the king and his army to Pherae in Thessaly. There the oaths to the treaty of peace and alliance were taken by Philip and by the representatives of his allies (including Thessaly, Thebes and Cardia). At last the treaty was complete. It came to be called 'the Peace of Philocrates'; and if Philip and Athens were as good as their word, Athens was no longer in danger of being attacked by the anti-Phocis coalition.

Why had Philip made this treaty and what were his intentions? As we have seen (p. 82 above), he wanted from summer 348 onwards to coexist and, if possible, to collaborate with Athens. That could only happen if Athens could be induced to withdraw from her commitment in the Sacred War and thus escape attack by the anti-Phocis coalition. For that reason he needed Athens to go further and ally herself with him, so that anyone attacking Athens would be attacking Philip and his allies. This he achieved, partly by waiting for his own advance to the vicinity of the Chersonese and for the development of events in Phocis to terrify the Athenian Assembly into acquiescence. In estimating his intentions we need to bear in mind, as few have done, that Philip and his laurel-wearing soldiers at the Battle of the Crocus Field had championed the cause of Apollo against the temple-robbers and were committed to doing so in the name of the Amphictyonic League. There was no possibility that Philip would turn on Thebes, his ally, who was championing the same cause. While he enabled Athens to break her ties with the temple-robbers, he did not create any such opportunity for Sparta, which had acted like Athens in the Sacred War. It seems, then, that he intended to bring that war to an end with the help of Thessaly, Thebes and some small states of Central Greece; to entrust the settlement to the Amphictyonic League; to maintain peace and alliance with Athens; and to let Argos, Messenia and Arcadia continue to keep Sparta in check.

At this point we have a very important commentary on the situation by

Isocrates, the Athenian political theorist. The final version of his pamphlet, entitled *Philippus*, which he sent to Philip, can be securely dated on internal evidence to between Athens' swearing to the peace and alliance and the coming of Philip to Pherae.[38] And when we consider how the pamphlet was delivered to Philip, we can say with some confidence that it went with the envoys in late May to Pella; for as the treaty was still unconfirmed on the Macedonian side, communication between Athens and Pella was difficult except through diplomatic channels.

In the *Philippus* Isocrates described some of the views of his contemporaries about the Sacred War. The Thebans hoped that Philip would deliver them from the horrors of guerrilla warfare (55; cf. Diod. 16. 58); the Spartans feared that the Thebans would settle the Phocian business, invade the Peloponnese, and with their allies attack Sparta (50); and trouble-makers in the city-states feared that after settling the Sacred War Philip would lead the Amphictyonic powers and Argos, Messenia and Arcadia against Sparta, obtain rule over the Peloponnese, and then dominate all of Greece (74). Isocrates then gave his own view on what Philip's policy should be at this critical time, when Philip had greater power than any single state in Europe (137) and enjoyed complete freedom of diplomacy and of action (15). He should endeavour to end the wars between the leading states and bring them into concord (16, 30, 141); unite the Greek states and lead them in war against Persia (9, 86); liberate the Greek cities in Asia and found there new cities for Greeks which would be protectors of the Greek world (120-3). Finally, Isocrates expressed the belief that, if Athens could be convinced that that was indeed Philip's policy, she would join in his enterprise (56), and other states might follow suit (69-70).

Political theorists and practical politicians rarely see eye to eye. In this instance Isocrates had heard that Philip was appreciative of reasoning and theorising (29), and he hoped that Philip would see the light. On the other hand, Isocrates had nothing but distrust for those orators at Athens who misrepresented Philip (73), and some of them at least were in his opinion maniacs (129) who flourished by promoting wars (73) and were responsible for the madness of innumerable interstate wars in Greece (88).

CHAPTER IX

Philip the victor of the Sacred War and the Amphictyonic Peace

1. Diplomatic manoeuvres in Pella and Pherae

As we ended the last chapter with the forward-looking views of Isocrates, we begin this chapter with the bitter hindsight of his pupil, Theopompus, who lived to see Athens subjugated by Antipater. His work suffered a double abbreviation, by Trogus and then by Justin, but his idiosyncratic approach and harsh verdicts have survived in this passage:

> Between Athens and Philip peace was concluded in the interest of both parties. The rest of the Greek states sent envoys too, not in longing for peace but in fear of war. With rising rage the Thessalians and the Boeotians besought Philip to show himself the leader he professed to be against the Phocians. Their hatred of the Phocians was so virulent that they forgot their own disasters, for they would rather perish themselves than fail to destroy the Phocians, and they preferred to endure the known severity of Philip rather than spare their enemies. The Phocian envoys, having invoked the Spartans and the Athenians, tried to avert hostilities, which they had bribed Philip to postpone thrice[1] already.
>
> What an utterly loathsome and pitiful spectacle! Greece, leader still of the world in power and prestige ... so reduced by internal dissension and civil wars that it chose of its own accord to fawn on what had until recently been a trivial part of its subject peoples![2]
>
> Philip meanwhile, exulting in his own glorious position and contemptuously scornful of such great states as Thebes and Sparta, pondered which of them he would deign to favour. He granted to each mission a private hearing. He promised to pardon the Spartans for their part in the war, but only if they took the oath not to reveal his words. He told the Thebans he would come and help them. Neither was to prepare for hostilities or to fear hostilities. When his varied responses had made the envoys of all the states free of fear, he seized control of the Pass of Thermopylae.

Let us comment in the same order. Philip handled Athens with great care. He had sent a letter with the envoys on their return from the first mission. It included the following sentence: 'I would be writing more explicitly of the benefits I shall confer on you, if I knew for sure that the alliance will be made' (D. 19. 40). Now, when he sent the envoys home from

Pherae, he sent a letter explaining why some of his allies but not others had taken the oath (Aeschin. 2. 129), and he added in the letter that he did not know what he should do to please the Athenians, but if they would tell him he would do what was compatible with his own honour and reputation (D. 19. 41). When the envoys arrived at Athens, Demosthenes denounced the others at the meeting of the Council, and the usual vote of thanks to envoys was not passed (D. 19. 18, 31 and 32).[3] At the meeting of the Assembly on 16 Scirophorion, which we may identify with 10 July,[4] Demosthenes tried to give his reasons for disbelieving these vague promises by Philip but he was shouted down, while other envoys taking an optimistic view were heard. Philocrates put the difference neatly: 'No wonder Demosthenes and I cannot agree. He drinks water and I drink wine.' The Assembly laughed (D. 19. 46). In the end a proposal by Philocrates was carried. It included the extension of the treaty of peace and alliance to Philip's descendants, praise of Philip for his professions, and a clause that 'if Phocians (not the Phocians) do not do their duty and hand over the shrine to the Amphictyons, the Athenian People will send help against those who seek to prevent the hand-over' (D. 19. 48-9).

The Thessalians had a hatred of the Phocians which went back over centuries and had been rekindled in the Sacred War by defeats in battle and by dissensions between individual Thessalian states which the Phocians had exploited, sometimes bribing political leaders (Diod. 16. 35. 2-3 and 37. 2 and 4). They saw now their opportunity for revenge, and their envoys must have discussed with Philip as their President (*archon*) and Commander the military preparations for the campaign. The Boeotians were even more embittered and rancorous not only towards the Phocians but also towards some city-states in Boeotia which were being used as fortified bases by the Phocians, whether willingly or under compulsion – in particular Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae. Moreover, the Boeotians, and the Thebans especially as leaders of the Boeotian League of city-states, had an inherited hatred of Orchomenus, which had been a centre of opposition to the democratic party in Thebes in 363 and had been punished then by enslavement and expulsions (Diod. 15. 79. 2; Paus. 9. 15. 3). Now the Boeotians were thirsting for revenge. Their envoys accepted the overall leadership of Philip (Just. loc. cit.) for the planning and the execution of the campaign, and it is to be assumed that some provisional plans were agreed between Philip and the Boeotian envoys.[5]

'The Phocians tried to avert hostilities.' It is not stated which of the two parties in the Phocian state was represented by the envoys. But it was probably that led by the three generals; for they had been in touch with Sparta and had obtained 1,000 Spartan troops as reinforcements. It is to be remembered that these envoys, like those of Athens, had been away from home for several weeks before they met Philip. It was probably during their absence that Phalaecus was appointed to the command; for Diodorus, following Demophilus, mentioned it as happening just before Philip

reached Thermopylae (16. 59. 1-2). If this interpretation is correct, the envoys came from the three generals, and they will have argued that the bulk of the Phocian people were innocent and attached the blame to the leaders of the rival party and to the mercenaries. It is unlikely that Philip gave these Phocian envoys any assurances.[6]

The tactics and the diplomacy of Philip had been carefully calculated. His victory at the Crocus Field in 352 had brought him enormous prestige as the champion of the god (Just. 8. 2. 5-7) in the eyes of Thessalians, Boeotians and others. His non-intervention from 352 to 345 had had the effects that the Phocian state had split under the strain, the Boeotian forces had been worn down, and the Athenians and the Spartans had been led to think that he might not try again to force the passage of Thermopylae. It was only when the envoys left Pella *en route* for Pherae and their homes that they realised that the Macedonian army was ready for action. By the time that they made their reports to their several states Philip was already at Thermopylae.

2. The occupation of Phocis and the reaction of Athens

Philip 'took over the Thessalians' during his march south, and some three days after leaving Pherae he faced the very strong position of the enemy. The pass was dominated by three fortified cities, from west to east Alponus, Nicaea and Thronium, the last of which had been captured and depopulated by Onomarchus (Diod. 16. 33. 4). All three were no doubt garrisoned by mercenaries. Phalaecus posted himself in the central position at Nicaea. Philip, depending for success on his siege-train and the bravery of the Macedonians in making assaults, 'was preparing to finish off the war by a set engagement' (Diod. 16. 59. 2). 'But Phalaecus ... sent envoys to the king to ask for terms. An agreement was made that Phalaecus and his 8,000 mercenaries[7] should go free to anywhere they wished', but without their weapons and their horses. The date was July 17th. 'And the Phocians, their hopes crushed, placed themselves in the hands of Philip.[8] Thereafter, having ended the Sacred War unexpectedly without a battle, the king sat in council with (representatives of) the Boeotians and the Thessalians' (Diod. 16. 59. 2-4).

Throughout this campaign Philip kept the decision in his own hands. He negotiated the departure of the mercenaries (as he had done at Pherae in 352), and he accepted the surrender of the Phocians. The Thessalian forces which were present were under his command. The Boeotians had not had time to deploy their forces and attack the Phocians. Intentionally or not, the Boeotians had complied with Philip's advice to their envoys 'not to prepare for hostilities nor to fear hostilities' (Just. loc. cit.). He retained the initiative by summoning representatives of his allies to meet in the presence of his victorious army and make some preliminary decisions. The Thebans, as the leaders of the Boeotian League, came in full strength

(*pandemei*); for they expected to take over the Boeotian cities in enemy occupation and to participate in the policing of the conquered territory (Aeschin. 2. 137). To that meeting we shall return later. For we need first to consider the reactions of Athens during these eventful days.

Philip sent two letters to Athens in which he asked her as his ally to send troops to help him (Aeschin. 2. 137 'with all her forces'; D. 19. 51). The exact timing of the letters is not known. Probably the first was sent before the agreement with Phalaecus, and the second after the capitulation of the Phocians. If Athens had responded to the request of the first letter, her troops would have arrived in time only for the meeting at which Philip sat with the Boeotians and the Thessalians. However, the request was refused on the proposal of Hegesippus, one reason being his assertion that Philip would hold the Athenian soldiers as hostages – an assertion supported by Demosthenes. We have described the meeting of the Assembly on 10 July. Ten envoys were appointed then to convey to Philip the decisions which had been taken. One decision was a willingness to send Athenian troops to act against any Phocians who might refuse to hand over the shrine of Apollo (p. 91 above). Demosthenes was nominated to serve again as an envoy but he declined, and Aeschines did not leave Athens.

The envoys were informed at Chalcis in Euboea that Phalaecus had surrendered the Pass of Thermopylae on 17 July. They turned back and reported the news to an Assembly on 21 July. Panic ensued. The People voted to evacuate the countryside, reinforce all garrisons, and hold a festival inside the city's walls (D. 19. 86 and 125), in the expectation that Philip with his allies would attack Athens. If Philip's second letter arrived during the panic, it was disregarded by the Assembly. Instead, the Assembly sent yet another set of envoys to Philip's camp. They returned with a letter from Philip, in which he expressed his surprise at the attitude of the Athenian People. By then the occupation of the Phocian towns was complete.

3. The conclusion of the Amphictyonic Peace

Philip then convened the Amphictyonic Council and entrusted to it the settlement of the war which the Council had declared in autumn 355 (p. 46 above). The Oetaeans proposed the execution of all adult male Phocians. However, the Council decided that the buildings of the Phocian city-states were to be destroyed, and the people to be moved into villages of no more than fifty houses. An exception was made for Abae, which had opposed the actions of their fellow-countrymen.[9] The Phocians collectively were required to pay 60 talents a year to Apollo, the first payment to be in 343. The Phocians were not permitted to possess arms or horses until the full sum owing to the god was repaid. Any Phocians who had fled or who had robbed the sanctuary were to be arrested. The remaining Phocians were excommunicated from Delphi and ejected from the Amphictyony. By Greek

standards the Phocians were treated lightly. The Amphictyonic Council decreed that the walls of the three Boeotian cities which were in Phocian hands were to be destroyed. Thereafter the fate of the defenceless populations of these cities (Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae) was a matter for the Boeotian League. They were treated without mercy by the Boeotians; for they were 'andrapodised', i.e. enslaved where they were or sold abroad as slaves.[10]

The decisions of the Amphictyonic Council were reported by Diodorus and Pausanias, whose ultimate source was probably the Amphictyonic record at Delphi or at Anthela.[11] Another decision was the transfer of the Phocians' two votes on the Amphictyonic Council to the 'Macedones' (Paus. 10. 3. 3 and 10. 8. 2). The term 'Macedones' was correct, since the twelve members of the Amphictyony were tribes (Thessaloi, Perrhaiboi, Iones etc.).[12] Because it was customary for historians and orators to speak of Philip rather than the Macedonians, we find it said by Diodorus that 'Philip and his descendants were to participate in the Amphictyony and have the two votes previously held by the defeated Phocians' (16. 60. 1). The Spartans were punished for their alliance with Phocis by expulsion from the Amphictyony (Paus. 10. 8. 2);[13] but not the Athenians. All the latter suffered was the loss of the right of precedence in consulting the oracle at Delphi, which was now given to Philip, much to the indignation of Demosthenes. In this way the services of the Macedonians and their king to the Amphictyony and to Apollo were duly rewarded, and their important role in Central Greece was recognised. 'Consistently with these decisions the Amphictyonic Council published regulations for the custody of the oracle and for everything else appertaining to religious practice, to common peace and to concord among the Greeks' (Diod. 16. 60. 3).[14] This sentence expressed the purpose of the Amphictyonic Council in laying down guidelines for its member-states to follow both in religious matters and in political relations with one another – not of course an actual 'Common Peace', as some have supposed, but steps leading in that direction.[15]

The decisions were implemented by the armed forces of Macedonians, Thessalians and Boeotians. They reduced any Phocian towns which offered resistance. They endorsed the excommunication of the Phocians by selling the horses and by throwing over the cliffs the weapons of the Phocians and the mercenaries (Diod. 16. 60. 3); for the weapons were polluted by sacrilegious crimes. Their actions in the field were directed on behalf of the Amphictyons by Philip, the natural choice since he had commanded the Macedonians, Thessalians and Boeotian forces in the campaign. 'His reputation stood high because of his pious conduct and his excellence as a commander.' Due honour was paid to him for his tact and friendliness. Finally he was appointed by the Amphictyonic Council to preside over the Pythian Games, which he was to organise together with the Boeotians and the Thessalians, who took the place of the sacrilegious Corinthians (Diod. 16. 60. 2).[16] On that occasion, in September 346, celebrations were to be

held in thanksgiving for the liberation of Apollo's shrine and for the enactment of the Amphictyonic Peace.

4. The policy of Philip

It has to be emphasised that Philip was the religious leader of the Macedonian state and had inherited in popular belief and probably in his own belief a special relationship with Zeus, Apollo and Athena. He sacrificed daily at dawn on behalf of the state, and he maintained the traditional cult of the Temenid family, the worship of his ancestor Heracles, son of Zeus, 'Heracles Patroüs'. The emblems which he chose to place on his coinage were the heads of Zeus, Apollo and Heracles. When he captured Amphipolis, a tithe of the property of the pro-Athenian leaders was dedicated to Apollo and Strymon.[17] In the same year, 357, he developed a special relationship with Delphi in contracting an alliance with the Chalcidian League; for he consulted Apollo in advance, and he and the Chalcidians had a copy of Apollo's response and of the consequent treaty set up at Delphi. The seizure of Delphi by Philomelus and the robbing of Apollo's treasure were shocking acts of sacrilege in the opinion of innumerable states[18] and not least, we may be sure, of Macedonia. It was a foregone conclusion that if Philip entered the Sacred War it would be on the side of the god. The wearing of the laurel wreath by the soldiers and the drowning of the prisoners as temple-robbers proclaimed the belief that Philip and his Macedonians were championing Apollo in the Battle of the Crocus Field. Thus in bringing the Sacred War to its conclusion, entrusting the settlement to the Amphictyonic Council and carrying out its decisions Philip was continuing to act as the champion of Apollo.

The policy of Philip was channelled by his religious convictions, both during the war and in the final settlement. His actions and the decisions of the Amphictyonic Council were in harmony. Religious scruples were observed when 'the Amphictyons and Philip shattered on the rocks' the malefactors' weapons, which they threw over the Phaedriadae cliffs at Delphi (Diod. 16. 60. 3). A distinction was drawn between the actual robbers of the temple and the Phocian people, and between the cities which followed Philomelus and his successors and Abae which opposed them. The regulations which the Amphictyonic Council published for the future practice of religious observance were accordingly not perfunctory nor insincere, but were seriously intended to reintroduce the religious standards which were an essential part of Greek civilisation. That Philip acted in agreement with the Amphictyons is evident; and that he had a hand in devising the regulations for religious procedure is probable.

While little attention has been paid to the religious outlook and activity of Philip in this context, many scholars have written about 'the regulations appertaining to common peace and concord for the Greeks'. It is important to note that the Amphictyonic Peace established peaceful relations be-

tween all the members of the Amphictyony. In planning for 'common peace and concord for the Greeks' in the future the Amphictyonic Council went beyond its own constituency and envisaged a Panhellenic programme which was to embrace the Greek world. There are some reasons for supposing that Philip inspired that programme. The actions of the Boeotians in destroying Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae and of the Thessalians in deporting and enslaving the population of Halus at this time (D. 19. 39) were incompatible with the ideas of developing a common peace and concord among the Greeks. On the other hand Philip was clearly responsible for the much less harsh treatment of the Phocians, and he expected soon to be operating in a wider theatre than the constituency of the Amphictyonic League. Moreover, he knew from the *Philippus* of Isocrates that there was a body of opinion in Athens and no doubt elsewhere which was weary of the internecine wars of the Greek city-states and hoped for reconciliation and peace. It was therefore prudent of Philip to reveal his own intentions through the mouthpiece of the Amphictyonic Council and enlist, if possible, support in Athens and in other states.

The other indicator of Philip's policy is what he did not do in regard to Athens. He repeatedly expresssed his desire to collaborate with Athens. Therefore he had not retained Athenian prisoners taken near Methone and at Potidaea. He never demanded ransom money for the liberation of Athenians (Aeschin. 2. 100). He was surely responsible for Athens not suffering the same fate as Sparta, namely excommunication from Delphi. Above all, he did not attack Athens at the time when the Thessalians and the Boeotians would have followed him and the Athenians expected an invasion of Attica. He genuinely wanted to be reconciled with Athens and to enlist her aid in his plans for the Greeks. He may have thought, as Isocrates did in the *Philippus* (56), that Athens, once she was at peace with him, would 'join with him in carrying out his policy, especially if she could be enabled to realise that Philip's arrangements were preliminary to a campaign against the barbarian', i.e. against Persia.

As Griffith wisely noted, a campaign against Persia had been Isocrates' hobby-horse for well over thirty years.[19] There is no reason to saddle Philip with that obsession. As a capable general he must have known in 346 that two preliminaries were essential to an invasion of Asia: the cooperation or at least the neutralisation of the Greek states, and the conquest not just of maritime Thrace but of the Thracian hinterland.[20] He set about these two tasks in the years after 346. Until they were completed it was premature to think in practical terms of overthrowing the Persian King. One passage which has, I think, misled some writers[21] is found in Diodorus 16. 60. 5: 'he longed to be appointed sole commander of Greece and to conduct the war against Persia, as indeed happened.' It is sandwiched between Philip's return to Macedonia in summer 346 and the later history of the temple-robbers. On my interpretation of the sources Diodorus was following the monograph of Demophilus on the Sacred War, and it is most

unlikely that Demophilus deviated from his subject to prophesy the future hopes of Philip. Rather, it is an insertion by Diodorus himself, one of about a dozen refrains on Philip's piety and aggrandisement.[22] We may cite 16. 8. 5: 'by using these coins he induced many to betray their country, but that will be revealed in detail by the particular events and we shall revert to the chronological order.' So too at 16. 60. 5 after 'as indeed happened' we read thus: 'but that will be recorded in its own good time bit by bit and now we shall turn to our continuous narrative.' Similarly, at 16. 64. 3, having completed the account of the fates of the temple-robbers, he added: 'Philip finally thanks to his piety towards heaven was appointed leader of all Greece', a senseless repetition of his remark at 16. 60. 4-5.[23]

CHAPTER X

Philip and the city-states, 346-343

1. The policies of Athens in April-September 346

Whereas Philip followed his own consistent policy, Athens wavered this way and that between the various policies which were advocated in one meeting or another of the Assembly. The majority of the Athenians thought of their country as 'leader of the world in power and prestige' (p. 59 above, a phrase of Theopompus) and as mistress of the Aegean Sea. Recessions there had been, resulting for instance in the loss of Amphipolis or the revolt of Rhodes and Chios, but such recessions were thought of as temporary and reversible. Orators appealed readily to these beliefs and recalled the great achievements of the past. Demosthenes portrayed Athens as holding the balance of power in many areas: between rival kings in Thrace; Philip and the Chalcidian League; the Thessalian League and the tyrants of Pherae; the Phocians and their enemies; Sparta and Thebes' allies in the Peloponnese; and democrats versus oligarchs in Rhodes. It was only a minority of Athenians who held the view that Athens was no longer, and was incapable of becoming, the great power that she had been. Isocrates, for instance, had thought of Athens c. 380 as capable of uniting the Greek states and of leading them in a crusade against Persia; but by 346 he saw her as one of several exhausted states and no longer capable of leadership.[1] Eubulus and his supporters realised from 355 onwards that financial retrenchment was essential if Athens was to regain political power, and therefore that a cautious foreign policy was necessary. Their main concern was to keep control of the two places which Demosthenes said were 'the most important in the world for Athens – Thermopylae by land and the Hellespont by sea'[2] – and behind those two shields to rebuild her financial and naval strength.

In Athenian eyes Macedonia was a backward and barely civilised region. Demosthenes was still able in 349 in *The Second Olynthiac* to play upon that belief and to portray the Macedonian monarchy as a corrupt and transient form of dictatorship. In February 346 the Athenian people realised that Macedonia and her allies constituted a grave threat in those two most vital areas, Thermopylae and the Hellespont. Under these circumstances a majority of the orators and of the voters in the Assembly of late February 346 were prepared to negotiate with Philip in the hope that they would obtain favourable terms of peace. Envoys representing

rival opinions in Athens and one envoy representing the Congress of Allies were appointed by the Assembly and set off for Pella. On their return, accompanied by Philip's three negotiators, a two-day debate took place in the Assembly. On the second day, when Philip's conditions were clarified, the Assembly decided to accept not only peace on his conditions but also alliance.

What was said by speakers in the Assembly on those two days is uncertain. No report thereof was kept at the time; only the formal proposals and the decrees were put on record. After the event an orator could publish what he claimed he had said; but since there was no check, and since the memory of an audience – often after the lapse of a few years – was inevitably hazy, he could modify or exaggerate or even invent, provided that he reproduced his main line of recommendation. For this particular debate we have two fragments of Theopompus which are worth more than the claims of Demosthenes and Aeschines in their law-court speeches, *De Falsa Legatione*, in 343.

It was during the first day that Philocrates stressed the need to reach an agreement with Philip. His words to the Assembly were given by Theopompus:

> Bear in mind then that this is not the time to engage in contentious rivalry, that the affairs of the state are not in a good situation, that many grave dangers surround us. For we know that the Boeotians and the Megarians are at enmity with us, the Peloponnesians are courting some the Thebans and others the Lacedaemonians, the Chians and the Rhodians and their allies are hostile to our state, and they are negotiating with Philip for his friendship (*FGrH* 115 F 164).

In view of this passage we can accept as true the plain speaking attributed to Eubulus by Demosthenes (19. 291) that the alternative to peace was a total commitment to war, a readiness 'to go it alone' (p. 87 above).

The other fragment of Theopompus reported the advice of Aristophon, an old opponent of Eubulus, who was speaking on the second day of the debate:[3]

> Bear in mind that the most cowardly thing of all that we could do would be to accept the peace while conceding Amphipolis, we who live in the greatest of the Greek states, have most allies, possess 300 triremes and receive almost 400 talents in revenue; which being so, who would not condemn us for making concessions contrary to our just rights because we are scared of the power of Macedonians? (*FGrH* 115 F 166).

From these two fragments we see two of the proposals put before the Assembly – to obtain peace and alliance with Philip and his allies at the cost of abandoning Amphipolis, Phocis, Halus and Cersobleptes, and on the other hand to defy Philip and his allies and fight as a great power. The

first proposal was adopted by the People but with the utmost reluctance, and the proposer and his supporters among whom were Eubulus and Aeschines were likely to be criticised later. Demosthenes was silent on that second day, when silence meant acquiescence. Subsequently as President of the Assembly he ruled a request to include Cersobleptes in the peace as unacceptable.[4]

In Athens some regarded the peace and alliance with Philip and his allies as a temporary expedient which might avert the immediate danger of invasion and could be abandoned later. Others thought that the peace and alliance would bring positive advantages, and they were encouraged in that view by Philip's promise of benefits to come. During the period in which Athens had taken the oaths and Philip had not done so he did honour two promises, namely that he would not enter the Chersonese and that he would return Athenian prisoners of war on completion of the oaths.[5] Other promises were undefined, inevitably. They cost Philip nothing, and they might encourage some Athenians to accept the peace wholeheartedly. Philocrates and Demosthenes took diametrically opposite views of such promises (p. 91 above); and Demosthenes was already accusing Philocrates, Aeschines and others of misconduct.

When the Assembly met on 10 July, the treaty of peace and alliance was already completed by both sides. But Philip had treaties of alliance also with many states which were hostile to Athens, and his favours were being sought by almost all states, including even Phocis. It seemed to the Assembly advisable to reaffirm the validity of Athens' alliance with him. The majority therefore voted in support of Philocrates' proposal that the peace and alliance be extended to Philip's descendants, and that Athens should act against any Phocians who might refuse to surrender the shrine of Delphi[6] (the split between the three generals and Phalaecus being already known). Then came Philip's first request that Athens should send troops to join him, a request which showed that Philip regarded the alliance as valid.[7] However, the Assembly refused on the proposal of Hegesippus, which Demosthenes supported. The majority thus swung to the other extreme – distrust of Philip, abandonment of the Phocians and non-fulfilment of the alliance. Another ten envoys set off from Athens to report to Philip the decisions of 10 July and also the refusal to send troops. But they turned back on hearing that Phalaecus had accepted Philip's terms and that Thermopylae was in Philip's hands.

The Assembly could hardly have been more foolishly inconsistent in its decisions. To offer action and then to refuse the invitation to act put the peace and alliance at risk. The statements of Hegesippus and Demosthenes in the Assembly that Philip would seize any Athenian troops and hold them as hostages advertised a lack of trust which made peace and alliance with him a nonsense. Moreover, to stay inactive was to leave the fate of Phocis solely to Philip and his allies. It is no wonder that the Assembly panicked on hearing that Thermopylae had fallen and that the road was open for

Philip and his allies to march into Attica. A majority decided to evacuate the countryside, man the fortifications and hold a rural festival inside the city-walls.[8] If Philip's second request for Athenian troops to join him arrived at this time, it was disregarded on the same ground as the first. The Athenians were thus more isolated and more vulnerable now than they had been in February at the start of the negotiations.

Envoys, including Aeschines but not Demosthenes, were sent from Athens in the hope of placating Philip and his allies. The initiative lay entirely with Philip. There was no march on Attica. Philip reported that the Phocian cities were under his control, and he sent a letter in which he protested at Athens' attitude which was incompatible with the alliance. The settlement of Phocis was entrusted by Philip and his allies to the Council of the Amphictyonic League, at which Athens was represented by Aeschines (among others), who pleaded for mercy in the treatment of the Phocians and the three Boeotian cities.[9] The decisions of the Council were reported back to Athens. One was that precedence in consulting the oracle at Delphi which the Phocians had conferred on Athens had been given to Philip, and another was the appointment of Philip to preside over the Pythian Games, of which the organisers were to be Thessaly and Boeotia, both being hostile to Athens. These measures seemed humiliating to most Athenians; for their country was being treated as a second-rate power and the glory and honour of ending the Sacred War had gone to Philip and his Macedonians, now admitted to membership of the Amphictyony and possessing two votes to Athens' one vote. They expressed their feelings by refusing to send the traditional delegation to represent Athens at the Pythian Festival.

The Council of the Amphictyonic League thereupon required Athens to recognise the membership of the Macedonians and the presidency of Philip at the Games. The meeting of the Assembly in September was stormy. The People were finally persuaded by Demosthenes, that it would be disastrous to defy the Amphictyonic League which had still under arms the victorious forces of Macedonia, Thessaly and Boeotia and could declare a Sacred War against Athens. Recognition was duly made.

Throughout this period the Assembly wavered between two courses. One was to seek peace and alliance, extend it to Philip's successors, and send troops to join Philip in bringing the Sacred War to an end. This course would leave Phocis isolated; but Athenian help had been refused by Phalaecus and his associates, and Athens was not prepared to fight on behalf of Phocis. Her only hope of influencing the treatment of the Phocians was to send troops and to have a say in the counsels of the Amphictyonic League. The other course was to seek peace as a temporary expedient, in order to stand aside from the Sacred War; and then, when Philip made it clear that peace involved alliance, to grant alliance but not to implement it. This course would leave the Phocians in the lurch altogether; but it would keep Athens' independence intact. For those who favoured it there

was no question of Athenian troops serving under the overall command of Philip, or of cooperating with the Thessalians and the Boeotians, whose enmity she reciprocated, or of finding herself tied by the policy of the Amphictyonic League.

By swinging from one course to the other the Assembly ended up with an insecure peace, a doubtful alliance, and a humiliating submission to the demands of the Amphictyonic League. During the debate in September Aeschines and other advocates of acceptance were shouted down. It was only when Demosthenes and other hostile critics of Philip insisted on accepting that the majority of the Assembly voted for appeasement.

Subsequently Demosthenes published a speech, *De Pace*, which purported to be what he had said during the debate but was in fact an indication of his future plans.[10] My advice, he argues, has been right all along – to send troops not to Euboea but to Chalcidice, not to trust the actor Neoptolemus, not to be deceived by those who advised the betrayal of Phocis in exchange for Philip's promises, and not to sacrifice the assets which would have made war with Philip easier and safer. Others advised you otherwise because they had been corrupted. You acted first and took thought afterwards. The present crisis came about because the individual interests of Philip, Thebes and Thessaly happened to coincide. They will not do so in future. But at the moment the threat is real. You made peace then by sacrificing Amphipolis and Cardia, accepting Carian rule over Chios, Cos and Rhodes, and letting Byzantium force the corn-ships to enter her harbour; for your purpose was to avoid war. It is the same now: do not go to war 'for the shadow in Delphi'. In this publication he assumed that Athens could have saved Olynthus and Phocis and kept Philip out of the Amphictyonic League, if only the Assembly had followed the advice of Demosthenes and not been deceived by corrupt orators. His advice now was to shelter behind the peace for the time being, but to await the break-up of the current coalition in the Amphictyonic League and then resist Philip by war, if necessary.

2. Diplomatic exchanges between Philip and city-states other than Athens

In 355, when Phocis and Thebes were contending for the possession of Delphi, Xenophon advised Athens to declare Delphi an independent state, rally the other states by diplomacy to that cause, and show herself zealous for peace on land and sea. If she did so, he believed that she would win the support of 'all the Greeks' (*Poroi* 5. 9-10). But Athens followed a different course. The benefits which Xenophon foresaw fell into other hands. In 346 Delphi was declared independent, and its citizens regained the two votes on the Amphictyonic Council of which the Phocians had deprived them.[11] Most states other than Athens and Sparta considered that independence appropriate. Next, the Amphictyonic Council proclaimed a policy of recon-

ciliation and peace.[12] No one doubted that the dominant voice on the Council was that of Philip, since the Macedones and their allies – the tribes of northern and central Greece – had a clear majority of votes. It was Philip, too, who brought peace to central Greece in ending the Sacred War without bloodshed and reconciling the Thessalians and the Boeotians with Athens by means of the Peace of Philocrates and then of the Amphictyonic Peace, even though Athens was prepared to reject peace until Demosthenes showed the Assembly the inevitable consequences of outright opposition. Thus at the end of 346 most states in Central Greece had reason to be grateful to Philip. But gratitude is short-lived in politics; and it was counterbalanced by the bitter reflection that the Boeotians and the Locrians, for instance, had suffered terrible losses, because Philip had turned back from Thermopylae in 352 and had sent only a bare minimum of help for six long years.[13]

Philip brought some hope of peace to the states of the Peloponnese. The war which Sparta had started by attacking Megalopolis and which had led to intervention by Phocis and by Boeotia had involved most Peloponnesian states in bloodshed and ravaging in 350 and 349 (p. 80 above). Although Athens had not intervened then, her close association with Sparta in the Sacred War had earned her the hostility of Argos, Messenia, Megalopolis and some other states.[14] Bitter animosities remained in 346: the Spartans resenting loss of the hegemony they had had for two hundred years, the Messenians eager to avenge three centuries of enslavement by Sparta, the Argives constantly at daggers drawn with Sparta, and the Arcadians resentful of Spartan irredentism. On the other hand, the terms of the Amphictyonic Peace and the Council's desire for reconciliation seemed to be sincere. The Amphictyonic Council clearly had no intention of employing its forces against Sparta.[15] The claims of some Athenian speakers in early 346 that after settling Phocis Philip would 'go to the help of Messenia, destroy Sparta and rule over the Peloponnese'[16] were seen to be groundless, when Philip and his victorious army returned to Macedonia in autumn 346.

Thereafter the influence of Philip in the Peloponnese was strengthened not by invasion but by diplomacy and by the provision of aid. A privileged position on the administrative boards of the Amphictyonic League was granted to Argos from late 346 onwards,[17] and the Argive origin of the Temenid royal family of Macedonia was no doubt stressed by Philip. The diplomatic relations of Philip with the Arcadians which Aeschines had tried to offset in 348 (p. 82 above) were renewed. And Philip's support was assumed by the Messenians in the event of any attack by Sparta. When Demosthenes delivered *The Second Philippic* in autumn 344, he spoke of Philip courting Argos and Messenia by providing them with aid in the form of mercenaries and money and thus planning to use those two states as his accomplices in gaining control of Greece.[18] In response to such insinuations these two states sent envoys together with envoys from Philip to

protest at Athens that she was maligning Philip and was supporting Sparta's attempt to dominate the Peloponnese.[19] In 343 Demosthenes reflected bitterly on Philip's success. 'Many of the Arcadians are admiring Philip, setting up a statue of him in bronze and crowning it with garlands, and, to cap it all, they have passed a decree to welcome him in their cities, if he should come into the Peloponnese. And the Argives are doing just the same.'[20] Such honours were indeed most exceptional. They had not been accorded even to Epaminondas, the Theban liberator of Messenia. Another unparalleled development was a request by Messenia and Megalopolis to be admitted to membership of the Delphic Amphictyony, no doubt to secure its protection against Sparta. It was not granted.[21]

Elis, which had been on the side of Sparta, fell into a savage party-strife (*stasis*) and much blood was shed. The oligarchic party was supported by the Arcadians in a battle against the exiles who had hired some thousands of mercenaries, veterans of the Sacred War. After the battle the victors divided among themselves 4,000 mercenaries who had been captured. The Eleans executed theirs as temple-robbers, and the Arcadians sold theirs into slavery. Thereafter the oligarchic leaders of Elis, now supported with money by Philip, established their position securely and made an alliance with him, probably in early 343.[22] Thus the only states in the Peloponnese which were aligned with Sparta and not on friendly terms with Philip were Achaea and Corinth.

The activities of Philip in the Peloponnese had repercussions in Central Greece. The Boeotians and especially the Thebans, who had been regarded since 369 as liberators and heroes by Messenia and Arcadia and who had fought on their behalf in 350 and 349, felt now that they had been ousted by Philip and by the Amphictyonic League, and that they had lost their leading position in Peloponnesian affairs. As regards Central Greece, although the Boeotians had had their way with the three Boeotian states, they had made no territorial gains as a result of the ten-year war, and they had been chagrined to see the award by the Amphictyonic Council of Nicaea to the Thessalians at the expense of the Locrians.[23] For the Boeotians had always hoped to gain control of the Pass of Thermopylae. On their southern frontier the Boeotians watched the development of party-strife (*stasis*) in Megara between the democrats and the oligarchs. The democrats were ideologically in sympathy with Boeotia and Athens, and the oligarchs intrigued with Philip. One of their leaders visited Pella. When he returned with a force of mercenaries at some time shortly before autumn 343,[24] it is evident that the oligarchs were in power and looked to Philip for support. This situation must have alarmed the Boeotians, as it did the Athenians.

Another area which was of great interest to the Boeotians and the Athenians was the offshore island, Euboea, over which they had fought one another in 357. Then Athens had been victorious but only to lose it in 348, when a general rising was assisted by mercenaries sent into the island

by Philip and the Euboean cities became independent. But their troubles were not over. Party-strife (*stasis*) broke out in many cities, and rival parties sought help from Athens and from Philip, but not from Boeotia. Here too the Boeotians must have felt that they had been worsted by Philip, indirectly but decisively.

3. Philip and Athens from late 346 to late 343

For Philip the heart of the matter was Athens. In 346 he had done all that was possible and that was 'consistent with his honour' (D. 19. 41) in order to win the cooperation of Athens in the peace and the alliance. The reasons for his lack of success were well known to him. As Isocrates wrote in a *Letter to Philip*, in late 345 or early 344, 'there are many, I think, who report to you and tell you not only the most offensive things that are said about you amongst us (i.e. in Athens) but also what they themselves invent in addition'.[25] Such reporters lived in a democratic state which prided itself on the openness of its government. There were practically no secrets. What Demosthenes said of Philip in September 346 and what he claimed in his *De Pace* to have said then became equally well known to Philip. It was obvious to him that the rival leaders – Eubulus, Philocrates and Aeschines versus Demosthenes, Hegesippus and Hyperides – had an almost equal following in the Assembly. For three years from autumn 346 to autumn 343 he waited to see which party would prevail. During that time he treated Athens as his ally and showed himself willing to consider any complaints or requests that she made. The diplomatic exchanges with her were the following.

In late 346 Athens sent an envoy Eucleides to Philip with the request that Cersobleptes should be included under the Peace of Philocrates and take the oaths thereto despite the earlier ruling (p. 87 above), and that the forts near the Chersonese should be returned to him. Philip rejected the requests with good reason. But because he knew that Athens was interested in Cersobleptes as a buffer between himself and the Chersonese, he offered to dig a canal through the neck of the Chersonese at his own expense; for such a canal would make invasion of the Chersonese by land very difficult, and it would enable Athenian and other shipping to avoid the circumnavigation of the promontory and in particular the strong current in the narrows of the Hellespont.[26] His offer was rejected. About that time, during the reorganisation of the Amphictyonic League, Delos asked the Amphictyonic Council to free their temple of Apollo from the control of Athens. When the matter was discussed, probably in spring 345, a representative of Athens put her case, and the decision was in favour of Athens.[27] That was due no doubt to Philip, because the great majority of the members of the Amphictyony were still hostile to Athens.

In 344, probably in the summer, Athens sent envoys to the Peloponne-

sian states which had established friendly relations with Philip. Demosthenes led the mission and after his return gave a self-satisfied version of his speech to the Argives and the Messenians, in which he maintained that to accept any help from Philip was to accept submission to his will; 'for every king and tyrant is the enemy of liberty and of law'. However, he had to admit his complete failure. Indeed the mission had a boomerang effect. For envoys from Argos and Messene and with them envoys from Philip came to Athens and complained that she was supporting Sparta, the would-be tyrant of the Peloponnese. Philip's envoys then or later delivered a formal protest to Athens as his ally, that Athenian speakers were claiming that he had broken the terms of the Peace of Philocrates and had not fulfilled promises which he had made. The reply of Athens has not survived.[28]

Early in 343 Philip made an attempt to improve relations with Athens. He sent as his envoy an able speaker, Python of Byzantium, and also envoys of all his allies to address the Athenian Assembly.[29] Their case was that Philip had not broken the peace or any promises; that, if Athens wanted peace to continue, their speakers must cease to misrepresent the Peace of Philocrates; and that Philip was willing to consider any proposals to alter the terms of that Peace, 'for he wanted to win the friendship of Athens more than that of any other state' ([D.] 7. 21). Hegesippus, a supporter of Demosthenes, admitted that Python in particular won not only applause but also acknowledgement from the People that his case was just; but Hegesippus managed to have himself appointed as one of the envoys to negotiate with Philip on possible alterations to the terms of the Peace. Much of the negotiation was a farce. Hegesippus wanted the clause 'to have what they hold' to be altered to 'to have what is their own', thus resurrecting demands for Athens to have Amphipolis, Potidaea and so on. Philip replied politely, as he did later in his *Letter* ([D.] 12. 20-3), that his ancestor, Alexander I, had captured Amphipolis, and that on every count he had a better claim to Amphipolis than Athens had. He was prepared to submit to arbitration the demands of Athens that Cardia, being in the Chersonese, should be ceded to Athens and that some Thracian forts should be returned to Cersobleptes. The dialogue ran on probably into early 342, when Philip offered to give Halonnesus to Athens.

The only constructive proposal during these negotiations was that the peace should be extended to all Greek states. Philip agreed, but Athens procrastinated. The proposal was not really an amendment to the Peace of Philocrates. It was a new initiative, a Common Peace such as had been enacted in 362 (see p. 74 above). For the aim was to bring the non-aligned states into the peace with the conditions that 'each state should be free and autonomous and that if any one state was attacked they would all go to its assistance' ([D.] 7. 30). Such a Peace, as Philip said later in his *Letter*, 'would be in the interests of the Greeks' ([D.] 12. 18). The conditions would

apply to Macedonia as a Greek state in the Common Peace; and as Philip pointed out, those conditions would provide a safeguard for those who might be suspecting that Philip had sinister intentions. Yet Athens rejected the proposal, and the hopes of a peaceful union of Greek states were dashed.

During the three years 346-343, Philip was fully informed about the internal politics of Athens. At first a majority of the People were grateful for the peace and alliance. But the advocates of that peace and alliance were denounced by Demosthenes and his associates as bribed agents of Philip, through whose treachery Athens had lost what she could otherwise have saved – Olynthus, Euboea, Amphipolis, Phocis, Cersobleptes etc.[30] The first attempt of Demosthenes to bring Aeschines to trial failed, mainly because Timarchus, the prosecutor, was himself prosecuted for criminal immorality and was deprived of his citizenship in 345. The tide of opinion began to turn in 344, when Demosthenes was chosen to lead the mission to some Peloponnesian states, and when Hyperides was appointed instead of Aeschines to address the Amphictyonic Council about the appeal by Delos. In 343 Hyperides charged Philocrates with corruption and with giving bad advice to the People. Philocrates was found guilty and condemned to death; but he left Athens before the trial and stayed in exile. The general Proxenus, who had been rebuffed by Phalaecus at Thermopylae (p. 85 above), was also condemned to death in this year. The appointment of Hegesippus to respond to Philip's offer of negotiations was a triumph for the anti-Macedonian party, and it was followed that autumn by Demosthenes' prosecution of Aeschines on charges of treachery and corruption before 1,501 judges. Aeschines, who was supported by Eubulus and Phocion, was acquitted by the narrow margin of 30 votes.[31] The speeches of the protagonists, *De Falsa Legatione*, are remarkable for their distortion of the facts.

The narrow escape of Aeschines and the blustering agressiveness of Hegesippus indicated to Philip that the anti-Macedonian orators were in the ascendant in the Assembly in the latter part of 343. Philip attributed to them the failure to establish a Common Peace. He wrote as follows in his *Letter* in 340. 'This (a Common Peace) was in the interest of the People but it was not to the advantage of the speakers. Those who have experience of your constitution say that for the orators peace is war and war is peace. For (in war) they always make something out of the generals by supporting them or by blackmailing them, and they win a reputation with the masses as "The People's men" (*demotikoi*) by slandering in their political speeches the most distinguished of your citizens and the most esteemed of those who are outside your citizenship' ([D.] 12. 19, written in 340).[32] He must have realised at the end of 343 that Demosthenes and his associates were so manipulating the People's interpretation of the past and so preventing any progress towards reconciliation, that he could not expect the peace and the

alliance to be implemented by Athens. Where persuasion had failed, he might have to use force. But he hoped to apply that force indirectly and thus not to alienate that part of the People which wanted coexistence and collaboration with Macedonia.

CHAPTER XI

Actions in Macedonia, Illyria and Thessaly, 346-343

1. Reorganisation of the kingdom's manpower

We begin with a most important passage in Justin. As I have argued elsewhere,[1] the source of the account by Trogus, of which Justin has given his summary, was Theopompus, *Philippica*. There is therefore no reason to question the accuracy of the facts; for Theopompus was praised for his careful research, and he was a visitor at the court of Philip in 342. The passage describes Philip's actions on his return from the autumn meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in 346. It may be translated as follows:

> On returning to his kingdom he transferred at his own pleasure populations and cities in accordance with his own idea of what places should be occupied or abandoned, even as shepherds move their flocks now to winter pastures and now to summer pastures. Everywhere there was a picture of misery, as in a holocaust. It was not a matter of panic in the presence of an enemy, or of troops rampaging through a city, or of an armed riot, or goods being plundered, or persons seized; there was just grief and mourning in silence, lest their very tears were interpreted as opposition ... [two sections of rhetorical pathos are omitted]. He placed some populations on the very frontiers to face his enemies. Others he planted at the furthest limits of the kingdom. Certain populations which had been captured in war he divided [and sent] to supplement the inhabitants of his cities. And it was by these means that he created a single kingdom and a single people out of many tribes and races. When he had arranged and regulated the affairs of Macedonia, he overwhelmed the Dardanians etc. (Just. 8. 5. 7 – 6. 3).[2]

The simile was particularly apt. For anyone familiar with the traditional form of transhumant pastoralism knew that it was not only the sheep and the shepherds but also the whole company (*parea*) which moved to and fro.[3] Thus Philip was transferring from one site to another whole city-populations, 'populos et urbes' being a hendiadys. There were precedents in the history of Macedonia. When the kingdom expanded from Pieria to include Eordaea, Almopia and Bottiaea, groups of Macedonian families were planted on new sites and especially in the plains as city-communities. When the peoples of Mycenae and of Histiaea in Euboea were expelled by Argos and Athens respectively, they were settled as two

self-standing communities in Macedonia. It was Perdiccas II who persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon some small cities and form a large community at Olynthus, and who gave to some Chalcidians land to inhabit in Mygdonia.[4] At the end of the fifth century a settlement of Macedonians was made at Manastir, in order to guard the Iron Gates of the Axius through which Paeonian raiders passed into the coastal plain.[5]

The attitude of Theopompus towards such transfers was that of a citizen of a Greek city-state which had a permanent and abiding location. To be removed from one's ancestral home and holy places was the ultimate horror, as Thucydides emphasised even when the move was only from a deme into the city of Athens.[6] But the first loyalty of the Macedonians was to their king, and they were prepared to obey his orders, even if to do so required the breaking of old ties. There is therefore no need to follow Theopompus in his description of lamentation and silent opposition.

Philip wisely chose this time for his major reorganisation of the manpower within the kingdom. His achievements since 359, culminating in the acceptance of Macedonia as a member of the Amphictyonic League, were such that his prestige was at its highest and he was confident his reforms would be accepted. His kingdom was now free from any fear of invasion; for he had defeated his immediate neighbours in the Balkans, and he was at peace or in alliance with most of the Greek city-states. He had made some preliminary moves. The first steps had been to build strong-points on his frontiers: in the northwest at St Erasmus and other places, in the east at Kalyva controlling the crossing of the Nestus river, and probably in the southern part of Magnesia to secure the approaches to the Gulf of Pagasae (D. 1. 23). At two places he had founded 'cities of Makedones'. One was at Oesyme on the coast south of Mt Pangaeum, and the other was at Pythion in what had been Perrhaebia but became an extension of Elimeotis.[7] The Macedonian city-population was moved to Oesyme evidently from Emathia, a city on the coast of the central plain, and therefore it called its new home 'Emathia'.[8] The king (not named but most probably Philip) 'transferred to the district now called Pythion the people of Balla', which was a city of Pieria. As we have explained (p. 38 above) the 'Makedones' of military age at these two sites were available for military service and therefore under arms, and the land was worked for them by subject peoples.

In the winter of 346-345 and thereafter Philip transplanted a number of city-populations from the original kingdom to create 'cities of Makedones' in areas close to the frontiers of the greater kingdom. In the northwest, facing the Illyrians, three new cities carried the names of cities of the original kingdom – Astraea, Dobera and Kellion – and one that of Melitousa, a city of Lyncus in Upper Macedonia. They were presumably located in the strategic and fertile areas of Ochrid and Resen. The Makedones of these cities were available to defend the frontier, for instance in 335.[9] In the north the region called Kavadarci (Tikvetch) was remarkable

for its large Greek-speaking population and for the frequency of the name 'Makedon' in what had been Paeonian territory.[10] It is therefore probable that Philip planted one or more 'cities of Makedones' in Kavadarci. It was of great strategic importance. For it faced the easiest route for Dardanian invaders, coming from Polog, and it covered the approach to the Iron Gates of the Axius, where a Macedonian city was situated at Manastir. In the northeast a city called Philippoupolis was evidently a 'city of Makedones', founded by Philip in the upper valley of the Kumli. It controlled an easy route from the east into the Axius valley, and it formed a strong-point between the Bisaltae within the kingdom and the Thracian Sinti outside the kingdom in the Strymon valley. Two other cities, Astraea and Doberus, situated in the upper valley of the Strumitsa and facing the Thracians of the middle Strymon valley, were evidently occupied by 'Makedones' from the old kingdom.[11]

The cities we have mentioned are consistent with Justin's description of populations planted 'on the very frontiers to face his enemies'. He went on to other populations planted 'at the furthest limits of the kingdom', presumably not facing his enemies, and therefore in the south and the southwest. Apart from Pythion, which we have just mentioned, the only clear case is Gomphi, renamed Philippopolis, which commanded the end of a route from Ambracia through the Pindus range;[12] for with that name it was presumably a 'city of Makedones'. It is not known when Phthiotic Thebes was renamed Philippi. Griffith suggested that it might have taken the name after the Battle of the Crocus Field as 'a compliment' to the victor; but the alternative that Philip then occupied the city, held it as a Macedonian base and himself renamed it Philippi is, I think, more likely.[13]

Justin did not say what happened to the existing populations, when Philip planted a 'city of Macedones' on an occupied site. As we have seen from the later example of Calindoea (p. 38 above), it seems that some of the local people were required to stay and cultivate the new city's territory, and others were moved elsewhere. When they had been conquered in war, they and their lands were possessions of the king, 'won by the spear', and they were disposed of as he thought fit. Of the existing population of Oesyme, for instance, a part may have been retained on the land, and others were placed in Amphipolis or Philippi which were both growing larger. When the population of Balla was moved to Pythion, the site of Balla in Pieria was presumably given to a population which had been displaced by a new 'city of Macedones'. When cities such as Apollonia and Garescus were razed by Philip, their populations were no doubt moved to other locations. Thus there were considerable shifts of population, even within the old kingdom. In addition, Justin mentioned the populations which had been captured in war. Probably in 345 Philip brought to Macedonia 'more than 10,000 Illyrians, named Sarnousii', and later in his reign 20,000 women and boys from Scythia. These and probably other

populations of which we have no knowledge were used 'to supplement the inhabitants of his cities'.[14]

In Upper Macedonia another kind of city was developing through Philip's encouragement of many transhumant pastoralist groups to adopt a settled way of life (p. 36 above). These too were 'cities of Macedonians'. The majority of the population in them were Macedonians of Upper Macedonia, but it seems that families were drafted into the population from Lower Macedonia, in order to introduce the establishment of laws and the growth of agriculture.[15] All citizens of these new 'towns' (*astea*), as they were called, were on an equal footing and had the same opportunities, especially the chance of being recruited into the King's Forces.

It was in the cities of Macedonians that boys were educated and trained for service in the armed forces. They served in the local militia and had experience of different forms of warfare, and the most proficient received training as pikemen; for when in 334 Alexander needed reinforcements for his phalanx in Asia, he sent officers not to take men from Antipater's army but to enlist 'as many men as possible from the land'.[16] Again in 332 Alexander sent officers 'to collect young soldiers', and on their return 6,000 infantrymen were drafted into the phalanx brigades. This was possible because they were already skilled pikemen. On the other hand, all cities of whatever kind in the kingdom of Philip were engaged in the development of agriculture, which was assisted by flood-control and by the reclamation of swampy land through proper drainage. They were also nuclear points in the development of communications and in the growth of commerce, and the ports were able to trade directly overseas. It is evident that peoples of all races within the kingdom in 346 enjoyed security from fear of invasion, established conditions of peace, and an increase in prosperity. To that extent Theopompus was justified in claiming that Philip in 346 onwards 'created a single kingdom and a single people out of many tribes and races'.

The extraordinary growth of the kingdom made great demands on the energies of the people. There was no basis of slave labour, such as existed in most Greek city-states, and it seems that even the captured Illyrians and Scythians were incorporated as free persons in the cities and in the attached villages.[17] The building of all-weather roads to the extended frontiers and even beyond them, the conversion of pastureland into arable fields, the clearing of scrub, the draining of swamps, the control of rivers by a system of dykes, the digging of canals to create the all-weather harbour at Pella, the reclamation of land to which Theophrastus bore testimony,[18] and the construction of buildings and circuit walls – these were all undertaken by the subjects of the king, whatever their race or status. We have evidence of this in the reign of Alexander; for the army acted as a free labour force with remarkable skill and efficiency. It was the soldiers of the King's Forces who constructed some public buildings and twenty kilometres of circuit-wall in twenty days at Alexandria Eschate,[19] and who built with local wood large siege-towers and constructed great

mounds at Tyre and Gaza, for instance. It was a principle of the Macedonian kingdom that all offered their personal services in the public interest.

Within the kingdom men and women must have worked industriously to produce a wealth of cereals in the numerous extensive plains; for Demeter was widely worshipped and Philip showed her symbol, an ear of wheat, on some of his coins. The hillsides were clothed in orchards; and towards the coast they yielded fine harvests of grapes, figs and even olives in a series of mild springs during the reign of Philip.[20] The population was engaged too in the breeding of stock: excellent horses for haulage and for war, famous Paeonian cattle, and large flocks of sheep and goats in the transhumant parts of the kingdom. Forestry provided the most valuable export. Men became expert in woodwork,[21] and Macedonian craftsmen built the hulls of the merchant ships and the warships which constituted the growing Macedonian navy. And increasing numbers of citizen soldiers were required for Philip's frequent and often longlasting campaigns.

Because there were such great demands on his manpower, Philip made much use of Greek mercenary soldiers. They were hired not individually but as specialised groups. They were placed under a Macedonian commander, discipline was strict, and service was continuous. Thus Alexander was to inherit fine forces of Greek mercenaries – Cretan archers, Greek cavalry and 'old-timer Greek infantry' (probably light-armed experts). As we have seen, Philip sent detachments of Greek mercenaries to those city-states which asked for help. They were deployed on his campaigns mainly in the Balkan area. For example, a Macedonian officer, Adaeus nick-named the Cock, commanded a contingent of mercenaries which fought against Chares and his mercenaries, hired by Athens, somewhere near the Thracian coast.[22] They formed a part of Philip's regular army. In the siege of Pharcedon 'the mercenaries of Philip' were ambushed, but they escaped destruction because the Macedonian troops made a diversionary attack on the walls. There was no doubt rivalry between Greek mercenaries and Macedonian pikemen; for we hear of a violent quarrel on one occasion, when Philip himself was said to have been wounded.[23]

Philip's expenditure was so enormous by Greek standards that Theopompus wrote of him as a spendthrift, much more of a soldier than a financier. But it has to be remembered that in Macedonia the king owned all fine timber, all mineral resources and large amounts of fertile land which had been won by conquest; and he imposed direct taxes on all land-holders and property-owners, drew rents from tenants of royal lands, and collected harbour-dues. To a great extent he owned the wealth of the state.[24] In 348 when he annexed the Chalcidic peninsula, he added greatly to that wealth; for he acquired very large deposits of gold, silver, copper, iron and lead in eastern Chalcidice, large stands of fine timber, and fertile spear-won land. The Chalcidians had coined in gold on the Attic standard and in silver and bronze on the Thracian standard, and their beautiful

coins with the head of Apollo, wearing a laurel-wreath, had had a very wide circulation. After the conquest of Chalcidice Philip used the same two standards, and he placed the same head of Apollo on his gold coins and on the reverse his own device, a two-horse chariot at the gallop, which commemorated his victory in that event at the Olympic Games probably in 348.[25] These gold coins were called 'Philippeioi'.[26] Issued during and after his lifetime they came to have an extraordinary circulation in the Greek mainland, throughout the Balkans, in Sicily and South Italy, in parts of Central Europe, South Russia, the Levant and Egypt. It was probably in 348 that he first issued silver tetradrachms. These bore on the obverse the laurel-wreathed head of Zeus, who was claimed to be the ancestor of the royal house and of the 'Makedones' and the supreme god of the Hellenic peoples. As this head had not appeared before on any Macedonian coinage, Philip may have been advertising his desire to reconcile the Greek city-states and unite them under his leadership. On the reverse on some issues he himself was figured, wearing a diadem with loose ends and Macedonian dress, riding a high-stepping horse, and raising his right arm in salute;[27] and on other issues a naked jockey on a racehorse, as on his earlier coins, celebrated a victory in the races at Olympia.[28] On some of the silver tetrobols the diademed head of a young man, which first appeared on coins of Archelaus, most probably represented the mythical founder of the Temenid house in Macedonia, 'Caranus'.[29]

Philip's gold and silver coinages were designed for dealings on the international market. Their distribution indicated that from 348 onwards Macedonia had the strongest currency in southeast Europe and was becoming a leading competitor in markets farther afield. On the other hand, within the kingdom bronze coinage was the usual medium for commercial exchange. Excavation at Olynthus and at its port, Mecyberna, has indicated which issues were popular. Apart from one silver tetrobol there were thirty-seven bronze pieces of Philip's reign down to 348, when Olynthus was abandoned. Thirty one of them had the head of 'Caranus' and on the reverse the naked jockey on the winning racehorse; four had the head of Heracles and the same reverse; and two had the head of Heracles and on the reverse a thunderbolt, the weapon of Zeus. At Mecyberna, which continued to trade after 348, the figures were similar: no silver coins, sixty-one showing 'Caranus', and seven the head of Heracles.[30] This choice of emblems shows that for the various peoples within the kingdom Philip wished to emphasise the continuity of the Macedonian royal house from the time of Caranus onwards; in the second place the close connections of the dynasty with Heracles and Zeus; and the importance of its success in the Olympic Games.

2. Philip's campaigns in Illyria in 344

The best guide to the sequence of events is afforded by Trogus, *Prologue* 8, since on my interpretation he was drawing on the history of Theopompus, a visitor at Philip's court in 342. The first of the events was 'how Illyrian kings were conquered by him' (Philip). The plural is significant in showing that there were two or more such kings at the time, and not one king of a united Illyrian kingdom.[31] That the war or wars were major matters is to be inferred from their place in the Prologue.

Narrative accounts of the war or wars were very brief. Justin introduced the matter 'after the regulation and organisation of Macedonian affairs' in a single sentence: 'Dardanos ceterosque finitimos fraude captos expugnat', 'By trickery he ensnared the Dardanians and the rest of the neighbouring peoples and overwhelmed them by assault'. The Dardanians were named no doubt as the most important of the Illyrian peoples whom Philip now subjugated. Diodorus had more to say, but he arranged his material in a chronologically confusing manner. Having reported the return of Philip to Macedonia under the archon-year 346/5 (correctly, in autumn 346), he added a long account of the fates of the sacrilegious Phocians and their associates, going even beyond the death of Archidamus which happened in 338 (16. 61-64). Sicilian affairs were described next, in 16. 65-9. 6 under the archon-years 346/5 to 344/3. Diodorus then resumed Macedonian affairs thus: 'Philip, having inherited his father's enmity towards Illyrians and finding their differences irremediable, invaded Illyris[32] with large forces' (16. 69. 7). These Illyrians were the Dardanians;[33] for the enmity which Philip inherited from Amyntas III was towards the successor of Bardylis, the Dardanian king, whom Callisthenes had described as 'the Illyrian bandit' (p. 7 above). The year in which Philip started his invasion was probably 345 rather than 344.[34]

The heartland of the Dardanians consisted of the immense, fen-like plains north of the watershed with the Danube – now known as Kosovo – and the fertile basin of the White Drin – now known as Metohija.[35] The Dardanians, themselves a cluster of tribes, had subjugated some neighbouring Illyrian tribes and organised them as warrior-slaves under their own command. Their chief rival, the Ardiaei, were said by Theopompus to have acquired 300,000 serfs. The Illyrian tribes between these two were less strong and seem not to have combined their forces. All these Illyrians were renowned as hard-living and hard-drinking and as experienced and formidable fighters.[36] Philip had to deploy the full forces of Macedonia against the Dardanians. According to Diodorus 'he ravaged the countryside, reduced many of the towns and returned with much booty' (16. 69. 7). According to Justin he employed trickery. One trick which Polyaenus recorded may be attributed to this campaign. Philip convened the Sarnousii, members of the Dardanian group, and his own men in an assembly which he seemed about to address. But his men had under their armpits



Fig. 8. The Balkan area

thongs which, as soon as Philip raised his right arm, they used like handcuffs to bind the unsuspecting Sarnousii. 'More than 10,000 were carried off to Macedonia' (Polyaen. 4. 2. 12). The result of the campaign was that Philip was accepted as his overlord by the reigning king, who was probably Cleitus, son of Bardylis.

Philip went on to 'conquer the rest of the neighbouring peoples' (Just. 8. 6. 1. 3, 'Dardanos ceterosque finitimos'). These were the neighbours of the Macedonians and not, as Griffith suggested, neighbours of the Dardanians, because the Dardanians would have to be neighbours of themselves. Who were they? In 356 the Grabaei had been compelled to submit to Macedonia. Since they held a large area which included the Mati valley and extended as far inland as the Macedonian border by Lake Ochrid, the tribes to the south of them – in particular the Taulantii and the Parthini – had become isolated. Writing to Philip in 346, Isocrates described him as 'having become lord and master of the mass of Illyrians except for those bordering the Adriatic' (5. 21). This can only mean that he was in control of all the southern tribes between the mouth of the Drilon (the Drin) and the mouth of the Aous, probably by treaty rather than by conquest;[37] for these tribes faced the Ionian Gulf, whereas the Adriatic of Isocrates began to the north of the Drin. Thus 'the neighbouring peoples' in 345 were those round Lake Scodra and the numerous tribes to the north which made up the Ardiaean state. Of one of Philip's campaigns we have information from Didymus to the effect that during Philip's pursuit of Pleuratus the Illyrian he and 150 of his Companions were wounded.[38] Since Pleuratus was a recurring name in the royal house of the Ardiaei, Philip had evidently won a major battle and engaged in a long pursuit of the Ardiaean cavalry, similar to that of the Dardanians in 358. It is probable that the Ardiaeans submitted and that their king became a client king of Philip.

These conquests led to increased revenues; for Philip will have imposed a tax of ten per cent on produce, as he did in Thrace. It is probable that he took possession of rich mineral resources – copper and iron in Mirdite and Scodra,[39] copper, silver and gold in Metohija, Kosovo and Polog – and demanded personal service on such projects as road-building and land reclamation and in the armed forces. For he had added to his area of control the most productive part of modern Albania and in particular the extensive coastal plains, Malakaster and Myzeqija,[40] which provided winter pasture for very great numbers of transhumant pastoralists. He must have entered into friendly relations and perhaps alliance with the wealthy Greek colonies, Apollonia and Dyrrachium, which exported Illyrian goods. It was probably the first time that this area had been forced to keep the peace and develop its potential. Isocrates, writing to Philip in 344, rebuked Philip for engaging in 'inglorious, difficult wars' and getting himself wounded by these barbarians instead of attacking the Persian Empire;[41] for at the age of ninety-two Isocrates dreamed of Persia being overthrown, whereas

Philip at the age of thirty-eight was extending the platform of power from which the attack on Persia might become possible.

3. Philip tightens his control in Thessaly

'Philip returned to Macedonia [from Illyris]. Thereafter he marched into Thessaly, expelled the tyrants from the cities, and made the Thessalians his own by acts of goodwill ... forthwith the neighbouring Greeks, carried along by the decision of the Thessalians, allied themselves with him readily' (Diod. 16. 69. 7-8 under the archon-year 344/3). Diodorus was drawing here on a short text-book, favourable to Philip, and he summarised Philip's successes in 344 and 343 in this region. A similarly favourable report was given by Polyaenus, that Philip accepted invitations to intervene, fed the factions (*tas staseis*) rather than disbanded them, cared for the weaker side, deposed the more powerful, and was friendly towards the popular parties.[42] And writing in 344 Isocrates expressed the same sentiment. 'In the judgement of many you have planned well in treating the Thessalians justly and in ways advantageous to them, although they are men not easy to handle but high-spirited and riddled with party-strife (*stasis*)' (*Letter* 2. 20). Just as there were two sides to party-strife, so there was the opposing view of Philip's interventions. Demosthenes expressed it well. 'By granting much to the Thessalians he reduced them to their present servitude'; 'this eagerness to be friends with Philip has only just recently deprived the Thessalians of their leadership and their general repute, and now is already undermining their liberty, since some of their citadels are garrisoned by Macedonians' (now being in 343).[43]

The party-strife which was endemic in Thessalian politics was of one city against another (Larissa v. Pherae, Pelinna v. Pharsalus etc.) and of rival leading groups, each with its ideology, within each city. We hear of Philip planning to arrest a leading group of Aleuadae at Larissa, collaborating with Simus and other Aleuadae, and then banishing them.[44] An exiled leader from Pherae, Aristomedes, served under Persian command against Philip in 340 and against Alexander in 333.[45] At Pherae, of which the leading group probably had refused to send troops at the demand of Philip as *archon* of the Thessalian League, Philip appeared with an army and imposed a garrison.[46] The net result was certainly that the leaders who favoured Philip and whom Philip favoured in return came into power in the cities and in the administration of the Thessalian League. In *The Second Philippic*, delivered in autumn 344, Demosthenes referred to such leaders when he said that Philip had imposed on the Thessalians 'the present decadarchy', an abusive term comparable to 'junta' in modern Greek politics.[47] In the same year Isocrates was complimenting Philip on his skill and just dealing with the Thessalians. The aim of Philip was to secure loyal support, draw the revenues and command the services of the

Thessalian cavalry and other troops. In this he and Alexander succeeded. The tide turned after Alexander's death.

It was probably in 343/2 that Philip made some reform in the administration of the Thessalian League. The territory of the League consisted of four traditional 'tetrades' (quarters), of which the origins were tribal. Philip appointed four 'tetrarchs', who may have been his chosen military commanders of the four levies, since they seem to have replaced the 'polemarchs' who had been elected locally. Theopompus described one such tetrarch, called Thrasydaeus, as 'a tyrant over his fellow-nationals, a man of little intellect but a master of flattery'.[48] It should be noted that Thessaly was treated by Philip as a free country. For 'Thessaly and Magnesia' gave audience to a diplomatic mission, led by Aristodemus and including Demosthenes, who claimed to have outshone any of Philip's envoys.[49] Such a mission was volubly hostile to Philip, *archon* though he was of the League.[50]

CHAPTER XII

Extension of Macedonian power and conflict with Athens and Persia

1. The intervention of Philip in Epirus

Epirus was a land of milk and animal products. Transhumant pastoralism flourished with high rainfall, winter pastures near the coast, and an abundance of summer pastures, principally on the mountainous terrain of North Pindus. The social unit was a small tribe, consisting of several nomadic or semi-nomadic groups, and these tribes, of which more than seventy names are known, coalesced into large tribal coalitions, three in number: Thesprotians, Molossians and Chaonians.[1] In our period the Molossian coalition was the most powerful, having attracted some small tribes from the other two coalitions.[2] We know from the discovery of inscriptions that these tribes were speaking the Greek language (in a West-Greek dialect) in the latter half of the fifth century, when Thucydides described them as 'barbarians'; and they were so described by two geographers, writing of the period 380-360. The term 'barbarian' was used with reference not to language but to the way of life, so different from the urban capitalism of the city-state.[3]

Philip's concern was primarily with the Molossian coalition, which in 360 controlled the summer pastures of Tymphaea, Parauaea and Orestis.[4] Moreover, all the tribes of Upper Macedonia were related more to the Molossians than to the 'Makedones' in dialect, origin and way of life. As we have seen, Philip married Olympias, a princess of the royal house of the Molossians, absorbed Orestis into his kingdom and c. 350 conducted a campaign which reduced the Molossian coalition to a position of dependency. The king, Arybbas, remained on the throne but as a vassal-king. Philip took to his court the young brother of Olympias, Alexander. He annexed Tymphaea and Parauaea, thereby exercising an indirect control of the tribes which used the winter pastures of coastal Epirus.[5] The Molossian coinage was suspended, and the bronze currency for internal exchange was that of Philip which proclaimed the victory of his racehorse at the Olympic Games and the descent of the Macedonian royal house from Caranus.[6] It is probable that Philip encouraged some of the pastoral population to adopt a settled life and build towns, and that the Molossians began to learn the use of the pike and the phalanx formation.

The next step was a forceful intervention by Philip which placed Alexander on the throne, drove out Arybbas, and added the Preveza peninsula to the Molossian kingdom, which became independent and issued its own coinage. When did this happen? The literary evidence is confused. Justin appended to the mention of Philip's marriage to Olympias (in 357) a note that it led to Arybbas being deprived of his kingdom and growing old in exile (7. 6. 11-12). In the next book, after the defeat of the Dardanians (in 345), Justin back-tracked to report the removal of Alexander to the Macedonian court and the sexual abuse of the boy by Philip. Then, when Alexander became twenty, Philip expelled Arybbas and placed Alexander on the throne (8. 6. 7-8). In my analysis of the sources I argued that Trogus whom Justin was abbreviating had drawn on Satyrus, *Life of Philip*, for the first passage and on Theopompus for the second passage.[7] If so, the picture of Arybbas growing old in exile may not be worthy of trust; but the timing of the intervention in Molossia must be accepted as correct, since Theopompus was at the Macedonian court in 342. That timing is between 344 and 340, since the next book opened with the siege of Byzantium.

Next, Diodorus recorded under the archon-year 342/1 only one event of the Greek mainland. 'Arybbas, the king of the Molossians, ended after a rule of ten years, leaving a son Aeacides who became the father of Pyrrhus; but the successor to the throne was Alexander, brother of Olympias, thanks to the collaboration of Philip the Macedonian' (16. 72. 1). The source of Diodorus was probably Diyllus, a Hellenistic historian, since there is the forward look to Pyrrhus.[8] The year should be correct. However, the information about Arybbas' length of rule and his 'ending', which here meant his death, is erroneous; and for the error we may blame Diodorus himself.[9] In fact Arybbas, who was an honorary Athenian citizen, like his father and grandfather, fled to Athens, as we know from an inscription found at Athens; therein the People confirmed his citizenship, extended it to his descendants, and instructed the Athenian generals to see to the recovery of his rule for him and his children. The inscription was dated by Tod to 'about 342'.[10] That accords with the year given by Diodorus and with the date of the speech *De Halonneso* (in the archon-year 343/2), in which 'Philip is advancing with an army towards Ambracia' ([D.] 7. 32).[11] Thus the probable date of the operations in Molossia and Cassopaea is in summer 342.

Philip came with an army to expel Arybbas and he went on to attack four independent city-states which were colonies of Elis. They were in control of Cassopaea, the peninsula to the south of the middle and lower Acheron, famous now for its olive-groves and its winter pastures. The strongest of them, Buchetium, situated on the navigable river Charadrus, exported the produce not only of Cassopaea but also goods from Molossia until some time in 380-360, when the Molossians acquired a strip, seven kilometres long, on the coast of the Gulf between Buchetium and Ambracia; and even then there was no natural harbour on that strip.[12] In fact in

342 Philip found a situation familiar to him in Macedonia, in which Greek colonial city-states monopolised the export of goods from the hinterland. He broke that monopoly by his campaign in Cassopaea. 'He destroyed by fire the territory of the three city-states in Cassopia – Pandosia, Boucheta, Elatea, colonies of Elis –, forced his way into the cities, and handed them over to his kinsman Alexander to be his slaves' ([D.] 7. 32). Theopompus corrected one name to Elatria and added a fourth city-state, Bitia. Thenceforth the Molossians exported their goods and those of the peninsula down the navigable part of the river Charadrus. Philip, we may suspect, inspired the creation of the tribal city-centre of the Cassopaei, named Cassope, and the issue of a bronze coinage which came to an end between 331 and 325.[13] Philip then moved his army towards two colonies of Corinth, Leucas and Ambracia, which was the chief exporter of timber and animal products from eastern Epirus.[14] The reactions of Corinth and her allies, including Athens, were such that he withdrew (p. 127 below).

2. Philip's conquests in Thrace, 342-340

There is only one, perfunctory account of the war in Thrace. It is given by Diodorus, who on my interpretation was drawing on a short Hellenistic text-book.[15] It may be translated as follows:

> As regards Macedonia Philip made a campaign into Thrace to win over the Greek city-states situated in Thrace to his side. For the king of the Thracians, Cersobleptes, was continually making subject to himself and ravaging the territory of the city-states which were his neighbours by the Hellespont. Accordingly, because Philip wished to put an end to the assaults by the barbarians, he campaigned against them with large forces. After victories over the Thracians in several battles he ordered the defeated barbarians to pay tithes to the Macedonians, and he put a stop to Thracian insolence by founding considerable cities in strategic regions. So the city-states of the Greeks were freed from their fears and entered most eagerly into the alliance of Philip (Diod. 16. 71. 1-2, under the archon-year 343/2).

Diodorus was dating the start of what must have been a series of campaigns; for they continued into the year 340. He placed the start before the intervention in Molossia and Cassopaea; and so did Trogus in his *Prologue* 8. The sequence, then, seems to be a first operation in Thrace in early spring 342[16] and actions in Epirus in summer 342. After those actions Philip spent a long period in Thrace; for in his speech *De Chersoneso*, delivered in spring 341, Demosthenes spoke of Philip having been on campaign in Thrace for ten months,[17] including the winter, which we may interpret as from July 342 to April 341. Operations continued, whether continuously or intermittently, from then on into 340. Philip campaigned 'with large forces'. That expression had been used of his campaigns in Illyris (Diod. 16. 69. 7); but this was a much larger undertaking and

longlasting. What troops did he use? For the 'several battles' he relied no doubt on his pikeman-phalanx and his Companion Cavalry, as he had done against Bardylis in 358. But for irregular warfare and speed of movement he evidently deployed other troops also. They were described by Demosthenes in *The Third Philippic*, delivered soon after the *De Chersoneso*. 'You hear of Philip marching wherever he wishes not by leading a phalanx of heavy infantry, but by being equipped with light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries and suchlike soldiery' (9. 49). Of the latter the mercenaries (such as the Cretan archers, 'old-timer' Greek infantry and Greek cavalry) were only a small part. The bulk, apart from the Companion Cavalry, came presumably from the allies and the subjects of Philip – Thessalian cavalry, light infantry from the Thessalian Perioikoi and the mountain tribes of Central Greece, and javelin-men from Illyris – while the Macedonian kingdom contributed only small numbers of light cavalry, slingers and archers.[18] We can be sure that Philip was as skilful as Alexander was to be in leading and coordinating 'such soldiery' with the King's Forces of Makedones.

The *Argument* to Demosthenes, *De Chersoneso* (section 3) drew an important geographical distinction, that 'while Philip was campaigning against the king of Odrysians in the interior, in Upper Thrace, Diopeithes overran coastal Thrace'. For Thrace consists mainly of three zones: the Aegean coastlands, cut off from the interior by the high mountain ranges of Orbelus (2029 m) and Rhodope (2191 m) which are parallel to the coast; the interior, mostly fertile plainland, facing the Black Sea coast; the Haemus range (2376 m) with its northern valleys running down to the Danube.[19] In his previous campaigns Philip had been conquering 'coastal Thrace' and then the coastal sector inland of the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus (p. 50 above). The entries from 'coastal Thrace' to 'the interior' are two: up the Strymon valley through the Rupel Pass and then the Kresna Defile to reach Sofia, which is to the west of the great plain; and up the Hebrus valley and so into the eastern part of the great plain, which slopes down to the Greek city-states on the Black Sea coast.[20] It may be assumed that Philip began his invasion of 'the interior' by subjugating or winning over the peoples of the Strymon valley (Sinti, Maedi, Agrianes), in order incidentally to cover his communications in the coastal sector. The Maedi rebelled in 340. The Agrianes, who were Paeonians, were probably won over, since their king was on good terms with Alexander from 340 onwards.[21] The next stage, the conquest of the Hebrus valley, brought Philip into the homeland of the Odrysian tribes and their allies, where there was certainly severe fighting. By spring 341 Philip had forced his way through that area into 'the interior' but had not yet finally defeated 'the king of Odrysae'.

The opposition was formidable but divided. Herodotus sized up the Thracians well.[22] For them 'to live by war and plunder is of all things the most glorious' and 'to till the ground the most dishonourable'. 'The Thra-

cians are the most powerful people in the world, except of course the Indians; and if they had one ruler, they would be irresistible and far the strongest of all peoples in my belief. But that is impossible.' The leading tribesmen of each tribe, normally led by a king, were fine cavalrymen and specially equipped infantrymen; the latter, called 'peltasts' because they carried a small shield, were skilled in using a longer spear both against cavalrymen and heavy infantry. They were despised as uncouth by the Greeks but feared as fighters. The Thracians and the Macedonians had a good deal in common as warlike peoples commanded by kings whose courts were lavish. Cotys and Cersobleptes, for instance, received silver jugs from each city in their realm.[23] But disunity prevailed. Philip was no doubt able to conquer one tribal group after another by knocking out the leading tribesmen and accepting the submission of the 'tillers of the ground'.

In the *De Chersoneso*, delivered in spring 341, Demosthenes mentioned as a result of the winter campaign the 'present destruction and reorganisation' by Philip of three places (Drongylus, Cabyle and Masteira), of which Cabyle was on a northern tributary of the Hebrus and close to Mt Haemus. By then too the Odrysian kings Teres and Cersobleptes had been expelled from their kingdoms.[24] Being now in control of the great plain, Philip entered into alliance with some of the Greek cities of its coast on the Black Sea. In the course of this year Philip founded 'the considerable cities in strategic regions', and he advanced to Odessus, a Greek city-state on the latitude of Mt Haemus, which was occupied by a garrison of Getae, a semi-nomadic people of the Danube basin. When his army was about to make an assault, the gates opened and white-robed Getic priests, playing lyres and intoning prayers, marched out with complete confidence towards the Macedonians who fell back in amazement. The priests were offering to negotiate. A treaty was made under which the Getae recovered any prisoners and withdrew from Odessus. A further treaty was concluded with the king of the Getae, Cothelas, who 'came to Philip bringing his daughter Meda and many gifts'.[25] In courtly etiquette Cothelas was recognising Philip as his superior.

A similar situation arose with Atheas, a Scythian king, who held part of the Dobruja, the fertile area north of Odessus which extended to the mouth of the Danube. For in soliciting military aid from Philip Atheas undertook 'to adopt Philip as heir to his kingdom', that adoption presumably committing Philip to marry Atheas' daughter. The background and the later developments (p. 136 below) as provided by Justin came through Trogus from Theopompus, who was very thorough in his researches and is to be trusted as accurate on the facts. Atheas, known also from his silver coinage, was a king of some importance. At the time he was hard pressed in a war against 'the king of the Histriani', who was, we may assume, king of a native people in the vicinity of 'Ister' (the Danube). The request for military aid came to Philip through the Greek city-state Apollonia, with which he had an alliance. One reason for Atheas approaching Philip was

that 'the revenues of Atheas were being harmed by the Byzantines' and that Philip was then at odds with Byzantium. So the request was accepted by Philip on the terms which Atheas had proposed, and Macedonian troops were sent to help Atheas. On their arrival Atheas felt no need of them, because the king of the Histriani had died. So he sent them back without payment and with an insulting message in which he negated his undertaking.[26] This happened probably in 340, when Philip was fully in control of 'the interior of Thrace' and was extending his sphere of influence into the area north of Mt Haemus. We shall discuss later (p. 138) his arrangements in Thrace.

The magnitude of Philip's military achievement should not be underestimated. The area of Thrace was at least seven times the size of the region from which Philip recruited the King's Forces, namely the original kingdom and Upper Macedonia. The population of Thrace must have been five times that of the greater Macedonian kingdom. The mountainous area between the coastal sector and the interior was almost impossibly difficult for an invader, because it was luxuriantly forested and often precipitous and inhabited by tribesmen, who were fiercely 'independent' in the sense of being self-governing and not subject to a king.[27] Philip may have recruited some of the Thracians into his army, as Alexander was to do on a large scale, and certainly some of the Agrianian infantrymen who were to serve Alexander as an élite unit.[28] We hear of Antipater and Parmenio being active with separate commands in 340.[29] Philip evidently operated at times with several columns, as Alexander was to do in similar circumstances. He himself had 30,000 men under his command at Perinthus, a trustworthy figure, because it came from Ephorus.[30] To deploy such very large forces in Thrace was possible, because Philip had secured his control of the Dardanian-Illyrian-Molossian fronts and knew that the Greek city-states were not yet capable of acting in union against Macedonia. It was only in the final stage that Persia was able to intervene. By then Philip had consolidated his control of the coastlands and the interior of Thrace except north of the Haemus.[31] More importantly, he had created and proved the fighting power of the multiracial army which was to establish the supremacy of Macedonia not only in eastern Europe, but also in Asia under his successor.[32]

3. Philip's negotiations with the city-states, 342-340

Because the evidence for these negotiations comes not from Diodorus and Justin but mainly from Demosthenes and his associates, it is important to understand their viewpoint. Demosthenes expressed it concisely in the summer of 341 in *The Fourth Philippic*:

> Men in the city-states are divided into two factions, one desiring to live as citizens with equal rights in freedom under the laws, and the other lusting

> to rule over their fellow-citizens and obey the orders of another who, they think, may enable them to succeed. Those who adhere to Philip's policy, in their lust for dictatorships and juntas, have prevailed everywhere, so that ours is the only stable democracy left. They have prevailed because they have a provider of money ... and a force available if they ask for it to destroy their opponents' (D. 10. 4-5).
>
> You must be told what you should do. First, men of Athens, you must know for sure that Philip is at war with our state, has broken the peace, is the malicious enemy of the entire state ... and his whole aim in going to war and scheming is to attack our constitution, and there is nothing in the world that he has more in view than the destruction of it. ... The first essential is to understand that Philip is the irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and our democracy, and to see clearly that in all his activities and plannings today he is preparing to attack our city (D. 10. 11-15).

Those who did not share these views of Demosthenes were all denounced by him as paid agents of Philip and traitors to their country.[33] That this was not so at Athens is clear from the reaction of Isocrates to the rise of Philip, a *Letter* from Speusippus the head of Plato's Academy which found precedents for Philip's actions in the life of Heracles,[34] and from the criticisms of Demosthenes and his associates as demagogues who wanted war with Philip for their own advancement in politics at Athens. As regards other states, Polybius saw that Demosthenes' views were an oversimplification. For Polybius, writing admittedly with hindsight some two centuries later, claimed that many of the men named by Demosthenes as traitors were in fact acting in the interest of their own state, as they saw it, for instance in maintaining their independence from Sparta.[35] It is probable that Polybius was right. Given the past record of inter-state wars, the smaller states felt the need of aligning themselves with a strong power, and in the 340s it was natural to turn to Macedonia and even to put some trust in the stated policy of the Amphictyonic Council which sought reconciliation and a Common Peace with collective security.

Demosthenes was correct in saying that Athens was the only stable democracy left. Elsewhere party-strife was of the violent kind which Thucydides and Isocrates had described so vividly (pp. 71 and 118 above), and in this type of faction (*stasis*) the invocation of an outside power was not infrequent.[36] Macedonia after 348 was such a power. In 343 the city-states in Euboea were affected by party-strife and also they were at odds with one another. As Demosthenes said in 341 in *The Third Philippic* (9. 57), the democrats who had expelled the tyrant from Eretria 'were guiding the control of affairs some towards Athens and others towards Philip'. Probably late in winter 343/2 the latter group of democrats brought in a Macedonian officer with 1,000 mercenaries, who razed the fortifications of the harbour and supported the pro-Macedonian democrats. Their leaders were described by Demosthenes as three dictators. In the course of 342 that support took the form of two more groups of mercenaries commanded respectively by Eurylochus and Parmenio (9. 58).[37] Oreus,

strategically placed on the Euripus Channel, was another unstable democracy in Euboea, and when the democratic leaders split in the struggle for power one faction brought in Macedonia and killed or banished their rivals. Chalcis seemed to be moving in the same direction when a leading politician, Callias, intrigued with Philip in Macedonia at an unknown date (Aeschin. 3. 89), then switched to Thebes and eventually to Athens, as we shall see.

The advance of Philip towards Ambracia in summer 342 (p. 122 above) caused a reaction which he may not have expected. Athens sent an expedition to reinforce Acarnania,[38] and Corinth presumably sent one to Ambracia. Philip wisely withdrew. The efforts of Demosthenes to stir up trouble for Philip by visiting 'Thessaly, Ambracia, the Illyrians and the kings of the Thracians' were praised by himself in 330 but had no visible effect at the time.[39] A larger mission which included Demosthenes, Hegesippus, Polyeuctus and others toured the cities of the Peloponnese in late summer or autumn 342, and the most Demosthenes could claim in summer 341 (9. 72) was that they had stopped Philip from invading the Peloponnese[40] – something which Philip had never in fact intended.

Philip made a direct approach to Athens in early summer 342 by sending a *Letter* and some envoys to amplify it. The content of the *Letter* can be deduced from a speech which Hegesippus made to the Assembly ([D.] 7, *De Halonneso*). Philip proposed to give to Athens a small island, Halonnesus, from which he had expelled a group of pirates, and to join Athens in a campaign against pirates in the Aegean; to proceed with Athens to the establishment of a Common Peace with collective security; to arrange with Athens how cases involving Athenians and Macedonians should be tried; and to submit to arbitration any points of dispute. He repeated his wish to benefit Athens, if only the Athenians would listen to those who were speaking in his favour and punish those who were maligning him in public. The *Letter* was written on the basis of the current Peace and Alliance. The speech of Hegesippus advised total rejection.[41] His attitude and his attacks on Philip were in line with those of Demosthenes which we cited at the beginning of this section. We do not know what other speeches were made. Once again the People procrastinated. Negotiations dragged on, but the constructive proposals of Philip proved no more acceptable than in the past (p. 106 above).

During the archon-year 343/2 Athens strengthened her hold on the Chersonese by sending further settlers and a general in command of mercenaries, Diopeithes of Sunium. Like his predecessors, Diopeithes had to find pay for his mercenaries by demands of 'benevolences' (*eunoiai*) from merchantships, piratical raids by sea, the ravaging of Thracian land, and the holding of prisoners to ransom.[42] His methods were breaches of the Peace and Alliance with Philip; for Diopeithes made his demands on Macedonian merchantmen, ravaged lands acquired by Philip, held Macedonian subjects as prisoners, arrested Philip's envoy, tortured him and

held him until a ransom of nine talents was paid. He threatened to attack Cardia, the ally of Philip and recognised as such under the Peace of Philocrates, and the people of Cardia requested and received from Philip a Macedonian garrison to protect themselves against Diopeithes. Both before and after the sending of the garrison Philip made an offer to submit the matter to arbitration, an offer which Athens rejected. At this time too an ally of Athens, Thasos, let pirates use their harbour – a breach of the Treaty of Philocrates and comparable to the acts of Diopeithes.

In 341 Philip sent a *Letter* of protest to Athens. A speech by Demosthenes during the debate on the *Letter* in late spring 341 was published in midsummer in a revised version as *De Chersoneso*.[43] The quotations from it at the beginning of this section are typical. He justified Diopeithes' acts on the grounds that Philip was already conducting an undeclared war against Athens, whether in Thrace or Epirus or Euboea, and he recommended the approval and the reinforcement of Diopeithes. He urged Athens to maintain a standing army, summon her allies and protect the city-states against the aggressor who aimed to deprive them of their liberties, and to 'cudgel to death the bribed agents of Philip', who were recommending on Demosthenes' view the appeasement of Philip[44] and on their view coexistence and even cooperation as the ally of Philip.

The Assembly approved the policy of Demosthenes and his supporters. Money, reinforcements and a second general (Chares) were sent to support Diopeithes in the Chersonese. In terms of international diplomacy Athens' response to Philip's *Letter* and her open encouragement of Diopeithes constituted a *casus belli*. Philip did not take it up. It was Demosthenes who was set on war. In two speeches that summer, *The Third Philippic* and *The Fourth Philippic*, he maintained his pressure on the Assembly by portraying Philip as engaged in an undeclared war against Athens, he demanded the execution of all opposing speakers as bribed traitors, and he urged Athens to rally the city-states in defence of their common liberty. Some action was needed to push Athens towards war and make Philip respond with war. Euboea was the most suitable place for such action. In summer 341 an alliance with Callias (p. 127 above), the leading politician of Chalcis, was concluded on the proposal of Demosthenes. Chalcidian and Athenian forces then intervened in Oreus and Eretria.[45] They expelled the leaders there who significantly did not have any Macedonian mercenaries or troops at their disposal, and they then put their own nominees in power. Some Megarians helped at Oreus. It was, if anything, a more blatant form of intervention than that for which Demosthenes had denounced Philip.

Later in the summer a Macedonian herald was kidnapped on Macedonian territory, taken to Athens where his despatches were read out to the Assembly, and then held prisoner for ten months. At Chalcis Callias was given the use of Athenian ships. With them he made an attack upon the unsuspecting cities on the coast of the Pagasaean Gulf, which were allies of Philip and as such were on terms of peace and alliance with Athens

under the Treaty of Philocrates.[46] Would Philip respond with war? He made no move. Callias was thanked by the Assembly and was subsequently made an Athenian citizen. Peparethos, a member of the Athenian Alliance and as such a beneficiary of the Treaty of Philocrates, seized Halonnesus and held its Macedonian garrison-troops as prisoners.[47] This was another *casus belli* disregarded by Philip.

With war in mind Demosthenes and Callias joined forces. A Euboean Confederacy was formed as an independent political body with its own finances, and it entered into alliance with Athens.[48] Demosthenes and Callias went to the Peloponnese and tried in autumn and winter to win allies for the as yet undeclared war against Philip. In February 340 each of them made a rosy but ill-founded report of monies, mercenaries and citizen troops which would be contributed at need by 'all the Peloponnesians and Acarnanians' as well as by the Megarians, Achaeans (named by Callias) and Euboeans. Demosthenes reported that the delegates of these peoples would meet at Athens on a stated date in March; but the meeting did not materialise.[49] A small incident was indicative of the war-spirit at Athens. A citizen of Oreus was arrested at Athens and accused of spying for Philip. According to Aeschines Demosthenes himself participated in the torture of the man, and Demosthenes proposed the execution which was carried out.[50]

In April 340, during the Dionysiac Festival, Demosthenes was officially crowned in the theatre with a wreath of gold for his services to the People.[51] To choose this occasion was to broadcast to the city-states and to Philip the complete support by Athens of Demosthenes' policy of war against Macedonia. It elicited no response from Philip. He knew that despite Demosthenes' demands (10. 19) Athens was doing nothing to equip herself for war, and that Demosthenes' declared strategy of ravaging Macedonian territory and keeping him confined to his own kingdom was puerile (D. 9. 51-2). He probably realised that, while the majority of the Athenians enjoyed defying and baiting him, they hesitated to commit themselves to a war which would demand great financial and even physical sacrifice. What might be dangerous for him was a coalition not of mainland states in 340 but one of naval powers, including Persia, which might challenge him for the control of Thrace.

4. Relations with Persia and the declaration of war by Athens

During most of Philip's reign Persia was weakened by a series of revolts in her western satrapies. The King (Artaxerxes Ochus) and the rebellious satraps alike were eager to obtain the services of Greek infantry, and to that end they entered into negotiations with the leading city-states of the mainland. Macedonia had no infantry to spare; but Philip enabled Pammenes with a force of Theban infantry to reach Artabazus, a satrap in

revolt, in 353 (p. 46 above). When Artabazus was defeated, he and his Greek general, Memnon, found refuge with Philip for a time and then were received by Artaxerxes at his court c. 349 (Diod. 16. 52. 3);[52] relations between Philip and Artaxerxes were presumably friendly at the time. The situation changed radically when Artaxerxes defeated Sidon in 343, reduced Egypt in spring 342, and appointed later in the year Mentor, brother of Memnon, to deal with the dissidents in northwest Asia. Persia now had the navies of Phoenicia, Egypt and Cyprus at her disposal, and could add those of the Greek cities in Asia if Mentor should overcome all opposition. As Philip was about to engage in a major campaign in Thrace, it was clear that his interests and those of Persia might clash in the waters which separate Europe from Asia.

In a *Letter* to Alexander the Persian king stated in 332 that Philip had had a treaty of 'friendship and alliance' with Artaxerxes. When was that treaty made? The only occasion on which Persian envoys were said to have been in Macedonia was when Philip was away and they were entertained by Alexander, a boy at the time who asked them un-boyish questions. This happened presumably when or soon after Alexander became a Page at the age of fourteen in summer 342. The source of the information which was supplied by Plutarch was probably a contemporary, Marsyas Macedon.[53] The alliance did not envisage any joint action; rather, it must have been a non-aggression pact in which Philip undertook not to intervene in Asia, where he was on friendly terms with Hermias who had set himself up as an independent ruler at Atarneus (opposite Lesbos), and Artaxerxes agreed not to cross into Thrace or act against Philip at sea. Later in the year or early in 341 Hermias, tricked and arrested by Mentor, was executed by Artaxerxes. There was a link between Hermias and Philip in the person of Aristotle, who was son-in-law of Hermias and on Philip's invitation came to educate Alexander in summer 342. Artaxerxes and Mentor will have known of this link, and it was probably they who initiated the request for alliance and sent the envoys to Philip's court.[54]

The revival of Persian power raised great hopes in Demosthenes. In summer 341 in *The Fourth Philippic* he admitted that of the Greek states 'none opens a dialogue with us through love or trust or fear' about the interests of Greece (10. 53). But Persia might be enlisted against Philip. In proposing an approach to Persia Demosthenes had to advocate an abrupt change of tune from the usual trumpeting of a Panhellenic crusade against the Persian enemy. He therefore stressed the common interest of Athens and Persia. The Chersonese had been recognised by Persia as an Athenian possession, the Thracians had been 'benefactors' of Persia and were Athens' friends, and 'all the plans of Philip against the Great King' (so he claimed) had been revealed by Hermias.[55] He convinced the Assembly despite those who wrote and spoke of a Common Peace and a united Greek attack on Persia. But procrastination followed. The efforts of Demosthenes, Hyperides and Diopeithes were rewarded by gifts of gold to

them personally from the Great King, and in summer 340 an embassy was in Susa discussing the terms of 'a defensive alliance' against Philip and no doubt soliciting a financial subsidy.[56]

The successes of Philip in Thrace in 340 alarmed Byzantium, which had hitherto been the most influential power in the Black Sea. Her fleet of warships, acting sometimes in cooperation with pirates, had enabled her to exercise control even over Athens in 348 and Atheas in 341 by 'bringing merchantmen into her harbour' and forcing them to pay dues.[57] Ally though she was of Philip, she realised that he was displacing her on the west coast of the Black Sea and was unlikely to accept her exactions from merchant shipping in general and Macedonian shipping in particular. Athens saw her chance. She sent an embassy to Byzantium in autumn 341 and separate embassies to Chios and Rhodes, which were on good terms with Byzantium. Friendly relations were no doubt established, but no formal treaties were made in the first half of 340.[58]

Because Athens was an open and talkative democracy, Philip knew her every move whether on the Greek mainland, in the Aegean and the Hellespont, or in treating with Persia. It was clear that she was drifting of her own volition – since he had taken no action – towards a war in league with some Greek states and perhaps Persia against himself. For some two years his priority had been the reduction of Thrace. Now, in early summer 340, with Thrace conquered south of the Haemus range, he was ready to take the initiative elsewhere. He had almost complete freedom of movement, because he had alliances with Athens, Persia and many city-states of the Thracian coast. The exception was the Chersonese. There the Athenian cleruchs were at war with his ally, Cardia, which was supported by his garrison.[59]

Philip chose to enter the Chersonese unannounced. While his fleet sailed alongside, he marched his army from Cardia along the west coast and then up the east coast to Cardia and beyond. He thus secured the passage of the fleet, which might have been forced by storm to put into land. He demonstrated that his forces could destroy the cleruchs at any time. But he committed no hostile act, although it was within his power to seize Athenian triremes or annex territory. Chares, the Athenian general, made no move, either because he had no orders to break the peace, or because he was unable to act in time. The operation completed, Philip sent a *Letter* to Athens in which he listed Athens' breaches of the peace and alliance and of international law, justified his march through the Chersonese, offered to go to arbitration, and said he would defend himself against attacks by Athens. 'Most unreasonable of all in my judgement was your refusal to listen to the envoys from me and all my allies, when I wanted to make with you a just agreement in the interest of the Greek world' (he was referring to a Common Peace of which Macedonia would be a member-state). 'That was in the interest of the People but not of your orators' ([D.] 12. 18-19).[60] The *Letter* has survived in an authentic form. It is a calm and masterly

statement of Philip's case. It had at least two aims: to put that case on record, and to indicate that Athens could still have a genuine peace with Macedonia.

His next move was made while the *Letter* was on its way to Athens. 'He attacked Perinthus which was opposing him and was inclining towards Athens' (Diod. 16. 74. 2). If he could capture that city (and he was confident of success), it would be an object-lesson to other city-states on the Thracian coast which were entertaining similar ideas, and especially to Byzantium, which, as he said in his *Letter*, had been incited by Athens. Speed was important, because he was still in alliance with Athens and Persia. He put everything into a continuous attack along the 200-yards-wide isthmus against the city-wall, using 120-feet-high towers equipped with catapults and employing battering-rams and sapping methods. His 30,000-strong army supplied assault-groups and prevented any overland assistance to Perinthus. A long stretch of the city-wall collapsed. On a flat site the Macedonians would have broken into the city. But close-packed high houses and narrow alleys rose up 'in the manner of a theatre', so that each tier of houses and blocked alleys formed a further wall, which the Perinthians held with determination.[61]

His fleet had carried the siege-train, but it was too small for a naval action. It was no doubt beached at his camp. Thus Byzantium was able to send in men, missiles and catapults by sea. Later, when supplies of food were critically short, the Persian satraps on the order of the Great King ferried food, money, missiles and mercenaries into the city.[62] It was clear that Philip had miscalculated. He therefore divided his large army. Part maintained the attack at Perinthus. With the rest he made a surprise attack on Byzantium, which came close to success. But Byzantium was helped by many allies, including some nearby Greek cities. One of them, Selymbria between Perinthus and Byzantium, was put under siege.[63] Anticipating a move by Athens, which had not sent any help to Perinthus, Philip's fleet landed some troops on the Asiatic coast of the Bosporus and captured 230 laden cornships, which were to have been escorted by the Athenian fleet under Chares. He released 50. The rest provided food in plenty for his huge army. The value of the 180 cornships, which had been bound for Athens and her allies, was estimated at 700 talents. Philip claimed that the ships were going to supply Selymbria. Negotiations with Athens were abortive. Around October 340 Demosthenes' proposal 'to destroy the record of the treaty of peace and alliance with Philip and to man the fleet' was carried.[64] Athens and Macedonia were at war.

CHAPTER XIII

Philip in Thrace and developments in Greece

1. War in the Hellespont and the Propontis, 340-339

Although we know very little about the siege of Byzantium, it was associated with an important development in the technique of siegecraft. For Athenaeus Mechanicus wrote as follows: 'All such making of machines made progress during the dictatorship of Dionysius of Sicily and in the reign of Philip, son of Amyntas, when Philip was besieging the Byzantines. Successful in developing such technique was Polyidus the Thessalian, whose pupils, Diades and Charias, campaigned with Alexander' (10. 5-10, ed. Wescher). The new development was evidently associated with some invention by Polyidus. We may summarise Macedonian siegecraft before his activity at Byzantium.

Philip amazed the Athenians by his capture of Amphipolis where they had failed for many decades. So early in his reign he probably used only the traditional equipment – battering-rams and scaling-ladders. What was new was the daring spirit of the Macedonians, a native characteristic, which was stimulated further by the hope of loot and by the king's prizes for courage. Catapults which shot bolts and others which hurled stones were effectively deployed by his enemies in 354 and 353, and Philip himself had bolt-shooting catapults at Olynthus in 348, where many large bolt-heads of bronze inscribed with his name were found during the excavations. By 341 his speed in bringing up his 'machines' and laying siege to an enemy-occupied city was seen as remarkable by Demosthenes.[1] This was certainly demonstrated at Perinthus. There a new feature in the literary record was the building of '120-feet-high towers' from which the fire of 'many catapults of all kinds' cleared the defenders from the battlements of the circuit-wall, which was much less high. These 'towers' were probably static, and not on a mobile wheeled base; and they were very effective until the Perinthians were firing back from tall houses on the steep hillside.[2]

At Byzantium the new invention by Polyidus was most probably the torsion-catapult, which was much more powerful than the mechanically-drawn catapult. He himself wrote a treatise *On Machines*, and the techni-

cal term *'katapeltai Makedonikoi'* shows that a new type of catapult was developed by the Macedonians.[3] Torsion-catapults, firing from a high tower, would be deadly in clearing defenders from the battlements at the very time when scaling-ladders were being set up, battering-rams were coming into action, or/and sappers were undermining the wall-foundations. Whatever the details may have been, it is certain that it was Philip who replaced the city-state method of blockade over months and even years by the immediate and sustained assault with better and better siege-engines. Also at Byzantium we hear for the first time that the Macedonians used stakes to enclose an enemy's position, even as they did to defend their own camp on a campaign.[4]

It is true that Philip failed to capture Perinthus, Byzantium or Selymbria.[5] All three were open to the sea; and in that respect their positions were comparable to that of Tyre during the period when Alexander did not control the sea. Moreover, they received much seaborne help in the form of men, missiles and foodstuffs. When Athens sent them her fleet of forty triremes from the Chersonese, Byzantium was not in a desperate situation; for Chares and his mercenaries were refused entry into the harbour, so unpleasant was their reputation. Instead, they took up a position opposite Byzantium on the east side of the entry to the Bosporus. The Byzantine fleet defeated the Macedonian fleet and drove it into the Black Sea, where it found a friendly harbour.[6] Other allies – Chios, Cos, and Rhodes among them – sent warships. Meanwhile at Athens a second fleet was being equipped on the initiative of Demosthenes, who was Minister of the Navy and managed to carry a reform of the Trierarchic system. It sailed with Phocion, who took over the command from Chares and was welcomed into the city, in the course of the winter. Persian aid was indirect; for Artaxerxes sent a raiding force into Thrace.[7] Philip was not to be outdone in that respect: 'with his bravest men' he ravaged the Chersonese and stormed a few towns.[8]

Late in the winter a night-attack during a rainstorm at Byzantium might have brought success but for the barking of dogs which alerted the defenders. So with the spring Philip decided to abandon all three sieges. He may have been alarmed by the rallying of the maritime city-states in support of Byzantium, as Diodorus stated;[9] for he did not want to create a situation in which the Persian fleet would have the support of Aegean islanders. He was therefore prepared to suffer a loss of personal prestige at home and elsewhere for failing to achieve his aim. But the demonstration of his power in attacking three cities at the same time was not in vain; for no single city, not even Athens, if cut off from the sea, could hope in future to survive an assault by the Macedonian army.

The extrication of the Macedonian fleet from the Black Sea had to be managed first. Philip wrote a letter saying that Thrace was in revolt and his garrisons there were isolated, and he addressed it to Antipater with an order to follow him into the interior. He arranged that the letter should

fall into the hands of the Athenians. They were deceived and withdrew their fleet, whereupon the Macedonian ships slipped through the Bosporus and escaped to Aegean waters. It seems that he had other ships at Byzantium or Perinthus which escaped through the Hellespont, while the Byzantine, Rhodian and Chian ships stationed there were off their guard. That happened during a period of long-drawn-out negotiation which Philip initiated with Byzantium. In the course of it Philip returned some captured warships, and this encouraged the Byzantines, Rhodians and Chians to relax their guard.[10] He did make peace with Byzantium and her allies excepting Athens; for it was in the interest of both sides that trade should be resumed with the hinterland which Philip controlled and that shipping should receive reasonable terms for calling at Byzantium and other ports. The war with Athens continued at sea. For Phocion freed some cities which Philip had garrisoned (probably on the Aegean coast of Thrace), captured some Macedonian warships, and made landings on Macedonian territory to carry off booty, until he himself was wounded and sailed home. Athens was recognised as their saviour by the Byzantines, the Perinthians and the cleruchs, who presented the city with crowns. Meanwhile Philip, having sent for Alexander, was campaigning in northernmost Thrace.[11]

2. The Scythian campaign and the Macedonian Empire in the Balkans

While Philip was engaged on the coast of eastern Thrace, his deputies carried out operations inland. 'When Philip was making an expedition against the Byzantines, Alexander though only sixteen years old, being left in charge of affairs and of the seal-ring in Macedonia, subjugated those of the Maedi who were in revolt and on capturing their city drove out the barbarians, settled it with mixed peoples and named it Alexandropolis' (Plu. *Alex.* 9. 1). Since Alexander was born in late summer 356, he was in his sixteenth year from 341 to 340, so that his action against the Maedi happened probably in summer 340 when Philip was entering the Chersonese in the first stage of what the Athenians called the war against Byzantium. Two years later, when Alexander entered his eighteenth year, he joined his father for the campaign against Atheas (Just. 9. 1. 8), which therefore took place in late summer 339.[12] Since the Maedi controlled the route up the Strymon valley, Alexander's success there was of great importance. It was achieved evidently by the forces which Philip had left in Macedonia. While Byzantium was under siege, Antipater and Parmenio were active against the Tetrachoritae, and Antipater stormed their city 'Angissus'. If the name was a corruption or variant of 'Argisce', also written as 'Ergisce',[13] we should see here another revolt; for it was one of the cities which Philip had captured in 346. Such revolts were not surprising. What was significant was that Macedonia had enough troops to cope simultane-

ously with the campaign against Byzantium and with revolts in Thrace, and to maintain an army at home.

If Philip was to keep control of Thrace, it was essential to prevent any interference by outside powers. According to Greek writers one reason for Philip's campaign against Perinthus and Byzantium was to deny to the Athenians the control of these harbours, from which they could conduct war against him. Now that he had agreements with these cities, he turned to another danger spot, the Dobruja from which there was easy entry for the Scythian cavalry into the central Thracian plain. We have already described the negotiations between Philip and Atheas, the Scythian king in control of the Dobruja (p. 124 above). Philip sent envoys ahead to tell Atheas that during the siege of Byzantium he had vowed to dedicate a statue to Heracles at the mouth of the Danube, and that coming now as a friend to the Scythians he asked to discharge in peace his religious obligation. Atheas, a ninety-year-old veteran, was not to be duped. 'Let Philip send the statue,' he replied, 'and it will not only be set up but be safeguarded on my word of honour. I shall not permit an army to enter my territory. Should a statue be set up against the will of the Scythians, I shall remove it on Philip's departure and convert the bronze of the statue into arrow-heads.'[14]

Philip entered the Dobruja and a great battle ensued. Arrow-heads were the chief weapon of the Scythians; for they excelled as mounted archers in the tactic of withdrawing, doubling back and riding fast in a circle round their enemy, while their arrows were finding their mark. Philip overcame this tactic probably by holding back his finest cavalry and then breaking the Scythian circle with its charge. This may be inferred from a strategem misrepresented by Frontinus, and from the fact that Alexander employed the same manoeuvre against the Scythians in 329. Atheas was killed, and the Scythians were routed and driven back across the Danube. Philip rounded up 20,000 women and children and 20,000 thoroughbred mares, and carried them off as booty. He presumably gave the land to his friends, the Getae and the Histriani. It is probable that he enforced the fulfilment of what Atheas had originally promised: the taking of his daughter in marriage and therewith the inheritance of Atheas' kingdom, not only south of the Danube but also the lands towards the Sea of Azov. For this would explain the title of Zopyrion 'praefectus Ponti' and his campaign 'in Scythia' with an army 30,000 strong in 330.[15]

When Philip was returning with his booty up the valley of the Danube through the territory of the Getae, he decided to go through the territory of the Triballi (probably via Pleven) and demanded a free passage from them. They were a particularly formidable group of tribes which had raided Macedonia in the past. Philip's request was tantamount to a recognition of his superiority. The Triballi countered with a demand for a portion of the booty as a price for the passage. Battle followed. During a pursuit Philip was wounded in the thigh by the lance (*sarissa*) of one of his own

men; it killed his horse under him. In the ensuing confusion the booty (or much of it) was lost, but the army returned, apparently unimpaired, to Macedonia in autumn 339.[16]

The area conquered by Philip was the first large land-empire in the history of Europe. It was an empire in that it was won by force of arms and governed without representation of its subjects, and it was a Macedonian empire in that tribute, consisting of one-tenth of produce, was paid annually to 'the Makedones', who as *hegemones* demanded personal service and obedience of their subjects, whether as labourers or soldiers. Philip as head of the Macedonian state could dispose of the spear-won land as he and the Makedones thought fit. It was a liberal form of empire. The tribes and the towns of the native peoples were left to govern themselves (whether monarchically or democratically), practise their own religions, laws and customs, speak their own language, train their own troops, and raise their own taxes. Thereby they retained their self-respect and identity. There were some favoured communities. The Agrianes, for instance, negotiated by embassy with Macedonia, and an intermarriage between the Agrianian and Macedonian royal houses (unusually the bride was to be Macedonian) was planned. The Getae whom Cothelas ruled were treated as allies, united by the intermarriage of the royal houses. The Dardanians were treated in a similar manner after their defeat in 358. But most peoples were direct subjects. Whichever category they were in, they had to keep the peace and to accept the foreign policy of Macedonia.

The status of the Greek city-states which were situated on the Illyrian and Thracian coasts varied, at least in theory. Those which had joined Philip willingly were free allies and negotiated with Macedonia by embassy. Because they faced dangerous enemies, whether these were their native neighbours or the Athenians, they might be protected by Macedonian garrisons without any loss of freedom. Aenus near the mouth of the Hebrus was a good example. On breaking away from the Athenian Alliance, it received a Macedonian garrison as an ally of Macedonia in 340, and it joined the Hellenic League as an independent state in 337. Cardia, too, accepted a garrison as a free ally. Other allies, e.g. Apollonia on the Black Sea, did not invoke a Macedonian garrison, as far as we know. It is possible that some Greek city-states were reduced initially by force or rebelled later, and if so they would have been made subject to Macedonian rule; but our sources of information do not provide an example. The generalisation of Diodorus, that 'the Greek city-states, being freed from their fears (of the native peoples), were enrolled most eagerly in the alliance of Philip', may not have had any exceptions in 343/2. They must have known at the time that in practice they would be obliged to follow the foreign policy of Macedonia, as Philip later indicated in the case of Cardia.[17]

The long pursuits of the Dardanian, Illyrian and Scythian cavalry by the Macedonian cavalry reveal that the aim of Philip in his battles was to

kill as many of the ruling class as possible and to force the rest to recognise Macedonian superiority in arms and to accept Macedonian control. The men of these ruling classes were, like the Makedones, trained for war; and because they had a similar sense of values, they had no difficulty in serving as soldiers in the Macedonian forces, whether against Perinthus or later in Asia, where they were brigaded in national units under Macedonian command. At the same time the tribes and towns continued to have their own militia for the maintenance of law and order, and for the defence of their territory against raiders. It was from these militia that Philip and Alexander recruited regular Balkan troops on a considerable scale; for Alexander crossed to Asia with 500 (later 1,000) Agrianians and 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians, and we hear of one reinforcement which included 600 Thracian cavalry and 3,500 Thracian infantry.[18]

Philip's intention was to establish peace within the empire, raise the status of 'the tillers of the soil' (see p. 123 above), and create a prosperity which would satisfy the great bulk of the population. One index of prosperity was 'an abundance of coinage' according to Aristotle, who was at Philip's court from 342 onwards. The king's own coinage was by then the strongest in Europe (p. 114 above). In addition coinages of silver tetradrachms and lesser denominations were issued within the kingdom by the Paeonian king, Philippi and Damastium. The last of these circulated mainly northwards and westwards, and on the Adriatic coast it dominated the market; for example, a hoard of 300 coins at Kotor (in the territory of the Ardiaei) consisted of 200 tetradrachms of Damastium and its neighbouring mints and 100 staters of Corinth and her colonies for the period c. 360-330. The defeated kings of Dardania and Thrace lost the right to coin. But two mining towns in Dardanian territory – Daparria and Pelagia – continued to issue fine silver coinages in the style of Damastium, and two new mints appeared in the area at that time. A few of the allied city-states on the coasts continued to coin – Epidamnus and Apollonia in the west, and Abdera and Aenus on the Aegean coast. When the latter pair ceased coining, it was probably because Macedonian currency was much stronger. Bronze coinage was indicative of trends in local trade. For instance in excavations at Istrus on the Black Sea coast Philip's bronze coins numbered 116, as compared with 54 of Alexander and 4 of Lysimachus; even when we allow for posthumous issues of Philip's popular coinage, it is apparent that under the regime of Philip trade boomed in the lower Danube valley and the northwestern part of the Black Sea.[19]

'By founding noteworthy cities in strategic regions Philip stopped the Thracians from committing further outrage' (Diod. 16. 71. 2). We may include among them Alexandropolis; for in his sixteenth year Alexander must have followed the example of his father. As strategic regions we may cite the middle Strymon valley for Alexandropolis, the junction of the main roads in the great plain for Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), and a northern entry into the plain for Cabyle (near Radnevo). The Thracians were

road-builders, and Philip will have developed the road-system for purposes of trade as well as military movement. His new cities – we know the names only of half-a-dozen in Thrace but there will have been more – occupied important positions on the road-system. When Alexandropolis was founded, the native Maedi who had revolted were expelled from the place, and a new population was planted there. Something similar was done at Cabyle, Drongilus, Masteira and other places 'which he is now destroying (*exairei*) and reorganising' ([D.] 8. 44). The people of these new cities were 'mixed' (at Alexandropolis), i. e. Macedonian, other Greek and Thracian; and it was the middle group which Theopompus described as rogues to the number of 2,000 at Poneropolis, as he called Philippopolis. Alexander founded similar mixed cities in Asia; and in one case the numbers of settlers were 7,000 natives, 3,000 camp-personnel and any volunteers from the (Greek) mercenaries. It is probable that the example for Alexander had been set by Philip. The military purpose of these new cities was recorded by Diodorus. It was also a purpose of Alexander, according to Curtius, that the settlers in his new cities should be supporters of his regime, and that thus he would be able to hold down Asia with a modest army.[20]

Philip had the same need as Alexander; for Philip did not have the manpower to provide a large Macedonian army of occupation in the Balkans. The new cities were to be more than military in character. In them the official language was Greek, and the institutions were Greek, so that the native element in the population came under the influence of Greek culture. They were able to develope trade and agriculture in the manner of fourth-century Greece, undertake land-reclamation as in Macedonia, and set an example to native towns and native peoples. Thus Philip was deliberately fostering Hellenisation in cultural and economic forms, which he hoped would lead to peace and prosperity in the Balkan empire. His emphasis was on coexistence and cooperation, not on imperial domination and suppression.

3. The Fourth Sacred War and the appointment of Philip as commander

Since 346 Philip had done little which might alarm the city-states of the mainland apart from Athens. The Peloponnesians acted almost as if he did not exist. Argos, for instance, sent 3,000 citizen troops to serve with Artaxerxes for the invasion of Egypt in winter 343/2. Archidamus set off from Sparta with some citizen troops to recruit mercenaries in Crete and help her colony Tarentum in a war against the Italian tribes; he was away from home from late 343 until 338, when he fell in battle. No Peloponnesian state, not even Corinth, supported Athens in the war against Philip from October 340 onwards, partly because the Peloponnesians regarded it as a local war in the Hellespont and Philip had appropriated only those cornships which were bound for Athens. Nor did Athens' allies in Euboea give

any help. The city-states which did rally to the assistance of Athens were only maritime states in the eastern Aegean. Their interests lay in the Hellespont, and there was no expectation that they would participate in any war against Philip on the mainland.

Demosthenes had pinned his hopes on Persia. He and other leaders had received personal subsidies from Artaxerxes, and it was Persia, not Athens, which sent help at a critical time to Perinthus and raided a part of Thrace. The Athenian commander, Chares, was in conference with the Persian generals when Philip seized the Athenian cornships in October 340; but his deliberations did not lead to any help from Persia for Byzantium, or to any alliance between Persia and Athens. It was evident that Artaxerxes was guided by self-interest, not by any affection for Athens, and that that self-interest would not extend to the armed intervention on the Greek mainland, which Demosthenes had thought would in combination with Athens 'easily overwhelm the power of Philip' ([D.] 11. 6). Money for the hiring of mercenaries was the most that might be obtained from Persia.

The situation in Central Greece was unstable from the Athenian point of view. The leaders in Megara, the foundress of Byzantium, and in the Euboean federation could be counted on not to join Philip, but they owed their position to Athenian interventions during party-strife (*stasis*) and would not necessarily carry their communities with them in the event of war. Acarnania was a faithful ally of Athens, but her more powerful neighbour, Aetolia, was firmly on the side of Philip, who had promised to liberate Naupactus from the Achaeans and give it to Aetolia. The Western Locrians, having fought alongside the Boeotians in the Sacred War, had no love for Athens as the ally of Phocis. Relations between the Boeotian League and Athens were complicated by age-old border disputes (Oropus, for instance, being in Boeotian hands) and by Athenian support in the past for the separatist states such as Plataea. As recently as 343 Athens had forestalled the Boeotians in intervening in the *stasis* at Megara, and it was probably then that Athens had manned the border fort Panactum which faced Boeotia in case the Boeotians should attack.[21] The Phocians, paying their indemnity from 343 onwards, were powerless, and all the tribal states north of them were firm supporters of Philip in the Delphic Amphictyony.

The choice for Athens was still open. When Philip came to terms with Athens' allies in the Hellespont in early summer 339, he was certainly prepared to negotiate with Athens also; for ever since 348 he had reiterated his desire to be at peace with Athens. Indeed Diodorus mistakenly asserted that he did make peace with her in 339.[22] How was the Athenian People to choose in the meetings of their Assembly? The Athenians of this generation had had little experience of a set battle; some had fought as hoplites at Mantinea in 362, but the last occasion when a large hoplite levy had been engaged was at the river Nemea in 394. Nor did they have personal knowledge of Macedonia and of Macedonian institutions. Inevi-

tably they depended on the orators, whose job it was to muster the information and give advice accordingly. Thus in 349 Demosthenes solemnly told the Assembly. 'Philip's soldiers are no better than any others, as I have heard from one of those who have lived in the very country, a man incapable of telling a lie. If anyone among them has experience of war and battle, he said that Philip pushes them aside out of jealousy.' The weakness of most orators was that they were specialists in oratory and law and not in military matters. For that department they depended on a specialist general, a commander of mercenaries, such as Diopeithes or Chares; and when a pair teamed up each benefited financially, according to Theopompus.[23] A man like Phocion, who was a general of citizen troops and also an effective, if blunt, speaker, was a rarity in Athenian politics.

In 339 the choice was crucial. Demosthenes insisted that Philip aimed to destroy Athens, and that she therefore had no option but to fight for her very existence. Whether he believed it after Philip's withdrawal when Athens was an easy victim in autumn 346 is perhaps beside the point. He had risen to a position of leadership in the Assembly as the denouncer of Philip as the enemy of liberty and of democracy, and he could not change that stance. His rival Aeschines was equally committed to the alternative position, that peace and cooperation with Philip would benefit Athens and might lead to a Common Peace.

Incidents outside the control of Philip and Athens made the choice immediate in 339. During a *stasis* in Amphissa, a city of the Western Locrians, the leaders who were responsible for cultivating part of the Sacred Land of Apollo drove their opponents into exile. These leaders, being partisans of Thebes, proposed in the autumn meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in 340 that Athens should be fined fifty talents for rededicating at Delphi some spoils with the inscription 'from the Medes and the Thebans when they fought against the Greeks'. This proposal was typical of city-state animosities. Amphissa expected to be supported by the Boeotians and others who had fought against Phocis. Aeschines happened to be one of three Pylagori elected at Athens to attend that meeting and put the Athenian point of view, but not with a vote (that was vested in the *hieromnemon* who served for a year). He counter-attacked by accusing the Amphissaean leaders of sacrilege in cultivating Sacred Land and of other impieties. The Councillors and the Delphians descended to the plain and burnt some buildings on the Sacred Land; but then they were attacked by the Amphissaeans and had to run for their lives.[24] An extraordinary meeting of the Council was held that winter. Amphissa being recalcitrant and counting on Boeotian support, the Council declared a Sacred War (the fourth in the series) and appointed Cottyphus, a Thessalian, as commander of the Amphictyonic forces. Amphissa caved in without fighting. The leaders were expelled and the exiles were reinstated at Amphissa. In spring 339 the Council at its regular meeting approved Cottyphus' actions and in addition imposed on Amphissa a fine which had to be paid by the

time of the autumn meeting. This caused another round of revolution at Amphissa. The original pro-Theban leaders returned, expelled some opponents and did not pay the fine.[25] At the autumn meeting the Council appointed Philip to command the Amphictyonic forces and coerce Amphissa.

The whole scenario was reminiscent of the start of the Third Sacred War: the *stasis* destined to continue, the manipulation of the Council for political ends, the recalcitrance of the Amphissaean leaders, and the manoeuvring of members of the Council. Demosthenes, of course, accused Aeschines of having acted in the pay of Philip. Some scholars with the advantage of hindsight have cleared Aeschines of complicity but have seen the Machiavellian hand of Philip from the first beginnings.[26] Yet it is unreasonable to suppose that he had a hand in the *stasis* at Amphissa, supported the anti-Boeotian party on the Council and foresaw the development and finale of the affair. From autumn 340 he was at war with Athens alone of the mainland states and had no wish to encourage other states to join her. In my opinion it was a typical squabble of city-states. The Thessalian group had a majority of votes on the Council and was hostile to the Boeotian League. It therefore carried the declaration of the Sacred War, appointed a Thessalian commander, and imposed the spiteful fine. Had it been paid, the war would have been over before Philip came back from Thrace to Macedonia; and if he had planned the whole affair from the beginning, it would have been a fiasco for him.

This Sacred War, like its predecessor, had political repercussions. The Thessalian group, hostile to Athens for her part in the Third Sacred War, would presumably have supported the proposal to fine Athens fifty talents. Aeschines did well to avert that possibility by his counter-attack. On the advice of Demosthenes Athens opted out of the extraordinary meeting. So too did Thebes. Their abstention had two effects: the Thessalian group was probably unopposed in declaring a Sacred War, and the two states indicated their unwillingness to set up such a war. To that extent Athens and Thebes were drawn together. In summer 339 Thebes acted in a way which put her alliance with Macedonia at risk. Nicaea, the fortress which commanded the Pass of Thermopylae, had been allocated in the Amphictyonic settlement of the Third Sacred War to the Thessalians. In summer 339 the garrison there was one of Macedonians, presumably in agreement with the Thessalians. A superior force of Theban troops ejected the Macedonians and occupied the fortress themselves.[27] That took place before the regular autumn meeting of the Amphictyonic Council at which Philip was appointed to command its forces.

1. West Macedonia and adjacent areas as seen from satellite. The northern lakes are Ochrid, Prespa, Little Prespa and Ostrovo, and the southern lake is Ioannina (see also plate 14).

2. (a) *left* Mount Olympus, the throne of Zeus. (b) *below* The Kresna defile of the River Strymon.



3. A phalanx of pikemen.

4. The cuirass and helmet from Philip's tomb.

5. (a) *above* Coins of Philip. (b) *below* Gold medallion of Philip and of Alexander's triumph, from a hoard near Tarsus.





6. (a) *right* The rape of Persephone by Pluto. (b) *below* Demeter mourning. On inside walls of the Tomb of Amyntas.

7. (a) *above* The tomb of Eurydice. (b) *below* Eurydice's throne.



8. (a) *above* Statue, perhaps of Eurydice, at Aegeae. (b) *below* The façade of Philip's tomb.

9. (a) *above* Ivory heads of Philip and Alexander. (b) *below* Five ivory heads from Philip's tomb.



10. (a) *top* Gold larnax; (b) *centre* gold diadem; (c) *left and above* silver-gilt diadem and head of Silenus, all from Philip's tomb.

11. (a) *left* Gold quiver-cover; (b) *below* gilded pectoral, both from Philip's tomb.

12. (a) *above* Silver vessels from Philip's tomb. (b) *below* Silver strainer from near Dium.

13. (a) *left* The Derveni crater; (b) *below* detail, showing a seated maenad.



14. The northwestern area, as seen from satellite. The northern lakes are Ochrid and Prespa (see also plate 1).

15. (a) *above* Head, probably of Philip, on the base of a Hellenistic vase. (b) *facing page* The Copenhagen head, probably of Philip.


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

16. Ivory head of Philip from his tomb.

CHAPTER XIV

Events leading to Philip's victory at Chaeronea

1. Negotiations ending in alliance between Thebes and Athens

When Philip reached Pella in early autumn 339, he had to consider three separate wars. The war against Persia, which had broken its treaty of 'alliance and friendship' with Macedonia in helping Perinthus and raiding Thrace, would now be quiescent, because the sailing season was drawing to an end; but there was the possibility of Persian gold reaching Philip's enemies. The war against Athens would not lead to further raids on the Macedonian coast, because sailing conditions were becoming adverse, and the initiative on land would lie with him. The diplomatic situation was that he could count on his allies in Central Greece, especially the Thessalians, to support him against Athens. But it was uncertain how many mainland states might help Athens if he should invade Attica. Corinth and Megara would probably do so, because they had sided with Athens in defence of their colonies (Byzantium and Ambracia); and the Euboean confederacy might do so if it had direct access to Attica. The doubtful quantity was Boeotia, his 'friend and ally' by treaty[1] but acting like an enemy at Nicaea, and on the other hand not on friendly terms with Athens. Most of the Peloponnesian states had alliances both with him and with Athens, and they were unlikely to intervene on either side, with the exception of Achaea, which had sided with Athens in the Third Sacred War and was hostile to him, because he had promised to deprive Achaea of Naupactus and to restore it to Aetolia.

The third war was that of the Amphictyony against Amphissa; for his Macedonian deputies (Theodorus and Cleander) on the Council had voted, we may be sure, with the Thessalian group in declaring the Sacred War in the winter of 340-339. The failure of Cottyphus as commander of the Amphictyonic forces to take any decisive action against a state as small as Amphissa may have been due to his fear of opposition by Boeotia and Athens, which had not attended the Council meeting and might join Amphissa. At the same time he was certainly in touch with Philip, and he may have been advised by Philip to use delaying tactics and let Amphissa continue its resistance.[2] In any case the result of the failure was the

appointment of Philip to the command. In accepting it Philip faced the same possibility as Cottyphus had done. Both he himself and the Macedonian Assembly had their representatives (*proxenoi*, sometimes translated as 'consuls') in Boeotia and especially in its leading city-state, Thebes, and he will have received from them information about the feelings of the Thebans towards Amphissa, Athens and himself.

'As soon as Philip convalesced from his wound', he led an army south. It included troops from the Thessalians, Aenianians, Dolopians and Phthiotians as well as from the Aetolians; for envoys from these peoples later accompanied Philip's envoys to Thebes. Since the first four peoples were members of the Amphictyony, the recruitment of them suggested that Philip was about to act in the Amphictyonic War and march against Amphissa. Aetolia was not a member of the Amphictyony; but being traditionally hostile to the Western Locrians and hoping to acquire Naupactus it had good reason to join the Amphictyonic forces. The Aetolian troops presumably joined Philip's army at or near Lamia. From there Philip chose not to enter the Pass of Thermopylae but to ascend between Mt Oeta and Mt Callidromus to the high canton of Doris which lay on the direct route to Amphissa. The people of Doris, being members of the Amphictyony, were on his side. Philip posted a detachment at their city Cytinium, some ten kilometres north of the Gravia Pass which led south towards Amphissa. He then marched eastwards into Phocis, which was defenceless and disarmed (see p. 93 above). He descended the wide Cephissus valley and halted at Elatea. There, on the east side of the valley, he was on the main road which linked Nicaea to Thebes, and which ran on through Thebes to Athens. A march of two or three days would take him to Athens.[3]

That Philip had turned aside into Phocis seems to have been a surprise to Thebes and to Athens. They had not defined their own position in the Amphictyonic War, nor had they entered into negotiations with one another, although Aristophon and Eubulus had been urging the Assembly to seek an alliance with Thebes.[4] Disagreements had been too strong. They arose from the hatreds of the Third Sacred War, Athens' support of the separatist states within Boeotia, and traditional frontier-disputes. Neither the Boeotian League nor Athens had conscripted their forces. At Athens 'it was evening when the news came to the sub-committee of the Council that Elatea had been occupied ... the city was thrown into confusion ... at daybreak the People assembled and at first no one came forward to speak.' Then Demosthenes proposed that envoys be sent at once, without waiting for representatives of Athens' allies, to seek the alliance of Thebes.

Why did Philip halt at Elatea instead of entering Boeotia – his ally and not yet mobilised – and from there entering Attica, where the levy had not yet been called up? His Amphictyonic army was large and powerful, especially in cavalry. It could have immediately overrun Boeotia, bypassed Thebes in the unlikely event that the Thebans chose to resist,

ravaged Attica and driven the Athenians into their walled city, where they would be cut off from any help.[5] Such a *Blitzkrieg* would surely have succeeded but only through a breach of his alliance with Boeotia and by making reconciliation with Athens impossible. He preferred a diplomatic approach. If he could persuade the Boeotians to honour their alliance with himself, or at least to stay neutral in the Amphictyonic War, he would isolate Athens and perhaps persuade her to treat for peace.

Accordingly, he sent his envoys from Elatea to Thebes as the leading city of the Boeotian League. They were two Macedonians, two Thessalians, and representatives of the Aenianes, Dolopes, Phthiotai and the Aetolians, all except the last being members of the Amphictyony. They conveyed the demand that Nicaea be restored to the Locrians 'in accordance with the resolution of the Amphictyons'. The Boeotians replied that they would send an embassy to negotiate. Next the envoys requested that the Boeotians should either join in invading Attica and have for themselves the booty in livestock, slaves and property, or else give his army free passage to the frontier of Attica. One of their arguments was that, had they been asked, the Boeotians would have given free passage in 346, and that they should do so now in the Fourth Sacred War.[6] For, although our chief source of information, Demosthenes, did not mention it, Philip evidently presented the war with Athens as 'The Sacred War'; for Athens to be at war with Philip was to be at war with the Amphictyony. The point was made later by Aeschines, when he claimed that Demosthenes had been in the pay of Amphissa and 'committed sacrilege against the shrine at Delphi'.[7]

Philip's envoys were asked to speak first, since Macedonia and Boeotia were in alliance. The Athenian envoys, led by Demosthenes, spoke next. They brought offers which had been voted already by the Athenian Assembly. If the Boeotians would join Athens against Macedonia, Athens would help 'the Boeotians in Thebes against any city which might revolt from Thebes'; the command by land would be held by Thebes, and the command by sea would be shared but with the cost falling on Athens alone; and of the expenses of the war on land two-thirds would be borne by Athens and one third by Thebes. The full Athenian levy was ready at Eleusis to enter and defend Boeotia. These offers, later decried by Aeschines, were in the interest of Athens if they led to Boeotia and not Attica bearing the brunt of the Macedonian onslaught.[8]

The choice for Thebes in 339 was not unlike the choice which Olynthus had faced in 349. To break an alliance at the eleventh hour was to invite in the event of defeat horrendous consequences not only from Macedonia, as Olynthus had found, but also from the Amphictyony, whose decisions were being flouted by one of its members. On the other hand, to accept Philip's request was to recognise his hegemony in the conduct of the Amphictyony, whether Thebes stayed neutral and granted free passage or joined Philip in invading Attica. Thebes, leading the Boeotian League on the same path, chose to act as an independent city-state, ambitious to

impose control over the separatist cities in Boeotia and to regain the military hegemony she had enjoyed in the days of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Despite its losses in the Third Sacred War the Boeotian army was still the strongest in Greece, confident in past victories and hardened by constant training. With the support of the armies of Athens and her allies it believed it could win the day. The requests of Philip were rejected. Those of Athens were accepted *in toto*. The new allies sent envoys far and wide to win support on the grounds that Philip was aiming to destroy the liberty not only of Boeotia and Athens but of all Greece. In Letters which Philip despatched to allied states of the Peloponnese he claimed to be acting 'in the general interest and as the Amphictyons resolved'.[9] In other words his aim was not conquest but the achievement of a Common Peace which he and the Amphictyony had sought to promote in and since 346 and which they were still pursuing.

For Boeotia and Athens the response to their appeal was most disappointing. Megara and Corinth confirmed their support, but although the route through the Isthmus was thereby safe the only Peloponnesian state which promised help was Achaea. The strongest military states at the time were Argos and Arcadia. Argos had had close ties with the Macedonian royal house. It was said later that Arcadia had held back through fear of Sparta; but that was unlikely since Archidamus and his Spartan troops were then operating in Italy. There were other reasons, such as distrust of Boeotia and Athens from past experience, and even a belief in the declared aim of Philip and the Amphictyons. From Philip's point of view the neutrality of the Peloponnesian states, apart from Achaea, was all he could expect; for if any had wished to join him, they were cut off by his enemies' control of the Isthmus and much of the Corinthian Gulf. Before any blood was shed in Central Greece, Philip sent heralds to the opposing armies and asked for peace instead of war. They preferred war.[10]

For Philip the negotiations had achieved some of his purposes. He wanted his campaign to be seen not as a continuation of the war between Macedonia and Athens which was concerned with supremacy over one another, but as an Amphictyonic war in which the Amphictyonic forces were defending the sacred lands of Apollo from desecration by Amphissa and indirectly by Amphissa's allies. As commander of the Amphictyonic forces Philip now expressed the desire of the Amphictyonic Council for a peaceful solution. But when the offer of peace was rejected Apollo's rights had to be enforced by war. Demosthenes with his associates Hyperides, Hegesippus and Lycurgus dominated the political arena both at Athens and at Thebes. He had succeeded in transferring the surplus revenues from the Theoric Fund to the Military Fund and in postponing work on naval construction, so that money was available to hire mercenaries for the allied cause. His brilliant oratory swayed both Assemblies. When the god at Delphi prophesied disaster for Boeotia and Athens, Demosthenes proclaimed that the priestess had 'medised' in the past and was 'philippising'

now. It was a war not about Amphictyonic intrigues but about the liberty of the Greeks. Anyone who questioned that was a hireling of Philip and should be cudgelled to death. In such a climate of feeling the offer of peace was rejected by the Boeotian and the Athenian Assemblies.[11]

2. The winter campaign and the strengths of the opposing armies

During the days of negotiation the Boeotian levy and the Athenian levy took up defensive positions on the Boeotian frontier just south of Parapotamii, where the Cephissus flowed through a narrow gap between an outlier of Mt Parnassus on the west and Mt Hedylium on the east, and at two minor passes, one on either side of Parapotamii. The defence of Amphissa was entrusted to a Theban commander, Proxenus, who had at his disposal 10,000 mercenaries, commanded by the Athenian general Chares. Proxenus placed his entire force in the narrow pass of Gravia. That was probably what Philip had wanted when he fortified Cytinium as his base instead of himself occupying the pass. For whereas his own line of defence from Cytinium to Elatea was short and easily supplied, the allied position consisted of two pieces separated by the mass of Mt Parnassus (2522 m) and supplied from Amphissa and Thebes respectively. If one piece should be broken, the other piece would be outflanked.[12]

During the winter both sides engaged in guerrilla warfare in which relatively small forces were engaged. The Boeotians had shown great skill in improvising field defences against Sparta in 378-376, and they had had much experience of guerrilla tactics in 356-346, whereas the Athenians had neither skill nor experience. Now, because the fortifications of the Phocian cities had been dismantled, there was plenty of material available for building strongpoints. Such a one was decribed by Pausanias at Ambrossus in south Phocis. It consisted of two concentric circles of stonewall, each wall being nearly six feet wide and fifteen feet high, the gap between the inner circle and the outer circle being six feet, and the whole designed 'merely for immediate defensive purposes.' The size of the enclosed area was not stated; but it was presumably large enough to serve as a base for a guerrilla group. The Macedonians too were skilled in making field defences, especially with palisades of stakes, and they also used the material of the dismantled cities for their fortifications. The Phocians themselves had no option but to join whichever army was in occupation of their village and try to protect their flocks and property.

From these strongpoints on each side of the Cephissus valley the guerrilla bands went out to ravage and loot. Polyaenus described such an occasion. Philip's band ravaged and burnt crops and buildings in order to draw the Boeotians out of a strategically placed strongpoint.[13] When the Boeotians came down to the plain, Philip doubled back and forced his way past the strongpoint. Demosthenes later boasted of Athenian prowess in

'the first battles, namely the one by the river and the one in the winter', which were evidently minor engagements. 'Athens then was full of pride, rejoicing and thanksgiving', said Demosthenes later; and he himself was awarded a golden crown for his services at the Dionysiac Festival in March 338.

In summer 338, when each side had brought its full strength into the field, Philip arranged for the commanders of the mercenaries at the Gravia Pass to capture the bearer of a dispatch, addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, in which Philip said he was postponing the attack on Amphissa and returning to deal with a rising in Thrace. Simultaneously the Macedonians were seen to be withdrawing from Cytinium. Chares had seen a similar dispatch, which had helped the Macedonian fleet to escape from the Black Sea in 339. Surely Philip would not play the same trick twice; it must be genuine this time. So Chares thought or something similar. He and Proxenus ceased to guard the Pass. A night or two later Philip's troops stormed through the Pass, annihilated the mercenaries, and captured Amphissa, from which he banished those responsible for sacrilege. Advancing westwards he captured Naupactus. It seems that the Achaean garrison capitulated on condition of a free passage across the Gulf to Achaea. On their arrival there the commander and his men were executed. Philip handed Naupactus over to the Aetolians, as he had promised in 341.[14]

The next step was for flying columns to take over southern Phocis, including Delphi, Cirphis and Anticyra, and to make it clear that they could enter and ravage the central Boeotian plain. This threat to their rear caused the allies to withdraw some five miles southwards from Parapotamii to a new defensive position on the narrow plain between the Acropolis of Chaeronea and the Cephissus, flowing close to Mt Akontion. Thereupon Philip concentrated all his forces and moved forward from Elatea to Parapotamii. The scene was set for a decisive battle. But before that could happen Philip sent envoys to both Thebes and Athens and proposed the terms of a peaceful settlement. Some of the Boeotarchs (they commanded the Boeotian forces) and Phocion in Athens advised acceptance, but Demosthenes would have none of it, called the Boeotarchs 'betrayers of the Greeks', and threatened to arrest any Athenian advocating peace. Once again the voice of Demosthenes prevailed against the advice of commanders with military experience. Both Assemblies rejected the proposal.[15]

The allied infantry probably totalled some 35,000 men, of whom on the highest estimate 30,000 were hoplites. The most experienced and respected were the Boeotian hoplites, some 12,000 in number, and they included a corps d'élite of 300 men, the Sacred Band. The Athenian hoplites, serving up to the age of fifty, were about 10,000, and Athens probably provided 2,000 or so mercenaries, serving as a separate unit. The Achaean hoplites were perhaps 2,000 as in 352. Corinth and Megara, though not mentioned in the accounts of the battle, may each have

contributed 2,000 hoplites. The 5,000 or more light-armed infantry were mostly Boeotian, Locrian and Phocian. Cavalry, mainly from Boeotia and Athens, may have been some 2,000.[16] Other states were in alliance with Athens – Corcyra and Leucas (colonies of Corinth), Acarnania and Euboea – but they did not have access to Boeotia; thus only small numbers of their citizens may have been in the allied forces. Justin said that 'when the battle was joined, the Athenians (i.e. the allies) were far superior in number of soldiers' to their opponents. On the other hand Diodorus reported that Philip had the advantage in numbers. Who is to be believed? On my analysis the source of Diodorus for the battle was Diyllus of Athens, writing in the first quarter of the third century. He wanted to justify Athens. Thus he attributed the supreme command to Athens, and he attributed her defeat to a lack of worthwhile generals (16. 85. 7 and 86. 2). The ultimate source of Justin was Theopompus, a competent contemporary historian, who praised the courage of the Athenians but saw that the Macedonians' victory was due to their 'valour hardened by continuous campaigning' (9. 3. 9). Justin's report of numbers is therefore to be accepted.

Figures for Philip's army at Chaeronea were given only by Diodorus, namely 2,000 cavalry and more than 30,000 infantry. The strength of the Macedonian army in Philip's last years was given by Diodorus as 'more than 30,000 infantry and no less than 3,000 cavalry, all experienced in danger on Philip's campaigns and undefeated in almost all their battles' (17. 9. 3). Figures of this order were given for actions at Perinthus and Thebes and for the start of Alexander's campaign in Asia, the ultimate sources being Ephorus, Cleitarchus and Ptolemy. The difference at Chaeronea is 2,000 cavalry, which may be accepted as particular to that battle. Of the 30,000 infantry the pikeman-phalanx of Macedonians accounted for 24,000. The remaining 6,000 infantry at Chaeronea were specialised infantry who protected the flanks of the phalanx, and light-armed infantry of whom a part were drawn from the Thessalians, Aenianes, Dolopes, and Phthiotae. We conclude that Philip did not employ Thessalian hoplites (they could not be placed in a pikeman-phalanx), and made only slight, if any, use of Thessalian cavalry.[17]

The quality of the allied contingents was variable. The Boeotians were as battle-hardened as the Macedonians, and they had had an unrivalled record under Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Their equipment was that of the hoplite – helmet, cuirass, greaves and large shield, all of bronze, and a seven-foot spear wielded by one hand – and they fought in a solid phalanx, eight men deep. Each man needed a space of one metre, within which to carry his shield (see p. 18 above). Their armament was heavy, and the Thebans were expert in using their weight to push through and over an enemy hoplite-line; for instance at Coronea in 394 the Thebans 'locking their shields together pushed, fought, killed and were killed'.[18] To this end they sometimes fought in a deeper formation, of twenty-five or even fifty men. The Boeotians will have learnt from the Phocians the nature of the

pikeman-phalanx, but they had not fought against it. They hoped perhaps to bring their superior weight to bear in a set battle. Of the Athenian hoplites some had fought in 362 at Mantinea and in 348 in Euboea, but most had had no experience of battle. They and the other allies had never faced a pikeman-phalanx. The mercenaries may have done so. The allied cavalrymen wore defensive armour, hurled javelins and wielded a spear, held at its centre, at close quarters against enemy cavalry or light-armed infantry. They could not attack an infantry phalanx except on an unprotected flank or from the rear.

The Macedonian infantry were highly professional. Regular training, strict discipline and close cooperation were essential for the men of the pikeman-phalanx. The long pike, counterweighted by its iron butt and held with both hands (see p. 19 and Fig. 2 above), was a more powerful weapon than a hoplite spear; moreover, in phalanx formation four or five pike-points faced the front-rank man of a hoplite phalanx, and in addition the pikemen, wearing a small shield, could contract their order and so pack more pike-points and bodies into a given space. In order to compensate for their lighter body-armour the pikemen probably fought ten deep at Chaeronea. Each unit of infantry had its own identity. The King's Guard of 500 'pezhetairoi' was recruited only from the Macedonians of the old kingdom, and they were always in close attendance on the King. On some occasions the King addressed them in their 'Macedonian dialect'. The King's Hypaspist Guard, 1,000 strong, was recruited from the Macedonians generally (i.e. including the Upper Macedonians) and spoke standard Greek (*koine*). Their barracks were within bugle call of the King's palace or head-quarters.[19] They were the élite unit of the Hypaspists, who were brigaded in two other units, each of 1,000 men. The rest of the pikemen formed 14 brigades, each 1,500 strong; and of these half were drawn from the old kingdom and half from Upper Macedonia, their titles being respectively 'pezhetairoi' and 'asthetairoi'. Each brigade of 'pezhetairoi' was named after its commanding officer, and each brigade of 'asthetairoi' after its canton, e.g. Tymphaea or Orestis.[20] There was intense rivalry between the units in drill and battle-honours.

The Macedonian Companion Cavalryman was trained to use the counterweighted lance, which enabled him to strike an Athenian cavalryman, for instance, before he could wield his spear. The King was protected by seven senior cavalrymen, called 'Somatophylakes' ('Bodyguards'), and in battle, if he was mounted, he commanded the Royal Squadron of 300 picked men. The rest of the Companion Cavalry, brigaded in squadrons of 200 men, may have numbered 2,800 at full strength. Each squadron was named after the locality from which it was recruited (e.g. 'from Amphipolis'). The bulk came from the southern part of the kingdom. One or more squadrons which were recruited from Upper Macedonia were called 'asthippoi', corresponding to the infantry 'asthetairoi' and indicating that they were from the towns (*astea*) of Upper Macedonia.[21] Each Squadron

was trained to charge in wedge-formation against enemy cavalry. When protecting the flanks of a marching phalanx, the cavalrymen rode at walking pace and kept in line.

All these troops were 'Companions' of the King. On enrolment into 'The King's Forces' each man took an oath of allegiance to the King as his Commander. Moreover, they and those who had served their time were the holders of the Macedonian citizenship and formed the Macedonian Assembly.[22] Thus they enjoyed both military prestige and political power. Philip raised light-armed cavalry ('Paeonian', 'Thracian' and 'Lancers') and light-armed infantry from his subjects within the kingdom; but they were neither part of the King's Forces nor holders of Macedonian citizenship. They had their own *esprit de corps*. Thus a Paeonian cavalryman figured on the coinage of a Paeonian king. There is no doubt that they too were trained to a high standard, and they were augmented by units of specialised mercenaries such as Cretan archers.[23]

3. The Battle of Chaeronea

My reconnaissance of the battlefield in 1937 led me to the conclusion that the stream 'Haemon' which according to Plutarch, a native of Chaeronea, flowed with the blood of the slain, i.e. of the Athenians killed on the left wing of the phalanx, is to be identified with the stream of Lykuressi. It was in the valley of this stream that the allies had their base camp (Plu. *Demosth.* 19. 2). My identification, though differing from those of most earlier scholars, has been supported by Pritchett, Ellis, Griffith and others, and it is assumed here to be correct.[24] The other fixed point is 'the mass-burial (*polyandrion*) of the Macedonians', which Plutarch described as being 'not far away from ... the oak of Alexander by the Cephissus, by which he pitched his tent' before he attacked the Sacred Band of the Thebans' (Plu. *Alex.* 9. 3). The mound of this mass-burial, twenty-three feet high, was identified and excavated by Soteriades. The dead had been cremated, and in the ashes were pottery of the fourth century, two Macedonian bronze coins and long spearheads, evidently of pikes. It presumably marked the spot where many Macedonians had fallen. These two identifications enable us to place the wings of the allied phalanx precisely as they are shown on Fig. 9, the left part of the line being held by the Athenians and the right part by the Boeotians, of whom the right-hand unit was the Sacred Band. I was able also to define the lay-out of the fortified Acropolis of Chaeronea, and to make the obvious deduction that the allied light-armed troops formed a link between the Athenian wing and the stream below the Acropolis.

The allied position was ideal for a defensive battle. The wings of the phalanx rested each on the bank of a perennial watercourse, so that a water-supply was assured. The distance from wing to wing being three kilometres was right for a phalanx of up to 30,000 hoplites, eight men deep,



Fig. 9. The Battle of Chaeronea

with one metre of fighting-space for each man and allowing for a greater depth in the Theban contingent on the far right.[25] The right wing was protected by the deep riverbed, and the left wing by some 5,000 light-armed infantry, whose line reached to the slope below the Acropolis, which was held by a garrison. There was no place in the line for the allied cavalry, the reason being presumably that it was no match for the Macedonian cavalry. Why did the Boeotian commanders-in-chief not choose a shorter line, such as that shown for the Macedonian phalanx on Fig. 9? Having superiority in numbers of phalangites, they wanted to extend the Macedonian phalanx to the maximum and so weaken it, and for that purpose the three-kilometre line seemed ideal. If the shorter line was adopted and the Macedonians were defeated, the Macedonians would be able to retreat in their own formation while receiving some protection from their cavalry. On the other hand, if the allies were defeated, they would be pursued over the plain by

the Macedonian cavalry and suffer heavy losses. The positive reasons for the position which the Boeotians chose were that if the allied phalanx should prove superior it could pivot on its fixed right wing and force the defeated Macedonians back towards the Cephissus. On the other hand, if the phalanx-formation should be broken, the troops of the left and the centre could escape over the Kerata Pass, which was not suitable for a cavalry pursuit, and fight in another defensive position.

To Philip it was obvious that the thinking of the allies was defensive and that their position was designed to be static. The initiative lay with him. He placed his Companion Cavalry on his left wing under the command of Alexander, who was accompanied by the leading officers. 'Keeping the picked men with himself, he commanded the other part (of the line) and he arranged the brigades (of phalangites) individually to suit the present occasion' (Diod. 16. 86. 1). In more technical terms we may say that Philip posted on the extreme right of his phalanx the Royal Guard of Pezhetairoi, and from there to the left the Royal Hypaspist Guard, then the other Hypaspist brigades, and finally the *pezhetairoi* and *asthetairoi* brigades. All units of the phalanx were armed with the pike. Philip was at the head of the Royal Guard of Pezhetairoi. While the left wing of the phalanx was protected by the cavalry, it is possible that Philip posted some light-armed infantry on the left wing between the last phalanx brigade and the cavalry. But the main body of light-armed infantry must have formed the flank-guard on his right wing, thus adding to the length of his line.

We are told by Plutarch that Alexander 'pitched his tent' by an oak tree. From this we infer that for a day or two before the battle Philip encamped his army in its battle formation in the plain. When the enemy stayed stationary in their formation, he moved to the attack at dawn (Diod. 16. 86). The clue to what happened is provided by Polyaenus, who reported in two passages what he considered to be the decisive tactical manoeuvre. I translate them as follows:

> (1) 4. 2. 2. At Chaeronea Philip, being in formation facing the Athenians, gave way and retired.[26] The Athenian commander, Stratocles, shouted out 'We must not stop pressing the enemy hard until we drive them into Macedonia', and he did not slacken the pursuit. Philip, saying 'Athenians do not know how to win', was retiring step by step, keeping his phalanx contracted and being protected inside the weapons (i.e. the pike-points). After a little, on gaining higher ground and after exhorting the troops, he reversed direction, charged powerfully at the Athenians, and by his brilliant fighting won the victory.
>
> (2) 4. 2. 7. At Chaeronea Philip, realising that the Athenians were impetuous and untrained, and that the Macedonians were experienced and trained, extended his formation a lot,[27] quickly loosened the Athenians (i.e. their formation) and made them easy to defeat.

We can now envisage the advance as on Fig. 9. The Macedonian phalanx

advanced not parallel to but at an acute angle in relation to the allied line, the Macedonian right being advanced and the Macedonian left retarded. The whole line, including the Companion Cavalry on the extreme left, advanced at a prearranged speed. The light-armed troops on the Macedonian right drove back the enemy light-armed and moved gradually to their right, as Philip's Royal Guard made contact with the Athenian left and then retreated step by step towards its right rear. As the Athenians advanced impetuously to their left front and kept advancing in pursuit, they forced the allied line to move to its left in order to prevent a gap occurring. Meanwhile the Macedonian phalanx was advancing and moving slightly to its right to keep contact with Philip's troops who were withdrawing in close order. When Philip reached the elevation of the dyke which confined the waters of the Lykuressi stream when it was in flood, he stopped. He had retreated perhaps for half an hour over a distance of some 150 metres, his men protected by the hedge of pike-points. The positions of the two phalanxes are shown on Fig. 9.

The purpose of Philip was twofold: to loosen the phalanx-formation of the Athenians, and by drawing the allied line to its left to create a gap at the point where the Thebans refused to move leftwards, because by so doing they would expose their right flank to the Companion Cavalry. It was into this gap that Alexander charged at the head of the Companion Cavalry (Diod. 16. 86. 3); some of his squadrons swung right to attack the rear of the allied phalanx and break it into parts (ibid. 4), while other squadrons, including Alexander in command of the Royal Squadron swung left and enclosed the Theban right and in particular the Sacred Band. Meanwhile Philip's troops broke the loosened formation of the Athenians and drove the left part of their line back into the Lykuressi valley where 1,000 fell and 2,000 were taken prisoner (Diod. 16. 86. 4-5).[28] As the rest of the allied phalanx broke and fled, Philip halted his army. There was no pursuit. The victory of Philip and the charge by Alexander are shown in Fig. 9. The Sacred Band of 300 men was surrounded. Alexander was said to have led the attack against them (Plu. *Alex.* 9. 2), probably with the pikemen, whose weapons outreached those of the Thebans. Later Philip saw them lying dead, their weapons facing the pikes and mingled one with another. Because they were said to be pairs of lovers, he wept at the sight of such brave and devoted men (Plu. *Pelop.* 18. 3).

CHAPTER XV

The creation of the Greek Community

1. The terms of peace and the assertion of military supremacy

The losses of the Boeotian League and especially of the Theban troops were crippling; for they had been caught between the charging pikeman-phalanx and the Companion Cavalry and they had fought back in vain. The Achaeans too who were evidently next to the Boeotians suffered heavy losses.[1] But the troops to their left escaped almost unscathed over the Kerata Pass, except for the extreme Athenian left which was trapped in the cul de sac of the Lykuressi valley. The Boeotian League and Thebes, despite its very strong defences, had no option but to surrender outright. Athens and Corinth manned their walls and passed resolutions to withstand a siege.

At Athens the general Lysicles was blamed for the disaster. On the accusation of Lycurgus he was condemned to death by the People and was executed; and another general, Stratocles, disappeared from the scene. Charidemus, hailed as a committed enemy of Philip by rowdy promoters of resistance, was appointed to the overall command,[2] and Demosthenes, who had escaped with the main body, continued to sway the Assembly. His chief supporter, Hyperides, made the proposal which was adopted: to evacuate the countryside, arm citizens to the age of sixty, reinstate the disfranchised, grant citizenship to resident aliens, free and arm slaves 'from the silver-mines and from the rest of the countryside' (frs. 31-3, Teubner) and prohibit departure from the city. He claimed later that slaves so freed would have exceeded 150,000.[3] Huge numbers would certainly have been needed to man the antiquated walls of Athens, the two Long Walls to the Peiraeus and the landward wall of the Peiraeus – in all not short of fourteen miles.[4] The chances of Athens withstanding a siege with a hastily-armed force were negligible on any assessment of military strengths. But Demosthenes, Hyperides and their associates had not taken Athens into the campaign which ended at Chaeronea on any such assessment, nor did they pay heed to any now. Demosthenes trusted in 'good luck', the motto on his shield,[5] and encouraged the Assembly to trust in that too. He claimed that the alternative to success was total destruction. Help was sought from Troezen, Epidaurus and nearby islands.

Demosthenes, having been appointed corn-commissioner, sailed off into the Aegean to oversee the provision of supplies.

While such feverish preparations were made, Philip did not move his army out of Boeotia. Since the battle had started at daylight and the fighting must have ended by 9 am, there being no pursuit, Philip had time that day to make arrangements for the dead. His Macedonians together with their weapons were cremated and a mound was raised over the ashes and the funerary offerings. The army paraded in honour of the dead. It was probably at the end of this parade that Philip sacrificed to the gods in thanksgiving for the victory and rewarded those who had shown conspicuous courage. The respect which Philip showed for the Sacred Band of Thebans (p. 154 above) has been confirmed by the excavation of 254 skeletons, laid out in seven rows; for this cheaper form of burial shows that the dead were not Macedonians, the number of skeletons is not widely short of the Sacred Band's 300 men, and Pausanias preserved the tradition that the Lion Monument above the mound was in honour of 'Thebans' and their courage.[6] This tribute by Philip disproves an Athenian version that Philip, drunk with joy and with wine, revelled among the corpses and recited a metrical refrain 'Demosthenes Demosthenous Paianieus tad eipen', making a mockery of Demosthenes as the proposer of innumerable decrees.

No more credence should be accorded to a story which Diodorus reported not as fact but as 'some say' and 'they say' (16. 87. 1 and 2). In this story Philip and his Friends in their drunken revel walked through the bands of captives and mocked them outrageously. But an Athenian captive, the orator Demades, rebuked Philip for behaving like Thersites, brought him to his senses, and 'by his Attic graces' persuaded him to liberate the Athenian prisoners without ransom. The theme of a drunken barbaric despot being sobered up by a persuasive, sophisticated city-state Greek was a commonplace of the time. We shall see other examples in the accounts of Philip's dealings with his son (pp. 172 and 174 below), accounts which derived probably from Satyrus, *Life of Philip*. There is more truth in the statement of Justin, that Philip did not indulge in any celebrations at all, 'so that no one should think of him as victor' (9. 4. 1-3).[7]

Philip treated Thebes as a treacherous ally, which had broken the religious oaths of the treaty. Prisoners of war and even the corpses of the fallen (apart from those of the Sacred Band) had to be ransomed, exiles were reinstated, previous leaders were executed or banished, and trials were held by a panel of the restored exiles. The survivors of Plataea, Orchomenus and Thespiae, which Thebes had destroyed, were recalled, and the Boeotian League undertook to help them rebuild their cities. Political changes followed within both the League and Thebes, whereby the League members escaped from domination by Thebes and the democratic constitution of Thebes was replaced by an oligarchic Council of Three Hundred. Finally, Philip ordered Thebes to surrender its frontier-town

Oropus to Athens, thus reopening the scar of a long dispute. Later, when his army left Boeotia, a Macedonian garrison stayed in the Cadmea, the acropolis of Thebes.[8]

Philip treated Athens in an entirely different manner. He sent one of the Athenian prisoners, Demades, to Athens to express his friendly intentions. He was indeed reiterating the policy which he had maintained since late in 348. Demades was able to persuade the Assembly that Philip meant what he said, and he, Phocion and Aeschines were sent by the Assembly to open negotiations. Meanwhile Philip had cremated the Athenian dead. His son Alexander, Antipater and Alcimachus, leading an escort of honour, brought the ashes to Athens. Such a tribute to a country defeated in war was unparalleled then and is unparalleled still. All Athenian prisoners of war were freed and sent home. The Macedonian army did not advance into Attica, and there was no interference with Athens' constitutional sytem or political leaders. A treaty was drafted under which the members of the so-called Athenian Alliance were liberated from the obligation to pay contributions to Athens; the cleruchs left the Chersonese and returned to Athens; the cleruchs of Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros and Samos were left in possession of their islands; Delos stayed under the control of Athens; and the Athenian navy continued to be the strongest in Aegean waters.[9]

At Athens, which had been led to expect total destruction, there was immense relief. Phocion, whom the Areopagus Council and the Assembly appointed as general in place of Charidemus, advised acceptance of Philip's 'generosity' (*philanthropia*). 'Lucky you', said Demosthenes later, 'you reaped the fruits of that generosity which he fabricated hypocritically; but I let it pass' (18. 231). A treaty of 'friendship and alliance' was concluded, one of its terms being that a Macedonian trireme should not enter the Peiraeus.[10] Philip and Alexander were made honorary citizens of Athens, the Assembly voted to erect a statue of Philip in the Agora, and Antipater and Alcimachus were chosen to be Athens' consuls in Macedonia (*proxenoi*). At the same time, when Demosthenes returned late in the year, he was chosen to make the funeral speech in honour of those who had fallen at Chaeronea; and that was appropriate since he more than any had championed the cause for which they had fought. For the future the Athenians put their trust in Phocion, Aeschines, Demades and others who believed that cooperation with Philip would be in Athens' interest, and who were not for all the blustering of Demosthenes the traitorous hirelings of Philip.

In Central Greece some changes of political leaders took place. Exiled Acarnanians found asylum at Athens in 337. A Macedonian garrison was installed at Ambracia, a colony of Corinth, which commanded the narrows of the route linking Molossia to Aetolia, both being allies of Philip. The Amphictyonic Council at its autumn meeting approved Philip's measures, punished Amphissa by making the population live in villages, and expressed its praise and support of Philip. The Council also permitted the

revival of the Phocian state, and it approved the reduction of its annual payment to Delphi from 60 talents to 10 talents a year.[11]

Proceeding through the Megarid to the Peloponnese with his army Philip took no punitive measures against Megara, Corinth and Achaea, which no doubt submitted and probably changed their political leaders. He placed a Macedonian garrison in Acrocorinth, the key to the Isthmus. Troezen and some other cities of the Epidaurian peninsula submitted, and a change of government which had occurred before the Battle of Chaeronea was approved. Some exiles found refuge in Athens. Most of the other Peloponnesian states were already in alliance with Philip, and they invited his presence now.[12] Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia had longstanding territorial claims against Sparta, and in order to cement their goodwill Philip invaded Laconia with his forces and theirs and those of Elis too. He ravaged the land but did not attack Sparta. His allies seized the disputed territories – Argos Thyreatis and part of Cynuria, Tegea Sciritis, Megalopolis Belbinatis, and Messenia Denthaliatis and part of the Mani peninsula. Philip decided, as Epaminondas had done, to leave a weakened but independent Sparta as an irritant to its neighbours. It was late in 338 when he turned northwards, exclaiming according to Aristotle in a metrical phrase 'I have fixed the frontiers in the land of Pelops'.[13] Thus the military supremacy of Macedonia was demonstrated, even more decisively that that of Boeotia had been, well within the memory of the older generation, in 369-368.

2. The creation of the Greek Community and the Hegemony of Philip

Philip was not only king of the Macedonians. He was a leading figure among the Greeks as *archon* of Thessaly, champion of Delphi, president of the Pythian Games and winner of events in the Olympic Games. Above all he was a direct descendant of Heracles, the benefactor of the Greeks, and of Zeus, the supreme god of the Greeks. He advertised that descent by placing on his coins the heads of Heracles wearing the lionskin-cap, Zeus crowned with laurel, and Apollo, the god not of war but of intelligence. He stressed his own personal relationship to Zeus in the tetradrachms which showed the head of Zeus on one face and himself on horseback saluting on the other face; and his worship of Apollo on his gold 'Philippeioi' with the head of Apollo and on the reverse the two-horse chariot victorious in the Panhellenic Games. Moreover, he had acted in accordance with those beliefs. Not only had he liberated the Panhellenic shrine of Apollo at Delphi and punished the sacrilege committed by Amphissa. Through the Amphictyonic Council in 346 he had published to the Greek world his regulations for 'the custody of the oracle and everything else appertaining to religious practice, to common peace and to concord among the Greeks' (p. 94 above). Now the gods had given him the decisive victory over those who had

opposed his plans then. Would he implement those regulations which he had proclaimed?

According to Plutarch 'there were some after his victory over the Greeks who advised him to hold the city-states down with garrisons'. That was the traditional policy. For every dominant city-state – Athens, Sparta, Thebes or Syracuse – had kept other city-states in subjection by expelling opponents, imposing a supportive government and installing a garrison, if that was necessary. The fruits of that policy had been internal strife (*stasis*), hatred between states, and internecine wars (p. 71 above). As Plato wrote in the middle of the fourth century, 'the natural activity of all city-states always is unproclaimed war against all city-states' and 'everyone's lifelong companion is continuous war'. Then too Xenophon and Isocrates had written urging Athens and other city-states to abandon imperialistic intervention (*polypragmosyne*) and to lead the way to peace. 'For those city-states which continue longest at peace are of course called the most fortunate, and of all city-states Athens is fitted by nature to prosper in peace, since all men have need of her' – ship-owners, traders, investors, artists, craftsmen, inventors, poets and philosophers. Isocrates devoted his long life to the advocacy of peace in inter-state relations within the Greek world and to the solving of Greece's social and economic ills by a crusade against Persia. At the age of ninety-eight he wrote a letter to Philip soon after the Battle of Chaeronea, in which he hoped that the dreams of his youth would be fulfilled – that the city-states would abandon their insane imperialism, become reconciled to one another, and carry the war into Asia under Philip's leadership.[14] How could these dreams be realised in practice?

Let us begin with the account of Justin, which was derived through Trogus from Theopompus, a capable contemporary writer, who reported the stages of negotiation in the correct sequence:[15]

> (1) Affairs once settled in Greece Philip ordered representatives of all the city-states to be summoned to Corinth to confirm the *status quo*. (2) There he established the terms of peace for all of Greece in accordance with the merits of the individual city-states, and he gathered from all of them a Council of them all like a single Senate. (3) However, the Lacedaemonians scorned the king and his terms, reckoning that the pact was not peace but subjection, since it was not in the interest of the city-states themselves but was being proposed by the victor. (4) Next, the auxiliary forces of the states, one by one, were defined [for service] if the king being under attack from anyone had to be aided by that force, or if a war had to be waged with him as leader (dux). (5) Indeed there was no doubt that the object of these arrangements was the Persian Empire. (6) The total of the auxiliary forces was 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. (7) In addition to that total there were both the army of Macedonia and the neighbouring barbarians of the subject races. (8) At the beginning of spring he sent three commanders – Parmenio, Amyntas and Attalus – into Asia which was under Persian rule (Justin 9. 5. 1-8).

In (1) and (2) the first step was the invitation late in 338, which amounted to an order, that the city-states should send representatives to Corinth. Diodorus contributed the additional information that Philip treated everyone in a kindly manner both in private and in public and declared that he wished to discuss with the city-states what was in their interests (16. 89. 2). When the discussion was held, the upshot was evidently that there should be an end to revolutionary strife (*stasis*) and to internecine wars; that a framework for maintaining a general peace should be created (pacis legem universae Graeciae); and that the administrator of the general peace should be a Council of which the members should be appointed in relation to the military and naval potential of the member-states (pro meritis singularum civitatum).[16]

This proposal was considered by the city-states during the winter. At Athens 'Phocion thought it right to accept Philip's policy and generosity in other respects; but when Demades proposed that the state should take part with the Greeks in the Common Peace and in the Council (*synhedrion*), Phocion was not in favour before they found out what Philip was going to demand for himself from the Greeks. But owing to the crisis he was outvoted' (Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 4-5).[17] Similar debates were held in other states, and similar decisions were reached. Then in spring 337 a meeting of delegates from the city-states was held at Corinth. The proposal having been approved, 'the terms of peace for all of Greece' except Sparta were established. One of them was the immediate setting up of a Council, of which the members represented one or more states in proportion to their military and naval potential.

At this point we have an important inscription which survived on the Acropolis of Athens. It relates to a later stage in the negotiations; but it reveals that the Council was already called 'The Common Council' (*to koinon synedrion*), that the Councillors had sworn oaths 'concerning the peace', and that the Council and the Hegemon could issue orders to the members. From this we see that the Council had absolute powers; it did not send its resolutions to the member-states for them to accept or reject.[18] During the reign of Alexander this peace was cited as 'The Common Peace' (*koine eirene*), and reference was made to 'the oaths and the agreements' at its inception. One of the decisions which were taken by the Common Council at its first meeting was the confirmation of the *status quo* (rerum praesentium statum), which included the garrisons at Ambracia, Thebes and Acrocorinth, and the redrawing of frontiers to the detriment of Sparta.[19]

In Justin (4) and (5) we have the decisions of a later meeting, held probably in summer 337. At that meeting an alliance was formed between the Greeks of the Common Peace and the Macedonians for all time. It was both defensive and offensive (adiuvandus ... inferendum). Each party undertook to respect the constitution of the other party. This was 'the alliance made with (the) Macedonians', to which in 330 BC Alexander

referred when dealing with Greek mercenaries in Persian service (Arr. *An.* 3. 24. 5). The total forces of the Greeks which might be made available for service in the event of any war were defined as being 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry (6). Justin did not mention naval forces; but Plutarch reported that Athens at this time had to provide 'both triremes and cavalry' (*Phoc.* 16. 5), and during the reign of Alexander Chios had to contribute 20 triremes manned at its own expense (Tod, *GHI* 192, line 9).

With the formation of the alliance the question arose, who should command the joint forces of the Greeks and the Macedonians. Such a person was to be called 'Hegemon', i.e. the leader or commander, for which the Latin equivalent was 'dux' (4). Philip was elected to that position, and the powers of the Hegemon were defined in relation to him under the term 'the agreements with Philip'. The inscription on the Acropolis mentioned these 'agreements' as already in existence; and when Alexander succeeded Philip in that position, 'agreements' were made with him ([D.] 17, *synthekai*). Phocion made a shrewd comment to the Athenians on this structure of command. 'Remember that our ancestors also were sometimes in command and sometimes under command, and that by doing well in both these roles they saved both the city and the Greeks' (*Phoc.* 16. 5). Phocion's reference to the famous Persian Wars was appropriate because it was known that the ultimate objective of Philip was to be war against Persia (5).

With the appointment of the Hegemon and the definition of his position the negotiations were complete, and the oath could be taken by the member-states and by the Macedonians to the entire package. Part of the oath by Athens as a member-state survives in the inscription. It runs as follows:

> Oath: I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Athena, Ares, all gods and all goddesses. I shall abide by the peace, and I shall not break the agreements with Philip ..., and I shall not carry weapons by land or by sea to the hurt of any of those who abide by the oaths, and I shall not occupy city, fort or harbour in war against any of those who share in the peace by hook or by crook, and I shall not overthrow the kingship of Philip and his descendants nor the constitutions as they were in each case at the time when they swore the oaths about the peace,[20] and I shall not myself do or allow anyone else to do anything contrary to these agreements as far as I am able. And if anyone does anything contrary to the treaty concerning the agreements, I shall help according to whatever those who are being wronged may order, and I shall go to war against the transgressor of the common peace according to whatever the Common Council may decide and the Hegemon may order, and I shall not abandon the ... [On a different part of the stone members or a group of members were listed with the appropriate number of votes, e.g.:] Thessalians 4, Thasians 2, Phocians 3, Locrians 3, Oetaei, Malieis, Aenianes, Agraei and Dolopes.

Confirmation and some additions may be made from [D.] 17, which

looked back to the agreements. As members of the common peace 'the Greeks were to be free and autonomous', and they were to sail the seas in freedom from any hindrance or from any compulsion to put in to a harbour (8 and 19). The clause about the overthrow of constitutions was cited almost verbatim (10). The methods of doing so were spelt out: killings and banishments contrary to the existing laws in the member-state, confiscations of property, redistributions of land, cancellations of debt, and liberations of slaves for revolutionary purposes; and one state arming and helping exiles from another state to enter that state with hostile intent (15 and 16). If any state should break the terms of the agreement, all member-states shall combine in a campaign against it (6).

Justin (5) and (8) looked forward to another meeting of the Common Council at which it was decided to go to war against the Persian Empire (imperium Persarum). That meeting was probably in autumn 337. The Council decided then in consultation with Philip as Hegemon what proportion of the total forces of the Greeks of the Common Peace should be conscripted for the war against Persia.[21] Since Macedonia was already at war with Persia, her army and the troops of her Balkan subjects would also be available (7). At the beginning of spring 336 Philip as commander-in-chief of the combined forces sent three generals (in command of a vanguard) into Asia (8). In autumn 336 the Greek sections of the expeditionary force were assembling, when Philip was assassinated (Just. 9. 6. 1, dum auxilia a Graecia coeunt).

During two years from the victory at Chaeronea to the assembling of the Greek forces Philip acted with extraordinary diplomacy and foresight. Whereas he punished the Boeotians for breaking the oaths of alliance, he showed the goodwill towards the other city-states which he had proclaimed since 346 by halting his men in the moment of victory, by releasing prisoners of war except in the case of the Boeotians, by not intervening in the defeated states in order to expel opponents and instal supporters, and by accepting invitations to enter the Peloponnese. There he gratified his allies at the expense of Sparta, which he knew would never accept his plans. His conduct was judged by the standard of city-state warfare to be generous, humane, moderate, and conciliatory. For a victorious state to invite enemies and friends alike to consider the victor's settlements and to plan their own future was unparalleled in Greek experience. As Justin remarked, Philip wanted no one, as far as that was possible, to feel he was the victor (9. 4. 1). It lay with the representatives of the numerous city-states to decide whether they would unite in developing a Common Peace; and when they did so decide, no doubt with tactful advice from Philip, he had won their confidence to such a degree that they chose him to be their leader (*hegemon*). The whole operation was a triumph of induction which respected the liberty and the autonomy of the city-states to decide their own future. They provided of their own will the naval and

military forces which served under the command of a Macedonian king – not Philip but Alexander – and eventually overthrew the Persian Empire.

3. The significance of Philip's action

What Philip created was 'the community of the Greeks' (*to koinon ton Hellenon*).[22] Within a year that Greek Community developed an agreed system of administration, which was far in advance of the present system of the European Community. The number of each state's members and so votes on the Council was decided on a form of proportional representation which was related to military and naval strengths. The decisions of the Council by majority vote were binding both on the Council and on the member-states. The powers of the Council were wide and absolute in military, financial and judicial matters, in foreign policy including going to war, in conscripting forces and in trying and banishing offenders from the territories of all member-states. To call this Greek Community 'the League of Corinth', as modern scholars have done, is to misrepresent its nature and to belittle its importance. It was a self-standing state, which banned internal wars between its members and revolutionary party-strife within each member, and which insisted on the maintenance of peace and the rule of law within its constituency.

For the Greeks of the fourth century the Greek Community was a new development in practical politics. The Peace of Antalcidas in 386 and that of Pelopidas in 366 were paraded as forms of 'Common Peace', but they were in reality arrangements under which the leading city-state at the time sought to impose its authority over the others with the help of the Persian King.[23] The Common Peace of the winter of 362/1 was to some extent a precedent. It sprang from a desire to end the internecine wars, settle differences between individual states, and enable the city-states to be at peace and promote each its own prosperity. Then all mainland states, except Sparta which refused to recognise the independence of Messenia, took the oaths to a treaty of 'common peace and alliance', under which they promised to act together against any disturber of the peace. This form of 'collective security' was emphasised by the addition of the word 'alliance' (Diod. 15. 89. 1). 'The Greeks', as they called themselves, rejected an appeal for help from the satraps who were in revolt from the Great King.[24] That there was some form of Council which spoke for 'The Greeks' is certain, but no details are known to us and 'the common peace and alliance' collapsed in 361. It was little more than a vision of what might be possible, indeed of what became actual in 337.

Philip will have known at that time the details of that 'common peace and alliance' through Euphraeus, the pupil of Plato, and through his friends at Thebes. It was evidently that form of 'common peace' which he advocated through the resolution of the Amphictyonic Council in 346 and which he offered in 343 to develop by extending 'the peace and alliance

with Athens' to all Greek states. If that offer had been accepted by Athens and the other city-states, Macedonia would have been a member-state of that Common Peace and would have been tied by its regulations (p. 107 above). In 338/7 Philip's proposals were different. By then he had consolidated his Balkan Empire, demonstrated his military supremacy and was at war with Persia. He decided, therefore, to construct a different system. Macedonia was to stand outside the Common Peace of the Greeks and thus outside what developed into the Greek Community. Late in 337 that self-governing, independent Community had at its disposal very large forces – 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry – which vastly outnumbered the armed forces of the Macedonian kingdom. Philip had in fact created the union of city-states which Athenian politicians had sought in vain to organise against him. It was a bold step. For it was entirely possible that the Greek Community might decide to use its forces against Macedonia.

Philip showed remarkable foresight. He realised that the desire for peace and independence was very strong, and that if the city-states of the mainland and the Aegean islands should remain at peace they would develop greater prosperity. Athens in particular would be the centre of a Greek culture which was spreading beyond Greek ethnic boundaries and, as Xenophon had forecast, of a flourishing maritime commerce which extended far into foreign waters.[25] He was aware, as Isocrates was aware, of the causes of the revolutionary party-strife and of the internecine wars, and he too saw that the conquest of a part of Asia would provide new areas for settlement and production by the surplus population of the Greek area. The example of Timoleon must have been in Philip's mind; for between 342 and 336 he attracted huge numbers of settlers from Greek lands to repeople the cities of Sicily.

It had been a weakness of the Common Peace of 362/1 that it was leaderless and static. The election of Philip as Hegemon gave the Greek Community leadership; the alliance with Macedonia provided a military spearhead; and the declaration of war against Persia added a purpose and a future. Because Philip had the interests of the city-states and the value of Greek culture at heart, he set up a Greek structure which enabled the city-states to be independent, self-governing and united, and thereby to contribute their wealth of ideas and their expertise in trade to the future world which Philip had in mind and Alexander realised. It was Philip as Leader of the Greeks who made the Hellenistic Age possible.

CHAPTER XVI

The last year and the assassination of Philip

1. The crusade against Persia

The attitude of the city-states of the Greek mainland towards Persia was ambivalent in the time of Demosthenes. During his first speech to the Assembly in 354 he put two points of view.[1] 'In my opinion the Great King is the common enemy of all the Greeks' and 'No Greek state should be left under the heel of the barbarian', proud sentiments which were inherited from the great days of the victories over Xerxes in Europe and over the Persians in Asia (p. 68 above). Indeed the liberation of the Greek states in Asia and revenge for the atrocities committed against the gods and the people of Greece were held to be long overdue. On the other hand, 'the Greeks' fear of Persia is subordinated to their feuds with one another' – so much so, we may add, that Sparta, Athens and Thebes in turn had sacrificed the liberty of the Greek states in Asia in order to win or end an internecine war in Greece in 404, 386, 371, 366 and 355. To those Greeks who took a Panhellenic view the remote control which in those years Persia exercised over the states of the mainland and the abandoning of the Greek states in Asia to Persian rule were a disgrace to the Greek people. Orators at the Panhellenic Games, such as Gorgias in 408 and Lysias in 388, called upon the Greeks to settle their differences and combine against the common enemy, and Isocrates from 380 in his *Panegyricus* onwards wrote pamphlet after pamphlet on this theme. Philip was particularly well placed to make use of that national sentiment. It was shared by Macedonia and the city-states; for Macedonia had suffered occupation by Persia for thirty years, and her king had joined the Greek cause in 479. The present king too had shown himself to be the champion of Apollo's cause in two Sacred Wars, and from 346 onwards he was more suitable in the eyes of Isocrates than any other to lead a crusade of revenge against Persia.

The military states of the mainland had no reason to fear any invasion by Persia. Greek hoplites were far superior to Persian infantry; indeed they were hired in huge numbers as mercenaries by the Great King and by his enemies in Egypt and Asia.[2] It was different for a naval state, such as Athens. As Demosthenes remarked in 354, 'the basic needs for all wars are warships, money and bases, and I find that the King is much better off for

all of these than we are' (14. 9). At the height of her power Persia conscripted the manned warships of Egypt, Phoenicia, Cyprus, Cilicia, Caria and the Greek states in Asia; and even when she was weakened by revolts, she still had a formidable fleet by Athenian standards. Money Persia had in abundance; for the Kings hoarded their treasure. The bases extended from Egypt to the south coast of the Black Sea at the start of the fourth century, and they were ideally situated for expeditions into the Aegean Sea. Threats by Persia to bring out her fleet were enough to make Athens retract in 355.[3]

The heartland of the Persian Empire was far away in Iran and Iraq, and its strength lay in cavalry, archer-infantry and gold for hiring Greek mercenaries. The provinces of the Empire were called satrapies. The Great King appointed members of his family and nobles to govern the satrapies. Since the Satraps, as they were called, exercised almost absolute power, they were well placed to rebel against the central government. In 366 to 359 many western satrapies were in revolt: Egypt employing the Spartan king Agesilaus to command Greek mercenary soldiers and the Athenian Chabrias to command the fleet, and also Caria, Lydia, Armenia, Hellespontine Phrygia and Cappadocia. The satrapies of the south coast of the Black Sea were never fully recovered by Persia. In 358 Artaxerxes Ochus succeeded to the Persian throne and ordered all Satraps to disband their armies. Artabazus, Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Orontes, Satrap of Armenia, refused and held out with the help of Egypt. Each side employed Greek mercenaries. Artabazus relied on a Rhodian commander, Memnon, and he bought the services of the Theban general Pammenes and 5,000 hoplites in 353; but he was defeated and fled later with Memnon to the court of Philip (p. 130 above). On receiving a pardon, Artabazus and Memnon returned to Persia c. 349.

The great ambition of Artaxerxes Ochus was to regain the southwest area. Idrieus, the loyal Satrap of Caria, employing 8,000 Greek mercenaries and Phocion as their commander, recovered Cyprus, and Artaxerxes mounted his second or third attack on Egypt in 343. The king of Egypt, Nectanebo, had recruited 20,000 Greek mercenaries, but he had recently lost his best mercenary commander, Mentor (a brother of Memnon), who entered the service of Artaxerxes and led the invasion of Egypt. Artaxerxes' army, which in addition to Greek mercenaries had 3,000 Argives, 1,000 Thebans and 6,000 Asiatic Greeks, proved victorious and Mentor was entrusted with the task of restoring order in all the coastal areas. In 342/1 he captured Hermias, the dynast of Atarneus, who had had dealings with Aristotle and Philip (p. 130 above). In 338, when Mentor died, Memnon was appointed to command his Greek mercenaries. In that summer Artaxerxes died. The Greek account is that Bagoas, a eunuch at the court, poisoned Artaxerxes, put the youngest son Arses on the throne, killed his brothers by poisoning them, and in 336 poisoned Arses and Arses' children. Bagoas then selected as king Darius Codomannus, a collateral member of

the royal family, who had distinguished himself in single combat with an enemy champion. Darius started to reign in April/May 336. Bagoas intended to poison Darius, but he was forced by Darius to drink the poison himself. While the Greek account is unlikely to be true,[4] it is clear that there was dynastic confusion and some paralysis of the central government in the months after April/May 336.[5] By then Philip's vanguard was operating in Asia.

Although Philip had helped Pammenes on his way in 353 and given refuge to Artabazus and Memnon for a time, he did not enter into diplomatic relations with Artaxerxes Ochus until probably winter 342/1, when a treaty of 'friendship and alliance' was made between Macedonia and Persia (p. 130 above). That treaty gave Philip a free hand in Thrace. It was broken in 340 when Persia sent help to Perinthus. From then on Macedonia was openly at war with Persia.[6] It might have been expected that Philip would have taken advantage of the confusion which followed the death of Artaxerxes in summer 338. But he did not move until he had won the cooperation of the city-states, been elected 'Leader' (*hegemon*) of 'The Greeks', and taken command of the joint forces as general with full powers (*strategos autocrator*).[7] Then, in spring 336, he opened the offensive. He ordered the commanders of the vanguard 'to liberate the Greek city-states' (Diod. 16. 91. 2), and to exact revenge for the crimes committed by the Persians (16. 89. 2 and 17. 4. 9).

The strategic problems which faced any general invading Asia Minor from Europe were familiar to Philip from the experience of Agesilaus in 396-394. All the harbours on the west coast, some on the south coast, and some on the offshore islands were occupied by Greek city-states, which were themselves controlled from within by pro-Persian tyrants or oligarchs and by fear of the Satraps' forces, especially of cavalry. The invader therefore needed to have a fleet at the outset in order to transport and supply his army. He hoped thereafter to capture the harbours by supporting an uprising or by siegecraft, before the Persians could muster their fleet. If he was able to win the harbours as far as and including Caria and to control the offshore islands, he had a fair chance of excluding that fleet from the Aegean basin. On the military side, because the rivers ran from east to west and their valleys were therefore parallel to one another, an invading army might force its way up one valley, only to be enfiladed by enemy cavalry from the parallel valleys. Also if the invading army followed the coast, its line of communications, as it advanced south, was exposed to attack by Persian forces from inland. Agesilaus failed on two counts. He did not capture the Carian coast, with the result that the Phoenician fleet entered the Aegean Sea and defeated the Spartan fleet. When he campaigned inland, he had to retreat because he was enfiladed. The final outcome was that a rising in Greece, prompted by Persian gold and supported by the Persian fleet, compelled him to return to Europe.[8]

Philip's order to his generals showed that he intended to advance down

the coast, 'liberating' the Greek city-states as he went and hopefully including Caria, in order to keep the Persian fleet out of the Aegean basin. He relied on his fleet of Greek and Macedonian ships for transportation to Asia and for supply there, and on his cavalry and supporting troops to protect his line of communications. The confusion at the Persian court after the death of Arses in April/May encouraged him to expect that he could campaign for a year without serious interruption by the Persian fleet. The vanguard consisted of part at least of the Greek Community's fleet (it totalled 160 triremes in 334) and part of the Macedonian fleet, and of an army of at least 10,000 men. The names of the naval commanders are not known. The army commanders were Parmenio, Attalus and Amyntas. Of these we may conjecture that Parmenio was the commander-in-chief, accompanied by one or more squadrons of Companion Cavalry; Attalus commanded the Macedonian infantry; and Amyntas commanded the Greek allies and the Greek mercenaries.[9] Philip intended to bring the main force to Asia in the late autumn of 336.[10] During the non-sailing season he would be able to capture the Carian harbours and perhaps to campaign inland. He would then be well placed in spring 335 to keep the Persian fleet out of the Aegean Sea.

The advance of the expeditionary force southwards down the coast is known to us through changes of government from pro-Persian 'tyrants' or 'oligarchs' to democracies. These changes occurred at Eresus on Lesbos, where altars were dedicated to Zeus Philippios; at Chios; and at Erythrae on the coast opposite Chios. They were brought about by the fleet. Meanwhile the army was liberating the Greek cities on and near the coast. At Ephesus the oligarchs were overthrown, and the democrats set up in the temple of Artemis a statue of Philip as a token of their gratitude.[11] We have details of one action between the expeditionary force and the Persians. It took place near 'Magnesia', which is to be identified with the Magnesia southeast of Ephesus and not with the Magnesia between Phocaea and Sardis, the seat of the Satrap of Lydia; for it was not the aim of the expeditionary force to penetrate inland and threaten a strong place like Sardis.[12]

The Macedonian commanders at the time were Parmenio and Attalus. Shortly after the death of Philip Alexander sent Hecataeus to arrest Attalus in Asia, or if Attalus should resist to kill him, 'as quickly as possible'. Since the death of Attalus should therefore be placed before the end of 336, the action at Magnesia should be dated within that year. The Macedonian commanders had 10,000 men at Magnesia, while Memnon had 4,000 soldiers in a fortified camp some five miles away. Despite the disparity in numbers Memnon won a victory and compelled the Macedonian force to withdraw into Magnesia.[13] The chief interest for us is that the Macedonian commanders had evidently liberated all the Greek cities on the coast from Abydus to Magnesia and were about to press on into

Caria. It was there that Memnon was trying to stop their advance late in 336.[14]

For reasons unknown to us Darius failed to muster the Persian fleet in 336. According to Diodorus he was ambitious to 'turn the war back on Macedonia', presumably by subsidising any enemies of Philip in Greece and by bringing the Persian fleet into action, but he abandoned his plans with the death of Philip. It is possible that he made contact with Demosthenes before Philip's death; for Plutarch reported that Darius ordered his Satraps to offer Demosthenes money in order to detain 'the Macedonian', meaning Philip, by causing trouble in Greece.[15] The failure of Darius to deploy the Persian fleet in 336 (and again in the spring of 334) was a grave error on his part. Had Philip lived, he would certainly have been able with the main body of the confederate forces to take control of Caria and to strike inland into Anatolia during the winter months.

Although the evidence is scanty, we can form some idea of Philip's policy. When Memnon tried to capture Cyzicus in the latter half of 335, he knew that the people of Cyzicus were expecting 'Calas the Macedonian who was (their) friend and ally'. Thus Philip had made a treaty of 'friendship and alliance' with this important Greek city-state on the Asiatic shore of the Propontis. Similarly Alexander had an 'alliance' with Mitylene in Lesbos sometime before summer 333. He evidently inherited that alliance from Philip; for, as we have seen, Eresus in Lesbos paid honours to Philip. Methymna, also in Lesbos, was in alliance with Alexander, since he sent its citizens for trial there and not to the Greek Community court; no doubt Methymna had entered into alliance with Philip in 336.[16] These alliances were contracted with Philip as king of Macedonia and not with 'The Greeks'. On the other hand, Chios was a member of 'The Greeks', i.e. of the Greek Community as I have called it. As such Chios later contributed ships to 'the fleet of the Greeks', and its citizens were tried for treason by the 'Council of the Greeks', sitting as a court. Similarly Tenedos had an agreement with 'Alexander and the Greeks', i.e. with the Hegemon and the Greek Community, and that agreement was no doubt a continuation of an agreement with 'Philip and the Greeks'.[17]

The explanation of the different terms is clear if we note the Greek terminology. Those city-states which had joined the Greek Community before the invasion of Asia continued to be members of the Community in action with the name 'Philip and the Greeks'.[18] Those city-states which were liberated by the expeditionary force entered into alliance with Philip only. As regards the latter group he was continuing the practice which he had formed in dealing with the Greek city-states in Thrace. His policy was inherited and continued by Alexander.

The purpose of Philip in invading Asia was revealed by the report of his consultation of the Oracle at Delphi in spring 336. Philip asked the Pythian priestess whether he would 'conquer the king of the Persians', and on his own interpretation of the oracular response 'he was overjoyed at the

thought that the gods would be his allies so that Asia would be spear-won, subject to the Macedonians'. The same prospect was envisaged in the recitation at the state banquet in October 336, that 'the kingdom of the Persians, great and famous though it was, would one day be overthrown'; and again Philip was delighted at the thought of 'the Persian king being overthrown'.[19] Thus Philip's aim was nothing less than the defeat and subjugation of the Persian king, and the acquisition of the territory of the Persian Empire in Asia as an addition to the Macedonian Empire in Europe. In this respect his war-aim and his policy were separate from those of the Greek Community. It was enough for 'The Greeks' that he as their Leader should make war on behalf of the Greeks (and with the Greeks) against the Persians and 'exact from them revenge for the profanation of the temples'. With such a programme he had already obtained the loyal support of 'The Greeks' (Diod. 16. 89. 2).

2. Affairs at court and the assassination

Since Philip aimed to overthrow the Persian king, he expected to be absent from Macedonia for a matter of years and no doubt to take with him his son Alexander, who had distinguished himself at the Battle of Chaeronea. He had therefore to make provision for the time of his absence. The first need was to secure his Balkan front. We learn only incidentally of a war conducted by Philip against an Illyrian king, Pleurias, and of a battle in which one of Philip's Pages called Pausanias met his death (see p. 176 below) either in late 337 or early 336. Of which tribal group was Pleurias king? Philip had already subjugated the Ardiaei of the Dalmatian coast and the Dardanians of the Kosovo area, but he had been resisted by the Triballi of the Morava valley. Our information about the Illyrian tribal groups before the Roman period comes mainly from Strabo, who drew probably on the description given by Theopompus. He reported as such groups Autariatae, Ardiaei and Dardanii, and the strongest of these at one time was the Autariatae. Thus the probable objective of Philip was the Autariatae. Since they were neighbours of the Ardiaei on the one hand and of the Triballi on the other (Str. 317-18) and to the north of Paeonia and close to Dardania (Str. 313 and 329 fr. 4), the Autariatae are to be located in central Bosnia. Philip was presumably making a pre-emptive strike, in order to deter the Autariatae from causing trouble later; for he did not subjugate this tribal group. It was later dealt with by the king of the Agrianians, acting on an order from Alexander.[20]

A concern of greater importance was the future of the royal family. The situation in early 337 was that Philip had already made six or seven marriages for reasons of policy (p. 41 above). Of these marriages four were to Greek-speakers – Phila (of the Elimeote royal family), Olympias (of the Molossian royal family), Philinna (Thessalian of Larissa, probably an Aleuad) and Nicesipolis (Thessalian of Pherae, a niece of Jason) – and two

or probably three to non-Greek-speakers – Audata (Dardanian of Bardylis' family), Meda (Getic, daughter of king Cothelas) and probably a daughter of king Atheas, Scythian (p. 136 above). By his marriages Philip had had 'many sons (all) recognised by royal tradition' (Just. 9. 8. 3, regio more susceptos), but of these 'some had died in war and others accidentally or of natural causes' (partim ferro partim fato) – not surprisingly when we remember that princes hunted and fought in battle in their 'teens as Alexander did at Chaeronea. Of those sons two alone survived in 337 – Alexander, son of Olympias, and Arrhidaeus, son of Philinna – and of them Arrhidaeus was impaired in mind and not capable of becoming an active king. Thus there was in effect only one possible successor who was a son of Philip, Alexander, and he was probably destined to lead cavalry charges in Asia and might be killed in action. There were, however, other royal males: Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III who had been king as an infant (p. 23 above) and was older than Alexander; and descendants of collateral branches, namely Leonnatus and Perdiccas and 'the sons of Aëropus'. Philip sought the cooperation of these royals by marrying Cynna, his daughter by Audata, to Amyntas, and by making Perdiccas one of his personal 'Bodyguards' (Somatophylakes); we do not know what positions were held by the sons of Aëropus. Amyntas led the envoys of Philip to Thebes in the all-important mission of 339,[21] and Alexander escorted the ashes of the Athenian dead to Athens in 338.

The election of a successor to the throne rested with the Assembly of Macedones. All the current king could do was to indicate his own choice in making appointments. Philip had indicated that he had Alexander in mind as his successor by appointing him to command the Companion Cavalry at Chaeronea. If Alexander should be killed with or before his father, the choice for the Assembly would be between Arrhidaeus and Amyntas. If Arrhidaeus were to be elected, a guardian would be needed and in theory that would be Amyntas as the closest male relative. But it seems that Amyntas was no warrior. Some of the Assembly might prefer to appoint Perdiccas, being a Bodyguard of the king. Divisions of opinion meant divisions of loyalty and a disruption of policy which might be fatal. It was therefore reasonable for Philip to beget more sons. Even if a son was still an infant when the election came, he would be a centre of loyalty and he would almost certainly be elected king as Orestes and Amyntas had been elected and as Alexander's son was to be *in utero*.

Philip looked outside his group of wives; for the earlier ones were past the child-bearing age, and he may have despaired of the younger ones producing an heir. It was probably in 337 that he married a young Macedonian woman, Cleopatra. She was of a distinguished family; for her brother Hippostratus had been named as a casualty in the pursuit of the Ardiaeans in 344 (probably as a Page), her guardian was Attalus, a Bodyguard of Philip, and Attalus was married to a daughter of Parmenio. In the account which Satyrus gave in his *Life of Philip* the king (now

forty-five years old) fell passionately in love with her (*erastheis*).[22] That is acceptable, because the policy of the kings was to make arranged marriages with foreign princesses or the like and not with Macedonian commoners for the obvious reason that a Macedonian union would not only create jealousy but would place the honoured family on a level with the royal house. In this particular case Attalus might think of himself or Cleopatra's child as a possible successor. It is certain, then, that Philip acted foolishly by the normal standards of royal marriages, and it was almost inevitable that those closest to him, Olympias and Alexander, should have thought so.

In the account of Satyrus the consequences of the marriage were utterly disastrous. At the wedding banquet Attalus shouted 'now legitimate sons, not bastards will be born to be kings', Alexander threw his tankard in the face of Attalus, Philip drew his sword to kill his son but fell in a drunken stupor, and Alexander mocked his father with the taunt 'See, you men, here is the man who was planning to cross from Europe to Asia. Why, in crossing from one couch to another he has fallen flat on his face.' Olympias too was outraged not only at Philip bringing girl after girl into their marriage-bed but trying now to kill her son. When she let fly at her husband, he responded by divorcing her (Just. 9. 7. 2). Alexander took her side and went with her to Epirus, where she urged her brother Alexander, the Molossian king, to mount a war against Philip (9. 7. 7). But Philip outmanoeuvred her by offering the hand of their daughter in marriage to the Molossian Alexander, who accepted. Meanwhile the Macedonian Alexander was intriguing with Illyrian kings. A diplomatic Corinthian, Demaratus, took Philip to task: 'You do very well to take thought for Greece, Philip, when you have filled your own household with such faction and disasters.' Brought to his senses, Philip persuaded Alexander, but only with great difficulty, to yield to the prayers of his kith and kin and return to Pella against his will. However, the rift was not closed. Olympias with the knowledge and complicity of Alexander arranged with one Pausanias the assassination of Philip. Thus Philip's mad passion for a young girl 'ruined his whole life' and turned the royal household upside down (Athenae. 557 D and 560 C).[23]

Anyone who has studied the sources of Justin and considered the malevolent statements about the Queen Mother, Eurydice (p. 17 above), will realise that Satyrus is here also fabricating slanderous stories about the doings of the Macedonian court – stories written for Greeks who hated Macedonia in the mid-third-century. They thought of a king's polygamy as a matter of one wife and many mistresses, including slave-girls employed as dancers at stag-parties and barbarian 'princesses'; so Olympias, the legitimate wife, saw Philip introducing girl after girl into their marriage-bed (*epeisagon*). Cleopatra was something different, for she was a high-ranking virgin of citizen birth. So it had to be out with Olympias and a proper wedding-banquet for Cleopatra. The fracas and the repartees at the

banquet are hilarious. Then the picture of the lecherous, drunken, unscrupulous king being brought to his senses by a Greek gentleman was no doubt particularly pleasing.[24] The assassination theme will be discussed later.

That the marriage of Philip to Cleopatra, whom he renamed 'Eurydice', did cause a serious rupture is known from Arrian's statement that it created 'suspicion in Alexander towards Philip when Philip dishonoured Olympias, the mother of Alexander' (*An.* 3. 6. 5). In accordance with his stated method in his *Preface* Arrian took this information from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, who wrote for contemporaries and were trustworthy. It is tantalisingly brief. What the dishonour was we do not know; but to judge from the passionate and violent emotions and behaviour of Olympias in later life we can well imagine that she showed her resentment in a public manner by leaving the court and going to Molossia. Alexander had to side with one or the other. His mother's tears mattered most,[25] and he went with her to Molossia. The previous trust between father and son was replaced by suspicion. Arrian gave this information in order to explain why Harpalus had been in exile, namely that because of loyalty to Alexander at the time of the rupture Harpalus and four other young men – Ptolemy, Nearchus, Erigyius and Laomedon – were banished and stayed in exile until after the death of Philip.

There is a possible clue to the dishonour. The discovery of an extraordinarily fine tomb for a woman in a part of the royal cemetery reserved for women at Aegeae has been tentatively identified with that of Eurydice, the mother of Philip. Structural peculiarities date the tomb some years before the tomb of Philip. As the Queen Mother she was the senior lady at court until her death, say c. 340. Thereafter, because Olympias was the mother of Philip's intended successor, she was in that position, being regarded as the future Queen Mother. If Philip promoted his new bride above Olympias and showed it by naming her at the wedding as 'Eurydice', the traditional dynastic name, he was suggesting that Cleopatra-Eurydice would be the future Queen Mother if she should bear him a son.[26] Such a suggestion naturally engendered suspicion in Alexander towards his father.

From Molossia Alexander went on to visit some 'Illyrian kings' – perhaps the client kings of the Grabaei, Taulantii and Dardanii – and gained a knowledge of the northwestern frontier, which was to stand him in good stead in 335. Such freedom of movement was possible only with the permission of Philip, and it was no doubt with Philip's approval that Alexander returned to Pella, probably late in 337. The next event which Plutarch narrated was another rift between Alexander and his father over a proposed marriage alliance with a daughter of a Persian Satrap, Pixodarus (*Alex.* 10. 1-5). We learn elsewhere that Pixodarus was the youngest of three sons of Mausolus, deposed his sister Ada as ruler of Caria c. 340, accepted Persian authority (*persisas*), and was succeeded after his death by Orontobates, who with Memnon fought against Alexander in 334.[27]

There is no suggestion that Pixodarus was other than loyal to Persia. The story which Plutarch tells is peculiar to him. It runs as follows.

Pixodarus, Satrap of Caria, wanted to give his oldest daughter in marriage to Philip's son Arrhidaeus, 'thereby worming his way into the alliance of Philip', and sent Aristocritus (probably a Greek actor) to the Macedonian court. Alexander's friends and his mother kept reporting and protesting to Alexander on the grounds that Philip was bringing Arrhidaeus into the succession to the throne by a brilliant marriage and a great situation. Confounded by this report, Alexander sent a Greek actor, Thessalus, to Caria to tell Pixodarus to drop the half-witted bastard and transfer the offer to Alexander. Pixodarus was overjoyed. But Philip, hearing of it, went to Alexander's room, taking one of Alexander's friends and associates, Philotas, son of Parmenio, censured him strongly and bitterly reviled him as unworthy of his birth and high station in desiring to become the son-in-law of a Carian fellow, the slave of a barbarian king. As for Thessalus Philip had the Corinthians put him in chains and send him back (to Macedonia), and he banished of Alexander's other companions Harpalus, Nearchus, Erigyius and Ptolemy, whom Alexander later recalled and held in the highest honour.

In 1980 and 1981 I published my opinion that 'the story in its unabbreviated form was probably totally imaginary and Alexander's part in it seems to bear the mark of malicious fiction', and in 1982 M.B. Hatzopoulos published his exposure of the story as unhistorical. Since Pixodarus was under the control of the Persian King, any such offer of a marriage alliance, and any such marriage if made, would have had to be entirely secret; yet the negotiations were public knowledge at Pella and even at Dodona, if Olympias was still in Molossia. Nor was such a marriage-alliance of any use. It had to be kept secret until a time, if any, when Macedonian troops were entering Caria, and it would be beneficial to Pixodarus only after liberation from Persia. To call it a brilliant marriage and a step towards the Macedonian throne for Arrhidaeus in 337 is absurd. That Alexander wanted to marry at all in 337 is most unlikely, as his first marriage was in 327. The alleged messages and conversations bear all the marks of invention – Alexander calling his half-brother a bastard, Philip – himself the son-in-law of two or perhaps three barbarians – taunting Alexander with wanting to become such a son-in-law to a Carian fellow. The report of a conversation known only to Philip, Alexander and Philotas is suspect at once. That the reporting by Alexander's friends of the initial approach should have resulted in the exile of four promising officers for a year or more is incredible, especially when we have the authority of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus that the exiling happened at the time of the wedding (p. 173 above).

That Plutarch took this story from Satyrus, *Life of Philip*, is most probable. For it has features which are common to the story of the marriage-banquet: Olympias exacerbating Alexander (9. 5), conversations

reported *verbatim* (9. 7-10 and 9. 13), Alexander fearful for succession (9. 8), and Philip furious and harsh towards his son (9. 9).[28] Moreover, all this leads up to the next phase of events in Plutarch's narrative, the plot by Olympias with the connivance of Alexander to kill Philip. Plutarch has points which are not in the main account (that of Diodorus): Olympias ordered and exacerbated the young assassin-to-be (*neaniskos*) Pausanias, so that most of the blame was pinned on Olympias but some of the accusation involved Alexander too, for he 'is said', on meeting Pausanias who had been outraged and was lamenting, to have recited the line from the *Medea*:

> the giver (of the bride), the bridegroom and the bride.

Although Plutarch does not explain the point, Alexander is assumed to have been prompting Pausanias to kill Attalus, Philip and Cleopatra (Eurydice) – a tall order indeed. It is obvious that neither Pausanias nor Alexander would have revealed this *tête-à-tête* conversation. It is clearly fictional. Plutarch showed his own reservations by adding 'is said' (*legetai*). A comparable account by Justin began with a similar reservation: 'it has been believed too' (9. 7. 1, creditum est etiam) 'that he' (the assassin) 'had been incited by Olympias, Alexander's mother, and that Alexander himself had emerged as not without (pre)knowledge of his father's murder.' Justin then gave as a background the story of the wedding-banquet and the flight of Olympias and Alexander to Epirus and her attempt to make Alexander the Molossian go to war against Philip, which Philip averted by mounting the marriage. As we have seen, Justin (Trogus) got this material from Satyrus. It follows that the prompting by Olympias and the complicity of Alexander came from Satyrus.[29] So too do the absurdities which followed in Justin's account: both (i.e. mother and son) 'are believed' to have prompted Pausanias to so great a crime, Olympias had horses prepared for Pausanias' get-away, ran to the funerary ceremony, placed a gold crown on the head of the crucified assassin during the night of her arrival (from Epirus), cremated the corpse above the remains of Philip, built a tumulus for it, and arranged an annual sacrifice to the assassin. The whole passage and the complicity of Alexander in particular are entirely fabricated.[30]

The only contribution by a contemporary is that of Aristotle, who was the philosopher at the court. He said that attacks on monarchs when provoked by outrageous treatment were aimed at the person for the sake of revenge and not in pursuit of ambition. He instanced the attack on the Peisistratidae being due to the outrageous treatment of Harmodius' sister, and 'the attack on Philip by Pausanias because Philip allowed him to be outrageously treated by Attalus and company'.[31] His testimony is beyond question correct. It establishes the personal motive of the assassin, but it does not mean that others were not involved in a plot.

We can now turn to the main account, that of Diodorus 16. 91-4. As I

have argued elsewhere,[32] his source was Diyllus and the account is dependable, especially in its understanding of Macedonian institutions, including the School of Pages in which homosexual relationships with older men often developed. The summary which I shall now give is not in the order of the original. Pausanias, who (evidently as a Page) 'had become a beloved of Philip', was now a mature man of great military distinction, a Bodyguard (93. 3). When he saw the king was in love with a like-named Page, he taunted the boy with being a promiscuous hermaphrodite. The boy told this to Attalus 'one of the Friends', said he would commit suicide, and did so a few days later by stepping in front of the king and receiving the blows intended for him in a battle against Pleurias (p. 170 above, in 337/6). Attalus then invited Pausanias to dinner, got him drunk and handed him over to his muleteers to abuse sexually. When Pausanias made this a cause of complaint to the king, Philip was indeed shocked by the atrocity, but he did not want to punish Attalus because of their kinship and because he needed the services of Attalus at the time (as elected general of the advance-force). Hoping to appease Pausanias, Philip gave him considerable gifts and honourable promotion in the group of seven Bodyguards. But Pausanias was not appeased. He planned to kill Philip.

The wedding of Cleopatra, the daughter of Philip and Olympias, to Alexander, the Molossian king and brother of Olympias, was arranged for the occasion of the great Macedonian festival[33] in October at Aegeae, which was itself a prelude to the main invasion of Asia. Philip invited leading members of the Greek Community, personal friends from the Greek states, notables from the Balkan Empire and of course leading Macedonians. The climax of the festival took place in the crowded theatre at sunrise. A procession entered from one *parodos*, escorting magnificent statues of the Twelve Gods and a thirteenth statue 'fit for a god', that of Philip. When the procession had departed, Philip who was still outside sent his Friends in to take their seats and after them the Guardsmen to take position at the edge of the *orchestra*. Then from the *parodos* Philip entered alone, wearing a white cloak. He stood in the *orchestra*, acknowledging the cheers of the spectators. Meanwhile, the seven Bodyguards fanned out at some distance from him. Suddenly one of them, Pausanias, sprang forward, stabbed the king and fled down the *parodos*. Three Bodyguards ran to the king's side. Three others – Leonnatus, Perdiccas and Attalus – chased Pausanias, who would have reached horses waiting at the gate, had he not tripped and been killed by his pursuers. The king was dead.

CHAPTER XVII

Epitaph and appreciation

1. Trial and burial

'First of all on succeeding to the kingship Alexander deemed the murderers of his father worthy of the appropriate punishment, and after that he took every possible care of the burial of his parent' (Diod. 17. 2. 1). The wording is precise.[1] At the trial Alexander prosecuted, and he named the penalty which he demanded. But the decision lay with the Macedones, that is with the soldiers and ex-soldiers of the King's Forces, who met under arms as a People's Court at Aegeae. They decided whether a defendant was innocent or guilty, and if the latter what the penalty was to be. For this case we have a fragment of papyrus of the second century AD, a copy of an original which in a Hellenistic history described the end of the trial.[2] It may be restored and translated as follows:

> Those with him in the theatre and his attendants they acquitted and those round the throne. The [?] diviner he delivered to the Macedones to punish and they crucified him. The body of Philip he delivered to courtiers to bury ... [and] by the burial ...

The persons here acquitted were the Bodyguards, the Guardsmen and those who were seated near the throne which Philip would have gone on to occupy in the front row of the seats. If the diviner is correctly restored in the text,[3] his offence was that he had declared the omens favourable at the sacrifice held before dawn on the fatal day. The body of Philip, as we shall see, was probably in front of the Assembly during the trial. Alexander now entrusted it to the Friends and the Pages; for it was their privilege to escort and guard the body until the final obsequies.

Having described the succession of Alexander Justin wrote as follows. 'His first care was for the funeral of his father, at which before everything else he ordered the execution of accomplices of the murder at the tumulus of his father' (11. 2. 1). Two men 'who took part with (Pausanias) in the killing of Philip' were named as Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, sons of Aëropus, by Arrian in the course of a digression concerning a third brother, Alexander, who had been charged also but had been acquitted.[4] They had evidently been found guilty during the trial of which the papyrus fragment described the sequel. The reasoning of the judges is not known to us. But

the fact that there were horses (in the plural) waiting and ready at the gate of the theatre must have led them to believe that a get-away had been planned for more than one would-be killer.[5]

For the burial of Philip we now have the remarkable discoveries of Andronikos in 1977. He reported for Tomb II the following features which were not associated with any other tomb of this kind. They are still unparalleled. The tomb, when completed, was covered with a low tumulus some twenty metres in diameter. In the red soil of this tumulus two skeletons were found without any offerings. On the vaulted top of the tomb there were some objects which had been brought from the cremation pyre. They included two swords, a spearhead set upright in the ground, and some trappings of horses. On the flat cornice of the tomb Andronikos found 'something like a small pyre, broken vases, small sherds' and bones of birds or small animals, which were the signs of purification.

The explanation of the unique features of Tomb II is provided by the literary evidence. The two skeletons were presumably the remains of Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, executed and interred at the tumulus. The swords were evidently their swords; for officers on trial were privileged to wear uniform and be armed.[6] The spearhead was the weapon of the assassin; to set it upright was probaby a traditional custom.[7] The horses were those at the gate 'prepared for the escape' which were mentioned by Diodorus 16. 94. 3 and Justin 9. 7. 9, 'fugienti equos praeparatos'. The cremated remains and the purification were at the place where the corpse of the assassin was hung on a cross 'above the remains' of Philip for exposure to public view. When it was taken down and 'cremated', the place was duly purified.[8] The correspondence of the archaeological evidence and the literary testimony is complete. It proves not only that Tomb II was the tomb of Philip, but also that the literary statements were factually correct – the interpretation which the authors set upon those facts being another matter. Those who have argued that Tomb II was that of Philip Arrhidaeus, the successor of Alexander, have no comparable explanation of the unique phoenomena.[9]

As we explained (p. 8 above), Tomb I was made on a new part of the royal cemetery for the founder of a new dynasty of the Temenidae, namely for Amyntas III. The shrine, measuring 9.60 by 8 metres and notable for the use of fine marble, was immediately adjacent to Tomb I. Beside the shrine Andronikos found two offering-places, circular and a metre in diameter, in which there were sherds of the period 350-325, indicating that worship ceased at about the time of Alexander's death.[10] The conclusion must be drawn that there were separate worships of two persons, namely the occupant of Tomb I and an occupant of Tomb II; for not only was Tomb II built close to Tomb I and so to the shrine, but the tumulus of a distinctive red soil[11] covering Tomb I and Tomb II was so made that the shrine and the offering-places were just outside it. There is no doubt that the second worship was of the king in Tomb II; for Tomb III was set in the end of the

tumulus far from the shrine. Thus we conclude that Amyntas and Philip were recipients of worship as gods after their deaths. As we shall see shortly, there is independent evidence that these two kings were so worshipped elsewhere, at Pydna and at Amphipolis.

2. The tomb and the high artistic level of the offerings

Whereas Tomb I was a cist, boxlike in shape (p. 43 above), Tomb II was entirely different. It was 9.50 metres long, divided into two chambers 4.46 metres wide, and had a vaulted roof. The first mention of such a tomb occurred in Plato, *Laws* 947 D, written c. 350: 'The tomb shall be made of *poros* stone, of which the strength is unaffected by age; it shall be vaulted, longer than it is wide, containing stone couches set parallel to one another, and shall be mounded over with soil in a circle ... one end [of the tumulus] shall be left free for those [later] being interred without need of [another] tumulus.' The description corresponds completely with Tomb II and its circular tumulus of soil, of which the far end away from the shrine was left free and was then occupied later by Tomb III. No tomb of this kind has been found in the territories of the Greek city-states in the fourth century. We must conclude that Plato had had a report of such a tomb from his pupil Euphraeus, who was the philosopher at the court of Perdiccas III in Macedonia in the late 360s. This conclusion incidentally supports the dating of Tomb I to the time of the death of Amyntas c. 370.

The earliest example (as yet) of such a vaulted tomb – we may call it a vaulted crypt, for it like Tombs I, II and III was under the original ground level – was discovered in 1987 by Andronikos in an area of the royal cemetery at Aegeae which was reserved for burials of women. The remains of offerings in the vaulted tomb were appropriate to a woman. It had two chambers and was slightly larger than Tomb II, until then the largest known. A unique feature of the tomb was that it was set within a frame of four walls close to the tomb-walls. This frame was evidently intended to carry some of the weight of a tumulus. By 336, when Tomb II was constructed, the builders knew from experience that a frame of walls was no longer necessary. Though the tomb had been robbed, the handle of a Panathenaic amphora (a prize in some contest) which was found in burnt remains probably from a pyre had stamped upon it some letters of the name of the Athenian official of the year 344/3; and inside the tomb were some Attic sherds dating from the 340s. Thus the probable date of its construction lay within 343-340. There was only one royal lady for whom so magnificent a tomb was appropriate, Eurydice, the Queen Mother, who would then have been over seventy years old in 340. We shall follow the example of Andronikos and call it the Tomb of Eurydice.[12] The dating of this vaulted tomb has destroyed the argument of those who, despite the passage in Plato, *Laws* 947 D, held that the vault first became known to Alexander in Asia and was not used in Europe until his latter years.[13]

Tomb II had some unique features. The top of the vault was covered with stucco, and a split in the stucco showed that the vault of the ante-chamber was made and stuccoed some time after the stuccoing of the main chamber. Then inside the main chamber the plastering had not been completed. It follows that the main chamber was closed precipitately. The reason was given by Justin who reported that Alexander 'hastened at full speed into Greece' (11. 2. 5, citato gradu in Graeciam contendit), where political troubles demanded his presence immediately.[14] Moreover, the fact that the burnt remains from the pyre, which included some pieces of the gold wreath within the chamber, were placed on top of the vault and not inside the chamber is an indication that the chamber was closed soon after the cremation of Philip's body.

The offerings in the Tomb of Philip were of the highest artistic standard. The gold coffer and the gold wreath were superb examples of the goldsmith's skill. The shield adorned with gold, silver and ivory, the gilded silver diadem with the snakeskin pattern, and the greaves engraved with gold were designed for ceremonial use. The numerous weapons and the armour were beautifully made, and the iron of the helmet and the cuirass was some form of mild steel, which when burnished shone like silver.[15] There were twenty silver vessels of varied shapes and supreme artistry, some having miniature heads at the base of the handles.[16] It is evident that Macedonia led the way in metallurgical techniques.

The art of painting developed from the direct simplicity of the frescoes of Tomb I to a sophisticated version of the same theme, the Rape of Persephone, on the back panel of the throne in the Tomb of Eurydice. The four horses facing the viewer are so divided that one sees Pluto and Persephone in the centre. Winged griffins, associated with the afterlife, were common to both tombs. A surprising novelty in the Tomb of Eurydice was a *trompe l'oeil* façade in which the illusion of depth was achieved by shading and perspective. This façade was painted on the internal backwall to make the viewer believe that there was a room beyond. It was placed there partly because the front wall of the Tomb was blocked from view by the frame wall. In Tomb II a similar façade was painted on the outer face of the front wall.

Splendid as these paintings are, they are surpassed by the fresco of the Royal Hunt in seven colours of exceptional purity in the space, 5.56 m by 1.16 m, between the cornice and the façade of Tomb II.[17] The scene is not an actual hunt but a composite one with a lion, a bear, a boar and two deer. Of the seven young men on foot six are shown in the nude as heroes in this dangerous sport, and one on the extreme right is wearing the tunic, cloak, boots and *kausia* (a 'warmer' cap), which were the traditional dress of the Royal Page.[18] The three riders are members of the royal family, who were required by Macedonian law to hunt on horseback. One is shown in the nude, his back to the viewer, so that he is unrecognisable – an obvious slight, which may mean that he was Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, who came

Fig. 10. Philip about to kill a lion

under suspicion as an accomplice in the murder. The dominant figure in the centre is a young rider, wearing a laurel wreath, who is presumably the new king. He is remarkable for his prominent eyes, and according to Andronikos he has the features of a young Alexander. But the hero of the hunt is the third rider, a mature, bearded man, who is about to despatch the mountain lion, the privilege of the king in any hunt. He is certainly the deceased king, who is buried in the main chamber. The interval in age between him and his successor fits only Philip and Alexander within the span of the fourth century.[19] The extraordinary thing about the mature man is the turning of his head to his right, so that he sees the lion with only his left eye. Any sighted man focusses his target with both eyes. This man is evidently sighted only with his left eye.[20] We know that Philip had lost the sight of his right eye in 354. All representations of him in silhouette on coins and on other media show only the left side of his face. Thus the fresco of the Royal Hunt alone proves that Tomb II is that of Philip. It is also a miracle of skill in composition and perspective.

In the main chamber fourteen ivory heads, an inch high but lacking the hair which has rotted away, had originally been attached to a funerary couch. They were portraits of men and women. One is of a mature, bearded

man with a prominent nose and strong expression. His right eye appears to be blind and in the brow above it there is a nick in the bone, due to a past injury; the left eye looks at the viewer. The head is undoubtedly that of Philip. Another head, of a young man in his 'teens, has the expression which was characteristic of Alexander. Three other heads, found together with these two, have been tentatively identified as those of Olympias, Amyntas and Eurydice. If so, they may be miniatures of the chryselephantine statues of these five persons which were being made for dedication in Philip's building at Olympia (p. 191 below); for some ivory limbs were found near the ivory heads.

Because cremation was carried out on a wood-fire, the bones of the deceased were somewhat shrunk but not destroyed. It was therefore possible to reconstitute the skeleton of the man in the main chamber and to determine his age at the time of death. His right eye socket had the mark of injury, and he was aged between forty and fifty. Both the injury and the age fit Philip. The age of the king in Tomb III was judged to be between twelve and fourteen, and he can only have been Alexander IV, who was born in 323 and died in 310/309. A woman aged 'about twenty-five', with a year or two either way, was buried in the antechamber of Tomb II, to which we come next.[21]

The antechamber was completed without haste. The queen was equipped for war or for hunting in the afterlife. For the offerings included a 'pectoral' (usually worn with a cuirass), two greaves, three spears or javelins, a quiver and a pile of arrows. The finest object was a gold quiver-cover. The bow was the prestigious weapon not of the Macedonians but of the Getae and the Scythians, who were famous as mounted archers. The same quiver-cover was shown on coins of the Scythian king Atheas, and a silver one from the same mould as that in the tomb was found in a Scythian royal burial in the Kuban.[22] The decoration of the gilded pectoral has close parallels in Thrace.[23] It is evident that this queen was not a Macedonian. When we take the age into account, she was either Meda, a daughter of the Getic king Cothelas, or a daughter of the Scythian king Atheas, if I am correct in thinking that she was married to Philip. It is of interest and may be relevant that, when a Getic or a Scythian king died, one of his wives took her own life or her life was taken and her body was buried with that of the king. Such a practice would explain how it came about that a woman of twenty-five died at the same time as Philip and was cremated beside him.[24]

3. The worship of Philip in Macedonia

As the intermediary between the gods and the Macedonian people the king sacrificed daily before dawn. His physical presence was imbued with divine power, but only if he had the approval of the gods. After death that power was thought to persist. For the weapons of all past kings were carried at

the head of the procession at the state festival, the Xanthica, each spring. In 323, when the Assembly of Macedones was discussing the succession to the throne, the corpse of Alexander was present, in order that 'His Majesty should be a witness to their decisions' (Just. 13. 4. 4, posito in medio Alexandri corpore, ut maiestas eius testis decretorum esset); and later the decisions of Eumenes and his council of officers were taken before a throne which was indicative of Alexander's presence.[25] The belief that there was a life after death was widely and strongly held in Macedonia. It was fostered particularly by the Orphic and Dionysiac religions, which were extensively practised in the fourth century. Thus a tomb at Derveni had a fragment of a commentary on an Orphic hymn and a krater with Dionysiac scenes in relief, and a tomb at Sedhes portraits of Persephone and Demeter on gold plaques, a statuette of Persephone in bone and a gold coin for Charon, the ferryman of the dead to the underworld.[26]

The literary evidence is confusing unless we distinguish Greek flattery from Macedonian belief. Interesting examples of the former are preserved in two late sources, the Scholia to D. 1. 5 and Aelius Aristides, which support one another in explaining that Philip banished or killed men who betrayed their city to him.[27] First (in 359 or 358) 'the Amphipolitans sacrificed to him as a god' (in gratitude for some benefit), and it was those responsible for setting up the sacrifices who were banished by Philip in 357. We may assume that there was an end also to those particular sacrifices. Second, at Pydna, which Philip captured in 357, there was a shrine, called the Amynteion, which the Pydnaeans had built 'when they were flattering his father'. There is an indication of a close relationship between Pydna and Amyntas in the fact that they both put on their coins an eagle striking a snake.[28] Those who admitted Philip into Pydna were executed on his orders (D. 1. 5). Brief though these statements are, they suffice to indicate that Greek city-states close to the Macedonian kingdom hoped to please the Macedonian king by treating him as a god in his lifetime. What happened to the Amynteion after 357? It would seem likely that Philip did not destroy the building (*hieron* and *neos* in the sources) but allowed the worship of his father to continue.

On the other hand within Macedonia there is evidence that some Macedonian kings were worshipped after death. 'The priesthood of Archelaus', mentioned in a Hellenistic inscription in Eordaea, can only mean that Archelaus had been worshipped after his death in 399 and still was so worshipped as a god.[29] The two offering places and the shrine at Aegeae were made for the worship after their death of two outstanding Macedonian kings, who can hardly be other than Amyntas and Philip. At Amphipolis in the Hellenistic period, when it was a fully Macedonian city, there was a priesthood of a Philip, who was probably Philip II rather than Philip V.[30] If so, there was a worship of Philip after his death as a god, the case being analogous to that of Archelaus.

Thus there are indisputable examples of some outstanding Macedonian

kings being worshipped in Macedonia after their death as gods. We learn more about this subject from the time of Alexander. He asked Zeus Ammon whether Hephaestion, who had died, was to be worshipped as a hero or as a god; and he accepted the answer that he should be worshipped as a hero. When Alexander died and his corpse was taken to Egypt, Ptolemy made sacrifices to him as 'a hero'.[31] The reason was that Alexander, then in his early thirties and in the full vigour of life, had asked the Macedonians for 'divine honours', i.e. for recognition as a god. The Macedonians had refused (Curt. 10. 5. 11). Ptolemy was anxious to show respect for that decision by the Macedonian Assembly. One of Alexander's wishes was that after her death Olympias should be 'dedicated to immortality' (Curt. 9. 6. 26, immortalitati consecretur), i.e. as a goddess. The splendour of the Tomb of Eurydice and the statue perhaps of her found near the shrine of Eukleia (p. 17 above) make it likely that she was worshipped after her death as a goddess.[32] One important deduction is that it lay in the power of the Assembly of Macedones to grant or withhold 'divine honours' to a king in his lifetime. That Alexander requested them and was hurt by the refusal suggests that at least one of his predecessors had been accorded that grant. The most probable recipient was Alexander's acknowledged rival, his father, Philip.

With this background we must consider the procession which entered the theatre at Aegeae for the national festival in October 336. The account by Diodorus was based on a description by a Hellenistic historian, whether Diyllus as I hold or Duris of Samos, and it is certain that that historian had access to reports by eyewitnesses.[33] It runs as follows. 'Together with other lavish displays there were statues of the twelve gods, fashioned with extreme artistry and amazingly equipped with a dazzling show of wealth; and with them in the procession a thirteenth statue fit for a god, that of Philip himself, for the king was showing himself enthroned with the twelve gods' (Diod. 16. 92. 5). This was above all a Macedonian occasion. The only rational explanation is that the Assembly of Macedones had granted 'divine honours' to Philip, and that at this festival on the eve of launching the full crusade against Persia he chose to celebrate his elevation to godhood.[34]

It is important to distinguish the Macedonian viewpoint from the attitude in most Greek city-states. To Macedonians Philip was in truth a descendant of Zeus through Heracles, their intermediary with the Olympian gods, and favoured by the gods beyond all men, when judged by the standard of success. For Macedonians to grant him 'divine honours' was to pay him the highest possible tribute, and it was also to recognise his parity with the gods in his services to them. In the Greek city-states at this time religious belief was weak. When Isocrates wrote in his last *Letter* that, once Philip had mastered the Persian king, there would be nothing left except 'to become a god', he meant that Philip would have reached the summit of human achievement. It had no religious overtones. In 324 in answer to

Alexander's request Sparta replied scornfully: 'We permit Alexander to be called a god if he so wishes.' At Athens Demosthenes remarked: 'Let him be son of Zeus or, if he prefers, son of Poseidon, for all I care.'[35] Sparta and Athens were living in a secular and no longer a religion-centred civilisation.

4. The Macedonian state and the greater kingdom

Philip was an exceedingly affable man. We learn this mainly from his dealings with the sophisticated Greeks of the city-states. In 346 he made such an impression on the Athenian envoys that Ctesiphon said he 'had never in all his long life seen so sweet and charming a man as Philip', and they commented on Philip's powers of memory and excellence as a speaker. In 338/7 'he showed a kindly face to all the Greeks both in private and in public' when he was proposing the formation of a Common Peace, and again during the gathering in October 336 'he was particularly eager to show a kindly face to the Greeks'. There was some truth in the statement that he owed his final position of leadership in the Greek world (*hegemonia*) 'more to his kindliness (*philophrosyne*) and his address (*homilia*) in diplomatic exchanges than to to his prowess in arms'.[36] For he persuaded the city-states to accept his proposals, to create the Greek Community and to undertake the crusade against Persia not by threats of military force but by considerate and enlightened diplomacy. In Macedonia he displayed this charismatic quality and this gift of oratory when as a young man he addressed assembly after assembly of soldiers – perhaps 10,000 of them – and raised their spirits from despair to confidence. He was kindly and considerate (*prosenes*) in his dealings with his men, and he advised Alexander as a young prince to associate with them, win their favour and show himself to be humane (*philanthropos*). All his subjects in Macedonia had the right of appeal to him as the final judge, and judging their appeals took much of his time. When an impoverished old lady had difficulty in obtaining an audience and upbraided him, he said he had no time. 'In that case', she burst out, 'give up being king.' Whereupon Philip heard her case and the cases of the others without delay. These personal qualities were combined with 'a brilliance of personality'.[37]

Philip owed much to the Friends and Companions who served as his loyal deputies and commanders. Isocrates wrote of them as 'the ablest of the Macedonians' and as 'Greeks of distinction and intelligence' whom Philip had attracted to his court. We hear more of the latter in our sources. Demosthenes denounced them all as traitors corrupted by gold and gifts of land. Theopompus held that they were selected not for ability but for lewdness and bestiality. Polybius saw the absurdity of the extreme views of Demosthenes and Theopompus, and he argued that many of the Greeks were serving the interests of their own city-state, and that their record of courage and energy in Philip's service was incompatible with Theopompus'

charges. One thinks of Eumenes of Cardia and Nearchus of Crete, who were certainly Greeks of outstanding courage, and of Aristotle and Theophrastus.[38] More important were 'the ablest of the Macedonians'. Many of them had come up through the School of Pages, 'a training ground for commanders and administrators' (p. 41 above), in which the numbers will have increased with Philip's expanding commitments. One may suggest an intake of 20 a year in 359, 30 a year in 346, 40 a year in 336 and 50 a year – the only recorded figure – in 331. Graduates of the School thus formed c. 340 the majority of the 800 Companions of whom Theopompus wrote so disparagingly.[39] There were other Macedonians, some leading men from Balkan tribes and Greeks 'of distinction and intelligence', who had been promoted to membership of Philip's Companionate. Euripides was an earlier example.

By these means Philip created a cadre of men who had the ability to act as military commanders, colonial administrators, and court officials. They and the king were interdependent, the one with the other, and the words of Polybius were true: 'These men by hard work and daring courage raised the petty kingdom of Macedonia to a position of the greatest and most glorious power.' An important department in Philip's administrative system was the Secretariat, which kept the *Journal* (*ephemerides*, 'dailies') and the correspondence to and from the king. Eumenes of Cardia was placed in that department by Philip in 343, and became Chief Secretary in the reign of Alexander. Philip's acts, movements and orders were recorded, and all 'letters' (such as those sent to Athens during 346) and all treaties were drafted in the Secretariat and copies were kept. The longest extant document is the *Letter* 'to the Council and Demos of Athens' in 340, which is an example of frank and detailed statement of complaints against Athens (p. 131 above); and reference is frequently made in inscriptions to a King's 'Letter'. While a *Journal* and an Archive may have been kept by his predecessors, the development of the department to deal with so wide a circle of states was due to Philip.[40]

Cordial relations between Philip and his Companions were essential if the administration was to be effective. To that end Philip himself entertained them in state banquets, participated in drinking-parties, engaged with them in athletic contests, and fought alongside them. He fostered competition for his favours, and he rewarded good service with 'promises and gifts', particularly of the revenues from landed estates, which were often much larger than those enjoyed by the rich in the city-states. He seems to have succeeded beyond all expectations; for we hear little or nothing of malcontents or deserters to Athens.[41] The speed and the efficiency of the combination of a constitutional monarchy and a capable administration, as compared with the slowness and incompetence of the contemporary Athenian democracy, proved so successful that the Macedonian kingdom rose from a condition almost of collapse to become the strongest state in eastern Europe. It was Philip's combination of Mace-

donian monarchy and an efficient administration which was to be the model for the Macedonian states and their imitators in Asia and Egypt for some two or three centuries.

The basis of the Macedonian state was the Assembly of Macedones, i.e. of the soldiers and ex-soldiers of the King's Forces. The spirit and the morale of this body were so revolutionised by Philip that it became the leading army in the Mediterranean area. Early in his rule he doubled its numbers by incorporating Upper Macedonians. There he stopped; for he wanted the citizen body to consist of those who were both Greek-speakers and Macedonians by tradition. He managed to create a national spirit without losing the strength of local loyalties, and he found it possible to deal effectively with an Assembly of which the potential members numbered some 30,000 men. When he needed more soldiers, he employed mercenaries and subjected them to strict discipline; and towards the end of his reign he deployed conscripted Balkan troops and Greek allied troops, as the need arose. But from first to last the secret of his military success lay in his élite and highly trained 'Macedones'.

There are indications that Philip inaugurated a state system of education in the areas from which he recruited those who on joining the King's Forces became 'Macedones'. In the early years in Asia Alexander recruited 'young men' from Macedonia whom he placed immediately in the brigades of the pikemen-phalanx. Since training in the use of the pike took a considerable time, and since Alexander did not want to deplete the Macedonian forces under Antipater's command, it follows that these young men had received military training as pikemen in their towns and were drafted from there into the existing infantry brigades in Asia. In 324, when 10,000 Macedonian soldiers were to return to Macedonia, Alexander undertook personally to have their sons in Asia 'brought up in the Macedonian manner in other respects and especially in being trained in the arts of war' (Arr. *An.* 7. 12. 2, based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus). Diodorus reported that Alexander 'provided money for their liberal upbringing and appointed educators who would give them the appropriate education' (*paideia*). Here we see that 'the Macedonian manner' meant more than a military training; rather there was a Macedonian system of education in Macedonia. It was probably the creation of Philip (rather than his predecessors) in his desire to raise the standard and the morale of his Macedonian infantrymen. The education was presumably like that in use in the School of Pages, namely a training in liberal arts and military expertise for four years, except that the Pages were to be cavalrymen and the others were to be infantrymen.[42] If this is correct, Philip was the originator of the Macedonian form of education, which produced an enlightened and loyal electorate, and which was to become a characteristic of the cities of the Hellenistic period.

Philip created the greater Macedonian kingdom, partly by persuasion as in Upper Macedonia, partly by conquest as in Paeonia and Chalcidice and occasionally by alliance as with Crenides-Philippi. But whatever the

means of association, 'he formed one kingdom and one people out of many tribes and nations',[43] so that there were no risings and no defections until the final stages of the Roman offensive in 197. It was a unity based not on uniformity but on variety and tolerance. Within the original kingdom each city administered its own affairs through an assembly and elected magistrates.[44] In the rest of the kingdom each tribe and nation administered its own affairs in its traditional manner, maintained its own religion and customs, and spoke its own language.[45] Because there was always a danger of raids from the north, the tribes trained their own militia and protected their own communications; but this was probably not the case in the cities of Chalcidice, which faced danger only from the sea. Thus cities, tribes and nations preserved their own identity and self-respect. The unifying factors were recognition of the king, obedience to his orders, payment of taxes, spread of the Greek language, safety of communications, and above all peace and prosperity within the kingdom. The originality of Philip is best appreciated if we compare his methods with those of Sparta in enslaving the Messenians and those of the Illyrian tribes in ruthless raiding and deporting of populations into serfdom.

Within the kingdom there was a clear definition of function. The king and the Macedones were what we may call the state or the government; for they decided all matters of foreign policy and they laid down the overall regulations within the kingdom. Their function was military; for they defended and extended the realm, and they manned the navy as marines. The rest of the population provided the support of these armed forces by engaging in intensive agriculture, commercial enterprise, road-maintenance and maritime trade. Except in parts of Chalcidice, there was no basis of slavery and no such scorn of manual labour or military service as had developed for instance at Athens. When Philip brought deported populations into the kingdom, he placed them on the land and in cities as free people. No one will deny that there were enforcements of law and restrictions on movement. For instance, it is evident that the villagers who were providing a support-system for a city of Macedones, for instance at Calindoea, were required to stay on the land; but that was not necessarily a hardship for a peasant population cultivating its own fields. The right of appeal to the king and the general absence of slavery were reasonable guarantees that respect was shown for what we now call 'basic human rights'.

5. The Macedonian Empire, the Common Peace and the sincerity of Philip

The Macedonian Empire in the Balkans was the first land-empire in Europe. Philip did not follow the example of Athens which in her maritime empire imposed 'democratic governments', sometimes garrisons, and settlements of her own citizens on good land. Nor did he follow the example

of Persia, which placed tyrants or oligarchies in Greek subject-cities and governed through satraps possessing almost absolute power. He did not disarm the subject peoples; indeed they supplied thousands of their soldiers to fight in his armed forces, and they undertook the defence of their own territory against raiders. During his conquest he inflicted heavy casualties on the ruling class, but thereafter he left the tribes to maintain their own institutions and administer their internal affairs. There were no garrisons of Macedonian troops. The cities which he planted did not consist of Macedonians alone. Rather, there was a mixture of Macedonians, Greeks and natives, who had a common interest in developing prosperity and maintaining peace. It was a daring experiment in an area notorious for its inter-tribal 'ethnic' warring, in which there had been no limit to barbaric reprisals.

For the history of civilisation in the cultural sense the treatment of the city-states by Philip and the Macedonians after their victory at Chaeronea was the most important of all Philip's achievements. He applied the principle which Epaminondas had proclaimed, 'that any who desired to lead the Greeks should preserve by generosity (*philanthropia*) what they had gained by military prowess';[46] for Philip left the city-states, guided by his power of persuasion, to work out their own solution, which took the form of the Greek Community and was to replace a century of internal faction and inter-state wars with the rule of law in each state, the Common Peace and collective security, and the crusade against Persia. Had Philip destroyed Athens in 336, as Thebes destroyed Orchomenus, he would have broken the heart of Greek civilisation. Instead, 'by his moderation, generosity and magnanimity', wrote Polybius, 'he changed their hostility into a willingness to cooperate fully with him'. Moreover, he achieved what Epaminondas had hoped to do: 'bring the Propylaea of the Acropolis of Athens to the forecourt of the Cadmea'. By respecting the integrity of Athens he brought the city-states into partnership with Macedonia for the liberation of the Greek cities in Asia and for the spread of Greek language and culture which was to follow under the leadership of Alexander. Philip was in a true sense, if only for a short time, 'the Leader of the Greeks' (*hegemon ton Hellenon*), and he opened the way to a better future.

The most important appreciations of Philip were those of contemporary historians. The opinion of Ephorus is known from the Proem and some early chapters of Diodorus XVI. He attributed the success of Philip not to 'chance' but to his 'excellence' (*arete*). The components of that excellence were 'strategic ability, personal bravery, brilliance of personality and reverence for the gods' (*eusebeia*). 'Strategic ability' was seen in his dealings with the Thessalians, towards whom he showed such loyalty (*eunoia*) that thereafter they always collaborated with him and with Alexander as well. Examples of his 'personal bravery' were his 'heroic fighting' in the battle against Bardylis which won him 'renown among the Macedonians'. Despite seven or eight wounds, which included the loss of one eye, the

laming of his right leg and the breaking of a collar-bone, he led the pikemen in their planned retreat and then their impetuous charge at Chaeronea. Philip and Alexander had a fearlessness in battle (and in hunting too), which some Greek critics found unintelligible, unless it was inspired by alcohol. We have commented already on the 'brilliance of personality'. Ephorus regarded 'the reverence for the gods' as genuine and as a part of Philip's 'excellence' (*arete*). He gave as an instance Philip's liberation of the oracle of Apollo from its desecrators, and he regarded the admission of Philip to the Amphictyony as a reward for that reverence. We have seen many other instances of a religious faith which was the mainspring of Philip's strength of purpose. In the judgement of Ephorus it was owing to his 'personal excellence' that Philip received and the city-states willingly granted to him 'the Leadership of all Greece'.[47]

What inspired Theopompus to write the history of this period as the *Philippica* was, according to Polybius, the realisation that 'Europe had never produced such a man all in all as Philip, son of Amyntas', and that Philip was a king 'by nature most fully endowed for excellence' (*arete*). What impressed Theopompus, as we may judge from the reflection of his work in the account by Justin, was the sheer ability of Philip in coping with the problems of the early years (Just. 7. 6. 3-9), in exploiting the divisions in the city-state world (8. 1. 3), in making Thrace 'a province of Macedonia' (8. 3. 6), in creating a united kingdom (8. 6. 2), and in determining a Common Peace for all of Greece (9. 5. 2). This appreciation was offset by the biting wit and cynicism of Theopompus, which accused Philip of duplicity and his Companions of bestiality. In theory one might argue that those qualities in Justin's account were due to the tendency of Trogus to undercut Philip and flatter Rome. But we learn from Polybius that they were carried to absurd lengths by Theopompus himself.[48] A fundamental reason was that Theopompus wrote as a champion of the city-state as it had been rather than as it was (8. 2. 11-12), and as a proponent of its complete freedom of action in all respects, so that he saw the defeat at Chaeronea as the end of Greek liberty and the final settlement as subjection to a king (8. 1. 3), who cleverly called himself a Leader (dux) (9. 3. 11, 8. 1. 3 and 9. 4. 2).

The same divergence of views appeared in the writings of Isocrates and in the speeches of Demosthenes and Hegesippus. To a great extent the final assessment of Philip's aims and integrity depends upon the interpretation of his actions in the last two years. The Athenians then honoured him with Athenian citizenship, set up a statue of him in the Odeum, crowned him with a golden crown at Aegeae and proclaimed there that anyone who plotted against Philip and sought asylum at Athens would be extradited.[49] Other states of the mainland may have done likewise; for the majority of them crowned Philip with golden crowns at Aegeae. More importantly, they provided their contingents of soldiers and ships for the crusade against Persia and rejoiced in the liberation of the Greek cities in

Asia. These are all indications that the opinions voiced by Ephorus and Isocrates were very widely held in the city-states and that the majority believed in the sincerity and generosity of Philip in his final settlement and in his future plans. The doubts of some scholars on these issues at least seem to be unfounded.[50] At the time of his death he had proved by his works that he was the greatest statesman Europe had known, and that his ambition to combine the Macedonian kingdom and the city-states in a common cause in Asia was about to be fulfilled.

The reaction of the liberated states was one of gratitude. The Ephesians placed a statue of Philip in the temple of Artemis, which was a higher compliment and a step nearer to reverence than the Athenian placing of his statue in the Odeum. The people of Eresus in Lesbos set up 'altars to Zeus Philippios', which indicated a worship of that aspect of Zeus which had inspired Philip as their liberator from oppression;[51] thus they came even closer to seeing Philip as fulfilling the purposes of the supreme Greek deity. It is probable that the democratic leaders in Eresus knew, through their fellow-citizen Theophrastus at Philip's court, that this was the form of reverence which would please Philip. In 337 Philip commissioned a circular building which was to be erected within the precinct of Zeus at Olympia. It was not a 'treasury' for the receipt of offerings (many states had such outside the precinct), but it was to contain the chryselephantine statues of Philip, Amyntas, Alexander, Eurydice and Olympias. It was thus a building of thanksgiving by Philip and his family to Zeus as their patron deity, a thanksgiving primarily for Philip's unanimous election as Leader of the Greeks and set in a most conspicuous place in the national shrine of the Greeks.[52] As Diodorus expressed it, Philip rejoiced that 'the gods were his allies', and it was 'in honour of the gods' that he designed for Greek participation the festival which ended with his assassination.[53] The sincerity of his religious belief is apparent.

Chronological table

382	Birth of Philip
368-365	Philip hostage in Thebes
364-359	Philip's separate command
359-357	Amyntas IV king and Philip his guardian
359	Defeat of Argaeus
358	Defeat of Bardylis
	Philip in Thessaly
357	Philip attacks Amphipolis
	Amyntas deposed and Philip elected king
	Outbreak of the Social War
	Capture of Pydna
	Alliance of Philip and the Chalcidian League
	Capture of Potidaea
356	Philomelus occupies Delphi
	Birth of Alexander (July/August)
	Alliance of Philip and Crenides
355	The Social War ends (summer)
	Third Sacred War declared (October)
	Siege of Methone starts
354	Fall of Methone
	Philip in Thessaly
	Battle of Neon
353	Pammenes in Macedonia (spring)
	Onomarchus defeats Philip twice (autumn)
352	Battle of the Crocus Field (spring)
	Philip turns back from Thermopylae (summer)
	Philip in Thrace
351	The Chalcidian League is warned
	Philip in Illyria
	The First Philippic of Demosthenes
350	Philip in Epirus
349	Philip at war with the Chalcidian League (midsummer)
	Philip engaged in Thessaly
348	Athens engaged in Euboea
	Fall of Olynthus (September)

347	Philip in Thessaly
	Philip in Thrace
346	Defeat of Cersobleptes
	Sparta and Athens rebuffed at Thermopylae
	Embassies to Philip
	Capitulation of Phalaecus (July)
	Sacred War terminated (autumn)
345	Diplomatic exchanges with Athens
	Philip in Dardania
344	Athenian mission in the Peloponnese
	Philip in Illyria
	Philip in Thessaly
	The Second Philippic (autumn)
343	Python at Athens
	Hegesippus appointed to deal with Philip
	Demosthenes prosecutes Aeschines (autumn)
342	Philip in Thrace
	De Halonneso
	Philip in Epirus (summer)
	Long campaign in Thrace
341	Philip's *Letter* of protest
	De Chersoneso (spring)
	Settlement of Thrace
	Athens approaches Byzantium
340	Demosthenes crowned (April)
	Philip attacks Perinthus
	Seizure of cornships
	Athens at war with Philip (autumn)
	Amphictyons declare the Fourth Sacred War
339	Philip in Northern Thrace
	Command in the Sacred War given to Philip (autumn)
	Philip at Elatea
338	Battle of Chaeronea (August)
	Philip in the Peloponnese
337	Creation of the Greek Community
	Marriage of Philip and Cleopatra
	Campaign in Illyria (autumn or spring 336)
336	First expeditionary force enters Asia (spring)
	Death of Philip (October)

Notes

I. The setting

1. This chapter is based mainly on Hammond in *HM* 2. 167-200. Shorter accounts in Ellis 42-4, Cawkwell 23-8 and Borza 181-97. For this paragraph see Paus. 2. 38. 1 (Temenion); Hdt. 8. 138. 2, Thuc. 2. 99. 3, Hdt. 5. 22.

2. Hesiod frs. 7 and 9 (Merkelbach): Homer, *Iliad* 8. 2 f. For the Greek origins and language of the Macedonians see Hammond in *HM* 2. 39-54. It should be noted that the Magnetes spoke an Aeolic dialect in early classical times, and that Hellanicus who visited the Macedonian court connected Macedon with Aeolus, the eponym of the Aeolic-speaking peoples. For an opposing view see E. Badian in B and B 33-51 and Borza 90-7, who regards all early literary evidence as 'ancestor-creation' (69 f.), a popular pursuit in modern America but difficult to achieve in a period in which family genealogy was zealously transmitted.

3. D. 9. 16; Aeschin. 2. 32; *IG* IV 94-5; *IG* IV^2 617, 15.

4. Thrasybulus of Calchedon, *For the Larissaeans*; D. 2. 15-21; Isoc. 5. 127.

5. In general see Hammond, *K* and Hammond, *KI* (Illyrians). Diod. 14. 92. 3; 15. 19. 2; 16. 2. 2; 15. 13. 3 (Molossians). For the raid by Sitalces in 429 see Thuc. 2. 98-101.

6. Anaxandrides in Athenae. 131 a-c. Hammond in *HM* 2. 95 and 158 (Paeonian kings); Arr. *An*. 1. 5. 2 (Agrianian king).

7. For the Phrygians see *HM* 1. 407-14 and Hdt. 8. 138. 2-3. Paus. 9. 30. 7 (burial of Orpheus); *HM* 1. 417.

8. Resources in *HM* 1. 12 f., 106 f., 123-86 and 190 f. Mineral deposits in *HM* 1 Map 1 and p. 13; Callisthenes in *FGrH* 124 F 24 (iron).

9. Curt. 3. 6. 17; Arr. *An*. 5. 27. 2 (by persuasion). X. *HG* 5. 2. 13; Ps.-Scymnus 624-5 (*poleis*).

10. Diod. 16. 4. 3. A. Gellius, *An*. 15. 20. 10 (Euripides); *FHG* 3. 691 = Porphyr. fr. 1; Tod, *GHI* 111 line 17. These views, which are controversial, are set out more fully in *CQ* 30 (1980) 461-5 and Hammond *MS* 58-67. Arist. *Pol*. 1297 b 1-2 and 13-15, and 1333 b 14-15.

11. For Amyntas III see Hammond in *HM* 2. 172-80; X. *HG* 6. 1. 11 (ship-timber); Tod, *GHI* 129 (alliance with Athens); X. *HG* 5. 2. 43, 5. 3. 1 and 5. 3. 3 (ravaging).

12. Isoc. 6. 46; Schol. D 1. 5 and Ael. Arist. 38. 715 d (shrine and priest). For Tomb I being that of Amyntas see most recently Hammond, *PhT* 74 ff., *RTV* 73 f.

13. Tod, *GHI* 129 line 21 ('the son of Errhidaios' should be restored in line 2, as in *GHI* 111 line 1). Hammond in *HM* 2. 14 f. (Bacchiadae). Just. 7. 5. 1 and Diod. 16. 2. 2 (hostage in Illyria), derived respectively from Marsyas Macedon (Hammond, *Sources J* 505) and Ephorus (Hammond, *Sources D* 81 and 85 f.). In 16. 2. 2 Diodorus erred in abbreviating, and he then made a hash of the ages of Epaminondas and Philip. This period as a hostage was neglected by Ellis and Cawkwell, seemed 'unclear' to Griffith in *HM* 2. 204 n. 5, and was 'problematic' for Borza 189,

for whom his own 'source criticism' for this period was, he confessed, 'minimal' (200 n. 7). The authority of Marsyas and Ephorus is for me decisive.

14. *FGrH* 72 (Anaximenes) F 4; for the attribution to Alexander II see Hammond, *HG* 536 (1959) and *MS* 98 and 148 (1989), whereas Griffith in *HM* 2. 419 f. and 705 f. argued for Alexander III, and Momigliano, *FM* 8 f., Ellis 53, Wirth 156 and J.N. Kalléris in *Stemmata*, Mélanges offerts à Jules Labarde, suppl. to *Antiquité Classique* 1987 p. 330 preferred Alexander I. X. *HG* 5. 2. 38 (Spartan advice).

15. Diod. 15. 71. 1 (Alorites); for his position and for that of Pausanias in the royal family see Hammond in *HM* 2. 182 and 184 and the table facing p. 176. For the assassination see *HM* 2. 183 with n. 1. D. 19. 194 (Apollophanes of Pydna) is inconsistent with the statement that Ptolemy killed Alexander (Diod. 15. 71. 1) but may be consistent with the statement that 'the party of Ptolemy' did so (*FGrH* 135/6 Marsyas Macedon F 3). At the time it was not thought so, since Ptolemy was trusted with the guardianship of Perdiccas and Philip (Schol. Aeschin. 2. 29). See my discussion in *HM* 181-4 and add Borza 191.

16. Aeschin. 2. 27-9; Nepos, *Iphicrates* 3. 2; Souda s.v. *Karanos*; Plu. *Pelop*. 27. 2-4 (hostages).

17. Philip and Epaminondas in Plu. *Pelop*. 26. 5 and Just. 6. 9. 7 ('triennio') and 7. 5. 2-3, the latter passage deriving from Marsyas Macedon on my analysis, Plu. *Lysander* 8. 4. At Susa X. *HG* 7. 1. 33-40; Diod. 15. 76. Beloch 3. 1.^{2} 189 ('Wettkriechen').

18. Theban supremacy in Plu. *Pelop*. 15. 1-3 and Diod. 15. 78. 4. The final quotation is from Cawkwell 27. Ellis 43 f., following A. Aymard in *REA* 56 (1954), dated Philip's time at Thebes to 369-367 and therefore concluded that Philip was too young to learn any lessons there. For my dating see *HM* 2. 181 and 186 n. 1, and Griffith in *HM* 2. 205. In two excellent articles M.B. Hatzopoulos, 'La Béotie et la Macédoine à l'époque de l'hégemonie thébaine', Editions du CNRS (Paris, 1985): *La Béotie antique* 247-56, and 'Philip's time as a hostage at Thebes' in *Archaeognosia* 4 (1985-86) 37-58, supports Aymard. For Oropus see Diod. 14. 17. 1-3, Isoc. 14. 20 and 37, and Diod. 15. 76. 1.

II. The sources of information

1. Momigliano, *FD* 530; he failed to note that *toxeuma* was used in the same context by Marsyas Macedon (*FGrH* 135/6 F 16); R. Laqueur, *The Historian Ephorus*.

2. Hammond, *Sources D*, especially p. 81. The method was generally approved, e.g. by G. Wirth in *Sitzb. Öster. Akademie* (Vienna, 1993) 7. n. 18 'exemplarisch scheint mir immer noch die Analyse von B. 16 durch N.G.L. Hammond'.

3. See *THA* 32 f.

4. Hammond, *Sources J*; Griffith in *HM* 2. 208 f., 560 and 627; for Marsyas Macedon see W. Heckel in *Hermes* 108 (1980) 444 ff.

5. See also my analysis in *THA* 87-90.

6. G. L. Barber in *OCD* 1059. *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 27.

7. Hammond, *Sources J* 504.

8. Ibid. 504 f.

9. Isoc. 5. 128, 154; *Ep*. 3; Griffith in *HM* 2. 285.

10. F.W. Walbank in *OCD* 956; for Diyllus see *THA* 33 f. and 174 n. 20.

11. Andronikos, *V* 24, 50 f.; *Ergon* 1983. 30, 1990. 83 f.; *EMTh* 3, 1989 [1992] 28, 34.

12. See Hammond, *KI* 243 f., *HM* 2. 14 f., *MS* 32 f. with references to other views, to which may be added that of Borza 191 'an Illyrian chieftain, Sirrhas'.

13. This was sometimes not understood, e.g. by Badian in A and B 100 f. and 106 on Philip's marriage to Audata 'to bring a foreign bride home involved some political risk at home'. Of Philip's seven or eight wives only one was from Macedonia proper.

14. *Ergon* 1990. 83 with Figs. 116-18. Professor Paliadeli kindly showed me the statue in September 1991. *EMTh* 3, 1989 [1992] 28.

15. Discussed by U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in *Hermes* 54 (1919) 71, whose text reading 'Irra' required different scansions for this hiatus and that in the second line.

16. Hermes was appropriate to a place in the Agora, as at Pella (see I. Akamatis in *EMTh* 3, 1989 [1992] 84).

17. See my arguments in *HM* 2. 16 with n. 3, 182 f. with notes mentioning those who accepted these statements as true or entertained them as worthy of report (to the latter group add Tsimboukides 83 f. and Borza 190-3).

18. *Arch. Eph.* 1987. 379.

III. The military revolution and the addition of Upper Macedonia

1. Inscription in *REG* 97 (1984) 45 ff. Diod. 15. 78. 4 and *HM* 2. 186.

2. Speusippus, *Epist. Socrat.* 30. 12 and Carystius of Pergamum in *FHG* 4. 356 F 1; Griffith in *HM* 2. 206 f.

3. See Hammond, *TUS*; Asclepiod. *Tact.* 5. 1 and 4. 1 and 3 for pike, shield and close order; Arr. *An.* 1. 15. 5 and 7-8 for cavalry lance.

4. See Hammond, *Ep.* 460-2; in *HM* 2. 63 f.; Thuc. 4. 83. 1.

5. *SEG* 23. 471, 13 and Hammond, *Ep.* 527 f. and in *HM* 2. 185. IG^2 II 190 and 110 = Tod, *GHI* 143 with *HM* 2. 19 and 186.

6. Tod, *GHI* 146; Aeschin. 2. 30; Diod. 16. 3. 3. Zahrnt 101.

7. *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 286; Hammond in *HM* 2. 191-3 and *MS* 92 with references.

8. *IG* IV^2 94 II, 6-20; Ps.-Scylax 66 (Ludias); Hammond in *HM* 2. 194. Forts on Mt. Khortiatis and at Manastir by the Iron Gates of the Axius; Hammond in *HM* 2. 146 and 197.

9. Polyaen. 4. 10. 1; Diod. 16. 2. 4-6 and 4. 4-5.

10. Just. 7. 2. 8-12, based on Marsyas Macedon (see Hammond, *Sources J* 497 and 501).

11. Satyrus in Athenae. 557 b; so also Souda s.v. *Karanos*. Hammond, *Sources J* 505. The shrine at Lebadea will have been visited by Philip during his period as a hostage. At Oropus, also in Boeotia until late 338, 'Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, a Macedonian', that is as a commoner, was granted special status at Oropus in *IG* VII 4251, when Philip was already king. For the interpretation in the text see Hammond in *HM* 2. 651 n. 1 and *MS* 157 n. 1, and D. Kanatsoulis in *Makedonika* 9 (1969) 237 ff.

12. For these views see Griffith in *HM* 2. 208 and 702 f.; Ellis 47 and 250 and at length in *JHS* 91 (1971) 15 ff. M.B. Hatzopoulos in A and B held that there was no king from 360 until 357/6 and that Philip was simply 'guardian'; see further references in his article. He placed the death of Perdiccas III in 360 on the basis of the Oleveni inscription, which mentions 'king Philip'; but it seems more likely from comparison with *SGDI* 1339 to refer to Philip V (see *ZA* 20 (1970) 133). Just. 9. 8. 1, giving Philip II a reign of 25 years, is the only passage in support of Hatzopoulos'

date, but it was derived probably from Cleitarchus, an inaccurate writer; see Hammond, *Sources J* 504.

13. Diod. 16. 2. 6; for their relationship to Archelaus see Hammond in *HM* 2. 175 f.

14. Diod. 16. 3. 3-4; for Cotys being alive after the death of Perdiccas see Athenae. 248 e and perhaps *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 31. So Ellis 250 n. 5; *contra* Griffith in *HM* 2. 208.

15. Polyaen. 4. 2. 17 (Amphipolis). Ellis 49 f. is preferable to Griffith in *HM* 2. 211, who, writing of '3,000 Greek mercenary hoplites', called the campaign 'a small affair' and the battle 'a military picnic'. Cawkwell is unduly brief. The contrast between 'hoplites' at Diod. 16. 2. 6 and 'mercenaries' at 16. 3. 5-6 should not be overlooked.

16. It is possible that Philip ambushed the troops of Argaeus, as Just. 7. 6. 6 said, his source being probably Theopompus (see Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503). But Justin abbreviated the account of Trogus so severely that in other respects preference should be given to Diod. 16. 2. 6, 3. 5-6 and 4. 1, which is derived from Ephorus (Hammond, *Sources D* 81 and 85 f.).

17. D. 23. 121; Diod. 16. 4. 1, based on Ephorus is preferable to statements by Attic orators that Philip made a treaty of alliance with Athens ([D.] 7. 10; D. 2. 7).

18. Polyaen. 4. 2 10 and Frontin. 4. 1. 6 are discussed in Hammond, *TUS*, attributing both passages also to Ephorus as source. *EM* 699. 45 f. refers probably to this campaign.

19. For the Infantry Guard and its name see *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 348 and Hammond, *VG* 403 f.

20. That is also the implication of the statement in Speusippus' Letter, cited on p. 18 above, that Philip 'had his own armed force ready for action at the death of Perdiccas'. Not mentioned by Borza 201 f.

21. For this pass see Hammond and Hatzopoulos in *AJAH* 7 (1982) 128 ff. with Map 1 and Plate 2. Diodorus wrote of 'the Macedonian cities' as those over which Macedonia had nominal suzerainty and of enemy-occupied Upper Macedonia as Illyrian territory. See Hammond, *B* 7.

22. The sources for the battle – Diod. 16. 4. 5-7 and Frontin. 2. 3. 2 – are discussed in Hammond, *B*. Many Illyrians were killed by the cavalry which pursued over a long distance (see Hammond in *CQ* 28 (1978) 138).

23. Athenae. 557 b-c, citing Satyrus, *Life of Philip*. Ellis 46 f. thought it possible that the marriage was before the battle; but Bardylis had every intention of ousting Philip altogether and had no reason then to grant him a royal marriage.

24. See Hammond, *WF*, especially 215 f., and Hammond, *ACI* 69-73.

25. For the marriage to Phila see Athenae. 557 c. She was a sister of Derdas, the name of more than one king of the Elimeotae. It was evidently this Derdas who was taken prisoner at Olynthus by Philip in 348 (Athenae. 436 c); he had presumably fled rather than join Philip's court. For this family see Hammond in *HM* 2. 19. Ellis 46 put the marriage before the death of Perdiccas III or in 359; but the royal house of Elimeotis must have regarded Macedonia then as near collapse. Griffith in *HM* 2. 214 reversed the order given by Satyrus and put the marriage to Phila before that to Audata; he had a note on the subject in *CQ* 20 (1970) 70. For Dardania being the centre of Bardylis' kingdom see Hammond, *KI* 248-52 and *MS* 91; a different opinion by M.B. Hatzopoulos in *L'Illyrie méridionale et l'Épire dans l'antiquité*, ed. P. Cabanes (Clermont-Ferrand, 1987).

IV. Philip exploits factions in and wars between city-states, 358-354

1. Hammond, *Sources J* 498 and 502 f.

2. For the background see Westlake 127-66 and Griffith in *CQ* 20 (1970) 72 f., arguing against C. Ehrhardt in *CQ* 17 (1967) 296.

3. Satyrus in Athenae. 557 c. The taunt that Philinna was a chorus-girl (Just. 9. 8. 2 'saltatrix'; cf. 13. 2. 11) came probably via Cleitarchus (*THA* 90-3) from the democratic opposition in Larissa.

4. For the first Just. 7. 6. 8-9, giving as Philip's aim not loot but military reinforcement. In abbreviating Trogus' account Justin has misapplied Trogus' mention of Larissa (there is no need to emend the text). For the second Diod. 16. 14. 2, derived from Ephorus (Hammond, *Sources D* 81 and 85 f.) and therefore dependable. The word *epanelthon* should be retained. See Griffith in *HM* 2. 220-30 for discussion and references, especially to M. Sordi, *LT*. Griffith dated the second appeal to 355; but on my interpretation Ephorus described it before the origin of the Sacred War.

5. Just. 7. 6. 10, derived from Theopompus; Satyrus in Athenae. 557 c; Plu. *Alex*. 2. 2, on which see comments in Hammond, *Sources A* 71.

6. Diod. 16. 8. 2, drawing on the dependable Ephorus (Hammond, *Sources D* 81 and 85 f.), who may have given Philip's claim from his Note to the Athenians. At 8. 1. 3, when he wrote of Philip's dealings with the city-states, Justin called Philip 'rex' for the first time; previously for Justin he had been the guardian. He did not mention Amphipolis.

7. See Griffith in *HM* 2. 230-8; Tod, *GHI* 150.

8. *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 30 A and B, mentioning the Council. Griffith, loc. cit. argued against G. E. M. de Ste Croix in *CQ* 13 (1963) 111 ff., who held on rather a priori grounds that a secret treaty or clause was 'a constitutional impossibility for a democracy' (114).

9. Hammond, *Sources D* 81 f. and 85.

10. See *HM* 1 Map 1 and p. 13 for the locations of the mineral deposits.

11. Thuc. 4. 109. 4

12. Hdt. 7. 185 and 8. 127.

13. For the Ionic migrations from Athens see my *HG* 84. Zahrnt 25, assuming that the Ionic settlers came from the north, dated their arrival to the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries. Sub-Mycenaean and Protogeometric pottery at Torone supports my proposed dating (*Ergon* (1990) 95). For the area which they occupied see Zahrnt's Map 1.

14. The date is inferred from that of the expansion of the Macedonians; see Hdt. 8. 127, Thuc. 2. 99. 3, *HM* 1. 440.

15. See Hammond *LIMC* 254.

16. D. 19. 230 and 266.

17. *TAPA* 69 (1938) 44 ff. no. 2; see Griffith in *HM* 2. 243.

18. Libanius' Argument to D. 1; D. 2. 14; 6. 20; 23. 107-8. Tod, *GHI* 158. Griffith in *HM* 2. 244-6; Ellis 67 f.

19. Diod. 16. 22. 3, a brief note drawn from a Hellenistic text-book (Hammond, *Sources D* 90 f.). Plu. *Alex*. 3. 8 and Just. 12. 16. 6 (Parmenio). The subjection of the Illyrians and the Paeonians was mentioned by Demosthenes in 349 (D. 1. 23). For the location of Grabus' kingdom see Hammond, *KI* 244.

20. Diod. 16. 8. 5; Plu. *Alex*. 3. 8.

21. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Philippoi*. Diod. 16. 3. 7 under 360/359, and 16. 8. 6 under 358/357. I suggest that Diodorus omitted the relief of Crenides by Philip and that

the expression 'coming to the city Crenides' referred to the second visit, not to the relief of the city. Appian *BC* 4. 105. Strabo 7 fr. 35.

22. Strabo 7 frs. 33-5. Scymnus 656 f.; for the date of parts of his account and for his use of Ephorus see Hammond, *Ep.* 515. Griffith in *HM* 2. 364 thought of large numbers of Macedonian settlers and of garrisons in addition in these cities.

23. Aeschin. 2. 72; the events are to be dated between the flight of the Athenians from the Chersonese and their return in 353/352.

24. M. B. Hatzopoulos, D. Knoepfer and V. Marigo-Papadopoulos in *BCH* 114 (1990) 639-68. *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 52; Polyaen. 4. 2. 15; I picked up four sling-stones in half an hour on the site in September 1991. Strabo 7 frs. 22 and 22a (catapult arrow). Diod. 16. 31. 6 and 34. 4-5 (see Hammond, *Sources D* 90 f. from a Hellenistic text-book). For Justin see Hammond, *Sources J* 505. For the dates see Hammond, *DSW* 57 f.

25. See Hammond in *CQ* 28 (1978) 128 f. and *MS* 150; Bosworth in *CQ* 23 (1973) 251 derived *asthetairoi* from a non-existent word *asistoi* 'closest in kin' (to whom?). Griffith in *HM* 2. 428 and 712 thought it meant 'best'; but the cavalry of Upper Macedonia, recently formed and used only in the Balkans by Alexander (Arr. *An.* 1. 2. 5), would not have surpassed the long-established squadrons of cavalry, let alone the Royal Squadron.

26. For Amphipolis see Tod, *GHI* 150; *SNG* 5 Pt. 4. Pl. 69 for Paeonian coins; for the Bisaltae Livy 44. 45. 8, 45. 29. 7 and 30. 3.

27. Diod. 16. 4. 2, 22. 3, 71. 2. He drew in these passages from Ephorus and a Hellenistic text-book (see Hammond, *Sources D* 81 and 90 f.).

28. See Hammond, *VG* 403 f.

29. Anthemus in D. 6. 20; see *HM* 1. 190 f.; for Upper Macedonia Thuc. 2. 99. 6.

30. C. Vatin in *Proc. 8th Epigr. Conf.* (Athens, 1984) 259-70, discussed by Hammond, *KL.* The relevant lines are 4-5, 9, 18, 21, 24-5. Calindoea had been held by the pretender Pausanias c. 360.

31. D. 1. 5 (Pydna). Diod. 16. 31. 6 and 34. 5 (Methone). D. 9. 26 (Methone utterly destroyed). Just. 7. 6. 16 and Hammond, *Sources J* 505. The destruction and abandonment of the site is certain, because I found on the surface some sling-stones, no doubt from the siege. Griffith in *HM* 2. 348-64, writing before the publication of the new inscriptions about Philippi and Calindoea, had very different views.

32. This point was not realised by those who inferred that Alexander Lyncestes, for instance, was a member of the Lyncestid royal house, or Perdiccas of the Orestid royal house. See Hammond in *CQ* 30 (1980) 458 with n. 12. A list of such 'Macedones' was given by Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3-10, ending with the explanation in the case of Nearchus that 'he lived in Amphipolis'. For a different interpretation see Griffith in *HM* 2. 353.

33. Diod. 16. 3. 3; 16. 53. 3; 16. 75. 4. *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 217 and Plu. *Alex.* 15. 3 with obvious exaggeration. *Syll*^{3}. 1. 332. *AJA* 42 (1938) 246.

34. Diod. 16. 8. 3, drawing on Ephorus, for the importance of Amphipolis in the growth of Macedonia. For drainage of land near Philippi see Theophrastus *CP* 5. 14. 5. Flood control was necessary before the waterway to Pella could be stabilised.

35. Recently by Price 43 no. 54 for a silver tetradrachm. There are no coins of Orestes, king as a minor for two years.

36. C. Hersh in *AJN* 1 (1989) 33 ff. He very kindly sent me a photograph of the coin. For the coin hoards see Price in *NC* 89 (1979) 230 ff., differing from G. Le Rider. In general see Hammond, *LIMC* 254 ff. and in *HM* 2. 665 f. The trident may have indicated the development of a Macedonian navy.

37. See *SNG* 5 Pt. 4 Pl. 69, wrongly put under Paeonia, citing May, *CD*; and Hammond in *HM* 1. 93 f. and 2. 668 with n. 4.

38. In *HM* 1. 16 ff. I reported the population figures in 1961. These were 990,510 for approximately the old kingdom, 853,221 for approximately Upper Macedonia, 692,741 for approximately Paeonia, and 681,015 for approximately East Macedonia. The total of 3,217,528, even if one reduces it by a third for the time of Philip, opens our eyes to the difference in scale between the Macedonian kingdom and the largest mainland city-state, Athens, which I estimated at some 400,000 including resident aliens and slaves c. 360 (*HG* 528).

39. Satyrus in Athenae. 557 b *kata polemon*, not as in the Loeb edition 'a new wife with each new war', which would have given him almost countless wives.

40. Curt. 5. 2. 20. See Hammond, *MS* 32 f. and 172.

41. Plu. *Mor.* 760b; E. A. Fredricksmeyer in *TAPA* 116 (1986) 218; the Page in the Royal Hunt Fresco on the spectator's right wears a *kausia*. See Hammond *RP* 262-4 for the early existence of the School of Pages.

42. Ael. *VH* 14. 48. Curt. 8. 6. 2-6. Athenae. 345d (four minas a day).

43. Plato, *Gorgias* 471 a-c and 526d. *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 225.

44. *SNG* 5 Pt. 3 Pl. 45-6.

45. Andronikos, *V* 65 (the tumulus) 'of great significance'; Hammond, *PhT* 73-4.

46. Lucian, *Tim.* 54; Andronikos, *Painting* 371 ff.

V. Philip's involvement with the city-states, 354-348

1. For the membership of the Council see G. Daux in *BCH* 81 (1957) 95 ff.

2. Diod. 16. 28. 4, following Demophilus' account of the Sacred War (see Hammond, *Sources D* 84 ff.). The chronology in this book is that of Hammond, *DSW*, which according to Griffith in *HM* 2. 224 n. 2 'has won a wide acceptance although naturally there are dissenters'. Since he wrote, Buckler 148 ff. has dated the Amphictyonic declaration a year earlier, on grounds which to me are unconvincing.

3. Diod. 16. 29. 1 'Thessalians'; 16. 30. 4 defeated; 16. 35. 1 'after this Philip entered Thessaly' (cf. Just. 8. 2. 1); Diod. 16. 31. 6 (reading Pagasas for Pagas). Arr. *An.* 1. 9. 9.

4. Diod. 16. 34. 1-2; D. 23. 183; Hammond, *DSW* 58 ff. (Pammenes). Polyaen. 4. 2. 22 (see my article forthcoming in *Antichthon*). *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 249 reported a minor battle between Philip's mercenaries and an Athenian commander, who operated probably from Neapolis.

5. Polyaen. 2. 38. 2.

6. Diod. 16. 35; Just. 8. 2. 3 (laurel wreaths), following Theopompus (Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 502 f.); Just. 8. 2. 4 'sanguine et caedibus'. Paus. 10. 2. 5, following Demophilus on the fate of Onomarchus, whose corpse was crucified by Philip (Diod. 16. 35. 6, also following Demophilus). Griffith in *HM* 2. 274 f. with n. 4 did not accept the drowning. The presence of the Athenian fleet was attributed by Diod. 16. 35. 5 to 'chance' rather than to the alliance; see Hammond, *DSW* 67 f.

7. Diod. 16. 38. 1. Athenae. 557 c.

8. Polyaen. 4. 2. 19 (Pharsalus and Pelinna); Diod. 18. 56. 5 (Tricca and Pharcadon). Griffith in *HM* 2. 270 (Crannon). Steph. Byz. s.v. Philippoi (Gomphi). Livy 32. 12. 6-9 and Hammond in *HM* 3. 426 (Enipeus valley). Polyaen. 4. 2. 19 and Just. 8. 3. 1 (Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 502, following Theopompus). Griffith in *HM* 2. 290 ff. (Perrhaebia and Magnesia). D. 1. 22 and Scholia ad loc. (Pagasae and Magnesia).

9. Diod. 16. 36. 1, 37. 1 – 38. 2; D. 19. 84; Just. 8. 2. 8-12, based on Theopompus (Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503).

10. D. 19. 84. Diod. 16. 38. 3-5 and 40. 2 (the Persian king giving Thebes 300 talents of silver).

11. Diod. 16. 34. 3 (Sestus; from a Hellenistic text-book according to Hammond, *Sources D* 90). Diod. 16. 34. 4; D. 23. 14 (Amphipolis); D. 23. 103 (settlers) and *IG* II^2 795, 134 and 1613, 297; D. 3. 4; D. 1. 13 (illness). For chronology see Hammond, *DSW* 57; contra J. R. Ellis in *REG* 79 (1966) 636 ff.

12. Aeschin. 2. 72; D. 4. 34; D. 59. 3.

13. *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 127 ('Insolence'). D. 4. 48. Hammond, *Ep.* 533 f. (Arybbas) and 545 (coinage), differing from P.R. Franke, *Die antiken Münzen von Epirus* (Wiesbaden, 1961) 44 f. Hammond in *HM* 2. 20 f. (Tymphaea and Parauaea). On the other hand R.M. Errington in *GRBS* 16 (1975) 48 and J. Heskel in *GRBS* 29 (1988) 190 argue that Arybbas was expelled at this time. For the extent of the Chalcidian League see Zahrnt 107-10.

14. Hammond, *Sources J* 498 f. Diod. 16. 52. 9 (probably from a Hellenistic text-book; see Hammond, *Sources D* 90). *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 137-8 (Pherae).

15. *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 49-51 recorded three expeditions to help the Chalcidians; see Cawkwell in *CQ* 12 (1962) 130 ff.

16. Aeschin. 3. 87 and Plu. *Phoc.* 12. 1 (Phocis and Philip). Plu. *Phoc.* 12 – 14. 1 (Athens). D. 21. 197 (cavalrymen sent to Olynthus). *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 50 (Charidemus). See Griffith in *HM* 2. 318 with n. 2, summarising other interpretations.

17. On the other hand they or some of them were serving in the east Aegean that summer with Chares, Charidemus and Phocion (*IG* II^2 207).

18. Diod. 16. 53. 2-3. D. 9. 11 and 56; 19. 267.

VI. Consolidation by Philip and opposition led by Demosthenes

1. See *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 217; Just. 8. 3. 1-5 with Hammond, *Sources J* 499 f. He was a 'slave' as a subject of a king, and the *penestae* were serfs in some parts of Thessaly.

2. See Hammond, *SMO*.

3. The inscription is in *BCH* 21 (1897) 112. For Balla and Pythion see *HM* 1. 154 f. and *HM* 2. 656. Hampl 37 n. 3 attributed to Philip the annexation of Pythion. See also Hammond, *MS* 157.

4. See Hammond in *Studies Edson* 212-17 with references, and add the identification of Kellis at a site near Petres in Hammond and Hatzopoulos 1982. 141 f. The reading in Stephanus Byzantius s.v. Eordaia should be 'Illyria' for 'Iberia' (see *HM* 2. 654).

5. *EMTh* 2 (1988) 451 f. (Kalyva), and G. Karamitrou-Mentessidi, *Aiani of Kozani* (Thessaloniki, 1989) 33 f.

6. W. Unverzagt in *Germania* 32 (1954) 19 f. See also *ZA* 3 (1953) 260 fig. 3 and Hammond in *HM* 2. 653 with Map 8.

7. *CAH* 4^2. 250 (Trebenishte). Hammond and Hatzopoulos 1982. 135. Thuc. 2. 100. 2 and 2. 98. 1. *Monumentet* 1971. 1. 43 ff., and *Studia Albanica* 1972. 1. 85 ff.

8. Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503. D. 1. 22 and 2. 17; Diod. 16. 8. 7; Polyaen. 4. 2. 18; *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 249 (mercenaries).

9. P. Chrysostomou in *EMTh* 1 (1987) 150 with a map which suggests that the extension 'in length' was inland in order to include the low hill.

10. See Ps.-Scylax 66; Livy 44. 46. 5-8; Strabo 330 frs. 20 and 23. Further in *HM* 1. 147-9 with Map 16.

11. See *AG*^{2} 126, 229 and 240.

12. Andronicus, *V* 38 and 49 f. (Aegeae). The Gate at Edessa, resembling that of Messene, and some of its walls may date from this time.

13. Diod. 18. 4. 4-5. For the genuineness of the plans see *AG* 281-5.

14. Diod. 16. 44. 1; 52. 3; 40. 2. The chronology of Diodorus' narrative is confused. For the alliance see Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 2 with Bosworth *C* 229 f., Cawkwell in *CQ* 13 (1963) 128 and Griffith in *HM* 2. 309.

15. For such lists see Tod, *GHI* 140 and for the chronology of these lists see Hammond, *DSW* 62 ff. with further references.

16. For the date see Cawkwell in *CQ* 12 (1962) 122 ff. and Griffith in *HM* 2. 296 f. P-C 184 preferred the autumn of 351. For criticisms of the speech see Cawkwell 80 ff.

17. The 5,000 infantry sent by sea to Thermopylae were conveyed in 50 triremes. See my article forthcoming in *Antichthon*.

18. [D.] 59. 3-5.

19. For these forces see *FGrH* 328 (Philochorus) F 49-51; see Griffith in *HM* 2. 322 n. 1. It appears from *IG* II^2 207 that Chares and Charidemus, the commanders nominally in Chalcidice, were in the east Aegean in early summer 348. See Cawkwell in *CQ* 12 (1962) 131 f. and 134 f. for Athens' strategies.

20. Tod, *GHI* 158 line 6 (penalty); Diod. 15. 79. 6 and 16. 55. 1; Tod, *GHI* 166, restoring Olynthians in the text rather than Methonaeans.

21. In Strabo 447 for the translation 'those next to Olynthus' see LSJ s.v. *hupo* B I, i.e. towards Sithonia as in Str. 7 fr. 11. Griffith in *HM* 2. 365 and on to p. 379 thought of political deprivation of these cities, but Demosthenes explicitly meant physical destruction. Griffith gave full references to previous writers on this subject. See Hammond, *Sources D* 83 and 89, and *Sources J* 499 and 503. Cawkwell 90 and n. 30 seems to accept Demosthenes' statement.

22. In *Recherches Franco-Helléniques* I (Thessaloniki, 1990) in Memory of D. Lazarides, 109-33 with 22 Plates. On the other hand, M.B. Hatzopoulos in *Rev. Ét. Gr.* 103 (1990) 526 and 528 held that the inscription referred to the northwestern part of Chalcidice, partly because he equated the Cissus of the inscription with the Cissus on Mt Khortiatis, for which see *HM* 1. 187. The tendency to duplicate or even triplicate a name in Macedonia makes topography difficult. On balance I find Vocotopoulou's location persuasive.

23. See *Syll.*^{3} 1. 332 and Griffith in *HM* 2. 366 f. He and others have thought that Alexander's cavalry squadrons 'from Bottiaea' and 'from Apollonia' were respectively from 'Bottike' (the interior of the Chalcidic peninsula) and from the Chalcidic Apollonia, and therefore that many cavalrymen had estates in Chalcidice. But I take Bottiaea to be the part of the old kingdom west of the Axius river and the Apollonia to be the one near Lake Bolbe. For the mineral resources see Map 1 in *HM* 1 and note that Just. 8. 3. 12 'argenti metalla in Thracia' probably means the silver mines at Stratonicea (near Stagira); indeed the gold mines ('auraria') of the preceding sentence may also be there, since there are no gold mines 'in Thessalia'. For the mines see Map 1 in *HM* 1.

24. Diod. 15. 55, following Diyllus (see Hammond, *Sources D* 83 and 89). Arr. *An.* 1. 11. 1 refers to the same festival. D. 19. 192-5 related the story of Satyrus' request, which Diyllus evidently repeated.

VII. The strengths and weaknesses of the city-state

1. For this period see A.J. Graham, 'The colonial expansion of Greece', in *The Cambridge Ancient History* 3. 3 (1982) 83-159.
2. The epigram is preserved in Diod. 11. 33. 2.
3. *Anth. Pal.* 7. 258.
4. Thuc. 1. 18. 3 and 1. 102. 4.
5. Thuc. 2. 41. 1. The Funeral Speech of Pericles, as reported by Thucydides, was a patriotic appraisal of the Athens of 446-431.
6. Thuc. 1. 19 and D. 9. 40.
7. Thuc. 1. 56. 2 and 103. 4.
8. Thuc. 3. 80-5. The translation is that of Richard Crawley in the Everyman edition.
9. Plato *Ep.* 353 d.
10. Isoc. *Panegyricus* 115 f. and 167 f.
11. Isoc. *Ep.* 9. 8 and 14.
12. Plato *Ep.* 353 d; Theopompus in Just. 8. 1. 1, for which see Hammond *Sources J* 498 and 503.
13. Isoc. *Ep.* 1. 7-8.
14. Isoc. *Ep.* 9. 18-9.
15. Tod, *GHI* 144.
16. Tod, *GHI* 144.
17. Aeneas Tacticus 1. 6-7 and 17.
18. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 41. 2 (the eleventh form of constitution).
19. Ar. *Eccl.* 197-8; Isoc. 8. 5; X. *Poroi* 1. 1.
20. Arist. *Pol.* 1320a29-41.
21. Op. cit. (n. 1 above) 159.
22. Thuc. 1. 118. 3; H.W. Parke, *The Delphic Oracle* (Blackwell, 1939) 203.
23. X. *HG* 7. 1. 27.
24. Plu. *Lys.* 8. 4.
25. E. *El.* 1282-3.
26. Tod, *GHI* 158, 6 f.

VIII. Philip's gains and city-state reactions, 348-346

1. The war in Chalcidice was called 'the war for Amphipolis' by Isocrates in 346 (5. 2) and by Aeschines in 343 (2. 70).
2. [D.] 59. 4-5 and 8.
3. Hammond, *Sources D* (1) 85-7 and 90. The account in Pausanias 10. 2. 1 – 3. 3 is drawn from a different source (e.g. on the death of Onomarchus at Diod. 16. 35. 6 and Paus. 10. 2. 5), which used information from Delphi and Amphictyonic records.
4. So P-C 132 f. and 134 'Eubulus' policy of non-intervention was undoubtedly the safer'.
5. Paus. 8. 27. 10.
6. It was a sign of Phocis' growing isolation that her allies ceased to send representatives to the meetings of the Naopoioi at Delphi after spring 351; see Hammond, *DSW* 512 f.
7. Dionysius dated the speech to 351/0; see Cawkwell, *O* 125 n. 2.
8. See P-C 136 'there can be little doubt that Demosthenes underrated the danger of war with Caria or Persia'. In fact Persia later was successful in Egypt (Diod. 16. 51).

9. See Hammond, *Sources J* 498 and 502 f.

10. Arr. *An.* 1. 9. 9 and Plu. *Alex.* 11. 12.

11. These contacts were described by Aeschines in 343 (2. 12 and 17).

12. Aeschin. 2. 79 and D. 19. 10-11 and 303-7. It is securely dated by Diod. 16. 54. 1, 'sending envoys to the cities', to 348/7; and to near the sack of Olynthus by the account of Philip sending Olynthian captives to a friend in Arcadia (D. 19. 306). These passages count against the dating of the mission to 346 by Cawkwell 97 (as in *REG* 73 (1960) 421). In my opinion Aeschines at 2. 57-9 and 3. 58 and 67 used the term 'the Greeks' when he was referring to the Athenian Allies, as we see from the document cited at 2. 60 which recorded a decision by the Allies.

13. 'Barbarian' is vituperative, not racial.

14. [D.] 59. 3 'not to be trusted by the other Greeks'.

15. Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 502 f. Little or no attention has been paid to the passage by those who have not analysed the sources used by Trogus, whose account Justin was abbreviating.

16. The alternative that the mistake is in the word 'Thessalia' is improbable, because gold-mines within Philip's reach were only at Stratonice in Chalcidice and so just acquired, and in Thrace.

17. D. 19. 36, 39 and 163.

18. See *HM* 1 Map 1 and p. 14 and *HM* 2. 70, 114 and 666.

19. Arist. *HA* 9. 36 and *Mir.* 118; see Griffith in *HM* 2. 252.

20. D. 19. 315 wrote of pirates ravaging Philip's territory and of the Macedonian ports being closed at the time when Philip first expressed his desire for peace. It is probable that Athenian ships were collaborating with the pirates. P-C 229 had no doubt that both the ravaging and the blockade were being carried out 'by Athenian ships'.

21. This passage was not used by Griffith in *HM* 2. He wrote that Philip from 352 to 346 'was not concerned evidently to squeeze them (the Athenians) by threatening the Chersonese again'. Ellis mentioned the passage in his note 88 on p. 267 in connection only with Philip's campaign in 352.

22. These kings were named in Tod, *GHI* 151 and 157, *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 101, and *IG* II^2 656. All three were mentioned in D. 23. 8 and Str. 7 fr. 47.

23. Cersobleptes in 353 against Amadocus (D. 23. 183), and Amadocus in 352/1 against Cersobleptes (*FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 101).

24. [D.] 7. 37; D. 9. 15.

25. Ellis 110 supposed that he had been taken hostage in 351 (qualified on p. 267 n. 85), and Griffith in *HM* 2. 283 in 352. If that had been so, it would have been reported to Athens forthwith by the Athenians living in the Chersonese, and it would have been very stale news in 346. Cawkwell 198 n. 2 mentioned Just. 8. 3. 12 and 13, but he did not envisage a Thracian campaign by Philip in 347 (92 and 98). Theopompus F 160 (*FGrH* 115) mentioning Antipater at Apros (near the Hieron Oros) was connected with the campaign of 347.

26. D. 23. 170; Tod, *GHI* 157; Diod. 16. 34. 4.

27. It was this unscrupulous policy of Athens which led to the revolt by Byzantium, Perinthus and others at the start of the Social War (357-355).

28. D. 23. 102.

29. [D.] 58. 37.

30. Diod. 16. 56. 3 – 58. 3.

31. Aeschin. 2. 132.

32. Diod. 16. 59. 1 and Aeschin. 2. 133-5, citing documents which establish the sequence of events and the date.

33. See Cawkwell 92 f. for a good assessment of this evidence.

34. D. 19. 278. The Loeb translation is misleading in that it implies the taking of oaths in each city geographically. The officials had been summoned by Philip in advance (Aeschin. 2. 129).

35. This I take to be the meaning behind 16. 59. 2 (*peri summachias*). The two states were certainly in alliance much earlier. Paus. 10. 2. 5 reported that 'Philip entered the alliance of Thebes' after the death of Philomelus, i.e. in 354 and so before Pammenes marched through Macedonia.

36. For Philip's contact with the Arcadians see D. 19. 11.

37. Aeschin. 2. 108 'the missions were assembled', 112 and 136.

38. Of recent writers Markle 258 drew attention to its importance. He followed the dating by G. Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris, 1925), and he concluded that the composition of *Philippus* was being completed 'at the very time the ambassadors were in Pella' for the second time. My view is slightly different. Perlman 99 also placed *Philippus* before Philip entered Phocis.

IX. Philip the victor of the Sacred War and the Amphictyonic Peace

1. The reference is to the occasions when in Theopompus' opinion Philip might have delivered an offensive against Phocis, namely after the victory at the Crocus Field, facing Thermopylae in 352, and being invited by the Boeotians to intervene in 347 (Diod. 16. 58. 3). That the Phocian leaders bribed leaders of other states was often alleged (Diod. 16. 32. 2-3, 37. 3-4, and 57. 1).

2. One may compare the remark of Alexander in Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 4 that Macedonia used to pay tribute to Athens and to obey the orders of Thebes.

3. So Demosthenes said. Because he cited the recommendation of the Council, whereas Aeschines did not do so, the account of Demosthenes is preferable. So P-C 277; *contra* Buckler 137.

4. The identification is within a day or two only. It is the basis for the dates which follow in the text

5. Justin, following Theopompus ultimately, and Diodorus, following Demophilus, wrote of 'Boeotians', that is of the Boeotian League of city-states, and this is shown to be correct by a contemporary inscription (Tod, *GHI* 160, 2). On the other hand, Demosthenes and Aeschines spoke of Thebans, because Thebes was the leading state and the centre of the Boeotian League. The Boeotian League certainly sent envoys to Pella. It may be that Thebes also sent a separate mission.

6. Cawkwell, *REG* 73 (1960) 456 thought that these envoys were sent by Phalaecus. These envoys accompanied Philip on his march from Pella to Pherae (D. 9. 11); they were probably not aware that Phalaecus had taken control of Thermopylae. The evidence of Justin was dismissed as worthless by Buckler 135 n. 42: 'no credence need be given to Justin, whose epitome of Pompeius Trogus is demonstrably defective.' He did not concern himself with the question of what sources were used by Trogus.

7. Demophilus' figure of 8,000 as reported by Diodorus is more likely to be correct than Demosthenes' figure of 1,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry (19. 230).

8. So too D. 19. 51, 'in utter despair they placed themselvs in his hands'. Athens had failed them and the 1,000 Spartans had gone back to the Peloponnese.

9. Paus. 10. 3. 1-2 listed the cities probably from an Amphictyonic record and noted Abae as the exception.

10. The text of Diodorus calling these cities 'the three cities in Phocian possession' (16. 60. 1, *epi Phokeusi*) has usually been considered corrupt. But the meaning is that of LSJ s.v. *epi* B I g *in dependence upon, in the power of*, and the passage

refers back to 16. 58. 1, where the three cities had been named as Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae. The same brevity of expression is found in Paus. 10. 33. 9 *en Phokeusi*, meaning the cities in Phocis. Demosthenes attributed the enslavement of the populations to Philip (19. 112 and 325), as part of his propaganda against Philip.

11. It is probable that both concise expressions in the preceding note were taken from the 'Amphictyonic decree for the destruction of the cities in Phocis' (Paus.10. 33. 9). There is a link between Paus. 10. 3. 1-2 and Paus. 10. 33. 9 which suggests that the decree was being used in the former passage also; for at 10. 33. 9 Pausanias cited the decree (*dogma*) for the use of a particular form of the name 'Amphikleia', and it is that form which was used in the list of cities at 10. 3. 2. Pausanias dated 'the seizure of Delphi' by the year of the *prytanis* at Delphi (10. 2. 5), as well as by the Athenian *archon* and the Olympiad year; this suggests that he or his source had access to the Delphic and/or Amphictyonic records.

12. 'Makedones' in Paus. 10. 3. 3 (probably from the Amphictyonic decree of the preceding note); cf. Paus. 10. 8. 2 'Makedones'. Aeschin. 2. 116 listed twelve 'tribes' (*ethne*). Demosthenes used the correct term at 19. 327, 'those who never yet were Amphictyons are now forcing their way to be so – Macedones and barbarians'. For payments being made to Delphi by 'Macedones' see my article in *CQ* 30 (1980) 462 f. This was not the view of Griffith in *HM* 2. 453, 'there was no question of the Macedonian *ethnos* achieving membership now in place of the Phocians'; for he, like Parke 244, stressed the personal character of the link. The distinction in fact was between membership and participation in the Council. The members were 'tribes', the Macedones being now included. But the representatives of the new member, who were called *hieromnemones*, were appointed by Philip as religious head of the Macedonian state and were 'those from Philip', e.g. in Tod, *GHI* 172, 24, 45 and 66. In other contexts also the state was called either by the name of the king or by that of the people.

13. The Spartans were members as Dorians but did not exercise one of the two Dorian votes. See Griffith in *HM* 2. 454 f., 'the Spartans were expelled along with the Phocians from the Amphictyony', presumably for failure to pay the fine as well as for their support of Phocis. Ellis 272-3 n. 157 and n. 165 held that Sparta was not expelled and referred to the lists of Naopoioi; so too Cawkwell 108; but the lists do not support their argument. Argos gained instead of Sparta (see *BCH* 40 (1916) 121).

14. Since I have argued that Diodorus was following Demophilus (Hammond, *Sources D* (1) 82 and 84), and that Demophilus drew on Amphictyonic records for his monograph, I maintain that these words occurred in the Amphictyonic decree.

15. For example, Buckler (writing of the Amphictyons' peace with the Phocians) 'Diodorus erroneously calls (it) a *koine eirene*' (141), misunderstands the Greek text in which *pros* governs the three nouns, and also the context within Diod. 16. 60, where the terms of the peace precede the issuing of the regulations for the future. So too M. Sordi in *BCH* 81 (1957) 73; Ryder 100.

16. C. L. Sherman in the Loeb edition ad loc., 'no satisfactory explanation of the MSS reading 'Corinthians' has been offered', failed to point out that a representative of Corinth attended the meetings of Naopoioi in spring 353 and in spring and autumn 352, which indicated their complicity with the Phocians.

17. Tod, *GHI* 150, 15, no doubt on the order of Philip.

18. We learn from Tod, *GHI* 160 that financial help came to the 'Boeotians' from distant places – Alyzea and Anactorium in the west mainland and Byzantium and Tenedos in the northeast.

19. Griffith discussed 'Philip and Persia' in 346 in *HM* 2. 458-63.

20. These tasks were undertaken also by Alexander before he led his main expeditionary force into Asia.

21. For instance, Cawkwell 112-13, arguing that Philip in 346 was intending war against Persia, ended his chapter with this passage as if it was very significant. See Perlman 78.

22. See Hammond, *Sources D* (1) 79 and n. 4, in which the references, including 16. 60. 4-5, are given.

23. There have been many and varying discussions of Philip's policy in the war and in the settlement. Markle *SP* and Ellis 115-24 held that Philip's preferred plan was to save Phocis and cut Thebes down to a small size, and that misunderstanding at Athens, for example, caused him to adopt the second plan which did rather the opposite. This theory has been opposed by Cawkwell 109-11 and by Griffith in HM 2. 343-7 and 458-63. Buckler 121-5 summarised and discussed these views, and gave his own views on 146 f.

X. Philip and the city-states, 346-343

1. Isoc. 5. 40.

2. D. 19. 180.

3. Theopompus evidently gave a lengthy account of the two-day debate, as Jacoby remarked in *FGrH* 2 B p. 381; for F 164 was in book 26 and F 166 in book 27.

4. Aeschin. 2. 82-5, citing as witnesses the proposer of the motion (whose name was on record) and also other Presidents of the Assembly at the time. See P-C 263 for a discussion.

5. [D.] 7. 38.

6. D. 19. 47 f. and 54 f.

7. Aeschin. 2. 137. He asserted that Philip asked Athens to come 'with all her forces', thus matching the 'full force' of the Boeotians. D. 19. 51 did not give any detail about the invitation.

8. D. 19. 125.

9. Aeschin. 2. 142, calling certain Phocians and Boeotians to bear witness.

10. The *Hypothesis* to the *De Pace*, section 3, said that the speech seems to have been prepared but not delivered.

11. There are three lists of members of the Amphictyony in the ancient sources. The context of each has to be borne in mind. Pausanias 10. 8. 2 listed those at the first foundation of the Amphictyony with Anthela as its centre in the very remote past (see Parke 118); then, of course, Delphi and the Western Locrians were not included. Theopompus in *FGrH* 115 F 63 of book 8, evidently listing the members of the Amphictyony before the seizure of the shrine by Philomelus, included the Delphians (Thessalians and Locrians being omitted by error, or more probably in the transmission of the text). Aeschines, speaking at Pella during the Sacred War (2. 116), did not include the Delphians because they had been deprived of their votes by the Phocians. Inscriptions of 343 onwards show that the Delphians were members (summary in Ellis 132-3). See G. Daux in *BCH* 81 (1957) 95 ff.

12. This policy was gradually implemented at Delphi itself. See Parke 243 and Buckler 203 f., Machidas being an example of a man serving as *bouleutes* both in 354/3 and in 343/2.

13. Demosthenes pointed out in late 346 that Thebes was disgruntled because Philip had obtained the control over Delphi and the Amphictyony which she had sought (5. 21-2).

14. D. 5. 18.

15. Isoc. 5. 49-50 described in 346 the fears of Sparta.

16. Isoc. 5. 74.

17. See *BCH* 40 (1916) 121.

18. D. 6. 9, 12 and 15.

19. See the *Hypothesis* to D. 6, citing 'the Philippic Histories' probably of Theopompus. I do not agree with Griffith 477 that a war was being waged in the Peloponnese, because Demosthenes would surely have said so in the speech.

20. D. 19. 261.

21. *Syll.*^{3} 224. Didym. *in D.* 4. 1 ff. See Wüst 26 and Griffith 481; *contra* Ellis 134 and 274 n. 28..

22. D. 16. 16 (Elis with Sparta); 10. 10 and 19. 260 and 294 (democracy violently overthrown); Diod. 16. 63. 4-5, following Demophilus (Arcadians and mercenaries); Paus. 4. 28. 4 (Philip's bribes); 5. 4. 9 (allies of Philip). See Griffith 476 f. and 499 f. I follow his interpretation rather than that of Cawkwell in *CQ* 12 (1962) 203 f.

23. D. 6. 22. The award, being dated before autumn 344, may have been made in 346. Didym. *in D.* 11. 44 referred to the original decree (*dogma*)

24. D. 19. 87, 204 and 294-5. Plut. *Phocion* 15 was reporting a later development, c. 340, because Plutarch's method was to hang his items on a chronological narrative thread. See Hammond, *Sources A*, 49, 154 and 162. On the other hand Griffith 497 f. dated it to 343.

25. D. 19. 41; Isoc. *Letter* 2. 14, dated to 345 by Griffith 724, to spring 344 by Wüst 55, and to late 344 by P-C 304.

26. D. 6. 30; 9. 162 and 181; Schol. D 6. 30. See P-C 305; Wüst 46.

27. D. 18. 134; Hyperides Frs. 70-9 (Teubner); *IG* II 223. The date is controversial; see Wüst 52 f., supported by Griffith 468 versus P-C 309 whose date was 344/3.

28. D. 6. 19-28; *Hypothesis* to D. 6; D. H. *Amm.* 1. 10. See P-C 307 f., Wüst 56 f. and Griffith 476 f.

29. D. 18. 136; Hegesippus 7. 18-23; Didym. 8. 9; [D.] 7. 19-23; [D.] 12. 18. See P-C 311 f., Wüst 69 f. and Griffith 489 f.

30. For example in *The Second Philippic* 34-6, written in autumn 344.

31. For the importance of these trials in the political arena see above pp. 107 f.

32. Philip was referring among others to Isocrates, who had written in 346 of those who 'slandered Philip from jealousy, were wont to stir up trouble in their own states, and regarded peace which the rest of men shared as a state of war against their own selfish interests' (5. 73).

XI. Actions in Macedonia, Illyria and Thessaly, 346-343

1. Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503.

2. In this passage I translate 'replenda' not as 'refill' but as 'fill', which is the meaning in post-Augustan literature; thus the word did not anticipate 'in supplementis urbium'. I take it that 'populos' at 8. 6. 1 is to be understood as resuming 'populos et urbes' at 8. 5. 7.

3. My own experience was in the 1930s; see my account in *Migrations and Invasions in Greece* (New Jersey, 1976) 37-51.

4. Paus. 7. 25. 6; *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 387; Thuc. 1. 58. 2.

5. This settlement is known only through excavation; see *HM* 1. 174 and 2. 146.

6. Thuc. 2. 14. 2 and 16. Pathetic descriptions of such incidents became a rhetorical commonplace. We may compare Just. 8. 5. 3-6 and Livy 32. 13. 5-9 (following Polybius).

7. See above, pp. 35 and 38 (Oesyme); 53 (Pythion).

8. Str. 7. fr. 11 and Scymn. 656 ff.

9. See my article, 'A Papyrus Commentary on Alexander's Balkan campaign', *GRBS* 28 (1987) 341 f.

10. The evidence is given in *HM* 1. 173-5 and 204. See *HM* 3. 459 for Philip V planting Makedones in this area as Polybius reported. 'He transferred the enfranchised men [i.e. Makedones] with their women and children from the most distinguished coastal cities and transplanted them to the area called Emathia but in earlier times Paeonia. He filled the [vacated] cities with Thracians and barbarians; for he supposed that they would show a more lasting loyalty in the circumstances' (23. 10. 4-5).

11. For earlier discussions of these transfers see Ellis in *Makedonika* 9 (1969) 9-17 and my remarks in *HM* 2. 652 and 661 f., and in *MS* 156 f.

12. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Philippoi*; for the route see Hammond *Ep.* 284.

13. Griffith 540. For its strategic value see my remarks in *JHS* 108 (1988) 60 f.

14. Polyaen. 4. 2.12; Just. 9. 2. 15.

15. Philip's policy was stated by Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 2 in a speech attributed to Alexander. I have argued in Hammond, *Sources A* 288 that the speech was based on material reported by Ptolemy and Aristobulus; for other views see *HM* 2. 657.

16. Arr. *An.* 1. 24. 2; 1. 29. 4; Diod. 17. 49. 1 and 65. 1; Curt. 4. 6. 30 and 5. 1. 40. See my article 'Casualties and reinforcements of citizen soldiers', *JHS* 109 (1989) 63 f.

17. It is noteworthy that Alexander bought prisoners of war from his soldiers and liberated them to become inhabitants of Alexandria Eschate (Curt. 7. 6. 27), and later he planned to purchase slaves and make them citizens of his new cities in Kuwait (Arr. *An.* 7. 19. 5).

18. Theophrastus, *CP* 5. 14. 5, described the change after Philip took possession of the plain round Philippi which was then forested and waterlogged. 'When the water had been drained off, the land mostly dried out, and the whole territory was brought into cultivation.' The inscription which has been cited above (p. 37) gave an example of such reclaimed land. See *HM* 1. 149 and 2. 658 f., citing similar changes in post-war Albania.

19. Curt. 7. 6. 27; Arr. *An.* 4. 4. 1; Just. 12. 5. 12. See *THA* 142 f. for their sources.

20. *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 230; Polyaen. 4. 2. 18.

21. In the 1930s the Vlachs of Pindus were famous for working in wood, and they even made a wooden clock at Vovousa; and the men of Voïon villages were renowned as builders in stone.

22. D. 1. 22 (explained in a different way by Griffith 439 n. 1); D. 2. 17. The defeat of Adaeus (*FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 249) may have happened near Neapolis, as Griffith 281 f. suggested, and the victory which he celebrated at Cypsela may have been won near Cypsela. C. B. Gulick in the Loeb edition of Athenaeus 11. 469 A and Badian 3 61 f. with n. 43 tried to merge the two actions into one and to locate it at Cypsela; but the circumstances of the actions in the texts differ widely.

23. Curt. 8. 1. 24. The story may have come from Cleitarchus, who is less than reliable; but this rivalry had disastrous consequences in 323 after the death of Alexander (Diod. 18. 7).

24. *FGrH* 115 F 224; Arr. *An.* 1. 16. 5; see also *CQ* 38 (1988) 388-90.

25. Philip won this event more than once (Plu. *Alex.* 4. 9 and *Mor.* 105 A). The date for the coinage is inferred partly from the observation that the hair of Apollo was long in the latest Chalcidian issues and in Philip's earliest issue, when he was presumably using the Chalcidian die-cutters.

26. Diod. 16. 8. 7, under the archon-year 358/7. This section is an addition by Diodorus himself to a passage, describing the gold mines near Crenides, which he

had derived from Ephorus (Hammond, *Sources D* 81 f. and 85). The indication that Diodorus has written the addition is given by his statement that he must revert to the chronological order of events; for the *Philippeioi* were later in date than 358/7.

27. On the coin the left-hand side of Philip's face was shown, because his right eye had been blinded by a catapult-bolt at Methone in 354.

28. For the earlier coins see p. 40 above; it is likely that Philip had a second victory in this same event, perhaps in 348.

29. See Hammond, *LIMC* 256 and *HM* 2. 665; and Price 21 f. The diadem of Caranus is without loose ends. Therein it resembles the ceremonial diadem of metal in Philip's Tomb at Vergina.

30. *Olynthus* 9. 253 f. The numbers are significant even if people took less trouble to look for a lost bronze coin than for a gold or silver one. Philip may have given the name 'Heraclea' to two new cities, one in Lyncus and the other inland of Amphipolis, Heraclea Sintica.

31. As maintained by F. Papazoglou in *Historia* 14 (1965) 143 ff. and in *Les Illyriens et les Albanais*, ed. M. Garašanin (Belgrade, 1988) 189. My arguments were stated in BSA 61 (1966) 239 ff. For another view see P. Carlier in *L'Illyrie méridionale et l'Épire dans l'antiquité*, ed. P. Cabanes (Adosa, 1987) 42.

32. This was the name of the Illyrian-speaking area on the frontiers of Epirus and Macedonia in the classical and Hellenistic periods. The Romans used 'Illyria' for a much wider geographical area.

33. Conversely the Dardanians were Illyrians, as I had argued in *BSA* 61. 242 ff., whereas F. Papazoglu has maintained that the Dardanians were not Illyrian but a separate race, like the Paeonians, in *Les Illyriens et les Albanais* 174 and 179.

34. *FGrH* 124 (Callisthenes) F 27. Cawkwell in *CQ* 15 (1965) 126 f. and Griffith 470 argued for 345, whereas Wüst 54 f. preferred 344.

35. See *BSA* 61. 249 ff. A different view has been advanced by M.B. Hatzopoulos in *L'Illyrie méridionale* etc. 84 ff. See my comments in *Antichthon* 23 (1989) 8 with n. 26.

36. *FGrH* 86 (Agatharchides) F 17; 115 (Theopompus) F 40.

37. The king of the Taulantii, Glaucias, was not said to be in revolt at Arr. *An.* 1. 51; see Griffith 472 n. 3.

38. Didym. *in D.* 12. 64. For the distinction between Pleuratus and Pleurias see *BSA* 61. 243 and 245.

39. See Hammond, *Migrations and Invasions in Greece* (New Jersey, 1978) 75.

40. See my article in *JRS* 56 (1966) 42 f.

41. Isoc. *Letter* 2. 3 and 11.

42. Polyaen. 4. 2.19.

43. D. 8. 62; D. 19. 259-60.

44. Polyaen. 4. 2. 11; D. 18. 48 and Scholia to D. 1. 22 and 2. 14; Arist. *Pol.* 1306a26.

45. *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 222; Curt. 3. 9. 3.

46. [D.] 7. 32; D. 9. 12. On the refusal to send troops see Griffith 525 n. 1 on D. 19. 320.

47. D. 6. 22; see Griffith 527-32 and Martin 102 on this term, which had been denigratory since the imposition by Sparta of governments of ten men (decadarchies) on the subject-states; see Isoc. 5. 95.

48. Harpocration s v. *dekadarkhia*; *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 208 and 209; D. 9. 26. See Westlake 202 f. on tetrarchies.

49. Aeschin. 3. 83 with the Scholia; D. 18. 166 and 244.

50. The content of this section on Thessaly is largely controversial. The fullest

recent studies are those of Griffith 523-44 and Martin 89-113 with full references to the earlier literature.

XII. Extension of Macedonian power and conflict with Athens and Persia

1. See Hammond *Ep.* 701 f., to which other tribal names can now be added.

2. Str. 323-4, citing Theopompus, and *Ep.* 531.

3. For the language and the dialect see *Ep.* 419-23 and the inscriptions cited in 525 ff. Ps-Scylax and Ps-Scymnus are cited and dated in *Ep.* 511-17.

4. For the pastoral area see *HM* 1 Maps 6, 8, 9 and 10.

5. The date for the annexation of Tymphaea is early enough to allow for the training of the phalanx-brigade from Tymphaea which fought at Issus in 333 (Diod. 17. 57. 2).

6. See *Ep.* 542-9 and for a different view P.R. Franke, *Die antiken Münzen von Epirus* (Wiesbaden, 1961) 89 ff.

7. See Hammond, *Sources J* 498 and 502 for Satyrus and 499 and 503 for Theopompus.

8. See Hammond, *Sources D* 89-91 for entries of this type.

9. The 'ten years' is a mistake, because Arybbas was sole king in 357 when Philip married his niece, Olympias. The only explanation I can see is that Arybbas had been a vassal-king since c. 350; the ten years from then, on inclusive reckoning, brings us to 342/1. Diodorus had before him a considerably longer statement and made a mess of it in abbreviating drastically.

10. Tod, *GHI* no. 173 and p. 216. On this controversial topic see Griffith 306-8 and 505-7, generally in line with my views in *HG* 547 and 560 and here, and different interpretations in *GRBS* 16 (1975) 41-50 and 29 (1988) 185-96 by R. M. Errington (on which see Griffith 308 n. 3 and 506 n. 1) and J. Heskel respectively, wherein they dated the flight of Arybbas to Athens c. 350. Errington put Alexander on the throne then, but Heskel in 343/2, leaving a kingless gap which seems unacceptable to me. They did not consider the question of Justin's and Diodorus' sources nor the gap in the Molossian coinages when Philip's coinage was used.

11. D. H. *Amm.* 1. 10 dated the *De Halonneso* to the archon-year 343/2. The date of Diodorus was imprecise through his mixing together the Athenian calendar and the Roman calendar. Trogus, *Prologue* 8 gave the sequence: the enthronement of Alexander and the expulsion of Arybbas between the subjugation of Thessaly (culminating on my view in the installation of tetrarchs in 343/2) and the siege of Perinthus (in 340); and *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 206 and F 207 corrected Demosthenes' mention of three Greek city-states in his book 43, which came just before the Thessalian tetrades were mentioned in book 44. Wüst 99 f. dated the setting up of the tetrarchs to 342, two years after Philip's earlier intervention.

12. Ps-Scylax 32. See Hammond *Ep.* 51-63 for the ancient sites in the peninsula, 135 for the coastal strip at Salaora, and 674 Map 16.

13. *Ep.* 541 f., the coins of Philip being overstruck by the Cassopaeans. Their bronze coins may have been for exchange with the pilgrims to the oracle at Dodona who took the shortest route from Buchetium up the Louros valley. See *Ep.* 172 for the 'Sacred Way'.

14. D. 9. 34. Timber for ship-building was obtained both from the Preveza peninsula (Cassopaea), and from eastern Epirus by the Corinthians and later by Napoleon; see *Ep.* 46, 51, 149 and 243.

15. Longer than the epitome of Theopompus, *Philippica* (*FGrH* 115 F 217) and

similar to *POxy.* 1. no 12 or *FGrH* 255. It was written with special attention to the Greek city-states.

16. Thus within the archon-year 343/2. Diodorus placed the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse in the same archon-year, presumably in late summer 343, a date accepted by Beloch 3. 2. 380 and by me in *HG* 577 but not by R. Hackforth in *CAH* 6. 291.

17. D. 8. 2 and 35.

18. 'Reinforcements from Thessaly' in D. 8. 14. Alexander was to use slingers and archers from the kingdom in his Balkan campaign (Arr. *An.* 1.1 12; 1. 2. 4 and 6; 1. 6. 6) and Cretan archers at Thebes.

19. For a geographical description see G. Mihailov in *CAH* 3. 2 (1991) 591 ff. and Map 14; and also Hammond, *Atlas* Maps 14 and 24.

20. The Hebrus valley route was the more important of the two; for goods could be transported along it from the Aegean coast to the Black Sea coast, thus cutting out the long voyage by sea through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. See my comments in *Chiron* 10 (1980) 55 ff.

21. Arr. *An.* 1. 5. 2.

22. Hdt. 5. 3. 1.

23. A number were found at Rogozen in northwest Bulgaria (*ILN* Dec. 1986, 56). Similar silver ware was given, it seems, to a Macedonian king when he entered a city (*FGrH* 134/5 Marsyas F). Theopompus expressed the Greeks' scorn for any Thracian king such as Cotys (*FGrH* 115 F 31).

24. D. 8. 44; [D.] 12. 8-10. Theopompus F 220 mentioned Cabyle in his book 47, while the attack on Perinthus was in book 48.

25. Theopompus F 217 in his book 46; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Getia*; Jordanes, *Getica* 10. 65, cited by Griffith 560 n. 2; Satyrus in Athenae. 13. 557 D. Ellis 167 and n. 37 dated this episode to 'the first part of the campaign (thus in late 342)'.

26. Just. 9. 2. 1-16; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5. 31. 3; Lucian, *Macrob.* 10. For Theopompus as source of Justin here see Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503. The Dobruja and the land of the Getae had been subject to Odrysian rule in 429 (Thuc. 2. 96. 1). The centre of Atheas' realm was north of the Danube.

27. For this meaning see *AG* 46 and Badian 69 with n. 68, both published in 1980, whereas Cawkwell 117 and Griffith 559, publishing respectively in 1978 and 1979, thought of them as unconquered. See also Hdt. 7. 111 and Thuc. 2. 96. 2 *autonomon*, 'self-governing'. I had the good fortune to travel through much of western Thrace, the coastal sector within Greece and part of the great plain, mostly in 1968.

28. See my article in *GRBS* 28 (1987) 340 f. which shows that already in 335 Alexander had Thracians and Agrianians in his army on the Balkan campaign.

29. Theopompus F 217.

30. Hammond, *Sources D* 82 and 87 f.

31. As Alexander said 'most of Thrace' (Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 3), allowing for his own addition of the Triballi. Accounts of Philip in Thrace are given by Griffith 554-66 and by Badian 66-70, differing in several respects from one another and from me. D. M. Pippidi was closer to my interpretation when he wrote of Philip's intentions in Thrace: 'de s'assurer la contrôle de la Thrace tout entière de l'Egée aux bouches de Danube' (*Anc. Mac.* 2 (1977) 389). The best general account was that of Wüst 102 ff.; the most inadequate that of Borza 215 and 224.

32. Polyaenus 4. 2. 13 reported an example of a disciplined retreat in the face of an attacking enemy, in which the front ranks withdrew and the rear rank stood firm with their pikes at the level to stop the enemy.

33. This was Demosthenes' main argument in 343 (19. 259 f. and 265 f.) and in retrospect in 330, when he named a covey of traitors (18. 295 f.).

34. *Epist. Socrat.* 30; see Griffith 514 for an amusing account of it.

35. Plb. 18. 14. 1-8.

36. See the remarks of Brunt in *CQ* 19 (1969) 245 f.

37. For the chronology which is controversial see Brunt, op. cit. 251 f. and 257 f.

38. For Acarnania D. 48. 24-6.

39. D. 18. 244.

40. Athens entered into alliance with Messene around June 342 (*IG* II^2 225), and according to the Scholia to Aeschin. 3. 181 also with Achaea, Argos, Megalopolis and some other Arcadians. That was not due to Demosthenes' mission, or he would have said so. Nor were these alliances of much significance, because they did not cancel the alliances between these states and Philip.

41. The date of the speech is determined by the reference to Philip's advance towards Ambracia ([D.] 7. 32). See the discussion by Griffith 510 ff.

42. *FGrH* 328 (Philochorus) F 158; D. 8. 6; 9. 15. 'Benevolences' justified by Demosthenes in D. 8. 24-7. Ransom in [D.] 12. 2.

43. The published version contained passages common to *The Fourth Philippic*, and the mention of the Etesian winds (D. 8. 18) belonged then. See Griffith 565 n. 1.

44. The leadership of the city-states against Philip was advocated in 46-9, and cudgelling in 61. For a favourable appreciation of this speech see P-C 331-40.

45. *FGrH* 328 (Philochorus) F 159 and F 160, and Schol. to Aeschin. 3. 85 and 103; for the date Diod. 16. 74. 1 under the archon-year 341/0; Didym. *in D.* 1. 13; Charax (*FGrH* 103) F 19 (Megarians).

46. [D.] 12. 5; *IG* II^2 1623, 160 ff.; 1629, 516.

47. [D.] 12. 12-15.

48. Aeschin. 3. 91-4, citing a decree; Didym. *in D.* 1. 15.

49. Aeschin. 3. 94-105; Plu. *Dem.* 17. 3. That the meeting took place is denied by Ellis 173 and Cawkwell 134 but supported by P-C 344 f. ('probably'), Wüst 119 and Griffith 551 ('probably').

50. Aeschin. 3. 224; D. 18. 137.

51. D. 18. 83; 223; Plu. *Mor.* 848 C.

52. Above, p. 130. The account was based on Ephorus Book 26 and so is trustworthy; see Hammond, *Sources D* 87.

53. Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 2 (I argued that the letter was genuine in *AG* 113 and Hammond, *Sources A* 222). Plu. *Mor.* 342 BC and *Alex.* 5. 1-3; for Marsyas see Hammond, *Sources A* 21 and n. 37.

54. Diod. 16. 52. 5-6; Str. 610; chronology in *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 291 from his book 46, and D. 10. 32 for the death of Hermias. See Wüst 63. Many different dates have been suggested for all these matters; see Griffith 484-8 and 517-22.

55. D. 14. 3-12 (crusade). D. 9. 16; 9. 71; 10. 31-4.

56. [D.] 12. 7 (*epimakhia*); Plu. *Mor.* 847 F; Arist. *Rhet.* 2. 1386a13.

57. D. 5. 25 (Athens); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5. 31. 3 (Atheas' message being 'Do not do harm to my revenues, unless you want my horses to drink your water'); [D.] 12. 2 (with pirates at Thasos).

58. D. 18. 302; Plu. *Mor.* 850 A; D 9. 71.

59. [D.] 12. 16, Philip citing the decree under which the cleruchs were at war 'with us'.

60. The authenticity of [D.] 12 is discussed by Griffith 714 ff. My view that the *Letter* 'contains the substance, if not the actual words' was stated in *HG* 564; for

the document may well have survived through citation by a writer who put it into his own form of words. In an article forthcoming in *Antichthon* I argue that it is in its original form.

61. The *Letter* was composed before the siege of Perinthus, which it did not mention; *contra* Griffith 567 and 575. The sequence of events was different in Wüst 127 ff. and 133 ff., who assumed that Philip brought the fleet when he had already put Perinthus under siege. Diod. 16. 74. 2 – 76. 3, following Ephorus book 26 (see Hammond, *Sources D* 87 f.), described the siege, for which see E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford, 1969) 59 ff.

62. Diod. 16. 75. 1-2; Paus. 1. 29. 10; Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 5; *FGrH* 328 (Philochorus) F 53-6. The money enabled Perinthus to issue an emergency coinage.

63. Diod. 16. 76. 3-4; Scholia to [D.] 11. 1 for Selymbria, on which see Wüst 136 ff. and Griffith 574 n. 2; Polyaen. 4. 2. 21 for Byzantium's nearby allies.

64. For the cornships Philochorus F 162; Scholia to [D.] 11. 1; Theopompus F 295; D. 18. 139; Just. 9. 1. 5-6. For the declaration of war D. 18. 71-2; Schol. to D. 18. 76; Philochorus F 55; Aeschin. 3. 55; Diod. 16. 77. 2 under the archon-year 340/339.

XIII. Philip in Thrace and developments in Greece

1. Diod. 16. 8. 2 rams (Amphipolis); 16. 75. 4 prizes; Polyaen. 4. 2. 15 ladders (Methone); Str. 7 fr. 22 fin. bolt (Methone); Polyaen. 2. 38. 2 stone-throwers (Onomarchus); D. 9. 50 (Demosthenes). The *oxybeles* sc. *katapeltes* (bolt-firing) was differentiated from the *petrobolos* sc. *katapeltes* (stone-thrower), e.g. in Diod. 18. 51. 1 (from Hieronymus).

2. Diod. 16. 74. 2-5; 75. 2 – 76. 3. Ram-carriers and towers could be taken apart and reassembled (Polyaen. 4. 2. 20). Philip used timber from captured ships.

3. E. W. Marsden made this suggestion in *Anc. Mac.* 2 (1977) 218 f.; see also Griffith 444 ff. Polyidus at the siege of Byzantium was mentioned also by Vitruvius 10. 13. 3. For sapping at Byzantium see Hesych. Miles. *FHG* 4. 151.

4. D. 18. 87 *charaka*; see my comments in *JHS* 104 (1984) 32 and *GRBS* 28 (1987) 341.

5. The evidence for the siege of Selymbria is complicated. I follow Wüst 136-40 and Griffith 574 with n. 2. See the Hypothesis to [D.] 11.

6. Plu. *Phoc.* 14. 2-3; Dionys. Byz. F 41 (*GGM* 2. 50); Hesych. Miles. 28 ff. (*FHG* 4. 151).

7. D. 18. 102-9; Plu. *Phoc.* 14. 3-4; Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 5.

8. Frontin. 1. 4. 13; D. 18. 139; Just. 9. 1. 7 based on Theopompus (see Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 502 f.). The last passage dates the ravaging to a time when Byzantium was still under siege and not, as Griffith 580 wrote, 'when he raised the siege of Byzantium'.

9. Hesych. Miles. 26-7 (*FHG* 4. 151) for the dogs; Diod. 16. 77. 3 and 84. 1, drawing on a Hellenistic writer probably Diyllus of Athens (Hammond, *Sources D* 83 and 89 f.), who may have accused Philip of trickery.

10. Frontin. 1. 4. 13 and 13 A.

11. Diod. 16. 77. 3 (Athens being wrongly included); Plu. *Phoc.* 14. 5; D. 18. 89 f.; Just. 9. 1. 8-9.

12. There is no clue to the source of Plu. *Alex.* 9. 1. Theopompus on my interpretation was the source ultimately of Just. 9. 1. 8 (Hammond, *Sources J* 499 and 503) and 9. 2. 1-16. As he was at the Macedonian court in 340, his statement of Alexander's age should be correct.

13. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 217 and F 218 ; Polyaen. 4. 4. 1. Both forms of

the name appear on the Rogozen jugs (see p. 212 n. 23 above). The position of the Tetrachoritae is not known.

14. Theopompus F 162 (another alleged reason being control of Athens' corn-trade); Just. 9. 2. 10-13, based on Theopompus; Str. 307 for the kingdom of Atheas extending to Lake Maeotis (Sea of Azov).

15. Frontin. 2. 8. 14; Arr. *An.* 4. 4. 7; Just. 9. 2. 14 – 3. 3; 12. 1 4; 12. 2. 16; 17. 3. 2; Trogus, *Prologue* 12 (preferable to Curt. 10. 1 44).

16. Theopompus F 221 mentioned the Danthaletae, for whom see *Atlas* Map 24, presumably because they were on Philip's route via Pautalia to Pella. Arr. *An.* 5. 26. 6; 7. 9. 2 (Triballi); Just. 9. 3. 2 and Didym. *in D.* 13. 3-7 (Philip's wound).

17. Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 3 (*hegemones*); Diod. 16. 71. 2 (tithe to 'the Makedones'); Arr. *An.* 7. 9. 3 the land was annexed 'to Macedonia', not included in Philip's kingdom, as Diod. 16. 1. 3 and 95. 2 expressed it. Arr. *An.* 1. 5. 2 (Agrianes); [D.] 58. 37-8 (Aenus); [D.] 7. 41-4 (Cardia).

18. Arr. *An.* 1. 5. 2-3 (Agrianians); *GRBS* 28 (1987) 340 f.; Diod. 17. 17. 4; Curt. 5. 1. 41.

19. Arist. *Rhet.* 1. 5. 7; *Epirus* 541 (Kotor = Rhizon); D. M. Pippidi in *Anc. Mac.* 2 (1977) 385 and 393 (Istrus); *HM* 2. 668 ff. (Damastium etc.). T.R. Martin showed that cessation of a city-state's coinage did not necessarily mean loss of autonomy. See pp. 191 ff. for his views on Abdera and Aenus. He argued that Amphipolis may have issued its own civic coinage after 357. His view differs from that of Price, *Coins* 18 'with the growth of the Macedonian kingdom the autonomy of the city states was throttled'.

20. Road-builders (Thuc. 2. 98. 1; Arr. *An.* 1. 26. 1); Plu. *Alex.* 9. 1 (Alexandropolis); Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 110; Pliny *NH* 4. 18; Diod. 17. 83. 2; Curt. 10. 2. 8.

21. Plu. *Demosth.* 20. 4-5 (Persia, whereas Aeschin. 3. 239 refers to a later date, c. 336); D. 9. 34 (Aetolia); Plu. *Phoc.* 15. 1 (Megara); D. 54. 3 (Panactum).

22. Diod. 16. 77. 3. Wüst 145 confused the issue by importing the idea of a general Common Peace; but Diodorus wrote only of 'those opposing him' in the Hellespont.

23. D. 2. 17 f.; Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 105.

24. Aeschin. 3. 116-22; D. 18. 149-51.

25. Aeschin. 3. 128-9; D. 18. 151. There has been much controversy over the chronology. See Griffith 717-19. It is necessary to discard the synchronisation proposed by Aeschin. 3. 128 for the appointment of Cottyphus and the Scythian expedition of Philip; this can be done on the grounds that Aeschines was arguing against the accusation that he was bringing Philip into Greece. For various chronologies see Wüst 153 ff.

26. D. 18. 147-52. Wüst 148 ff.; Griffith 585 ff.

27. D. 6. 22; Didym. *in D.* 11. 40, 44 and 47.

XIV. Events leading to Philip's victory at Chaeronea

1. Diod. 16. 84. 5.

2. That Cottyphus was acting on behalf of Philip was stated by the Scholiast to D. 18. 151.

3. Just. 9. 3. 4 ubi ... primum convaluit, drawing ultimately on Theopompus. See Hammond *Atlas* Map 14. Diod. 16. 84. 5 (two days).

4. D. 18. 162 (Eubulus); D. 18. 169-178; Diod. 16. 84. 5 (allies).

5. Demosthenes later thanked 'Fortune' that this disaster had not happened, and he attributed to 'the goodwill of some god' the three days of grace which enabled

her to save herself (D. 18. 195; cf. 230). There was of course no suggestion that both were due to Philip.

6. Philochorus (*FGrH* 328) F 56 and Didym. *in D.* 11. 40 (Nicaea); D. 18. 213; for the booty compare the Oxyrhynchus Historian 12. 4; Arist. *Rhet.* II 23b.

7. Aeschin. 3. 106 and 113 f.

8. D. 18. 177-9; Aeschin. 3. 141-4. Discussed by D. J. Mosley in *Historia* 20 (1971) 501-10.

9. Just. 9. 3. 6-7; D. 18. 156 and 158.

10. Paus. 8. 6. 2; 8. 27. 10; Plu. *Demosth.* 18. 3 (peace).

11. Philochorus (*FGrH* 328) F 56 (Military Fund); Plu. *Demosth.* 18. 2-3 and 20. 1. While Plutarch praised Demosthenes, Theopompus agreed that Demosthenes inflamed the spirit of the Thebans, but he regarded Demosthenes' power as contrary to justice and to worth (*FGrH* 115 F 328 = Plu. *Demosth.* 18. 3 fin.). Demosthenes named 'philippisers' as he saw them in other states (F 223 and F 224). See Plb. 18. 14 on such persons.

12. One may compare the allied position in two pieces in 1941, when the Pindus range separated the main Greek army from the British force. The collapse of the Greek army caused the British force to retreat. The Boeotian commanders must have foreseen the weakness but decided nevertheless to help their ally.

13. Paus. 10. 36. 3-4 (Ambrossus): Polyaen. 4. 2. 14. Both sides were credited with 'rebuilding the Phocian cities'. D. 18. 216-17 (two battles). The rejoicing in Athens reminds me of similar rejoicing early in March 1941 in Athens.

14. Polyaen. 4. 2. 8; for Philip's trick and Chares' reaction see my explanation in *HG* 567; Aeschin. 3. 146; Deinarch. 1. 74; Diod. 18. 56. 5 (Amphissa); Str. 427 ; Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 235, in which the text of Zenobius is to be preferred; D. 9. 34 (Naupactus).

15. Aeschin. 3. 149-51; Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 1-3.

16. *HG* 663 (Boeotians); X. *Eq. Mag.* 7. 3; Lycurg. 1. 39; *HG* 664 (Athens); Str. 414 (Corinth); Paus. 7. 6. 5 (Achaea); 10. 3. 3 (Phocians); *HG* 663 f. (cavalry). A check on Athens' strength is provided by Diodorus' figures for the Lamian War in 323 (*HG* 646), which yield actual totals of some 650 cavalry and 6,500 hoplites up to the age of forty (Diod. 18. 10. 2 and 11. 3). For the Lamian War figures see N. V. Sekunda in *BSA* 87 (1992) 345 f., and for lower figures Beloch 3. 2. 300 f.

17. Diod. 16. 85. 5, mentioning Philip's 'allies' (Chaeronea); 16. 74. 5 (Perinthus); 17. 17. 3-5. For the sources see Hammond, *Sources D* 82 and 87, *THA* 13 and 26, and *THA* 36 f.

18. X. *HG* 4. 3. 19.

19. For the two Guards see Hammond, *VG*, in which the existence of the two was first suggested.

20. Most of our information comes from the early years of Alexander, e.g. from his meeting with Diogenes in 336 (Hammond, *Sources A* 28).

21. For the meaning of the names see *CQ* 28 (1978) 128 f.; *contra* Bosworth C 252 and Griffith 709 ff.

22. See Hammond *MS* 58 ff. (oath) and 166 ff. (citizenship and Assembly).

23. Some of these units served with Alexander in 335 and presumably existed under Philip. The Thracian squadron is to be distinguished from the Thracians conscripted from the Empire. The Paeonian king was Patraus, contemporary with Alexander; see *SNG* 5. 4. Pl. 70.

24. *Klio* 31 (1938) 186 ff.; Braun in *JOAI* 37 (1948) 80 ff.; W. K. Pritchett in *AJA* 62 (1958) 307-11; Hammond, *St* 534-57 (1973); Ellis 294 n. 71; Griffith 596-603. My identifications of the rivers Molos and Haemon is now confirmed by the discovery of a trophy, reported in *AJA* 96 (1992) 408 ff. and especially 453.

25. For deep Theban formations see Thuc. 4. 93. 4 (25 men deep) and X. *HG* 6. 4. 12 (50 men deep).

26. The word *eneklinen* has a connotation of a change of angle, as in its translation 'incline'; see Arr. *Tact.* 21. 3.

27. The Greek phrase *epi polu* can mean a lot in time or in space (see LSJ s.v. *polus* III 4 ab with references); and in either case it was a subjective judgement made probably by the men who were retiring, while Polyaen. 4. 2. 2 said it happened 'after a little'. Frontin. 2. 1. 9 took it in the former sense. Frontinus and Griffith 601 n. 1 understood *parataxin* as 'battle', whereas I take it to mean 'formation' as in LSJ and connect it with *paratassomenos* in Polyaen. 4. 2. 2.

28. A similar fate befell the Greek mercenary hoplites at the Battle of the Granicus River (see *AG* 77).

XV. The creation of the Greek Community

1. Paus. 7. 6. 5.

2. Diod. 16. 88. 1-2 (Lysicles); Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 3 (Charidemus).

3. I argued in *PCPhS* 160 (1935) that these numbers of tough men indicate that the total slave population at this time was of the order of 350,000, a figure supported and in my opinion confirmed by Ctesicles' figure of 400,000 slaves (Athenae. 272 c).

4. See *HG* 445 and Hammond, *Atlas* 10; the walls lacked the towers which were needed for defence against artillery.

5. Phocion ordered Demosthenes to consider not where but how Athens would defeat Philip (Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 3). For the shield Plu. *Demosth.* 20. 2. See Cawkwell 130 for the prominence of luck (*tyche*) in Demosthenes' thinking.

6. Diod. 16. 86. 1 (daybreak); 16. 86. 6 (sacrifice). Alexander continued the tradition , for instance at the Granicus river and at Issus (Arr. *An.* 1. 16. 5; 2. 12. 1). The excavation was reported by Soteriades in *AM* 30 (1905) 113 f.; Paus. 9. 40. 10; cf. Strabo 414. For the refrain Plu. *Demosth.* 20. 3. The identification of those buried under the Lion Monument has been controversial. In *Studies* 553-7 I followed the views of Beloch and others, but since then I have changed to my present opinion, persuaded mainly by M. Andronikos in *BCH* 94 (1970) 91 ff. on the sarissa-heads in the Polyandrion.

7. On my interpretation Diodorus in chapters 84-88. 2 was following the narrative of Diyllus (Hammond, *Sources D* 83 f.); but either he or Diyllus took the story of Demades from a different writer, probably Satyrus. Justin obtained his material via Trogus from Theopompus, who was more interested in the astuteness of Philip in diplomacy (Hammond, *Sources J* 500 and 503) but did not misrepresent the facts in writing for contemporaries.

8. Just. 9. 4. 6-8, based on the account of Theopompus (see last note); Paus. 4. 27. 10, 9. 1. 8 and 9. 37. 8; 1. 34. 1 (Oropus); 9. 1. 8 and Diod. 16. 87. 3 (garrison). Thespiae and Tanagra but not Thebes were represented on the board of *naopoioi* in autumn 338.

9. Diod. 16. 87. 3; Hyperides fr. 80 (Teubner); Plb. 5. 10. 4-5; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62. 2.

10. Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 4 and Plb. 5. 10. 1-3 (*philanthropia*); Diod. 16. 87. 3 and Just. 9. 4. 5 (pacem amicitiamque); [D.] 17. 26 with *HM* 3. 578 fin.

11. Tod, *GHI* 2. 178 (Acarnanians). Strabo 427 *katespasan* should be interpreted as at 646, where Smyrna was so divided into villages (*komedon*). Syll.[3] 230 of spring 337 (Phocis).

12. Aelian *VH* 6. 1 for general submission in the Peloponnese. Plu. *Aratus* 23. 4 (Corinth); Plb. 18. 14. 6.

13. Plb. 9. 28. 6-7 and 33. 9-12; Paus. 3. 24. 6; 5. 4. 9 (Elis); 7. 10. 3 and Plu. *Mor.* 235 b (Sparta). For the disputed territories see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius 2* (Oxford, 1967) 172 f. Arist. fr. 611 (Rose). In general see Roebuck 73-92.

14. Plu. *Mor.* 177 d; Plato, *Laws* 625 e – 626 a, writing of the city-states in Crete, which was a microcosm of the Greek world; X. *Poroi* 5. 2 f.; Isoc. *Letter* 3.

15. See Hammond, *Sources J* 500 and 503. This identification gives Justin's account an importance which has not been appreciated by writers on the subject. My account rests on the arguments I deployed in *HM* 3. 571-9. Ryder 150-62 and Griffith in *HM* 2. 623-466 give reviews of the literature on the subject and hold different views in some respects from mine.

16. Justin translated *polis* as 'civitas'. He was extraordinarily concise in this passage. Since I take 'pacis legem' to look forward to the plan of the Common Peace and its Council, the words 'pro meritis singularum civitatum' should also look forward and explain the composition of the Council.

17. Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 4-5. The passage is important in showing that the plan was presented to Athens for consideration, and not as a foregone conclusion.

18. Tod, *GHI* 177, lines 22, 15 and 24.

19. [D.] 17. 2 and 4; Plb. 9. 33. 12, the Council acting as a 'common court [recruited] from all the Greeks'. See discussion by Roebuck 91 f.

20. The past tense *omnyon* shows that the oaths had been taken at an earlier meeting. [D.] 17. 10, citing this clause, used the aorist tense *omnysan*. For a different view, not backed by any argument, see Ryder 152 n. 3.

21. Athens, for instance, sent triremes only, and not the cavalry of Plu. *Phoc.* 16. 5.

22. *POxy* 12 (*FGrH* 255) 5 had *to koinon ton Hellenon* elect Philip to command in the war against Persia. Arr. *An.* 3. 24. 4 used this expression in saying that Sinope was not a member-state. For the meaning of *to koinon* see my article in *Illinois Classical Studies* 16 (1991) 183-92. For the supposition that what Philip created was 'a league' see for instance Brunt *L* 1. xlviii f.

23. Andoc. 3. 17-19 used the terminology of the Common Peace (see Ryder 33). The Peace of 366 was described as such by Diod. 15. 76. 3, whose source was Ephorus.

24. Tod, *GHI* 145. This inscription provides most of what we know about this Common Peace; see Ryder 140-4.

25. Isoc. 4. 50 on culture, and X. *Poroi* 5. 3-4 on commerce.

XVI. The last year and the assassination of Philip

1. The quotations are from D. 14. 3 and 6, and 14. 12.

2. See *HG* 667 for references and Hammond, *Sources D* 87, where Ephorus XXVI was proposed as the source of Diodorus' Persian narrative; if that is so, his figures are likely to be correct.

3. D. 14. 9 (bases); Diod. 16. 22. 2.

4. The account in Diod. 17. 5. 3 – 6. 2 was derived probably from Diyllus, *Syntaxis* II (*THA* 30-3); it was known to Plu. *Mor.* 337 E and to Aelian *VH* 6. 8. Alexander in his letter to Darius accused him of killing Arses with the help of Bagoas (Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 5). On the other hand, Justin 10. 3. 1-5, though abbreviating Trogus drastically as we see from Trogus, *Prologue* 10, preserved a different version in which Darius was elected by the people without any mention of Bagoas. It is

possible that Trogus took his version from Deinon, *Persica* (*THA* 93). W. W. Tarn in *CAH* 6 (1927) 23 f. accepted the poisonings by Bagoas without demur.

5. The date is obtained from the time of Darius' death in June/July 330 (see Grzybek 44) and the length of his reign as most probably six years and two months (see Bosworth *C* 347). When Darius claimed in his letter to Alexander (Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 2) that Philip had wronged Arses, he referred no doubt to the invasion in spring 336.

6. As Alexander claimed in his letter to Darius (Arr. *An.* 2. 14. 4-5). For the genuineness of the letter see Hammond, *Sources A* 222.

7. The term was used of a single general (Athens usually appointed two or more from a board of ten annually elected generals) who had the authority to appoint his own subordinate commanders. Philip's overall command of the joint forces was also mentioned as 'the whole hegemony' (Diod. 16. 91. 6).

8. For a short account see *HG* 454-6.

9. The number 10,000, which was given for a single action by Polyaenus 5. 44. 4, is a minimum; for there must have been supporting troops on the line of communication. Diod. 16. 91. 2; Just. 9. 5. 8. Parmenio was Philip's senior general (Plu. *Mor.* 177 C). Attalus' influential position was due to his command evidently of the Macedonian infantrymen (Diod. 16. 93. 8-9). Amyntas may have been the son of Arrhabaeus (cf. Arr. *An.* 1. 14. 1). The fleet was mentioned by Trogus, *Prologue* 9, 'praemissa classe cum ducibus'. Since some Greek states will have provided most of this fleet, it is to be expected that other states contributed some infantry to the advance-force. R.D. Milns in *JHS* 86 (1966) 167 made the inference from Diod. 17. 7. 10, which mentioned a force of 'Macedonians and mercenaries' near Pitane in 335/4, that the advance-force consisted of only such infantrymen; but the inference is not valid since the action was a single one in the Troad. For the war of liberation and revenge Philip had every reason to include troops of the Greek Community from the outset.

10. Just. 9. 6. 1 had the contingents assembling at the time of the wedding.

11. Tod, *GHI* 191, line 5 (Eresus); 192 (Chios); *SIG* 284 (Erythrae); Arr. *An.* 1. 17. 11 (Ephesus). The compliments were paid to Philip presumably when he was on the throne.

12. I differ from Badian 2. 41 and Cawkwell 177, who thought of the northern Magnesia.

13. Polyaen. 5. 44. 4. Diod. 17. 2. 5 placed the despatch of Hecataeus after the funeral of Philip and before Alexander moved into Thessaly. Badian 2. 41 placed the operation at Magnesia apparently in summer 335 and the death of Attalus 'say in the autumn of 335'; but a full year does not suit the order of late 336 to act 'as quickly as possible'. Diodorus was probably drawing on Diyllus, *Syntaxis* III (*THA* 30 and 32).

14. Brief accounts of the campaign are given by Badian 2. 40, Cawkwell 177, Ellis 221 and Griffith 680 and 691. After the death of Attalus Calas joined Parmenio, and the operations at Gryneum, Pitane and C. Rhoetium happened in 335/4 (Diod. 17. 7. 3-10).

15. Diod. 17. 7. 1; Plu. *Demosth.* 20. 3-4. For the meaning of the expression 'to turn the war back on Macedonia' see Arr. *An.* 2. 1. 1. Such contact would provide a background to the intrigues of Attalus and Demosthenes shortly after the death of Philip.

16. Polyaen. 5. 44. 5 (Cyzicus): Arr. *An.* 2. 1. 4 (Mitylene); Curt. 4. 8. 11 (Methymna). See further *AG* 254. The subject is controversial; see for instance Bosworth *C* 178-80 with references.

17. Tod, *GHI* 192, lines 11 and 14 f. (Chios); Arr. *An.* 3. 2. 7 with *AG* 129; Arr.

An. 2. 2. 2-3 (Tenedos). It was natural for some islanders like those of Tenedos on the corn-route from the Black Sea to feel loyalty to 'The Greek Community' (Arr. *An.* 3. 24. 4 *to koinon ton Hellenon*), described in action as 'Alexander and the Greeks'.

18. The earliest examples of this description, 'Philip (or Alexander) and the Greeks', are in the dedication of spoils at Athens in 334 (Arr. *An.* 1. 16. 7 and Plu. *Alex.* 16. 18) and in Tod, *GHI* 191, lines 6-7 at Eresus.

19. Diod. 16. 91. 2-4 and 92. 3-4. The source of these passages was on my interpretation Diyllus (Hammond, *Sources D* 84 and 90). The oracular response was similarly explained by Pausanias (8. 7. 6). These passages are much more indicative of Philip's intentions than the readiness of Parmenio to accept Asia west of the Euphrates (Arr. *An.* 2. 25. 2); for there is no reason to suppose that Philip in 336 and Parmenio in 332 were necessarily of the same mind.

20. Diod. 16. 93. 6, where the battle was by implication shortly before the archon-year 336/5. Theopompus, *Philippica* (*FGrH* 115) Book 2, F 40; he was cited for the Adriatic area and the northwest zone by Strabo 317 and 324, and by Athenaeus 271 E and 443 A-C. The Autariatae raided and migrated far and wide (Str. 317-18; Just. 15. 2. 1). Agrianians (Arr. *An.* 1. 5. 1-4). For this paragraph see Hammond, *KI* 245 and 249. Many errors have been made in interpreting the evidence. For instance, Pleurias has been equated with Pleuratus, the battle of Diod. 16. 93. 6 has been shifted from near the archon-year 336/5 to join the campaign of Diod. 16. 69. 7 in the archon-year 344/3, the assassin Pausanias has been thought to be avenging in 336 a death which had occurred in 344/3. The Autariatae are wrongly placed by Bosworth *C* 66 'in the vicinity of the Niš and Morava rivers', while his map on p. 53 showed them south of the former in the area of Presevo.

21. Leonnatus and Perdiccas (Diod. 16. 94. 4); Cynna and Amyntas (Satyrus, *FHG* 3. 161 F 5). Marsyas Macedon (*FGrH* 135/6) F 20 = Plu. *Demosth.* 18. 2 named 'Amyntas' first in his list of Philip's envoys to Thebes in 339, when Philip was at Elatea. For so important a mission a royal leader was appropriate; moreover, Amyntas had contacts in Boeotia at Lebadea and before 338 at Oropus (Tod, *GHI* 164 A with Griffith 704 n. 5).

22. Satyrus in Athenae. 557 D and Didym. *in D.* 12. 65 ff. for Hippostratus' death. For Parmenio see Curt. 6. 9. 18. For the love-passion of Plu. *Alex.* 9. 6 and Athenae. 557 D overcoming reason see Soph. *Antig.* 791 f.

23. The accounts are in Just. 9. 5. 9 and 9. 7. 1-8, Plu. *Alex.* 9. 5-14 and 10. 6-8, and Athenae. 557 D-E and 560 C. My arguments that they have come from a common source, namely the account of Satyrus, are in *AG* 36 f., *THA* 86-90, *Sources J* 500 and 502 f., and *Sources A* 6-11. It should be noted that I attributed to Cleitarchus the passage in Just. 9. 5. 9 and 11. 11. 3-5 in which Philip accused Olympias of sexual depravity and she confessed that Alexander was the result of her copulation with a giant snake.

24. The story was accepted as historical fact by Badian 1. 244 ff.; J.R. Hamilton in *Greece and Rome* 12 (1965) 120 ff.; Bosworth in *CQ* 21 (1971) 101 ff.; Cawkwell 178; and Griffith 676-81. Proper scepticism was expressed by Ellis 211-16, but he did not analyse the sources of the accounts.

25. Of the two authors Ptolemy is the more probable, as he was himself one of the exiles. To think him mistaken in relating the exiling to the marriage is surely wrong; yet Bosworth *C* 282 did so in moving the exiling to the affair of Pixodarus, which Plutarch alone narrated. The effect of Olympias' tears was nicely expressed on another occasion in Plu. *Alex.* 39. 13.

26. For the tomb see Andronikos *Painting* 375 ff. and *Ergon* 1987. 46 ff., and

my article in *BSA* 86 (1991) 70 f. The name 'Eurydice' is given of the wife in Arr. *An.* 3. 6. 5. For the standing of the Queen Mother see Hammond, *MS* 32.

27. Strabo 656-7 and Arrian *An.* 1. 23. 1 and 7-8 gave accounts of this dynasty; see Bosworth *C* 153 for an inscription mentioning Pixodarus as Satrap which he dated to 337/6.

28. In H-L *Philip* 168 and *AG* 37; Hatzopoulos in B and B 5 ff. The story was accepted as historical by A.R. Burn in *Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Empire* (London, 1947) as 'a pretty kettle of fish', V. French and P. Dixon in *The Ancient World* 13 (1986) 72-86, and cautiously by Bosworth *CE* 21 f. See my arguments in *Sources A* 15 f.

29. See *THA* 89 f. The story probably originated in the deadly quarrel between Olympias and Cassander and its aftermath, when both sides issued propaganda.

30. Just. 9. 7. 8-11; see *THA* 89 f. and 113.

31. Arist. *Pol.* 1311b2-4.

32. *Sources D* 84 and 89 f. and especially Hammond *VG* 407-13, where I discussed the different views held by Berve, Bosworth in *CQ* 21 (1971) 93 ff. and *CE* 22 f. and 25 f.

33. For the festival see Arr. *An.* 1. 11. 1. At the time the allied contingents were gathering (Just. 9. 6. 1, dum auxilia a Graecia coeunt).

XVII. Epitaph and appreciation

1. Diodorus was drawing on Diyllus, *Syntaxis* II on my interpretation, as he had done for the detailed description of the assassination (*THA* 28 f. and 32-5).

2. *POxy* 1798. 1. 6 f. = *FGrH* 148. For my restorations see Hammond *PhT* 343 f. with references.

3. I restored the diviner (*mantin*) because the only letters here were an uncertain iota and then the nu. If an omicron were to be read instead of the iota, I should restore *ton de nekron*, 'the corpse' being that of Pausanias. This restoration would fit the account of Justin, in which the corpse was put on a cross. For the corpse being on show at the trial see Curt. 6. 8. 26, 'Dymni cadaver infertur'.

4. Arrian's source was Ptolemy or/and Aristobulus in accordance with his statement in the *Preface*. Other examples of acquittal are in the papyrus fragment and in Curt. 7. 2. 7-8. The sons of Aëropus were members of the royal house; see *CQ* 30 (1980) 459.

5. 'The horses' are in two accounts from different sources: that of Diodorus from Diyllus (see n. 1) and that of Justin from Satyrus (Hammond, *Sources J* 503 f.).

6. An officer of the King's Forces on trial had the right to wear uniform and carry arms (Curt. 6. 10. 23).

7. For a spear set upright see Arist. *Poet.* 25. 14 = 1461 a 33, giving the Homeric precedent and adding that it was a current practice in Illyria.

8. The burning of everything connected with the assassin and any accomplices was a traditional form of purification.

9. I discussed and rejected the idea that it was Philip Arrhidaeus in *PhT* 337 f. and again in *BSA* 86 (1991) 79 ff. For those who adhered to the idea see W. L. Adams in *The Ancient World* 3 (1980) 69 ff.; P.W. Lehmann in *AJA* 86 (1982) 437 ff. and *AAA* 14 (1981) 134 ff., E.N. Borza in *Archaeological News* 10 (1981) 73 ff. and 11 (1982) 8 ff., *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 105 ff. and still in his book (1990) 260 ff. I have discussed the points they raised against the identification of Tomb II as that of Philip in *BSA* 86 (1991) 79-82.

10. Andronikos *V* 64. Such offering places have been found beside or on tumuli, e.g. at the Tomb of the Plataeans and at that of the Athenians at Marathon.

11. This red soil was used for the fill of the tumuli in the great cemetery of some 300 tumuli below Aegeae and also in other places.

12. Andronikos' report of this tomb is in *Arch. Eph.* 1987. 363 ff. and in *Ergon* (1987). 46 ff. I gave a summary description in *BSA* 86 (1991) 70 ff.

13. The use of vaulting had been held by some scholars to have become known first during Alexander's campaign in Asia (e.g. R.A. Tomlinson in *Anc. Mac.* 2 (1977) 473 ff., writing before Andronikos found the Tombs at Vergina). I argued against this belief in *PhT* 338 n. 33 (1978). Borza 262 repeated the old belief in 1990.

14. The dissenters (e.g. in n. 9), whose views that Tomb II was that of Arrhidaeus and Eurydice have been summarised by Borza 261 f., have not provided any explanation for the hurried closing of the main chamber and the delay in completing the antechamber.

15. See Andronikos *V* 144. So too Alexander armed himself before the battle of Gaugamela with a helmet and gorget of iron 'like polished silver' (Plu. *Alex.* 32. 9). Borza suggested that the weapons and armour in Tomb II were those of Alexander, inherited by Philip Arrhidaeus and so in his tomb, in *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 105 ff.; but I showed in *Phoenix* 43 (1989) 221 ff. that where comparison can be made the weapons and armour were not those of Alexander. Borza 265 still advanced his view as a *possibility* (his italics).

16. All these offerings are beautifully illustrated and described in Andronikos *V* 134 f.

17. For the Tomb of Eurydice see n. 12 above. The best reproductions of the Royal Hunt are in Andronikos *V* 100 ff. and *Painting*, 369.

18. For the Pages – and evidently they alone usually – accompanying the royal party on a hunt see Arr. *An.* 4. 13. 1 fin.; cf. Curt. 8. 8. 3. The fresco dates the wearing of the *kausia* to the reign of Philip, thus supporting the arguments of E.A. Fredricksmeyer in *TAPA* 116 (1986) 215 ff. against those who held that Alexander's soldiers adopted it in Afghanistan.

19. Borza 258 f. dismissed Andronikos' interpretation, but he did not explain what relevance the fresco might have to the remains of Philip Arrhidaeus, his choice as the occupier of Tomb II (p. 266), when the only occasion on which we know this half-witted king to have wielded a spear was when he tried to strike a defendant during a trial (Plu. *Phoc.* 33. 7). See also 'Les chasseurs de Vergina', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 1991, by B. Tripodi, P. Briant and A.M. Prestianni Giallombardo, who treat the fresco almost *in vacuo* without referring to the interval in age or addressing the problems which arise from a late dating of Tomb II at Vergina – for which see my article *RTV* 79-82.

20. The best illustrations of this are in Andronikos *V* 116 and *Eph. Arch.* 1987. 369. My point seems not to have been proposed.

21. See J. H. Musgrave in *BSA* 85 (1990) 279 ff.

22. See Andronikos *V* 180 ff. and my arguments in *PhT* 336 and in A and B 123 f.

23. Andronikos *V* 189 and my arguments in *BSA* 86 (1991) 77 with n. 45.

24. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Getia* and Hdt. 4. 71. 4 for this practice. For an indication that the queen was cremated on the same pyre as the king see Andronikos *V* 197.

25. Diod. 18. 60. 4 – 61. 2 with sacrifice to Alexander 'as a god', and Plu. *Eum.* 13. 3-4.

26. *Arch. Delt.* 18 (1963) 2. 193 ff. (Derveni); *Eph. Arch.* (1937) 866 ff. (Sedhes).

27. Aelius Aristides, *Symmach.* A (Or. 38) 1 p. 715 D. This support is not noted by Griffith 692 who belittled the value of Aristides by remarking that he wrote '500

years later'; but Aristides took it from someone he considered to be reliable. See Habicht 11 f. for a discussion.

28. See *HM* 2. 192.

29. *Eph. Arch.* 1936 *Chron.* 7, not in the Index of Habicht, op. cit. An unpublished inscription from Philippi may record worship of Philip, perhaps as the founder (Habicht 16 and Walbank in *CAH* 7. 1. 90); but it is not definite enough for my purpose here.

30. See also M.B. Hatzopoulos and L. Loukopoulou, 'Morrylos', *Meletemata* 7 (1989) 47 with n. 5 on a dedication in which 'king Philip' ('à ne pas douter Philippe II') and the Egyptian gods Sarapis and Isis were associated.

31. Diod. 18. 28. 4, his source being Hieronymus, a dependable historian.

32. The statue is well illustrated in the Supplement of the newspaper *Kathemerine* of 28 March 1993, p. 11. See now *EMTh.* 4 (1990) 26-9 and Pl. 4-12.

33. Hammond, *Sources D* 84 and 89. The cursory account of Justin 9. 6. 1-4, which was concerned more with the wedding than the festival, was drawn from Cleitarchus (Hammond, *Sources J* 500 and 404). This procession was clearly a forerunner of the processions in the kingdoms of the Successors with a most lavish display of wealth and of resources, e.g. that of Ptolemy II in Athenae. 5. 201-3.

34. In a fragmentary inscription at Philippi, dated to the period 350-300 BC, Philip's two 'precincts' were associated with the properties of Ares and Poseidon in a somewhat similar manner (*Actes du colloque international d'epigraphie 1986*, Neuchatel (1988) 207). The tradition of 'the thirteenth god' is recorded also by Apsines in *Rhet. Graec.* (Teubner ed.) 1, p. 221, who had Demades propose, and Demosthenes oppose unsuccessfully, the proposal that Philip be declared 'a thirteenth god', and Demosthenes then propose to found a temple (*neos*) to Philip. Similarly Clem. Al. *Protr.* 4. 48 P cited as an extravagant honour the worship of Philip at Cynosarges, established by Athens. For brief discussions see Ellis 307 n. 58 and Griffith 682 f., who both regarded the thirteenth statue as 'a vast compliment paid by himself to himself' and as repugnant to the Macedonians. Fuller discussions are by E.A. Fredricksmeyer in *TAPA* 109 (1979) 39 ff. and in *Studies Edson* 145 ff. and by E. Badian in *Studies Edson* 27 ff. *passim* and 67 ff.

35. Isoc. *Letter* 3. 5; Ael. *VH* 2. 19 and Plu. *Mor.* 219 E (Sparta); Hyper. 1. 30 (Athens).

36. Aeschin. 2. 42 (Ctesiphon); Diod. 16. 89. 2, 91. 6 and 95. 2.

37. Diod. 16. 3. 1-3; Plu. *Mor.* 178 B and 179 C; Diod. 16. 1. 6. Just. 9. 8. 10, 'eloquentia et insignis oratio, acuminis et sollertiae plena'. Isocrates laid much stress on the need for kindliness and humanity in dealing with the city-states (5. 116) and on the reputation of Philip as a man of logical mind and cultural understanding (5. 29).

38. Isoc. 5. 19; Theopompus (*FGrH*) 115) F 224 and F 225. Plb. 18. 14-15; 8. 9-10.

39. Diod. 17. 65. 1 and Curt. 5. 1. 42; see Hammond, *RP* 265-8; Theopomp. F 225 (b) from his Book 49. Plb. 8. 10. 6.

40. Nepos, *Eum.* 1. 5, scribae loco. See *Historia* 37 (1988) 131 ff. for the nature of the Archive.

41. Diod. 16. 3. 3; 55. 2; Theopomp. F 225 (b). For an earlier desertion see Tod, *GHI* 143 and 148.

42. Arr. *An.* 1. 24. 2 and 29. 4 (3,000 'Macedones infantrymen'); Diod. 17. 49. 1 'the young men' (compare Arr. *An.* 7. 12. 4 'the mature men') and 65. 1 (6,000 'Macedones infantrymen'); Arr. *An.* 3. 16. 11. For 324 Arr. *An.* 7. 12. 2; Diod. 17. 110. 3 (*paideia*), drawing on Diyllus (*THA* 73). See Hammond, *RP* 274 and 277 f.

43. Just. 8. 6. 2.

44. Late in the fourth century at Dium (*Anc. Mac.* 2. 341) and a financial subscription by Edessa (*IG* IV 617, line 15; see *HM* 1. 157 and *MS* 386 f).

45. See *MS* 389 ff.

46. Plb. 5. 10. 1-5. Diod. 15. 57. 1 and Aeschin. 2. 105 (Epaminondas).

47. For Diodorus' use of Ephorus see Hammond, *Sources D* 81, 85 and 88. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 282 and Just. 9. 8. 15 (alcohol). Diod. 16. 1. 4 (leadership).

48. Plb. 8. 9. 1 and 11. 1; the whole passage runs from 8. 9. 1 to 8. 11. 8.

49. Plu. *Demosth.* 22. 4; Paus. 1. 8. 6 and 9. 4; Diod. 16. 92. 1-2.

50. For other appreciations see Ellis 232 ff., Griffith's final chapter, significantly entitled 'Decline and Fall', 675-98, and Borza 228-30.

51. Arr. *An.* 1. 17. 11; Tod, *GHI* 191, line 5; Habicht 14 ff. and 245; Griffith 683 with n. 1 and 720.

52. Paus. 5. 20. 10; Griffith 683 n. 2 and 691 ff. The building, which was later called the Philippeum, was remarkable for architectural innovations, impressive even now (see *CAH* 6. 552). The election by the Councillors was reported as unanimous in the speech of Lyciscus (Plb. 9. 33. 7). See also *POxy* 12 (*FGrH* 255) (5).

53. Diod. 16. 91. 4-5.

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